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This thesis explores the significance of political change, law, and rhetoric in 
imaginary cities that feature animals and women as ‘Others.’ It studies dramatic and 
philosophical texts, from Aeschylean tragedy, Aristophanic comedy, and Platonic dialogue in 
ancient Greece to modern works, including Thomas More’s Utopia in 16th-century England 
and the utopias and dystopias of the 20th-century, in order to offer a discourse between the 
ancient and modern world. I demonstrate that each of these texts can be compared on a 
rhetorical and jurisprudential level, which allows us to examine how different characters 
engage with different forms of power in a setting which at least begins by being democratic. 
This enables us to trace the development of this strand of Western political thought over the 
last two thousand years, and to confront intractable political problems that recur throughout 
time. This confrontation helps us understand patterns of legal reforms and rhetoric and 
demonstrates that the concerns of Aristophanes and Plato can also be found in modern 
paradigms. The recourse to the utopian and dystopian fantastic, the seemingly apolitical 
animal world, and the differently organised female sphere, offers new insight into the 
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  INTRODUCTION 
 
	
I. Thomas More’s Utopia  
  
 I begin this thesis by examining the political and juridical problems addressed in 
Thomas More’s Utopia. Although Thompson argues that Utopia is essentially “Morean, for it 
is unique,”1 I have chosen to focus on More’s text because of its versatility: it is Lucianic, 
Vespuccian, and Swiftian in some ways, but it is also Aeschylean, Platonic, Aristotelian, and 
Plutarchan in other ways. More importantly, it is also Aristophanic – as I will demonstrate 
below, More’s satirical approach to solving political and legal problems in Utopia recalls that 
of Aristophanes, who frequently toys with Athens and its institutions with comic verve only 
to restore them in one way or another at the end of the play. A comparable approach, though 
less comic, can also be found in many Platonic dialogues, for example in the Gorgias, the 
Protagoras, and the Statesman – three dialogues which systematically interrogate the 
vacillating human activity of law-making and polity-planning. Furthermore, Utopia is rich in 
political and legal imagery, which reflects that of both ancient Greece and Rome, from 
Aeschylus to Aristotle to Cicero, and eventually Plutarch and Lucian – it thus expresses part 
of the Greek and Roman legacy to western culture and literature.2  
 This is why I disagree with Thompson, because while Utopia is definitely ‘Morean’ 
(More is the author, after all), there is also a literary connection between his text and others, 
which should not be ignored. Especially, the array of classical references in Utopia echoes 
Lucian’s presentation of Verae Historiae “as an ainigma, a riddle or a series of veiled 
																																								 																				
1 Thompson 1974: xlix. 
2 Cf. Brock 2013: xi. 
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references which hint at something else.”3 By presenting it that way, Ní Mheallaigh writes, 
“Lucian invites the reader [and More does the same] to interpret every detail in it as a sign 
which points towards other texts. In this way, the fictional travel-narrative offers, for the 
scholarly reader…an intellectual journey through the literature of the past.”4 Additionally, 
More’s text recalls the notion found in Lucian’s A teacher of rhetoric 9, namely that in order 
“to achieve true culture, the scholar must emulate classical authors literally by following in 
their footsteps.”5 By presenting works full of classical imagery, both Lucian and More remind 
the reader, “in a surreally literal way, that they are following in the footsteps of the literary 
giants of the past.”6  
 Like Greek and Roman political and legal imagery, which “is largely drawn from 
experience,”7 the imagery in Utopia echoes that of the past and the present. For example, 
More’s use of the ship of state metaphor recalls that of Aeschylus and Plato, and the allusions 
to the working class who suffer from the restraints the absolute monarch puts on them brings 
to mind problems of More’s own time. Furthermore, like Aristophanes, who enriches this 
imagery with intertextual allusions in order to make a particular point about Athenian 
politicians, orators, or the demos, More includes similar references in order to scrutinise the 
political and legal issues he experiences in sixteenth-century England.  
 At the same time, while certainly influenced by ancient sources, I argue that the 
political and juridical problems interrogated in Utopia, as well as the (satirical) answers 
offered to solve them, can be readily compared with modern political thought and 
																																								 																				
3 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 207. Cf. Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 116.  
4 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 207-8. 
5 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 209. 
6 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 210. Cf. Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 174. See VH 1.2, ‘my readers will be 
attracted not only by the novelty of the subject…but also by the humorous allusions in every 
part of my story to various poets, historians, and philosophers of former times…’ 
7 Brock 2013: xii. 
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jurisprudence in turn. This becomes especially clear when examining the utopian and 
dystopian writings of H.G. Wells,8 George Orwell,9 and Charlotte Perkins Gilman.10 As I will 
																																								 																				
8 H.G. Wells did not receive the same classical training as Orwell later would but he was 
nonetheless well read. Sherborne 2010: 175, notes: “Wells champions both large-scale 
readings of history such as his old favourite, Carlyle’s French Revolution, and explications of 
social values in the forms of Utopias such as those of Plato and More.” Indeed, “while 
scholars regarded Plato’s philosophy as speculative and theoretical, for Wells it was virtually 
a manifesto,” mainly because of Plato’s idea of what a just society would look like. “It would 
still be a class society, but exceptionally gifted children from the lower class would be 
secretly admitted to…the Guardians. The appeal to Wells [who grew up in poverty] of this 
meritorious notion is obvious.” (Sherborne 2010: 50).  
 Furthermore, “one consequence of Wells’ constant engagement with the writings of 
his contemporaries, and his conscientious reading of classics, is that his own fiction is 
informed by a strong sense of kinship to and dissent from other authors. His work is highly 
‘intertextual’, imitating and parodying other books, as well as making explicit references to 
them.” (Sherborne 2010: 101). For example, The Time Machine refers to lost ancient 
civilizations, such as those of the Greeks and the Phoenicians; it alludes to Oedipus 
encountering the riddle of the Sphinx; and it incorporates references to the Golden Age in 
general. The Island of Doctor Moreau meanwhile alludes, among others, “to a range of 
sources including Swift, Kipling, Shakespeare, Mary Shelley, Darwin and the Bible.” 
(Sherborne 2010: 101). This is a significant piece of information for the comparative literary 
approach that underpins this thesis. 
9 Orwell was educated at St. Cyprian’s and Eton and thus deeply immersed in the classical 
tradition. As he writes in As I Please in 1944: “…I am old enough to have been educated at a 
time when Latin and Greek were only escapable with great difficulty, while ‘English’ was 
hardly regarded as a school subject at all.” However, even though he “disparaged classics as a 
snobbish and useless relic of a more benighted age,” it is clear that he is influenced by it. 
(Burton 2005: 53). Especially, Aristophanes seems to influence Orwell, and he praises him for 
his ‘brutality and coarseness.’ Specifically, in Funny, but not Vulgar, he asserts, “that you 
cannot be memorably funny without at some point raising topics which the rich, the powerful 
and the complacent would prefer to see left alone.” This becomes especially clear “if one 
draws in the English humourists of earlier ages – for instance, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Swift 
and the picaresque novelists, Smollett, Fielding and Sterne.” It becomes even clearer, Orwell 
asserts, “if one considers foreign writers, both ancient and modern – for example, 
Aristophanes, Voltaire, Rabelais, Boccaccio and Cervantes.” He says: 
 
 All of these writers are remarkable for their brutality and coarseness. People are 
 tossed in blankets, they fall through   cucumber frames, they are hidden in  washing
 baskets, [and] and they rob, lie, swindle, and are caught out in every conceivable 
 humiliating situation. And all great humorous writers show a willingness to attack the 
 beliefs and the virtues on which society necessarily rests. 
 
A year later, Orwell refers to Aristophanes in Why I Write and, recounting his school days, 
remarks: “Apart from school work, I wrote vers d’occasion, semi-comic poems which I could 
turn out at what now seems to me astonishing speed—at fourteen I wrote a whole rhyming 
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demonstrate in this thesis, these texts share a connective way of thinking and I illuminate this 
by transporting themes from the ancient Greek authors mentioned earlier (specifically, 
Aristophanes and Plato) to modern literature, using Thomas More as the starting point. 
Specifically, I argue that, looking at the ways in which these texts can be analysed through a 
comparative reading, especially on a rhetorical and juridical level, allows us to examine how 
different characters respond to, and engage with, different forms of power in a setting which 
at least begins by being democratic.  
 I wish to address explicitly that the methodological approach that supports this entire 
thesis and my reading of the texts from different periods, is a comparative literary approach 
with historical underpinnings. This is not an analysis dealing with historical receptions of one 
text within another, but a comparative study that connects texts across time and space to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
play, in imitation of Aristophanes, in about a week...” This is notable praise from someone 
who, two years prior, had gleefully noted, “Classical education is going down the drain at 
last…” In addition to admiring the humour of Aristophanes, “Orwell also had a taste for the 
dialogues of Plato. Contemporaries at Eton were struck by [his] Socratic style of 
argumentation.” (Burton 2005: 70). There are also several references to classical authors in 
his novels: he mentions various Greeks, Romans, and ancient civilizations in Coming Up for 
Air (such as Horace, the Mycenaeans, and the Phoenicians), refers to Aristophanes again in 
Down and Out in Paris and London, and the society depicted in 1984 bears certain 
hierarchical features, which recall those of the Republic. Despite Orwell’s disdain for the 
classics, it is clear that there are similar ideas in their works and his; and this is important 
information for the comparative analysis presented in this thesis. 
10 In regards to Gilman’s knowledge of classics and ancient history, “she enrolled for three 
years in the early 1880s in the Society to Encourage Studies at Home [a distance learning 
programme]” where [she] studied ancient history, the ancient Hebrews, and Egypt.” (Davis 
2010: 58-9). In her autobiography, The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, she compares 
herself to Socrates, because “[I] worked for various reforms, as Socrates went to war when 
Athens needed his services, but we do not remember him as a soldier. My business was to 
find out what ailed society, and how most easily and naturally to improve it.” (Gilman 1935: 
182). She also mentions him when she talks about her mother who refused “all manner of 
invitations for [her]… [but she] found it saved emotion to ‘fight fire with fire’…and, 
strengthened by Emerson, Socrates, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, [she] became a genuine 
stoic.” (Gilman 1935: 51). Moreover, she recognises the Tuscans, the Greeks, the Etruscans, 
and the Vandals when quoting from a newspaper article, which ridicules and criticizes girls 
going to college. (Gilman 1935: 62). Furthermore, her novel Herland can be compared to 
Herodotus and several versions of the Amazon myth, which continues to show that there are 
similar ideas in her writings and Greek and Roman literature. 
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provide a trans-chronological exploration of the history of legal and political thought. The 
original contribution to knowledge my research has to make is, in my view, a comparative 
literary analysis that makes a case for the importance of studies of literature in the longue 
durée for enhancing our understanding of legal reforms, political thought and discourse 
between the ancient and modern world. It enables us to confront intractable political and 
juridical problems that consistently recur throughout time. 
 The choice of texts used for this undertaking stems from both interests of originality 
and pragmatic concerns for scope and word-capacity. It may be rather provocative to some 
readers that several obvious and influential sources of ancient utopian thought have been left 
out, such as Euhemerus who claims to have travelled to the legendary island of Panchaea, 
somewhere in the Ocean off Arabia, Iambulus who ‘wrote a long account of the wonders of 
the great ocean,’11 or Zeno and his idea of the perfect community. Likewise, while I mention 
several aspects of Plato’s Rep. and Laws, I do not give them their own sections in this thesis. 
This is due to reasons related to the intended originality and theme of this project, as much ink 
indeed has been spilled on the Rep. and its influence on utopian thought from antiquity (and 
its resemblance to Aristophanes’ Eccl.). I would really like to lay that debate on one side and 
concentrate instead on more animated and satirical philosophic drama, because it fits in with 
the serio-comic tune of this thesis. 
 I do not discuss Lucian much even though he is, as is very well known, much more 
important for More than Aristophanes (cf. pp. 9-14). The requirement to adhere to a specific 
word-limit is one of the reasons: if I had unlimited space at my disposal, I would consider 
generously several of Lucian’s works, and not only VH which would be the first obvious 
choice, but also Prometheus (and its sophistic imagery), Tyrannicide (and the implications of 
																																								 																				
11 VH 1.3. 
	 6	
the court case) or Menippus (and the satiric degree voted for by souls in the underworld) to 
name just a few. Yet, I have chosen to discuss Aristophanes in detail instead, both because of 
interests in original contribution and because I think it is fruitful to consider how More and 
Aristophanes match. 
 Utopia, as acknowledged above, is riddled with references to both authors from the 
past and topical allusions to the world of the audience. It is no secret that More’s interplay of 
the imaginative world of the characters with the real world of the audience echoes that of 
Lucian in VH. However, it is also no secret that these metafictional and topical games go back 
much further than Lucian since they are also one of the backbones of Old Comedy, a fact 
Lucian himself recognises.12 Thus, Lucian himself addresses Aristophanes’ important position 
in the realm of authors who aligned themselves with the imaginative and metafictional genre. 
This is why, I think, it is worth considering the similar ideas in Aristophanes and More, 
because while Lucian may have influenced More in many important respects, Aristophanes’ 
fantastic voyages on the theatrical stage and allusions to contemporary Athens were a vital 
source for Lucian’s metafictional consciousness. He exploits the strategies of Aristophanes 
for his own literary pursuits, and shows a profound understanding of the subtleties of satire 
and nuances of Old Comedy, as he places his writings within an Old Comic tradition. 
 It thus seems to me that Aristophanes can convincingly be used as one of the main 
authors in this thesis, because going back to one of the earlier genres of satire enriches not 
only our literary understanding of Utopia, but also the comparative literary approach that 
																																								 																				
12 See, for example, Double Indictment, 33 and Against the Uneducated Book-collector 27. 
See also Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 174, Slater 2016: 15-18, and Rosen 2016, esp. 143-4 and 153-7. 
For a useful appendix listing Aristophanes and other fifth-century comic playwrights 
mentioned in Lucian, see Sidwell 2000: 151-2. 
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underpins my reading of these texts from different periods and their sophisticated principles 
of combining great wisdom with delightful entertainment.13 
 As a final justification of my methodological approach, I would like to draw attention 
to the present, because it is clear that in the current world we live, the powers and limitations 
of speech, and questionable political and juridical practices, are under ever increasing 
scrutiny. A critical analysis of how the rhetorical games and (satirical) legal reforms seen in 
ancient Greek comedy and philosophical treatises can be compared with elements of modern 
political thought and jurisprudence—and connecting them with the righteous mockery and 
verbal dexterity seen in More in the process—is therefore very timely and seems to me to be 
worth pursuing. 
 In my critical approach I also bear in mind that the rebellious mood of the present, and 
the feeling that revolution is in the air once again, is matched with opportune anniversaries of 
upheavals and social commentaries in the past. Specifically, 2016 – a year full of political 
turmoil that clearly showed that the concerns of Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, More and their 
descendants can also be found in modern paradigms – marked the 500th anniversary of More’s 
Utopia and the 150th anniversary of Wells’ birthday. 2017, meanwhile, marks the 500th 
anniversary of the start of the Protestant Reformation, the 350th anniversary of Swift’s 
birthday, the 150th anniversary of the publication of Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, the centennial 
of the Russian Revolution, and the 50th anniversary of Che Guevara’s death. It is not hard to 
																																								 																				
13 This is, perhaps, further accentuated by the fact that Aristophanes, too, can be found in the 
library of the Utopians: ‘among the poets they have Aristophanes, Homer and Euripides, 
together with Sophocles in the small typeface of the Aldine edition’ (Utopia, 80). Aldus 
Manutius published the first printed edition of Aristophanes (with exception of Lys. and 
Thesm.) in 1498, only a few years before Utopia was published. The inclusion of the editio 
princeps of Aristophanes shows further that Utopia points towards many other texts, as it 
portrays its literary (and satiric) heritage not just by following in the footsteps of Lucian and 
other later writers, but also in those of some of the greatest poets of 5th-century Greece. 
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find parallels between the political upheavals presented in Aristophanes and More, and the 
rebellious temperament of our time, which these anniversaries only accentuate. 
The discussion below, which focuses on both the serio-comic legal structure of the 
Utopian society and the role rhetoric and juridical concerns play in the rationale for setting it 
up that way, paves the way towards the dialogue presented in this thesis. As is so often the 
case, it is worth looking at this through the lens of the ‘Other.’ It is clear that More utilises a 
(satirical) humanist approach and looks at the topic through the lens of the victims of tyranny 
and unjust applications of the law. Aristophanes, meanwhile, often turns to animals and 
female characters in times of crisis and at moments of foundation and revolution. This is also 
true for utopian and dystopian writers of the twentieth-century. Especially, as I demonstrate in 
this dissertation, it is the pairing of the ‘Other’ with a (satirical) travel theme, or recourse to 
another world, which can be witnessed in More and Swift (who express ideas similar to those 
of Aristophanes, Lucian, and Herodotus), that is also present in the writings of Wells, Orwell, 
and Gilman.  
Additionally, the mixture of realism with fantasy, the wise with the foolish, and the 
tragic with the ridiculous, is the literary style which informs both the ancient and the modern 
texts. It shapes not only the comedies of Aristophanes and the philosophical thought 
experiments of Socrates, but also the tales of Utopia and Gulliver’s Travels, as well as the 
utopian and dystopian fantasies found in writings of the twentieth-century, such as The Time 







II. The serio-comic nature of Utopia 
 
In 1506, Thomas More sent a letter to Thomas Ruthall in which he praised Lucian’s 
ability to “[reprimand and censure], with very honest and at the same time very entertaining 
wit, our human frailties.”14 It is clear that More is influenced by Lucian’s technique in 
refraining “from the arrogant pronouncements of the philosophers as well as from the wanton 
wiles of the poets,”15 when writing Utopia. Indeed, like Lucian in Verae Historiae, More 
presents an entertaining travelogue, which satirically reflects on the political and legal 
problems of his time. There is a reference to Lucian in Utopia which underlines this further 
because the Utopians are, according to Raphael Hythloday “delighted with the witty 
persiflage of Lucian.”16 Certainly, it is not only the Utopians who are delighted by the 
writings of Lucian but More himself is too, which becomes especially clear when looking at 
the satirical and adventurous aspects of his narrative style.17  
More importantly, as already suggested above, More appears to endorse Lucian’s method 
of presenting “dramatically, through dialogue, what he wants us to see and to think about. He 
praises, because he values, this literary mode of moral teaching, a mode utilizing satire and 
irony but not malevolence.”18 Logan asserts likewise:19   
																																								 																				
14 Thompson 1974: 3. Cf. VH 1.1-2. Lucian, in turn, praises Eupolis and Aristophanes, who 
are “formidable men for attacking what’s grand and laughing at what’s right.” (δεινοὺς 
ἄνδρας ἐπικερτοµῆσαι τὰ σεµνὰ καὶ χλευάσαι τὰ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντα). Double Indictment 33.  
15 Thompson 1974: 3. 
16 Utopia, 80. 
17 Lucian in turn seems to have written VH “in imitation of other notoriously mendacious 
travel-narratives, such as the works of Herodotus, Ctesias, Iambulus and the tales of Homer’s 
Odysseus whom he identifies as the ‘pioneer and teacher of such nonsense’ (VH 1.3).” Ní 
Mheallaigh 2014: 207. Cf. Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 211-2. 
18 Thompson 1974: xlii-xliii. Cf. Carroll 1996: 251. “Encomium moriae and Utopia both 
reflect [Erasmus’ and More’s] Lucianic inspiration by enlightening readers about the need for 
moral and political reform.” Furthermore, despite the controversy that surrounds Polybius’ 
ambitions as a moral historian (he has been dismissed as “Machiavellian – that is, as someone 
who rendered judgment on human conduct by employing the utterly practical and even amoral 
standard of success or failure”), he has also been presented as someone who aims “at both the 
	 10	
In the view of More and Erasmus [a contemporary of More with whom he translated 
many of Lucian’s writings]…Lucian was a satirist of devastating effectiveness whose 
targets richly deserved striking, and his works provided (as also for Rabelais and 
Swift) invaluable models for pungent and wide-ranging social criticism. 
 
The reference to Jonathan Swift is important because it continues to show that Utopia, much 
like Lucian’s Verae Historiae, Amerigo Vespucci’s New World and The First Four Voyages 
of Amerigo Vespucci, and indeed Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, belongs to the literature of 
(satirical) exploration.20  Especially, the descriptions of foreign customs, paired with a sense 
of humour and enticing narrative art that can be found in Utopia, suggest, as Swift also says 
of Gulliver’s travel writing, “an air of truth apparent through the whole.”21 “These,” as 
Thompson asserts, “are qualities present also in Lucian’s sketches and tales, and could have 
taught More some of the techniques and strategems he uses so aptly in Utopia.”22 Dorsch 
argues similarly: “Swift reproduced much of the method and spirit of The True History, and 
of the spirit at least of the Menippus, in Gulliver’s Travels; and these…are the method and the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
practical but also the moral instruction of his readers.” Eckstein 1995: 1 and 19. For instance, 
at 39.6, Polybius praises the Roman general Mummius for his conduct, which had been 
moderate and unsullied even though he had great opportunities and power in Greece. See also 
Walbank 1956-1979. 
19 Logan 2016: xxiii. 
20 Cf. Sylvester 1968: 275. The link to Vespucci (and Swift) is also evident in More’s 
presentation of Hythloday who “being eager to see the world…left to his brothers the 
patrimony to which he was entitled at home…and joined Amerigo Vespucci. He was 
Vespucci’s constant companion on the last three of his four voyages, accounts of which are 
now common reading everywhere, but on the last voyage did not return home with 
him…After Vespucci’s departure he travelled through many countries with five companions 
from the garrison.” Utopia, 10. One of those countries was Utopia and after spending some 
time there, Hythloday returns home to Antwerp to tell his friends about the remarkable things 
he encountered on the island. See also Traugott, who notes, “More’s Utopia appeared only a 
decade after Americus’s Four Voyages. Plato, Ulysses, Americus, Hythloday – they were all 
one to More.” Traugott 1961: 554. 
21 Gulliver’s Travels, 5. 
22 Thompson 1974: xlix. 
	 11	
spirit also of Book II of More’s Utopia.”23 This is also evident when looking at the opening 
pages of the second book: much like some of the beginnings seen in Lucian and Swift, they 
begin with a detailed description of the topographical features of the faraway island that is 
Utopia. In this way, it is clear that, like Lucian’s Isle of the Blest and Swift’s society of the 
Houyhnhnms, Utopia is isolated and set apart from the known world, which continues to 
underline its fantastic and exploratory aspects. 
 In this way, Utopia can thus be characterised as Lucianic, and, anachronistically, as 
Swiftian as well. However, it is important to note that it is also Platonic and Aristotelian and, 
more importantly, Plutarchan in other ways. Indeed, many features of More’s approach bring 
to mind those seen in the writings of classical political thought. This, then, places him among 
those works as well and not exclusively among satire and travel-writing. In the most recent 
edition of Utopia, Logan states:24 
 
The first part of [More’s] book’s title – ‘On the Best State of a Commonwealth’ – 
serves to identify it as belonging to the most celebrated species of classical political 
writing: a tradition of works, inaugurated by Plato’s Republic and Laws and continued 
in one segment of Aristotle’s Politics (and subsequently in many other works), that 
embody their authors’ views on the form and rationale of the best conceivable polity. 
 
It is clear that Logan situates Utopia within other political exercises, seen especially in Greek 
texts, on how to create the best commonwealth. He asserts that More takes many of the 
political, legal, and social arrangements of Utopia from Platonic dialogues, Aristotelian 
treatises, and also “from idealised accounts of historical polities and their lawgivers by such 
																																								 																				
23 Dorsch 1966-7: 349. See Traugott 1961: 536, who writes, “…both Utopia and Gulliver’s 
Travels are discoveries of the moral and spiritual reality of utopia in our everyday lives, and 
to this end employ as a satiric device a voyager who is maddened by a glimpse of the reality 
of the Good in a fantastic land and of the unreality of everyday life in real Englands.” See 
Traugott 1961 and Rielly 1992 for discussions of the connections between Thomas More and 
Jonathan Swift.  
24 Logan 2016: xviii. 
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authors as Tacitus and, especially, Plutarch.”25 The reference to Plutarch here is important and 
deserves further attention. In the second book of Utopia, when Hythloday itemizes and 
describes the library of the Utopians, he says, “they are very fond of Plutarch’s writings.”26 
Hythloday does not specify which Plutarchan writings the Utopians are fond of in particular 
but, as will become clear, they almost certainly include the Parallel Lives, especially Life of 
Lycurgus, from which More seems to draw on more than one occasion when writing Utopia.27  
 This double focus on political philosophy and (satirical) travel narrative is already 
made clear in the full title of the book, which affirms that Utopia concerns both ‘the best state 
of a commonwealth’ and ‘the new island of Utopia.’ The subtitle demonstrates this further: ‘A 
Truly Golden Handbook, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining.’ This recalls More’s fond 
expression of Lucian’s ability to reprimand honestly, yet entertainingly, human weaknesses, 
in the letter quoted earlier. It also suggests that More’s work is beneficial in that it may lead 
the reader to question problematic aspects of sixteenth-century England, but it is amusing at 
the same time because it offers a witty satire on the existing situation.28 In this vein, More 
offers a Lucianic episode, where “the real world of the reader imprints itself upon the work of 
																																								 																				
25 Logan 2016: xxviii. Certainly, Republic is not the only Platonic text that comes to mind 
here, as the description of Magnesia in the Laws and the myth of Atlantis in the Timaeus and 
the Critias are just as applicable.  
26 Utopia, 80. 
27 See Schoeck 1956: 369, who notes, “More, we may be certain, knew his Plutarch well…in 
the Epigrams there are many ideas and sentiments which seem to echo rather closely many of 
the concepts to be found in the Lives and the Moralia.” Schoeck mentions the Epigrams but it 
is clear that Utopia also echoes many Plutarchan concepts. More is not the only writer of his 
time who is influenced by Plutarch but many of his contemporaries are as well, such as 
George Cavendish, Nicholas Harpsfield, and William Roper. On the influence of Plutarch on 
English writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Mossman 2007. 
28 The satirical aspect is further underlined by More himself in the preface to the work in 
which he expresses his worries to Peter Giles about different types of readers some of whom 
may not respond positively to his text. He writes, “…and there’s [a man] so insipid of taste 
that he can’t endure the salt a little wit” and others are “so flat-nosed that they dread satire as 
a man bitten by a rabid dog dreads water…” See Utopia, 6. 
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fiction – and the fictional world of the book absorbs and dramatizes the world of the reader.”29 
By including this dual notion so early on, the title of Utopia, like the prologue of VH, 
“appeals up front to scholarly readers and demands to be read at more than one level.”30 
In addition to the title and subtitle of the work, the etymology of Raphael Hythloday’s 
name also stresses the double focus and serio-comic nature of Utopia. For his first name, 
Raphael, is of Hebrew origin and means ‘healer from God.’ His last name, Hythloday, 
however, is rooted in ancient Greek (specifically, ὕθλος plus either δαίω or δάιος or ὁδάω)31 
and means ‘speaker of nonsense.’32 Thus, while Hythloday can be seen as a clever healer, or 
guide, from God who advises on the problems of commonwealths based on what he has 
experienced in other countries, he can also be interpreted as a comic figure who entertains his 
listeners by telling nonsensical tales of his journeys to exotic and faraway places.	The satirical 
aspect of his name is underlined further in his exchange with the character ‘More’ in Book I 
of Utopia, whose name is similar to the Greek µωρός. The audience witnesses a dialogue 
between a fool and a speaker of nonsense at the beginning of the work – and the Lucianic 
attribute of this is only accentuated by the fact that “Hythloday’s advice is dismissed as 
																																								 																				
29 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 144.  
30 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 116. 
31 ὕθλος means ‘idle talk or non-sense’ δαίω ‘distribute,’ δάιος here means ‘knowing or 
cunning,’ and ὁδάω ‘export and sell.’ 
32 Wegemer 1995: 134. See also Sylvester 1968: 283 and Baker-Smith 2011: 144. Wooden 
argues, “…in the dual use of [Hythloday’s] satiric persona, More is able to have it both ways, 
to agree and disagree, to laugh at and commend Hythloday’s various attacks on European 
society and praise of Utopian institutions. The technique is a favorite among Lucianic 
satirists, perhaps the most famous non-classical example being Swift’s Gulliver.” Wooden 
1977: 43.  
 On Swift, Wooden notes: “In Swift’s satire the apparently judicious and rational 
discourse of the benevolent humanitarian sets out to correct social ills not much different from 
those Hythloday discussed in Book I through the implementation of another theoretically 
conceived plan. In both cases the evils and abuses deprecated by the satiric persona did indeed 
exist; but the remedies proposed are more radical, impractical, and destructive than the evils 
they are intended to cure.” Wooden 1977: 43 n. 25. 
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nonsense by a moros.”33 At the same time, like Hythloday’s name, the name of ‘More’ also 
bears serious connotations. As is the case with Lucian in VH, More is ‘both author and 
diegetic character,’34 and his ‘real’ name has the ability to “pull the narrative towards the 
referential pole of the reading-spectrum which is occupied by genres such as historiography 
which are generally read as ‘true’ in their references to the extra-diegetic world shared by 
reader and author.”35 
In this manner, it becomes clear that Utopia is not merely a post-Platonic or post-
Aristotelian political exercise on how to fashion the best government, but much more 
complex than that. Certainly, despite the ostensible dichotomy of the double focus of the 
book, it is worth combining the two interpretations mentioned above, especially keeping in 
mind Plutarch’s and Lucian’s influence on More. In this way, I suggest that we can 
characterize Utopia as a Lucianic travelogue, which is shaped by a Plutarchan sense of 
political philosophy in many important respects. Specifically, it appears that More 
appropriates a style of Plutarchan political philosophy in a Lucianic travel narrative, which 
does echo ideas of other creations of the best commonwealths (and might thus be ‘beneficial’ 








33 Nelson 2001: 891. The creation of a character that bears the same name is also Lucianic. In 
VH, Lucian creates “an alter ego, Lucian the narrator, who may lie with Odysseus-like 
abandon, whilst Lucian the author remains free from blame.” Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 173. (As 
Ní Mheallaigh points out, this is also Homeric).  
34 Ní Mheallaigh 2009: 20. 
35 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 175. 
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III. The political and legal structure of Utopia 
	
The fundamental premise of Utopia is autarkeia: the best commonwealth, according to 
More, includes everything that is vital to ensure its citizens’ happiness (and excludes 
everything that contributes to their unhappiness), and nothing else. This premise, that one 
must first determine what constitutes the happiest life for the citizens in order to found the 
ideal commonwealth, recalls Republic 369b. There, Socrates says to Adeimantus, γίγνεται 
τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγᾦµαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡµῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ 
πολλῶν ὢν ἐνδεής: ἢ τίν᾽ οἴει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; (“I think a city comes to be 
because none of us is self-sufficient, but we all need many things. Do you think that a city is 
founded on any other principle?). Adeimantus replies, οὐδεµίαν (“No.”).36 It also echoes 
Aristotle’s approach in Politics 1323a20 when he asserts that when inquiring about the best 
form of state (πολιτείας ἀρίστης), one must first define the conditions for “the most generally 
eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals.” 
(διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον ὁµολογεῖσθαι τίς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος, µετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πότερον 
κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος). The answer to this essential question, i.e. what constitutes 
the happiest life for the individual citizen in a state, is the starting point of political theory; 
and the question itself is a central aspect of ethical theory relating to the foundation of the 
state.37   
Two striking features of More’s constitution of happiness in Utopia are that there are 
only a few laws, and no lawyers. The rationale for this recalls many of the problems that we 
																																								 																				
36 The use of οὐδεµίαν (or, οὐδείς) suggests that Adeimantus’ ‘No’ is rather emphatic, as it 
means ‘not a single one’ or ‘none whatever.’ A similar use of the word appears in 
Aristophanes’ Frogs 927 when Euripides says that not one thing Aeschylus said was clear 
(σαφὲς δ᾽ ἂν εἶπεν οὐδὲ ἕν), and in Wealth 1115 when Hermes complains that there is nothing 
at all for the other gods since Plutus has recovered his sight (οὐκ ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἓν). 
 Note that the details of the translations of the works used in this thesis are listed in the 
bibliography. 
37 Cf. Logan 2016: xxviii. 
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encounter in Aristophanic comedy (and perhaps especially in Birds, Ecclesiazusae, and 
Wasps), and many Platonic and Aristotelian treatises. For the Utopians “think it completely 
unjust to bind people by a set of laws that are too many to read or too obscure for anyone to 
understand.”38 They “consider the most obvious interpretation of any law to be the fairest… 
[because] the most simple and apparent sense of the law is open to everyone.”39 More 
importantly, “if laws are not clear, they are useless; for simple-minded men…there might as 
well be no laws at all as laws which can be interpreted only by devious minds after endless 
disputes.”40 The Utopians’ reasoning here is also based on the main fault that they find with 
other nations, namely that “their infinite volumes of laws and interpretations are not 
adequate,” for it is impossible to have a straightforward and fair government when there is a 
“mass of incomprehensibly intricate laws.”41 
																																								 																				
38 See Utopia, 86-7. There, Hythloday says: “As for lawyers, a class of men whose trade it is 
to manipulate cases and multiply quibbles, they exclude them entirely. They think it practical 
for each man to plead his own case, and say the same thing to the judge that he would tell his 
lawyer. This makes for less confusion and readier access to the truth. A man speaks his mind 
without tricky instructions from a lawyer, and the judge examines each point carefully, taking 
pains to protect simple folk against the accusations of the crafty.”  
 Cf. Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, p. 90. “…the laws should be 
drafted in plain terms, with the minimum of complications, so that there is little need for that 
grasping sort who call themselves lawyers and advocates…” Cf. Erasmus, EM p.150. 
“Amongst the learned the lawyers claim first place, the most self-satisfied class of people, as 
they roll their rock of Sisyphus and string together six hundred laws in the same breath, no 
matter whether relevant or not, piling up opinion on opinion…anything which causes trouble 
has special merit in their eyes.” 
39 Utopia, 87. See also Jardine 1997: 80 n. 136, who asserts that because More’s Utopia has 
few laws, it avoids “the proliferation of interpretations of the law, which bogs down 
administration.” 
40 Utopia, 87. 
41 Utopia, 86-7. Cf. Plutarch, Sayings of Spartans, 232c, “Those who use few words have 
need of but few laws.” It needs to be stated explicitly in regards to any Plutarchan Spartan 
reference cited in this thesis, that Plutarch is offering an idealised version of Sparta in his 
writings that is increasingly being doubted by modern scholars. (See, for example, Fine 1983: 
143, and Hansen and Hodkinson 2009: 476). This is also true for More’s interpretation of 
Sparta: the key point is that it is not necessarily the reality of Sparta, but rather the Sparta that 
More knows. 
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According to Hythloday, there is no need for many laws because the excellent 
education that the Utopians receive obviates the need for a complex system of law. This idea 
that good training can replace elaborate legal systems is already present in the Republic when 
Socrates asserts that it is foolish to make laws concerning children and their demeanour in 
front of their parents because “verbal or written decrees will never make them come about or 
last” (οὔτε γάρ που γίγνεται οὔτ᾽ ἂν µείνειεν λόγῳ τε καὶ γράµµασιν νοµοθετηθέντα).42 
Rather, Socrates continues, “the start of someone’s education determines what follows” (ἐκ 
τῆς παιδείας ὅποι ἄν τις ὁρµήσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἑπόµενα εἶναι).43 This is why, he concludes, 
it is not necessarily important to try to make laws (οὐκ…ἐπιχειρήσαιµι νοµοθετεῖν) about 
these things. This is also true for laws concerning the government: when the ruler is well-
trained and impartial, and when the magistrates do their job, there is no need for many laws.44  
A similar sentiment appears in Politics 1337a10 when Aristotle makes clear that “the 
legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth.” (ὅτι µὲν οὖν τῷ 
νοµοθέτῃ µάλιστα πραγµατευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀµφισβητήσειε). 
Isocrates, too, draws on it in his Areopagiticus when he expresses that it is more important to 
produce citizens who refrain from committing any punishable act in the first place, rather than 
drawing up a list of potential punishments for those who are lawless.45 Harding notes that 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 On how More’s career as a lawyer and judge may have influenced him when drafting 
the Utopian legal system, see Zilko 1999: 49. Zilko argues, “More was expressing the 
frustrations of his own experiences applying the law, with all its attendant rigidity, in the 
common law courts.” This may be true in some ways, but I think in others ways this satirical 
portrayal of lawyers, and the law, is intended to be merely a joke. More, fitting in with the 
pun on his name, makes fun of his own occupation (and everything that comes with it), just 
like Aristophanes makes fun of the Athenians’ litigiousness and fondness for lawsuits in his 
comedies. 
42 Rep. 425b. 
43 Rep. 425b-c. Cf. Tim.44c, the right educational training has the power to reinforce the soul 
so that man becomes faultless.  
44 Rep. 425c-e. 
45 Areopagiticus 42. 
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Isocrates’ speech is based largely on “criticising the faults of fourth-century democracy and 
praising the way of life of past generations, especially those who had lived under the 
supervision of the Areopagus.”46 However, like More’s work, the content of his speech is 
both humorous and serious, which is exemplified by the fact that it does bring to mind 
Aristophanes (especially Wealth, Wasps, and Clouds) on more than one occasion. In section 
48, he notes that it is due to the excellent education of the young that 
 
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς σκιραφείοις οἱ νεώτεροι διέτριβον, οὐδ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αὐλητρίσιν, οὐδ᾽ ἐν τοῖς 
τοιούτοις συλλόγοις ἐν οἷς νῦν διηµερεύουσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύµασιν ἔµενον ἐν 
οἷς ἐτάχθησαν, θαυµάζοντες καὶ ζηλοῦντες τοὺς ἐν τούτοις πρωτεύοντας. οὕτω δ᾽ 
ἔφευγον τὴν ἀγοράν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ καί ποτε διελθεῖν ἀναγκασθεῖεν, µετὰ πολλῆς αἰδοῦς καὶ 
σωφροσύνης ἐφαίνοντο τοῦτο ποιοῦντες. 
 
The young men did not waste their time in the gambling-dens with the flute-girls or in 
the kind of company in which they now spend their days, but remained steadfastly in 
the pursuits to which they had been assigned, admiring and emulating those who 
excelled in these. And so strictly did they avoid the market-place that even when they 
were at times compelled to pass through it, they were seen to do this with great 
modesty and sobriety of manner. 
 
The note on how it is important to respects one’s elders humorously recalls some of the 
arguments made in Clouds, but the emphasis on the significance of the education of the youth 
also connects with the philosophical treatises mentioned above as well as with More’s 
education system in Utopia.47 
Later, Plutarch discusses a similar approach in Lycurgus when he tells of Lycurgus 
who did not put any of his laws in writing because:48 
 
τὰ µὲν γάρ κυριώτατα καὶ µέγιστα πρὸς εὐδαιµονίαν πόλεως καὶ ἀρετήν, ἐν τοῖς 
ἤθεσιν ᾤετο καὶ ταῖς ἀγωγαῖς τῶν πολιτῶν ἐγκατεστοιχειωµένα µένειν ἀκίνητα καὶ 
βέβαια, ἔχοντα τὴν προαίρεσιν δεσµὸν ἰσχυρότερον τῆς ἀνάγκης, ἣν ἡ παίδευσις 
ἐµποιεῖ τοῖς νέοις, νοµοθέτου διάθεσιν ἀπεργαζοµένη περὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν 
																																								 																				
46 Harding 1994: 206. 
47 See Clouds 991-998. Cf. Harding 1994: 208. 
48 Lyc. 13.1. 
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He thought that if the most important and binding principles which conduce to the 
prosperity and virtue of a city were implanted in the habits and training of its citizens, 
they would remain unchanged and secure, having a stronger bond than compulsion in 
the fixed purposes imparted to the young by education, which performs the office of a 
law-giver for every one of them 
 
Liebert argues that on the practicality of the best regime, “Plutarch understands virtuous 
action itself to command admiration and obedience.”49 Moreover, Plutarch shows in 
Lycurgus’ Sparta “how a regime oriented towards honour can educate for moderation as well 
as for courage.”50 Certainly, “Plutarch is more sensitive to the political utility of honour than 
is Socrates in the Republic…”51 It seems that More utilizes a similar approach when drawing 
up his ideal commonwealth, which devotes “its energies less to setting up laws than to 
forming the very best men to administer them.”52 As Nelson notes, in Utopia “justice is 
instantiated by the rule of reason in the persons of the most excellent men; it results in a social 
existence which teaches citizens virtue.”53 
The reference to Plutarch here reinforces the point made earlier, namely that More 
seems to incorporate a Plutarchan style of political philosophy when creating the legal system 
of the Utopians. More importantly, he draws from the life of a Spartan, rather than that of an 
Athenian or Roman. This emphasises further the idea that More does not merely present a 
post-Platonic, or post- Aristotelian commonwealth (even though he employs a similar kind of 
thinking in certain regards), but one that praises elements of the constitution of Lycurgus’ 
Sparta, as told by Plutarch in the Parallel Lives. This can also be seen in examples later on. 
																																								 																				
49 Liebert 2016: 111. 
50 Liebert 2009: 258. Cf. Liebert 2016: 25. 
51 Liebert 2009: 254. Cf. Liebert 2016: 2. According to Socrates in Rep. 545a-549b, Sparta is 
only the second-best regime because they put honour at the top and leave reason at the 
bottom. 
52 Utopia, 129-30. 
53 Nelson 2001: 895. 
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At the same time, despite the tendency towards Spartan attributes here, the point that it 
is important to educate properly the legal administrators of the ideal commonwealth can also 
be found in Plato. De Busleyden makes this connection clear in a letter he writes to More in 
1516. He says: “…without good rulers, even the best laws (if we take Plato’s word for it) 
would be nothing but dead letters.”54 De Busleyden refers to the Athenian in Plato’s Laws 
vi.751b-c here who asserts:  
 
παντί που δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅτι µεγάλου τῆς νοµοθεσίας ὄντος ἔργου, τοῦ πόλιν εὖ 
παρεσκευασµένην ἀρχὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς εὖ κειµένοις νόµοις, οὐ µόνον 
οὐδὲν πλέον εὖ τεθέντων, οὐδ᾽ ὅτι γέλως ἂν πάµπολυς συµβαίνοι, σχεδὸν δὲ βλάβαι 
καὶ λῶβαι πολὺ µέγισται ταῖς πόλεσι γίγνοιντ᾽ ἂν ἐξ αὐτῶν. 
 
It’s obvious to anyone, I suppose, this kind of thing, but lawgiving is a serious 
business, so if a city which has been well catered for appoints unsuitable officials to 
supervise laws that are well framed, not only does it get no advantage from them, well 
framed as they are – not to mention exposing the city to complete ridicule – but, 
broadly speaking, by far the greatest injuries and violence in cities arise from this 
cause. 
 
The emphasis, which the Athenian puts on (moral) education here may have inspired More 
when he installed an awareness of the fundamental importance of a good education in the 
Utopians in order to avoid unnecessary legal quarrels. Hythloday expresses the same thought 
towards the end of Utopia when he says: “What is planted in the minds of children lives on in 
the minds of grown men and serves greatly to strengthen the commonwealth; its decline can 
always be traced to vices that arise from wrong attitudes.”55 Therefore, rather than focusing 
on making myriad laws that are too abstruse and too many to understand, the government in 
the best commonwealth should concentrate on installing prudence in the rulers (both current 
and future) in order to ensure a just conduct. 
																																								 																				
54 Utopia, 130.  
55 Utopia, 104. 
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 Hythloday’s disdain for obscure laws, and rulers who interpret laws in an arbitrary 
manner, is already present earlier on in his narration when he talks about the Utopian’s poor 
opinion of treaties (“…the Utopians make none at all with any nation”).56 The citizens of 
Utopia do not trust treaties because “no treaty can be made so strong and explicit that a 
government will not be able to worm out of it, breaking in the process both the treaty and its 
own word.”57 Moreover, governments and rulers frequently “find some defect in the wording, 
which often enough they deliberately inserted themselves.”58 Again, comparable political 
thinking can be found in Plutarch’s Lycurgus when Lycurgus “withdraws Sparta from the 
international economy, thus inoculating Spartan leaders to bribes foreign as well as 
domestic.”59 
 Plutarch primarily focuses on the importation of foreign luxuries here, which, 
according to him, leads to political corruption and an unfair advantage of the wealthy over the 
poor. However, with Lycurgus’ reforms, this stops. He writes, “but luxury, thus gradually 
																																								 																				
56 Utopia, 88. 
57 Utopia, 88. 
58 Utopia, 88. 
59 Liebert 2016: 117. Cf. Lyc. 31.1. This also shows that in both Lycurgus’ Sparta, and More’s 
Utopia, the concentration is on honour and virtue within their own borders, rather than on 
expansion or command over other nations, which includes travelling to other places. Socrates 
reflects on this at Prot. 342c-d when, referring to the Spartans, he says: καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐδένα 
ἐῶσιν τῶν νέων εἰς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξιέναι…ἵνα µὴ ἀποµανθάνωσιν ἃ αὐτοὶ διδάσκουσιν. 
(“…while on their part they do not permit any of their young men to travel abroad to the other 
cities…lest they unlearn what they are taught at home”). Cf. Laws 704d-705a, Magnesia is 
located about ten miles from the sea because if it were any closer it would fill “the city with 
trade, with buying and selling for profit” which in turn would cause feelings of distrust and 
unfriendliness.  
 Ironically, in reality the Spartans are guilty of the sort of acts the Utopians despise. 
Liebert notes that after the Battle of Leuctra in 371, Sparta had “fallen victim to the wealth its 
victories had won. Rampant bribery came to shadow every avenue to public honor, so that 
leading Spartans had powerful incentives to become as rich as possible, by any means 
possible. Because Lycurgus had tied citizenship to the payment of mess dues, widening 
economic inequality added to the misery of poverty the dishonor of disenfranchisement.” 
Liebert 2016: 106. On the Spartans’ sophistic interpretation of treaties, see Bayliss 2009, 
especially pp. 245-253 and Bayliss 2017, especially p. 161. 
	 22	
deprived of that which stimulated and supported it, died away of itself, and men of large 
possessions had no advantage over the poor…” (ἀλλὰ οὕτως ἀπερηµωθεῖσα κατὰ µικρὸν ἡ 
τρυφὴ τῶν ζωπυρούντων καὶ τρεφόντων αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἐµαραίνετο: καὶ πλεῖον οὐδὲν ἦν τοῖς 
πολλὰ κεκτηµένοις).60 While the overall reason for Lycurgus’ decision is different from the 
one we find in Utopia, the link can still be made because both rationales stem from corruption 
and unfairness brought about by the government and the wealthy. In Utopia, this is 
exemplified further by Hythloday’s definition of the kind of justice that is found in the 
average commonwealth. He says: 61  
 
there are two kinds of justice, one for the common herd, a lowly justice that creeps 
along the ground, hedged in everywhere and encumbered with chains; and the other, 
which is the justice of princes, much more majestic and hence more free than common 
justice, so that it can do anything it wants and nothing it doesn’t want.  
 
This contempt for leaders who interpret treaties and laws in their favour already appears in the 
first book of Utopia when Hythloday expresses his disapproval of complex legal systems, 
judges whose interests are not entirely altruistic, and absolute monarchs in general.62 
																																								 																				
60 Lyc. 9.4. Lycurgus’ opinion of luxury items here brings to mind Xenophanes’ criticism of 
useless luxuries (fr. 3), which allow people to care more about material possessions and 
wealth than about virtue. In regards to Xenophanes, his travels all over Greece as well as his 
elegiac and satirical poems recall the approach of Swift (and Gulliver) since his poetry also 
criticises and satirises a wide range of social and religious ideas. See Lesher 1992 for a 
commentary on Xenophanes’ fragments. 
 Cf. Laws 705b, if Magnesia exported a lot of goods and received much gold and silver 
in return, it would be the greatest impediment to them to acquire a just and honest character.  
61 Utopia, 88-9. The idea that raison d’état sometimes includes a style of politics that 
conflicts with traditional morality, is also present in the writings of Machiavelli, a 
contemporary of More. However, there are also important differences between More’s Utopia 
and Machiavelli’s The Prince. For instance, “The Prince concerns political action and the 
duties of political leadership; while Utopia presents the portrait of a ‘best commonwealth’ in 
which political action has remarkably little place.” Tinkler 1988: 188. 
62 More’s contempt for absolute monarchs shows another important difference between his 
and Plato’s political theory. As Surtz writes: “For Plato, the just state is an aristocracy, not a 
timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, or tyranny. More, on the other hand, condemns the 
absolutism of kings, the insolence of nobles, and the exploitation of the poor.” See Surtz 
1965: clviii. 
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Specifically, he points at the contradictions and questionable legal decisions that are present 
in legal matters all too often. In a Socratic manner that especially brings to mind the debates 
in Old Comedy, and also the concerns raised in Greek comedy about the Athenians constantly 
going back and forth at law, he discusses the various ways in which a king and his councillors 
may attempt to fill the king’s treasury.  
Hythloday asserts that there are a few options the king and his councillors would 
mention in such an exchange of ideas (such as increasing the value of money, pretending the 
nation is at war in order to raise money under that pretext, or installing many heavy fines for 
various things). However, the three most important ones for this discussion are the following: 
(i) one councillor “calls to mind some old moth-eaten laws, antiquated by long disuse, which 
no one remembers being made and therefore everyone has transgressed, and suggests that the 
king levy fines for breaking them.”63 (ii) Another councillor proposes “that he work on the 
judges so they will decide every case in the royal interest;”64 and (iii) that the king should find 
judges who will give different opinions because “if…judges give differing opinions, the 
clearest matter in the world can be made cloudy and truth itself brought into question.”65 In 
this way, “the king is given a convenient handle to interpret the law in his favour, and 
everyone else will acquiesce from shame or fear.” Thus, Hythloday continues, “either equity 
is on the king’s side, or the letter of the law makes for him, or a twisted interpretation of a 
																																								 																				
63 Utopia, 33. Cf. Utopia, 35. “Let [the king] not rashly revive antiquated laws, especially if 
they have been long forgotten and never missed.” This is also why “Utopian laws are based 
on reason rather than tradition and are drafted so as to be immediately intelligible to all 
citizens.” See Norbrook 2002: 17. See also Zilko 1999: 55.  
64 Utopia, 33. 
65 Utopia, 33. 
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document, or the factor which in the end outweighs all laws for scrupulous judges, the 
indisputable prerogative of the prince.”66 
It is clear that there is a large streak of disapproving sentiments towards unnecessarily 
complicated juridical matters that runs through Hythloday’s examples, which links back to 
one of the fundamental premises of Utopia where “the law is left simple [and] affords no 
chance for the crafty handling of cases or the tricky arguing of technical points.”67 This also 
includes the absence of lawsuits, which according to Hythloday, is primarily due to the fact 
that the citizens of Utopia do not own private property. As he asserts, “in [other] nations, 
whatever a man can get he calls his own private property; but all the mass of laws enacted day 
																																								 																				
66 Utopia, 33. Cf. Erasmus, Chr. Prin, pp. 87-8. “Like the prince, the law must, more than 
anything else, be accessible and fair to all; otherwise, as the Greek philosopher cleverly put it, 
the laws will be nothing but spiders’ webs, which birds can easily break because of their size, 
and in which only flies will be entangled.” (Erasmus reiterates this statement a couple of 
pages later at Chr. Prin., p. 90). He refers to Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers 1.2.58 (on Solon) here. There it says: Ἔλεγε δὲ τὸν µὲν λόγον εἴδωλον εἶναι τῶν 
ἔργων: βασιλέα δὲ τὸν ἰσχυρότατον τῇ δυνάµει. τοὺς δὲ νόµους τοῖς ἀραχνίοις ὁµοίους: καὶ 
γὰρ ἐκεῖνα, ἐὰν µὲν ἐµπέσῃ τι κοῦφον καὶ ἀσθενές, στέγειν: ἐὰν δὲ µεῖζον, διακόψαν 
οἴχεσθαι. (“Speech is the mirror of action; and another that the strongest and most capable is 
king. He compared laws to spiders' webs, which stand firm when any light and yielding object 
falls upon them, while a larger thing breaks through them and makes off”). 
 Plutarch attributes the comparison of laws to spider webs, which catch the weak but 
which the strong are able to break through, to Anacharsis who supposedly used this saying to 
refer to the laws of Solon as well. See Solon 5.2. The comic poet Platon, a contemporary of 
Aristophanes, uses the same comparison at Photius p.638.5. See also Stobaeus Serm. xlv. 25, 
who ascribes the saying to the Locrian lawgiver, Zaleucus. 
67 Hexter 1965: lv. This also feeds into Erasmus’ critique of tyranny. Like More, Erasmus is 
concerned with the multiplicity of laws and tyrants’ arbitrary ruling. He uses Dionysius of 
Syracuse as an example and writes that he established most of his laws according to a 
tyrannical scheme. Specifically, he writes, “[Dionysius of Syracuse] passed a great many 
laws, piling one on top of another, but he is said to have allowed his people to ignore them 
and in this way to have made everyone beholden to him. That was not making laws, but 
setting traps.” A good ruler, however, Erasmus writes, will “spare no effort to enact the best 
possible laws, those most beneficial to the state, rather than a great number. A very small 
number of laws will be sufficient in a well-ordered state under a good prince and honest 
magistrates, and if things are otherwise, no amount of laws will suffice.” Erasmus, Chr. Prin., 
pp. 79-80. See also Hexter and Surtz 1965: 363. 
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after day don’t enable him to secure his own or to defend it…as is shown by innumerable and 
interminable lawsuits, fresh ones every day.”68  
Hythloday’s criticism here does not only derive from unjust lawyers but also from the 
unequal distribution of wealth he sees in his own, and other, societies. He struggles to 
understand how a commonwealth cannot make “proper provision for the welfare of farmers 
and colliers, labourers, carters and carpenters, without whom the commonwealth would 
simply not exist.”69 Moreover, he asserts, “the rich constantly try to grind out of the poor part 
of their daily wages, not only by swindling but by public laws… [and] by promulgating law, 
they have transmuted this perversion into justice.”70 This feeling of unfairness based on the 
unequal distribution of wealth in society is another example that brings to mind Plutarch’s 
Life of Lycurgus, as has already been made clear in the point on foreign and domestic affairs. 
(It also recalls the ending of Lucian’s Menippus, which outlines the satiric decree, voted for 
by souls in the underworld, that the wealthy, who have formerly oppressed the poor, will be 
send back to earth in the shape of donkeys where they will bear the burdens of the poor).71 
																																								 																				
68 Utopia, 39. Hexter and Surtz 1965: 379 write, “The disappearance of lawsuits has always 
been a promised result or concomitant of communism.” This sentiment towards lawsuits also 
appears in Rep. 464d-e when Socrates asserts that the guardians will be spared all the conflict 
and disagreement that arise from lawsuits. See also Lyc. 24.3-4, where Plutarch reports that 
lawsuits vanished in Sparta alongside gold and silver coinage, because there was neither greed 
nor want but equality all around. This take on the elimination of lawsuits readily brings to 
mind Praxagora’s political proposal in Eccl., which, among others, promises the abolition of 
lawsuits and legal battles.    
69 Utopia, 110. 
70 Utopia, 111. See Ames 1949: 128, who argues, “This passage clearly refers to the 
legislation of recent parliaments, completed in the parliament of 1515, which re-enacted the 
old statutes against laborers while removing clauses unfavorable to employers.” 
71 Menippus, in turn, brings to mind Phaedo 81e-82a, where Socrates, referring to 
metempsychosis, asserts, “those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and 
drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely to pass into the bodies of asses 
and other beasts of that sort.” οἷον τοὺς µὲν γαστριµαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας 
µεµελετηκότας καὶ µὴ διηυλαβηµένους εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς 
ἐνδύεσθαι).  
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In Sparta, the unequal distribution of wealth was due not only because of trade but 
also because of unjust land ownership. Plutarch writes, before Lycurgus’ reforms, “there was 
a dreadful inequality in this regard, the city was heavily burdened with indigent and helpless 
people, and wealth was wholly concentrated in the hands of a few” (δεινῆς γάρ οὔσης 
ἀνωµαλίας καὶ πολλῶν ἀκτηµόνων καὶ ἀπόρων ἐπιφεροµένων τῇ πόλει, τοῦ δὲ πλούτου 
παντάπασιν εἰς ὀλίγους συνερρυηκότος).72 However, Lycurgus redistributes land and by 
doing so, “…eliminates at stroke the envy and emulation that attend property…[and] forces 
political corruption into the open, where it can be shamed.”73 Again, the focus is on honour 
and shame, which brings to mind fundamental attributes of the Utopian society, which 
concentrates on honourable and virtuous training of the young, and punishment if they fail to 
live up to these honours and virtues adequately.74  
It is worth noting that Lycurgus’ reforms do not only recall Hythloday’s criticism of 
other commonwealths of his time here, but they also bring to mind the very foundation of 
Utopia by Utopus. For Utopus, “…conquered the country and gave it his 
name…and…brought its rude, uncouth inhabitants to such a high level of culture and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 Furthermore, More’s take on the unequal distribution of wealth in society recalls 
Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translation of Plato’s dialogues. When Ficino summarises Plato’s 
theory that cities, which are made up of both rich and poor citizens are not actually one city 
but two, he describes the philosopher’s solution to the problem: “whence he arrived step by 
step at his mystery, that everything should certainly be held in common. Some would not 
have less, nor truly others more. And it is from the former circumstance that jealousies, lies, 
thefts are born, while extravagance, pride, and sloth are born from the latter circumstance.” 
Ficino, Platonis opera, p. 232. Nelson 2001: 900 states, “Erasmus drew heavily on [Ficino’s] 
work” and “although More was accomplished in Greek, it is probable that he too consulted 
Ficino’s translations.” Certainly, as Nelson argues further, “Ficino’s characterization of 
Platonic ‘justice’ as ‘the order and health of the society’… is very much the view of justice 
we encounter in Utopia.” Nelson 2001: 901. 
72 Lyc. 8.1. 
73 Liebert 2016: 117. 
74 Cf. Utopia, 82. 
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humanity that they now surpass almost every other people.”75 While there is not quite such a 
level of superiority in Life of Lycurgus (and, as mentioned earlier, according to Socrates in the 
Republic, Sparta is not superior but only second-best because of its very focus on honour and 
shame), the connection is worth making. This is because the foundation of Utopia does reflect 
the improvements made by Greek lawgivers such as Lycurgus (or Solon for that matter) who 
establish or alter politics.76 
Additionally, Lycurgus’ political thinking in regard to the redistribution of land 
connects with the passages of Hythloday’s speech quoted above, which reflect the view that 
law does not necessarily equate with justice - a view of which there is a clear thread 
throughout Utopia. This is why (and it appears that Lycurgus employs a similar kind of 
thinking here) law, in order to be just, needs to include moral principles, which cannot be 
ignored in favour of the wealthy or (potentially antiquated) laws made by them.77 Highet, 
referring to Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus, asserts similarly that the text “treats [Lycurgus] as a 
great statesman who saw that the legislator’s first duty is to ensure moral education.”78 
“Together with Plutarch’s other accounts of Spartan virtue,” continues Highet, this embodies 
the belief “that the innate goodness of man could be developed by good institutions. Political 
reform was to be moral reform.”79 
																																								 																				
75 Utopia, 44. 
76 Cf. Traugott 1961: 544, who juxtaposes Utopus and Lycurgus, and says, “…there was an 
eponymous Utopus who like Lycurgus lived and established things once upon a time 
forevermore…” 
77 Liebert 2016: 110 notes that this is also evident in Xenophon’s Constitution of the 
Lacedaimonians where Lycurgus is “portrayed as a reflective, almost philosophical lawgiver 
constantly observing foreign regimes, considering the limitations and potentialities of human 
nature, and inventing novel solutions to long-standing problems.” See Liebert 2016: 107. 
Lycurgus’ reforms are also a rebuttal of Aristotle’s critique of Sparta being a society where 
wealth is distributed unequally. As Liebert asserts, to this criticism, “Plutarch counters with 
an austere Sparta in which wealth was carefully controlled.” 
78 Highet 1949: 394. 
79 Highet 1949: 394-5. 
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The emphasis on moral reform in Plutarch recalls the point made earlier in Utopia 
about kings using certain laws to their advantage, especially to gain money. To them, this 
approach allows for a rich, and creditable, source of income “since it can be made to wear the 
mask of justice.”80 At the end of the day, however, many of those laws only look like justice 
while in reality they are neither just nor beneficial to the majority of the citizens of the 
commonwealth.81 It is clear that More feels uneasy about these juridical problems of his time: 
in his opinion the line between just laws and seemingly just laws, and the deliberate abuse of 
them, is too thin. All too often it is not the law that triumphs, “but the king’s appetite, cloaked 
in forms of law.”82  
In the same vein, the line between just politics and tyranny is also too thin because 
wherever “there is politics, there tyranny becomes a possibility.”83 Where there is tyranny, the 
meaning of law and truth is based solely on the tyrant’s will, and may change at any given 
moment.84 More voices the same concern in his reply to Lucian’s Tyrannicide where he asks 
Lucian why he has to remind him of laws in a tyranny (quid in Tyrannide leges memorat). 
After all, “they are laws in name only” (legum ista nomina sunt) and it is ultimately up to the 
tyrant to decide how he wants to use them.85 This is something Swift is concerned with as 
																																								 																				
80 Utopia, 33. 
81 Cf. Utopia, 21. Logan notes that More’s disappointment with the commonwealths of his 
time, (“[he sees] in them nothing but a conspiracy of the rich, who are advancing their own 
interests under the name and title of the commonwealth,” Utopia, 111), may allude to the 
judgment of St. Augustine: “if justice is left out, what are kingdoms but great robber bands?” 
See Augustine, The City of God 4.4 and Logan 2016: 111 n. 147. 
82 Fenlon 1981: 469. 
83 Fenlon 1981: 454. 
84 More expresses these feelings in more detail in his The History of King Richard the Third, 
written between 1513 and 1518 (but left unpublished), which explores the consequences of 
tyranny. 
85 More’s Declamation in Reply to Lucian’s, 104-5. Specifically, More refers to the 
succession of the throne under a tyranny here. According to his response, “there is no lawful 
inheritance of government [in a tyranny], since all just laws are suspended and ineffective…” 
Meyer 2014: 636. More asserts, “A tyrant always dies intestate, since the laws, which alone 
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well. Traugott asserts that Swift is aware “of the linguistic process by which tyrants destroy 
the meanings of words.” By doing so, continues Traugott, “a tyrant can reduce life to insane 
paradox…anything can mean anything.”86 
This is why at the heart of Utopia, there is “More’s deep understanding of – and 
scathing contempt for – immoral, self-serving rulers and their enablers, his profound 
sympathy for their victims and his passionate desire to expose their machinations and 
depredations… ”87 Again, this relates to Plutarch’s Lycurgus, whose reforms seek to prevent 
Spartan leaders from engaging with (monetary) corruption that may influence their rule. In 
this way, it also becomes clear that Utopia is not necessarily about constructing the perfect 
commonwealth, but it is more about constructing the best possible commonwealth of More’s 
time, namely a commonwealth that is able to prevent the emergence of tyranny.88 The same 
can be said for Lycurgus’ Sparta, which, before his reforms, vacillates between tyranny and 
democracy, but does now enjoy the safest arrangement (ἰσορροπήσασα τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην 
τάξιν ἔσχε) that helps the Spartan people to withstand tyranny.89  
However, in Utopia, the prevention of tyranny, which is made more vital by a fear of 
factionalism in general, comes at a price. Specifically, in order to avoid the emergence of 
(tyrannical) factions, it is prohibited to have political discussions in private. As Hythloday 
reports in the second book of Utopia: “It is a capital offence to make plans about public 
business outside the senate or the popular assembly. The purpose of these rules…is to prevent 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
can make a will valid, are held captive by him. In like manner, he who succeeds to the place 
of a deceased tyrant is not an heir but a new tyrant, for he does not succeed but usurps.” 
Declamation, p. 105. 
86 Traugott 1961: 543. 
87 Logan 2011: 168. 
88 Cf. Fenlon 1981: 462. “More’s eyes were open when he entered politics. His object was not 
to build Utopia. It was to prevent the re-enactment of Richard III.” 
89 Lycurgus 5.6-7. Cf. Liebert 2016: 115. 
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governor and tranibors90 from conspiring together to alter the government and enslave the 
people.”91 This prohibition is further emphasised by the fact that in Utopia, there are “no 
chances for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meetings.”92 Hythloday refers 
back to this in the closing paragraph of the second book when he says: “Now that [the 
Utopians] have torn up the seeds of ambition and faction at home…they are in no danger from 
internal strife, which alone has destroyed the prosperity of many cities that seemed eminently 
secure.”93 
Even so, despite the positive aspect, the open spaces and lack of opportunity to cause 
internal strife also result in something else, namely the elimination of individuality. Again, 
this brings to mind a passage in Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus, which portrays a similar lack of 
individuality. At 25.3, he asserts:  
 
τὸ δὲ ὅλον εἴθιζε τοὺς πολίτας µὴ βούλεσθαι µηδὲ ἐπίστασθαι κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ 
ὥσπερ τᾶς µελίττας τῷ κοινῷ συµφυεῖς ὄντας ἀεὶ καὶ µετ᾽ ἀλλήλων εἱλουµένους περὶ 
τὸν ἄρχοντα, µικροῦ δεῖν ἐξεστῶτας ἑαυτῶν ὑπ᾽ ἐνθουσιασµοῦ καὶ φιλοτιµίας, ὅλους 
εἶναι τῆς πατρίδος 
																																								 																				
90 On the use of ‘tranibor,’ Thompson notes, “we find in Utopia many fanciful names coined 
from Greek…a Lucianic trick, though Aristophanic as well.” See Thompson 1974: xlvii. 
Berger 1982 states that ‘tranibor’ means ‘plain glutton’ (τρανής + βορός). This probably 
refers to More’s disdain for those who relentlessly gather money and land at the expense of 
others. On this being an Aristophanic (or, old comic) trick, see for instance Galen, Glosses on 
Hippocrates 19 p. 65 K. On the Lucianic aspects of this trick (and his ‘onomastic games’), see 
Ní Mheallaigh 2010: 126-7 and Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 175-6. 
91 Utopia, 50. In case any Utopian is caught committing such an offence, they are punished 
harshly (e.g. with enslavement or execution) because “they had an excellent education and the 
best of moral training, yet still couldn’t be restrained from wrongdoing.” See Utopia, 82. This 
is in line with Plato’s reasoning for punishing the citizens of his ideal state more harshly than 
the non-citizens if they commit a crime. See Laws 854e. 
92 Utopia, 62. Cf. Utopia, 48. “Every house has a front door to the street and a back door to 
the garden. The double doors, which open easily with a push of the hand and close again 
automatically, let anyone come in – so there is nothing private anywhere.” See Greenblatt 
1980: 47 who states that the original Latin makes this point even clearer: ita nihil usquam 
priuati est. 
93 Utopia, 112. This recalls the point made earlier that like Lycurgus, the Utopians are more 
concerned with honour and peace within their own borders, and command over their own 
people, rather than command over other nations. 
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In a word, he trained his fellow-citizens to have neither the wish nor the ability to live 
for themselves; but like bees they were to make themselves always integral parts of 
the whole community, clustering together about their leader, almost beside themselves 
with enthusiasm and noble ambition, and to belong wholly to their country. 
 
As is the case in More’s Utopia, in Lycurgus’ Sparta, the citizen “is always outside of 
himself, more a creature of the city than his own man.”94 The rationale for installing these 
measures, and for training the citizens in these ways, is again comparable in both cases: the 
assurance of greater stability of the law and the government.  
In Utopia, this also brings to mind the overall intended effect of the arrangement of 
the Utopian legal system. Namely, it is socially, and legally, impossible to conspire against 
the government and to destabilise the law by tyrannical means because “men live all the time 
under everyone’s eyes.”95 More importantly, these coercive practices are “by no means 
accidental [but] built into the logic of the ideal state.”96 Indeed, they are part of the plan of 
living the Utopians have adopted through which “they have laid the foundation of a 
commonwealth that is not only very happy but also, so far as human prescience can tell, likely 
to last forever.”97 The argument that the laws and institutions of the best commonwealth are 
																																								 																				
94 Liebert 2016: 122. 
95 Hexter 1965: ciii. Cf. Sylvester 1963: c and Carroll 1996: 253.  
 The statement that ‘men live all the time under everyone’s eyes’ brings to mind 
Isocrates’ Areopagiticus 46-7, where he asserts that the Athenian forefathers “kept watch over 
the life of every citizen” (δήµους ἐθεώρουν τὸν βίον τὸν ἑκάστου). This watchfulness is 
necessary, “for where no watch is kept over such matters and the judgments are not strict, 
there even honest natures grow corrupt” (παρ᾽ οἷς µὲν γὰρ µήτε φυλακὴ µηδεµία τῶν 
τοιούτων καθέστηκε µήθ᾽ αἱ κρίσεις ἀκριβεῖς εἰσι, παρὰ τούτοις µὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰς 
ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν φύσεων). As is the case in Utopia, close surveillance and harsh punishment is 
the primary concern of the Areopagus in the old days, according to Isocrates. See also 
Harding 1994: 208. 
96 Yoran 2005: 8. 
97 Utopia, 112. 
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designed in a way that enables it to last forever, is also evident in the letter de Busleyden’s 
sends to More in 1516. He writes:98 
 
Had [Sparta, Athens and Rome] been founded under the same auspices as your 
commonwealth and governed by the same institutions, laws, regulations and customs, 
certainly they would not now be fallen, levelled to the ground and extinguished – alas! 
– beyond all hope of rebirth. On the contrary, they would now be intact, fortunate and 
prosperous, leading a happy existence…99 
 
This is why the political and legal system of Utopia is set up the way it is: it is (i) to avoid the 
fate of other commonwealths, brought about by inadequate legal systems and political 
regulations, and (ii) “to temper laws which [are] complex and unjust in their application.”100 
There may be no place to hide on the island, and no opportunity to engage in political and 
legal discussion outside the assembly or the senate, but to More, this seems to be a price 
worth paying for the abolition of tyranny and the unfair application of laws. As Logan writes: 
“…there appears to be an inescapable trade-off between the requirements for securing the 
																																								 																				
98 Utopia, 129. It is significant that de Busleyden mentions Sparta first here, rather than 
Athens or Rome. On the one hand, this underlines the influence of Life of Lycurgus on the 
work, and thus also that of Plutarchan political philosophy. On the other hand, it also brings to 
mind the defeat of Sparta at the battle of Leuctra, which left Spartan power shattered. See 
Polybius 4.81.12, “the Lacedaemonians who ever since the legislation of Lycurgus had 
enjoyed the best form of government and had the greatest power until the battle of Leuctra, 
when chance henceforth turned against them, and their system of government instead of 
improving began to go rapidly from bad to worse…” 
99 A similar notion appears in Stat. 297d, where the Stranger, building onto his argument that 
the best government has written laws, says to the Young Socrates, that every government 
must employ the written laws of the best government if they wish to be preserved. This is 
why, he says at 301e, it is always necessary to ‘follow in the track of the perfect government 
by coming together and making written laws.’ 
100 Zilko 1999: 62. Cf. Utopia, 129. See also the letter Guillaume Budé sends to Thomas 
Lupset in 1517 in which he praises the Utopians’ attitude towards legal matters. He believes 
that if the gods could cause Utopian policies “to be fixed by the bolts of strong and settled 
conviction in the minds of all mortals. …The immense weight of all those legal volumes, 
which occupy so many brilliant and solid minds for their whole lifetimes, would suddenly 
turn to empty air, the paper food for worms or used to wrap parcels in shops.” See Utopia, 
121. (Budé might find entertainment in Philocleon’s decision to throw away the voting urns 
and dismiss the jurors at Wasps 1339-41). 
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commonwealth, and the attainment of freedom for its inhabitants…”101 Yoran asserts 
similarly: “for achieving the all-important goal of an egalitarian as well as a stable social 
order, the freedom and even the individuality of the citizens had to be compromised.”102  
 Indeed, the Utopians’ political and legal system does affect the citizens’ individuality 
in that it provides only “minimal scope to individual idiosyncrasy.”103 Greenblatt states 
likewise, “Utopian institutions are cunningly designed to reduce the scope of the ego: avenues 
of self-aggrandizement are blocked, individuation is sharply limited.”104 However, building a 
system that has this kind of impact on the Utopians’ individuality also eliminates the 
possibility for them to adopt readily different disguises. As mentioned earlier, this is one of 
Hythloday’s objections to both royal and legal service – kings and lawyers can adopt, like a 
cloak, an infinite variety of opinions and masks that interfere with the truth and justice of 
law.105 In this way, the succession of kings has “no more value than a stage play, with the 
																																								 																				
101 Logan 1983: 258. See also Logan 1983: 252. 
102 Yoran 2005: 11. 
103 Hexter 1965: ciii. 
104 Greenblatt 1980: 39. This is another aspect of the Utopian constitution that brings to mind 
that of Lycurgus. In the Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa 4.4, Plutarch writes that the 
regulated training of the Spartan youth ensured that “there might be no confusing differences 
in their characters, but that they might be moulded and fashioned from the very outset so as to 
walk harmoniously together in the same path of virtue.” (ὅπως µὴ διάφοροι µηδὲ ταραχώδεις 
γένοιντο τοῖς ἤθεσιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἕν τι κοινὸν ἀρετῆς ἴχνος εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς πλαττόµενοι καὶ 
τυπούµενοι συµβαίνοιεν ἀλλήλοις). 
 Again, as is the case with the other Plutarchan Spartan references in this chapter, it is 
significant to note that Plutarch is offering an idealised version of Sparta that does not 
necessarily relate to the reality of Sparta. 
105 This is also one of the major themes of The History of King Richard the III, i.e. the 
discrepancy between the public appearance and the actual, hidden, motive; and More conveys 
this through theatrical metaphor. As More writes, “and so they said that these matters be 
kings’ games, as it were, stage plays, and for the most part played upon scaffolds, in which 
poor men be but the on-lookers.” Richard III, 73. It also echoes Pico della Mirandola’s 
Oration on the Dignity of Man, which More had translated earlier, which presents “man as an 
essentially rhetorical creature, capable of adopting an infinite variety of disguises rather than 
possessing one unvaried and natural essence.” See Norbrook 2002: 7.  
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various participants simply acting out fictional roles.”106 However, in Utopia, each citizen 
possesses only one, invariable, persona, which makes any type of (tyrannical) role-play 
impossible.107  
At the same time however, though More is well aware of the social, political, and legal 
consequences of tyranny, he is also able to offer a compromise to Hythloday’s protest. While 
he does not necessarily disagree with him, he also believes that the citizens should not “give 
up the ship in a storm because [they] cannot hold back the winds.”108 Instead, he asserts, they 
should employ a civil philosophy (i.e. a philosophy, “suited for the role of the citizen”109) that 
is informed by rhetoric, as it “adapts itself to the drama in hand and acts its part neatly and 
appropriately.”110  
This philosophy is undeniably Ciceronian (see Orator xxxv.123), but it is also 
Aeschylean. It recalls Aeschylus’ ship of state metaphor at PV 150-1 and 186-192, and it also 
brings to mind Oceanus’ warning at PV 308-12, when he tells Prometheus to change his 
																																								 																				
106 Betteridge 2013: 43. 
107 See also Greenblatt 1980: 41 and 62. Cf. Traugott 1961: 551, who states, “the moral 
superiority of the public good over personal and the mutual subjection of the members of the 
commonwealth” are also principles of Swift’s political philosophy. He argues: “Like More’s 
communism, Swift’s principle of ‘mutual subjection’ is an argument against individualism 
and for the common body.” 
 The idea that individuality, and concentration on personal advancement rather than the 
public good, is potentially dangerous, can also be linked back to many Greek political 
treatises. For instance, in Thucydides 2.65.7, the Athenians allow themselves to be taken over 
by private interests and private ambitions and fail to focus on what is good for the country. 
Likewise, 6.15.2-4 shows, how “Alcibiades’ private excesses are coming to compromise the 
city’s welfare” when he hopes to gain personal wealth and favourable reputation by means of 
his successes. Pelling 2000: 53. Again, this reflects More’s disdain for individuals gathering 
wealth (and power) at the expense of others, which also ties into his critique of Richard III 
whose “real crime [according to More] is not legal…but communal. Richard broke the bounds 
of community that, within the tradition of political thought inspired by Aristotle’s thought, are 
the basis of ethical government.” Betteridge 2013: 41. 
108 Utopia, 37. 
109 Utopia, 36. 
110 Utopia, 36. Cf. Traugott 1961: 554-5. “More cared for ‘history’ as an allegorical drama in 
which certain individuals happened to play certain rôles always well-known to the mind that 
examines life.” 
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speech and adapt to the new situation (i.e. Zeus’ regime). Furthermore, it is Aristophanic, 
because at Thesm. 149-52, Agathon tells the relative: χρὴ γὰρ ποιητὴν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ 
δράµατα ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς τρόπους ἔχειν. αὐτίκα γυναικεῖ᾽ ἢν ποιῇ τις δράµατα, 
µετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶµ᾽ ἔχειν. (“To be a poet, a man must suit his behaviour to the 
requirements of his plays. If, say, he’s writing plays about women, his body must partake of 
women’s behaviour”).111 
More exemplifies this idea of a civil philosophy by offering the following analogy 
(which highlights once again the versatility of his text, as he continues to correspond 
elegantly with literary themes from the past in order to achieve true intellectual emulation): 
when a comedy by Plautus is put on, one cannot simply come on stage and start quoting a 
tragedy by Seneca because plays are perverted and ruined when influenced by irrelevant 
speeches. Even if the irrelevant speeches were better than the play itself, continues More, it 
would still “be better to take a silent role than to say something inappropriate and…turn the 
play into a tragicomedy.”112 
Instead, rather than giving “strange and out-of-the-way speeches to people with whom 
they will carry no weight,” one should follow an indirect approach and handle matters as 
tactfully as one can in order to make things “as little bad as possible.”113 This is because, 
More writes, “it is impossible to make everything good unless all men are good, and that I 
																																								 																				
111 Agathon’s point refers to the relative’s disguise and altered speech when he enters the 
women’s sphere, and it emphasises More’s civil philosophy because it shows how man must 
adapt his behaviour to the present set of circumstances. 
112 Utopia, 37. A comparable idea can be found in Lycurgus 19.1, where Lycurgus installs 
into young Spartans the habit of silence, for “intemperance in talking makes discourse empty 
and vapid.” See also Mor. 506c. Cf. David 1999: 119 and Ducat 2006: 36. See Bayliss 2009: 
236-240 for the ‘brevity’ of Spartan speech. The same sentiment appears in Aristophanes’ 
Clouds 960-965 and 1058-9. There is also a fragment of Prometheus Unbound, which may 
allude to a similar notion. πολλοῖς γάρ ἐστι κέρδος ἡ σιγὴ βροτῶν. "For to many mortals 
silence is advantageous.” (Scholia (M B D) to Aelius Aristeides, Oration 3.97). 
113 Utopia, 37. Cf. Wooden 1977: 39.  
	 36	
don’t expect to see for quite a few years yet.”114 However, what can be done in the meantime 
is “to work so as to restrain the vicious and reduce the scope of evil.”115 On the one hand, the 
advice to accept reality in order to make things ‘as little bad as possible’ bears again 
Aeschylean connotations, because it brings to mind the advice Kratos gives to Hephaestus at 
PV 66-8, when he urges him to stop pitying Prometheus because it will only make matters 
worse for himself. On the other hand, this approach also links back to the point made earlier 
about how More’s intention is not to create the best commonwealth of all times but a 
commonwealth that reduces the possibilities of evil as much as possible, especially the ever-
looming threat of tyranny. 
It is, perhaps, due to the somewhat contradictory meanings of these connotations that 
this approach also includes satirical features. Even though More believes that it is impossible 
to make everything good unless everyone is good, he invents a society that “posits a kind of 
golden humanity, faceless and obedient, a race of beings from whose composition all of the 
limited and unpleasant features have been erased.”116 Indeed, as Dudok points out, “… [A] 
model state as such is an utter impossibility; because More does not invent ideal institutions 
for mankind, but an ideal mankind for their institutions.”117 Certainly, this satirises the 
humanist belief in the reforming power of education (and thus also one of the core principles 
of Utopian and Platonic philosophy), as “the obvious practical difficulty with this design is 
																																								 																				
114 Utopia, 37.  
115 Fenlon 1981: 461. Cf. Sylvester 1963: cii. 
 See also the letter Erasmus sends to Ulrich von Hutten in 1516 in which he describes 
More’s optimistic opinion that it is always possible to look at things positively. He writes: 
“There is nothing that occurs in human life, from which [More] does not seek to extract some 
pleasure, although the matter may be serious in itself. If he has to do with the learned and 
intelligent, he is delighted with their cleverness, if with unlearned or stupid people, he finds 
amusement in their folly. He is not offended even by professed clowns, as he adapts himself 
with marvellous dexterity to the tastes of all.”  
116 Wooden 1977: 38. 
117 Dudok 1923: 174.  
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that a fallible, variegated humanity will never conform to it.”118 The kind of idealism that 
More presents here is not teachable; and thus it resembles more the satirical recourses to the 
fantastic we witness in Lucian and Swift, rather than those of actual civil philosophy. (Of 
course, the etymology of the name Utopia highlights this, too. It does spell ‘nowhere,’ after 
all).119 
Nonetheless, More’s principles presented in Utopia (though carried to such an 
illogical extreme that they are hardly feasible), have the double perspective of comic fantasy 
and apt realism; and this approach can also be found in Aristophanes, Plato, and later Swift. 
As Ruskin puts it, “What an infinitely wise – infinitely foolish – book [Utopia] is! Right in all 
it asks – insane, in venturing to ask it, all at once – so making its own wisdom folly for ever 
more.”120 Much like Aristophanic comedy, Platonic dialogues, and Swiftian travel tales, 
Utopia has the potential to combine the wise and the silly (which again echoes its Lucianic 
tone), as it satirises the truth in an entertaining adventure story. The mockery of tyranny (and, 
in More’s case, especially the mockery of Richard III), and the contempt for factionalism and 
individualism clearly inform many passages in Utopia and reflect the author’s disapproval of 
these principles. At the same time, the very solution More proposes is a clever mockery in 
itself because he proposes a new tyrannical system in order to bring an end to the old one.  
																																								 																				
118 Wooden 1977: 38. 
119 It is this idealism, which Swift, according to Nichols, objects to in Gulliver’s Travels. 
Precisely, he argues, “the dangerous propensity of philosophy that Swift criticizes [is] the 
inclination to turn away from humanity in search for perfection.” He portrays in Gulliver “the 
folly of man who tries to stamp out [human] passions under the influence of a mistaken notion 
of virtue and reason.” Nichols 1981: 1169. Indeed, “in his love of the Houyhnhnms, Gulliver 
accepts an idea of perfection which makes it impossible for him either to understand or to 
participate in human life.” Nichols 1981: 1154. Swift’s criticism of his own character recalls 
that of More when he asks Hythloday to adopt a more realistic, and more practical, 
philosophy – one that will work among human beings. 
120 This quotation is taken from a letter John Ruskin sends to Frederick Startridge Ellis in 
1870 to thank him for getting a hold of a copy of Utopia for him. 
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Specifically, the fact that on the Utopian island, the threat of tyranny is exchanged for 
the absence of individual freedom and, more importantly, restricted freedom of political 
speech, is another serio-comic solution to the problem. Certainly, tyrannical systems and 
absolute monarchs do not exist in Utopia – and thus, a serious threat is no longer a concern. 
At the same time, it is questionable whether the Utopian citizens are actually free from this 
concern, or whether they are merely enslaved in another absolute system – and thus, victim to 
a satirical, and paradoxical, interpretation of tyranny. It is clear that their legal and political 
structure leaves no room for the kind of tyranny that More despises, but it certainly includes 
space for many Orwellian measures. This also poses the question: what difference does it 
make whether people are ruled by tyrants who lead with their appetite and interpret laws 
whichever way suits them best, or by constant surveillance, which leaves no room for privacy, 
let alone unrestrained freedom of political speech? In this manner, it is easy to interpret 
Utopia as an absolute state as well; it is merely a different, and in many ways more satirical, 
form of absolutism.121  
Yet, as mentioned on pp. 35-6, More does not actually say that his intention is to 
create the perfect state with Utopia; his goal is to create what is, in his opinion, the best 
possible state in his time, namely a state that does not allow for tyrannical factions to rise to 
power. He presents his serio-comic proposal for solving the problems of his own 
commonwealth, primarily brought about by absolute monarchs, tyrants, and irrelevant 
political speeches, which so happens to include absolute features others might want to abolish 
instead. In a way then, More dismantles the absolutism of his time only to put it back together 
in a different form on the island of Utopia – much like Aristophanes takes apart the Athenian 
																																								 																				
121 As mentioned earlier (cf. p. 13), Wooden goes even so far to argue, “the remedies 
proposed [in Utopia] are more radical, impractical, and destructive than the evils they are 
intended to cure.” Wooden 1977: 43. 
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political and legal system throughout his comedies only to re-assemble it in one way or 
another at the end of the play. Consequently, in a fashion that resembles that of Aristophanes, 
while More’s proposal certainly solves one set of problems, it also gives way to another one 
at the same time. 122 
In this manner, the nature of the question asked above remains complicated, for it is 
questionable whether exchanging one kind of absolutism for another is an adequate solution 
to the problems about which More is concerned. At the same time, it is this potentially 
inadequate, and satirical, solution, paired with a political-philosophical stance, which reflects 
the exact problems More aims to solve. Precisely, it is this mixture of the serious with the 
entertaining, and the ‘speaking truth while he laughs and laughing while he speaks truth,’123 
which seems to characterise More here, that is noteworthy.  It is the serio-comic response that 
is visible throughout Utopia that gives way to a discussion about other possible ways of 
organising society, and the measures people take, and have taken in the past, to solve the 
various social, political, and legal problems of their time.  
 
	
IV. Utopia in relation to ancient and modern political thought  
 
I mention above (p. 8) that Aristophanes, and ancient Greek culture in general, often 
turns to animals in times of crisis and in situations that bear new beginnings.124 For instance, 
in Birds, Peisetaerus and Euelpides decide to leave Athens and live with the birds in order to 
escape lawsuits, debts and litigiousness – indeed, the proto-pastoral lifestyle of the birds 
																																								 																				
122 At the same time, looking at this from a slightly different point of view, this also links 
back to More’s use of the ship of state metaphor: a counsellor should never give up because 
even though he may not be able to secure the good, he may at least be able to reduce the bad. 
123 Erasmus, Epistolae I, 425.45-426.46. Cf. Thompson 1974: li-lii. 
124 On the possible relation of Aesop’s animal fables to the formation of states and creation of 
urban spaces, see Bloch 2004. Bloch primarily focuses on the twelfth-century, but his article 
makes many important points which are applicable to fifth-century Greece as well. 
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(already tested and approved by Tereus) seems to offer much more than life in Athens ever 
could. Likewise, in Plutarch’s Gryllus, Gryllus declines Odysseus’ offer to convince Circe to 
transform him back into a human being; he prefers being a pig because animals enjoy a much 
more virtuous way of life than human beings do. Comparably, Lucretius argues that the world 
is not created for human beings, or for their comfort, so ‘riddled is it with faults.’125 On the 
contrary, if it is made for anyone then it is animals because they are more self-sufficient and 
much better adapted to it than human beings are.126 Additionally, in Lucian’s Gallus, the 
rooster shows Micyllus that life is not as bad as he thinks it is, and that he is better off in 
poverty than in wealth. In this vein, we are also intended “to learn moral lessons from 
Aesop’s animal fables: to learn from the animals”127 who so often have a much better 
understanding of our merits and faults than we do. 
As Aristotle notes, “If, however, there is anyone who holds that the study of the 
animals is an unworthy pursuit, he ought to go further and hold the same opinion about the 
study of himself” (εἰ δέ τις τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων θεωρίαν ἄτιµον εἶναι νενόµικε, τὸν 
αὐτὸν τρόπον οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ).128  Certainly, “animals are good to think with,”129 
and this is true not just for antiquity but also for the subsequent time-periods. Animals often, 
																																								 																				
125 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.181. 
126 Lucretius, 5.195-234.  
127 Campbell 2014: xvi. 
128 Aristotle, Part. An. 645a. 
129 Campbell 2014: xv. Campbell (ed.) 2014, The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical 
Thought and Life, is one of the latest works on animals in ancient intellectual culture. Other 
recent studies include Kurhonen and Ruonakoski (eds.) 2017, Human and Animal in Ancient 
Greece: Empathy and Encounter in Classical Literature; Johnston, Mastrocinque, and 
Papaioannou (eds.) 2016, Animals in Greek and Roman Religion and Myth. Proceedings of 
the Symposium Grumentinum Grumento Nova (Potenza), 5-7 June 2013; Kalof (ed.) 2007, A 
Cultural History of Animals in Antiquity, Vol. 1; Frizell (ed.) 2004, Pecus: Man and Animal in 
Antiquity, Proceedings of the conference at the Swedish Institute in Rome, September 9-12, 
2002. See also Bell and Naas (eds.) 2015, Plato’s Animals: Gadflies, Horses, Swans, and 
Other Philosophical Beasts for a discussion of the role animal metaphors, allusions, 
analogies, and images play in the Platonic dialogues.  
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reflectively, offer insight into human institutions (especially, the political, legal, and social 
ones) and, by doing so, give way to two important questions: what makes human beings 
human, and how do we differ from other animals? This is especially the case for accounts 
which grant speech to animals and which endow them with the faculty of a human mind. For 
in awarding these abilities to animals, these stories “draw attention to questions about what 
differentiates human from animal by manipulating a standard marker of the boundary between 
the two categories.”130 They thus provide the ideal textual space to examine questions 
pertaining to the qualities, habits, and culpabilities of human beings.  
Additionally, animals often provide an escape to a fantastic world, which is at least 
initially separate from the one the author, or character, seeks to leave behind. For example, 
Lemuel Gulliver, similarly to Gryllus, is unable to find true happiness among the human 
society after his journey to the Houyhnhnms who possess far more virtue and wisdom than he 
could ever find in any human being. Indeed, to Gulliver, “the perfectly rational social order is 
not a human society but a mythical animal one.”131 In this vein, as Traugott aptly puts it, 
“rather than shipwreck our imaginations on Circe’s island, Swift suggests that we might 
discover her pigs in our own parlors.”132 Similarly, Orwell asserts, “humour is the debunking 
of humanity, and nothing is funny except in relation to human beings. Animals…are…funny 
because they are caricatures of ourselves.”133 Drawing from these points, I argue that the 
finding of a truth about our own world (and of that of the protagonist) in the everyday life in a 
(seemingly) fantastic realm is not only “Swift’s principal satiric device – and philosophic 
statement,”134 but also that of Aristophanes, More, Orwell, Wells, and Gilman. More 
																																								 																				
130 Lefkowitz 2014: 1. 
131 Higgins 1983: 529. 
132 Traugott 1961: 559. 
133 Orwell 1945, Funny, but not Vulgar. 
134 Traugott 1961: 559. 
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specifically, I show in this thesis that, if we connect the strands of these individual works, it 
becomes clear that they all reveal a notion of reality which treats life, as the authors and 
characters know it, as an allegory in a serio-comic manner. 
Furthermore, I demonstrate that in virtually every story mentioned here, the fantastic 
realms and countries which are explored, recall those that are left behind at the beginning of 
the account in one way or another. Νεφελοκοκκυγία starts to bear strong resemblance to 
Athens when Peisetaerus and Euelpides impose capricious law-codes and death penalties on 
its citizens, the birds. They, in turn, begin to resemble Athenian citizens, as they are swayed 
by empty rhetoric and promises Peisetaerus is unlikely to keep. Gryllus experiences 
flashbacks of the time he was a human being when Odysseus visits him on Aiaia, and when 
he juxtaposes the human world with that of the animals in order to convince his former 
companion that life is much better as a pig. Gulliver, meanwhile, is disgusted by the habits of 
the Yahoos because they remind him of human beings far too much for his liking; they are 
incapable of living up to the calm and rational society of the horses of which he thinks so 
highly. (And this clearly brings to mind Orwell’s point made in Funny, but not Vulgar, that 
“comic verse…often depends on building up a fantastic universe which is just similar enough 
to the real universe to rob it of its dignity”). Furthermore, in Animal Farm, it is clear that both 
the animals and their farm humanize over the course of the story, to the extent that at the end 
of the narrative it is impossible to distinguish them from their human neighbours. 
In this way, animals are indeed ‘good to think with,’ because the fantastic and satiric 
representation of them, their minds, and their habits in a strange and, often, faraway land, 
offers a fable for our time through which certain political, legal, and social concerns can be 
displayed all too clearly. Higgins writes similarly, “the…order of the Houyhnhnms may be 
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unattainable but it remains as a perpetual reproach to moderns.”135 As noted above, the same 
can be said for the other animal societies presented here. In Birds, this is accentuated by the 
fact that the comedy features animal characters in their own rights rather than a mere animal 
chorus, as is, for example, the case in Frogs; and in Gryllus and Animal Farm, it is made clear 
by the point that the animals voice clearly which kind of life they actually want. The same is, 
of course, also true for Aesop’s fables, which clearly portray animals who have language, 
societal expectations, assemblies, and an understanding of politics. 
 The idea that the order of the Houyhnhnms, and those of the other animal societies, 
remains a reproach to modernity is significant; and it applies to the texts, which do not feature 
animals but women, or female characters, as the ‘Other’ as well. As I show in this 
dissertation, like the portrayal of (comic) animals, the (satiric) representation of women in 
state ideology and legal discourse grants a mode of investigating the problems of both 
antiquity and modernity. This is as true for Aristophanes’ comedies and Herodotus’ histories 
as it is for modern accounts of females proposing another possible way of organising society. 
Again, the travel theme, or the fictitious recourse to an alternate world, is relevant, as is the 
serio-comic narrative style of Utopia.136   
Like Lucian, Aristophanes can be related to More and Swift when it comes to satirical 
portrayals of the political situation of his time. He goes further than More because he is, I 
believe, ultimately more of a satirist than More is, but does not go quite as far as Swift does, 
since his plays do not take the audience on actual voyages that far away. Furthermore, they 
																																								 																				
135 Higgins 1983: 531. 
136 On a discussion of both ancient and modern interpretations of the Amazon myth, see 
especially Blok 1995, who, in the first part of her book, situates representations of the 
Amazons within modern historiography.  On the ancient idea of matriarchy and women in 
charge in Greek tradition, see for example Pembroke 1967 and Vidal-Naquet 1986. Moreover, 
for discussions of utopian and comic fiction in Aristophanic comedy, see Zeitlin 1999a and 
1999b, Zumbrunnen 2006, and Ruffell 2011. 
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lack the descriptions of the customs and way of life in other societies (this is more Herodotus’ 
style). Nonetheless, the two comedies which are especially relevant when discussing women 
in charge, namely Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae, do offer an escape to differently organised 
societies, despite the fact that they take place at home in Athens.137 Specifically, both plays 
feature a topsy-turvy world, namely a world that is, (at least for the majority of the plays), 
shaped by a form of gynaecocracy with reversed gender roles. In this vein, like Hythloday’s 
and Gulliver’s physical voyages, Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae present to the audience a world 
of comic reversal, which is, like the meaning of the full title of Utopia, both an entertaining 
liberation from the established order and a self-reflective mirror, which shows the problems of 
the very society it aims to amuse.  
Likewise, Herodotus’ description of Argos as a strange and upside-down world where 
the female has overcome the male, and his depiction of the Amazons as self-sufficient warrior 
women, take the reader on a journey to differently organised societies that recalls the travel 
theme seen in More and Swift.138 The same is true for Apollonius of Rhodes’ portrayal of the 
Lemnian women, who are, at least temporarily, in charge of Lemnos. Moreover, “on each of 
																																								 																				
137 Thesmophoriazusae is another comedy which needs to be mentioned here because it also 
portrays female characters engaging with Athenian state ideology. Particularly, by referring to 
themselves as demos in the play, the women draw up a symbolic city wall in the 
Thesmophorian sanctuary, away from the real demos, thus demarcating their own community. 
Their experiences with religious festivals serve as a foundation for this community and their 
religious gatherings as a foundation for their demos’ assemblies. The legal and political 
character of the comedy reaches its zenith in lines 331-71 where the women list the laws and 
customs of their community, which appear to be a blend of religious and civic elements. 
Moreover, they begin to emerge as a debating society which resembles the Athenian 
assembly, which is especially clear in lines 352-71 where the chorus’ prayer recalls political 
rhetoric off stage.   
138 Herodotus 6.77. See also Plutarch de Mul. Virt. 4.245, where he tells the story of Telesilla 
who orders the women of Argos to defend the city and dresses them in men’s clothes. This is 
the origin of a festival called Hybristika, which commemorates the women’s courage and 
during which men and women wear each other’s dress. See Pausanias 2.20.8-9 for a different 
version of that story where Telesilla calls upon everyone, not just women, to defend the city, 
including old men and slaves. 
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Gulliver’s voyages we are given a particular account of education, learning, and marriage 
customs in the societies visited,”139 and often these observations are compared to the ones 
Gulliver makes in his own home. Hythloday makes use of the same method when he tells his 
audience about Utopia, and it is clear that Herodotus uses it too. Certainly, Herodotus’ 
accounts are intended to be more historical than More’s and Swift’s, and he does not employ 
satire, ridicule, allegory, and the fantastic with the same dexterity than they do (although he 
does come close in some passages), mainly because this is not his aim. The general travel 
theme, however, and the general storytelling of the customs of strange, and often remote, 
societies, which echo those of others, does connect these works.  
Furthermore, I argue that the (utopian) travel theme continues to connect these ancient 
works with certain modern accounts which tell relatable stories. In Herland, Gilman explores 
questions pertaining to the political and social order of her time by imagining a nation of 
women in a remote mountain pathway whose only pass to the outside world has been sealed 
off a long time ago. As is the case with Herodotus’ Amazons, who live more or less among 
themselves until the Scythian men come along, and Praxagora, who seeks to keep the outside 
world out by transforming Athens into one big household, and the Lemnian myth and rite, the 
plot of Herland requires the exclusion from the world outside.140 More importantly, this 
exclusion comes to an abrupt halt when three male explorers make their way into Herland.  
																																								 																				
139 Higgins 1983: 518. 
140 This recalls one of the fundamental concepts of Utopia and Lycurgus’ Sparta where the 
focus is on the society within, rather than the world outside. 
 In regards to the Lemnian rite, every year, in order to commemorate the crime of the 
Lemnian women, all fires on Lemnos were extinguished for nine days. During that time, no 
ship was allowed to land on the island but at the end of the nine-day period, a ship bearing 
new fire from Delos arrived and distributed the flame all over Lemnos. This fire was 
associated with restoration, which in turn was supposed to indicate the arrival of new life on 
the island. See Martin 1987: 89. See also Dumézil 1924: 37-39 and Burkert 1970: 6.  
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I demonstrate in this thesis that the men’s arrival sets in motion an important plot 
point of the story, namely the juxtaposition of matriarchy and patriarchy; this is also the case 
in the ancient accounts. I show that this juxtaposition is an entertaining and effective method 
of illuminating not only the fifth-century fascination with other ways of organising society 
and gender-relations but also that of the twentieth-century. In a recent talk called Women in 
Power, given at the London Review of Books Winter Lecture, Mary Beard both started and 
ended with Herland because:141 
 
it nicely raises some of the topics that [are] on the agenda [here] – from imaginary 
communities of women doing things their way to bigger questions of knowing how we 
recognise female power under the sometimes funny and sometimes honestly 
frightening stories that we tell ourselves about female power, and indeed have told 
ourselves about it in the West at least for thousands of years. 
 
Indeed, as is the case in Animal Farm, which brings to mind many of the concerns raised in 
Aristophanes’ Birds, Herland re-addresses some of the points made in Lysistrata and 
Ecclesiazusae as well as in Herodotus’ account of the Amazons and Apollonius’ version of 
the myth of the Lemnian women. In this manner, I argue that, like the animal fictions, 
Herland, in conjunction with its ancient counterparts, raises important questions about the 
merits and faults of female power and, as Beard points out, about the ‘sometimes funny and 
sometime frightening’ aspects with which female power is associated. More importantly, it 
highlights a phenomenon, which shapes, either directly or indirectly, the comedies, the 
																																								 																				
141 Beard, Women in Power, London Review of Books Winter Lecture, 6 March 2017. I 
listened to Beard’s lecture after both this part of the introduction and the section on Herland 
had been written. I am pleased to say that we have both, independently of one another, 
decided to use Herland (and its sequel With Her in Ourland) and compare it to ancient 
accounts of ‘women in power.’ I revised both sections appropriately and included aspects of 
her talk in order to acknowledge my debt to her, where her research has enhanced my own. 
Meanwhile, her new book, Women & Power: A Manifesto, came out shortly before I 
submitted this thesis, and after everything had been written, and therefore could not be 
considered. 
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historical account, and the myth: gynaecocratic leaderships are ephemeral, and the eventual 
return to a more patriarchal social order is inevitable. In this vein, I demonstrate that both the 
ancient and modern texts end up giving way to an expression, and even justification, of the 
inescapable reality of the patriarchal status quo, which looms over the characters’ heads 
throughout the story.  
 In this way, the discussion of female societies continues to join the dialogue presented 
in the analyses of the animal communities and Utopia. It shows that instead of enabling us to 
leave behind perceptions of our own world, the fantastic realms guide us towards them yet 
again as soon as we have spent some time there, which in turn makes clear that, often, strange 
and faraway lands are not as strange and faraway as they may seem. Additionally, I show that 
both the ancient and the modern accounts of women in power all share the same basic pattern: 
at one point in each story, women rule and men have either vanished, sunk to the bottom of 
the hierarchy, or are otherwise unimportant. In each narrative, things go well for a while – 
sometimes even for two-thousand years, as is the case in Herland. Eventually, however, chaos 
ensues, caused by either men’s absence or female rule in general. The solution to the problem 
is the same in nearly all accounts: reunite men and women and renew the patriarchal status 
quo, at least on a social level.142 In this manner, as is the case in Birds and Animal Farm, the 
audience is taken home at the end of the tale. 
These endings may be disappointing to some, but they also have the potential to point 
at something else. Specifically, I argue that the collective power of these narratives portray 
not only women and animals at times of crisis and at moments of foundation and revolution 
																																								 																				
142 Granted, in Ecclesiazusae, this does not exactly happen because the play ends with a 
celebration of the gynaecocratic regime. However, I suggest that the comparison with other 
ancient accounts allows us to propose that the same return to the status quo will eventually 
take place in the comedy as well, even if it does not happen within the actual timeframe of the 
play. 
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but they also play into the historic conflict between matriarchal and patriarchal regimes, and 
into the continuous conflict between different (and often unsuccessful) proposals for the (re-) 
structuring of society. Like Utopia and Gulliver’s Travels, these stories are then assimilated to 
a debate about not only democracy, different types of social orders with alternative leadership 
styles, and various attempts to refine law, but also about which political system is ultimately 
the best one. Furthermore, I argue that these stories imply that the past is inevitably contained 
in the future, as we are presented with ever-recurring cycles of political conflict. I will 
demonstrate in this thesis that this is done by portraying either the return to a previously 
discarded social order or by showing the recurrence of political and legal problems, which 
cannot seem to be avoided no matter no hard one may try. 
 The last point is elaborated especially well by the dismantlement of society seen in 
Aristophanes’ Birds, Lysistrata, and Ecclesiazusae, Plato’s Statesman, Timaeus, and Critias 
as well as More’s Utopia, Wells’ The Time Machine and Orwell’s Animal Farm. For 
example, in the myth of the reversed cosmos in the Statesman, the Stranger demonstrates that 
political conflicts perpetually repeat themselves by showing that the cosmos exchanges (a) for 
(b) on a regular basis, and that we are subject to an eternal cycle of reversal of times. 
Likewise, in the Timaeus and the Critias we hear a story about an Athens that undergoes 
recurrent periods of foundation and destruction. Similarly, Wells’ time traveller observes 
things that remind him of the past when travelling several hundred-thousand years into the 
future: the buildings he sees in the year 802,701 remind him of those of the Phoenicians and 
the Sphinx. Furthermore, as already stated above, both Aristophanes and More may take apart 
their respective polities over the course of their stories but they always put them back together 
once they reach the end of the story; and often the characters end up right where they started. 
It is clear that the same concept applies to Orwell’s Animal Farm: at the end of the tale, the 
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animals’ farm is undistinguishable from the one they seek to reform at the beginning of the 
account.  
 In addition to the anniversaries listed earlier, these points continue to pull the strands 
of the ancient and modern texts together because they all show seemingly unbreakable 
political and social cycles, continuous oscillation and re-evaluation of the law, and characters 
who always seem to end up right where they started. The emphasis is, as stated earlier, on 
rhetoric, especially legal language (and the misuse thereof) of characters who either 
systematically exploit and manipulate a collective people (represented by animals and female 
characters) for their own advantage or who offer a satirical solution to certain political and 
social problems, which is grounded in the legal language of their time. I argue that this 
emphasis continues to show that it is not hard to find parallels between their time and our 
own, where deceptive rhetoric is under increasing scrutiny worldwide, as is the question who 
has the right to speak and who does not. It also shows, in another timely manner, that the right 
to speak does not necessarily include the ability (and willingness) to contribute effectively to 
political debate, and that skilful articulate speech is often at risk of being silenced or 
dismissed as inept.143  
 As stated at the beginning of this section, I aim to demonstrate in this thesis the ways 
in which the ancient and modern texts can be compared, particularly in important political, 
																																								 																				
143 In many important ways, the unwillingness and inability to contribute effectively to 
political discourse is more Huxleyan than Orwellian. Postman writes: “What Orwell feared 
were those who would ban books. What Huxley feared was that there would be no reason to 
ban a book, for there would be no one who wanted to read one. Orwell feared those who 
would deprive us of information. Huxley feared those who would give us so much that we 
would be reduced to passivity and egoism. Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed 
from us. Huxley feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance. Orwell feared we 
would become a captive culture. Huxley feared we would become a trivial culture, 
preoccupied with some equivalent of the feelies, the orgy porgy, and the centrifugal 
bumblepuppy…In short, Orwell feared that what we hate will ruin us. Huxley feared that 
what we love will ruin us.” Postman 1985: xix-xx. 
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juridical, and rhetorical respects. I do this in order to examine how different characters 
respond to, and engage with, different forms of power in an environment that at least begins 
as democratic. As pointed out earlier, I argue that this study enables us to trace not only the 
development of (Western) political thought over the last two-thousand years but also to 
challenge and interrogate difficult political, juridical, and rhetorical problems, which seem to 




V. Synopsis of the thesis 
  
I begin my discussion in the first chapter, ‘Rhetorical Paradigms and Cyclical Themes 
in Aeschylus, Plato, and Wells,’ by examining the theme of change and notions of ascent and 
descent in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Vinctus. Looking at the characters’ rhetoric, I argue that, 
while Zeus may be the legitimate ruler in the tragedy, his rule is not eternal and will be altered 
in the next play, Prometheus Unbound. I then analyse the ascent of man to which the play 
clearly refers and the Protagorean reliance on the human intellect, rather than on a divine 
anchor, that simultaneously arises with mankind. The sophistic view that human intellect is 
self-sufficient leads on to a series of questions, such as ‘how should we live?’ and ‘what does 
it mean for our political, legal, and social system when we rely exclusively on reason and 
rhetoric?’ The significance of these questions is especially highlighted by the discussions 
about rhetoric and political existence found in the Gorgias, the Statesman, the Protagoras, the 
Timaeus, and the Critias. 
In particular, the analysis of the themes found in PV feeds into a discussion of Plato’s 
critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias; the importance of the myth of the reversed cosmos and the 
ways in which different factions engage with one another in the Statesman; the consequences 
	 51	
of the limits of human reason in the Protagoras; and the significance of the recurrent cycles 
of ascent and descent in the Timaeus and the Critias. I end the chapter with a discussion of 
Wells’ The Time Machine, which not only continues to highlight the idea that we are subject 
to recurrent circles, but also offers a symbolic answer to the question what might happen 
when we fail to acknowledge the boundaries of the human intellect.  
 The second chapter, ‘Rhetorical Strategies and State Formation in Aristophanes and 
Orwell,’ begins with an analysis of Tereus’ and Peisetaerus’ use of distinct political rhetoric 
in Aristophanes’ Birds, which enables the construction of νεφελοκοκκυγία. Looking at 
Tereus’ role as a Greek teacher (influenced by his tragic past), I argue that he serves as an 
agent of speech who decides who has the right to speak and who does not, which allows him 
to create a window into the gap between the right to speak and the right to be heard. The birds 
are able to speak Greek; however, they neither use that skill to defend themselves nor to 
unravel the real meaning behind Peisetaerus’ flattering rhetoric. Instead, they are swayed by 
deceptive speech, which leads them to accept Peisetaerus’ proposal optimistically, not 
knowing that it will not bode well for all of them.  
 In the subsequent sections of chapter 2, I analyse the problematic nature of the law 
code of νεφελοκοκκυγία. It is not clear whether the birds’ laws are based on an ancient law 
code (as Peisetaerus claims they are) or whether Peisetaerus creates them on a whim. These 
uncertainties contribute to the dubious and, potentially, arbitrary legal structure of the birds’ 
city. However, I also show how these uncertainties (in true Aristophanic style) are balanced 
by a great comic sense, which offers the opportunity to laugh at utter human failure in a way 
that is distressed by an equally great sense of despair.  
In this way, Aristophanes’ Birds is comparable with Orwell’s Animal Farm: like the 
comic playwright, Orwell satirically exposes false optimism and the oxymoronic nature of 
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tyranny by portraying animals who are unable to question political decrees properly, rashly 
surrender power, and who fall victim to leaders who misuse rhetoric. Additionally, both 
Aristophanes and Orwell express that exchanging one political system for another is not 
necessarily a positive undertaking because it only contributes to the, often negative, 
oscillation of law-making and continuous regeneration of politics.  
The use (and misuse) of rhetoric to influence a specific community feeds into the 
discussion presented in the third chapter, ‘Female Deliberative Rhetoric and State Ideology in 
Aristophanes and Gilman.’ I begin by analysing the way in which Lysistrata rallies the 
women to announce that the future of Greece is in their hands, and continue by examining the 
dialogue between Lysistrata and the Proboulos. I argue that their exchange emerges as a 
political spectacle, where one side fails to understand the other, which brings to mind real 
political speeches off stage that are also informed by miscomprehension and 
miscommunication. Like the moral of Birds and Animal Farm, their dialogue makes clear that 
the masses must not fall prey to empty rhetoric but that they must learn to see rhetoric for 
what it really is.   
In the next part of chapter 3, I analyse the misuse of rhetoric in Ecclesiazusae and 
show how Praxagora appropriates masculine rhetorical strategies in order to exploit feelings 
of discomfort caused by problematic Athenian political affairs. While Lysistrata also adopts 
male political discourse, I argue that Praxagora’s rhetoric is ultimately more destructive 
because it alters the fundamental nature of Athens, at least temporarily. Furthermore, I 
demonstrate that Praxagora uses legal language which is anchored deeply in the political and 
legal world of early fourth-century Athens. This demonstration is important because it shows, 
in combination with an analysis of the changes made to the Athenian legal system in the late 
fifth and early fourth-century, that the foundation of Praxagora’s regime, while dubious in 
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some ways, is not quite as illegitimate as it may seem and therefore might just work, at least 
in theory.  
In the subsequent sections of chapter 3, I assert that the ending of Ecclesiazusae 
recalls many of the points made earlier: the Athenians accept a political proposal full of 
discomforting indications, which imply that Praxagora is not the great leader she claims she is 
but yet another scoundrel. Nonetheless, I also argue that the language of Blepyrus suggests 
that Praxagora’s regime is bound to fail and that power will eventually go back to the 
Athenian men. I emphasise this point by examining other stories which depict women in 
charge (specifically, Herodotus’ account of the Amazons and Apollonius’ version of the myth 
of the Lemnian women), which portray temporary gynaecocracies, and which suggest that 
Praxagora’s rule is ephemeral as well. 
I end the chapter with a discussion of Herland, which highlights my argument that a 
return to origins is unavoidable. I show that Gilman, like Aristophanes, More and Orwell, 
dismantles her own society, which, both entertainingly and unsettlingly, points at its 
shortcomings. By portraying three male explorers in a gynaecocratic setting, she juxtaposes 
matriarchy and patriarchy and, as is the case in Herodotus and Aristophanes, she looks at both 
concepts through the eyes of the ‘Other.’ I further argue that Gilman is interested in 
envisioning a better world, which is established by the integration of different polarities.  
However, as is the case in the other texts, this integration is not as balanced as she hopes it 
will be, for it once again brings everything back to the world it seeks to escape at the 
beginning of the story.  
I conclude the thesis not by recapitulating everything that has been said, but rather by 
showing how the cyclical movements discussed in it are still of relevance today, and how the 
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powers and limitations of rhetoric are still just as troublesome in modern political discourse, 


























CHAPTER 1  




I. The cyclical nature of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Vinctus   
  
 This chapter examines the theme of change and circular notions of ascent and descent 
which characterise this thesis in fundamental ways, and it explores the underlying reasons 
behind these movements. I examine political change, legal reforms, and rhetoric in Aeschylus, 
Plato, and Wells and draw from different epistemologies (tragedy, philosophy, and science 
fiction) in order to present case studies that go to the root of the political and legal issues 
analysed in the next chapters. I show that these cases are informed by the virtues and vices of 
rhetoric, its powers and its limitations, and similar oscillating elements found in law-making 
and political debate. In this vein, they inform the comparative literary approach of this thesis, 
as they present parallels between political upheavals across time and space.  
 The inevitability of change is a central theme in Prometheus Vinctus. Like the political 
imagery in More’s Utopia, which, as discussed in the introduction, expresses part of the 
Greek legacy to Western culture, the imagery in PV echoes not only the past and the present 
but it also foreshadows the future. Especially, the talk of the new regime and the annulment of 
the previous one, as well as the allusions to Zeus eventually suffering shipwreck, are all part 
of a cycle. It is a cycle which recalls the assertions made in the introduction, namely that the 
past is inexorably contained in the future and that law oscillates continuously. In Zeus’ case, 
this means that what he has done (i.e. dissolve the former regime and establish new laws) will 
be done to him as well at some point. In this vein, the imagery in PV also belongs to the wider 
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categories of ascent and descent, both of which embody cyclical features reminiscent of the 
other.144   
 The imagery of ascent and descent is accentuated especially well when we situate the 
figures of Zeus and Prometheus in the tragedy in the centre of a trilogy. It is clear that the 
scholarly debate regarding the question whether or not there was a trilogy, and which play 
was at the beginning and which at the end, is large and difficult, mostly because of lost 
information and the poor state of the existing evidence.145 However, I am inclined to agree 
with Griffith who argues that there once was a trilogy consisting of Prometheus Firebearer 
(Pyrphoros), Prometheus Bound, and Prometheus Unbound – and in the following 
paragraphs, I presume that this really was the case, and also in that order.146 Drawing from 
																																								 																				
144 See Lebeck 1971: 1, who uses similar terms when describing the imagery in the Oresteia. 
145 Cf. Mossman 1996: 61. 
146 Griffith 1983: 281-4. Cf. Pohlenz 1930: 72: “Danach müssen wir schließen, daß der 
Pyrphoros, der sicher mit den beiden andren Stücken verbunden war, nicht den Fackelträger 
bedeutete sondern den Feuerbringer, und daß er nicht das letzte sondern das erste Stück der 
Trilogie bildete.” (Cf. Pohlenz 1930: 70-1). He refutes the Scholia on Prometheus 94, which 
asserts that Pyrphoros was the third play, and Westphal 1869: 222, who argues that πυρφόρος 
refers to the festival of the Prometheia at the end of the trilogy because elsewhere it ‘always 
means ‘equipped with fire’ or ‘carrying a torch’. Cf. Herington 1963a: 189 and 1963b: 242. 
 Yet, says Fitton-Brown 1959: 52, “that does not prove that it means it here, for 
Euripides’ title ‘Ιππόλυτος Στεφανηφόρος surely means not ‘Hippolytus Garlanded’, 
‘equipped with a garland’, but ‘Hippolytus bringing the garland’…in any case, the Greek for 
‘fire-bringing’ is presumably πυρφόρος. Since titles, ancient and modern, and whether chosen 
by the author or another, are designed to capture the salient feature or scene for identification 
purposes, Purphoros would perhaps be applied most naturally to the bringing of fire to man at 
the beginning of the story.” See also West 1979: 131. 
 Winnington-Ingram 1983: 188 argues that PV is the first play, because “the whole 
technique of exposition is appropriate only to the first play of a trilogy;” but in my opinion 
that view does not provide us with a satisfying sequence of events. Further, I am not sure 
whether Prometheus Pyrphoros can convincingly be linked to the satyr-drama Prometheus 
Pyrkaeus, produced together with Persians in 472 (Sommerstein 2008: 439; Dodds 1973: 39).  
I am neither convinced by the idea of a Prometheus dilogy (West 1994: 131) nor by 
the view that PV was an independent play (Yoon 2016), because it would disturb the sequence 
noted in n. 147, which (in my opinion) informs the drama. I do believe that Pohlenz, Fitton-
Brown, West, and Griffith make a convincing case when they argue for a Prometheia trilogy 
and when they place Prometheus Pyrphoros at the beginning of it and PV in the centre. This 
also fits in with the trilogy’s theme of ascent and descent. 
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this assumption, we can make the following general assertions: the story begins with the rise 
of Prometheus (and mankind), and the fall of Zeus (in that he loses exclusive rights to fire) in 
the first play. It continues with the fall of Prometheus and the rise of Zeus (as new tyrant) in 
the second play; and the third play portrays Prometheus’ rise and Zeus’ fall (in that his plans 
to rule as an autocrat are thwarted).147 Again, the cyclical and oscillatory imagery is evident, 
and it is this imagery (which I will discuss in more detail below) that enables us to at least try 
“to make sense of patterns of events.”148 This in turn underlines one of the main rationales of 
this thesis, as outlined in the introduction.  
 When looking closely, it is clear that there is also a sequence of ascending and 
descending cycles within PV itself, which adds to the general assertions made above. 
Specifically, the descent of Prometheus is pointed out in lines 8-9; 96-7; 248-256; 409; 474; 
561-608; 999; 1007-1035; 1050-3; 1071-93, and the rise of Zeus in lines 12-13 and 402-5. 
The following lines simultaneously point at Prometheus’ descent and Zeus’ ascent: 146-151 
and 304-11; and these ones concurrently allude to Prometheus’ ascent and Zeus’ fall (or, 
compromise) in the third play: 189 and 522-5. Furthermore, Zeus’ fall is exclusively alluded 
to in lines 167; 171-3; 518; 760; 909-10; 930-1; 948, while lines 938-4 emphasise both his 
rise and eventual fall at the same time. Prometheus’ ascent, meanwhile, is noted in lines 213; 
325-339; 507-10 and 772 while lines 270-8 reinforce both his ascent and descent at the same 
																																								 																				
147 In this vein, “on Griffith’s analysis the trilogy would present us with a satisfying sequence: 
(first play) Crime: (second play): Punishment: (third play) Regeneration.” Mossman 1996: 61-
2 n. 15. West 1979: 132 argues likewise: “if Pyrph. came first, it dealt with Prometheus‘ theft 
of fire. The play of the trilogy was then Crime-Punishment-Reconciliation. This, and not 
Punishment-Reconciliation- (?), is surely the scheme that would naturally have occurred to 
the poet.” See also Pohlenz 1930: 71. 
148 Lakoff and Turner 1989: 159. “…Prometheus’ emotional movement from despair to 
renewed self-respect,” which can be traced in PV, also belongs to the rubric of ascent and 
descent. Mossman 1996: 62. 
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time. Lastly, man’s ascent is stated in lines 248-256 (at the same time as Prometheus’ descent 
is mentioned), 436-471, 476-506 and 613-4. 
 These sequences reinforce both the recurrent patterns of events as well as the theme of 
change, both of which characterise the trilogy. ‘Ascent’ and ‘descent’, as seen above, are 
scattered across the tragedy with virtually no separation; they are constantly stated 
simultaneously in regards to different characters while referring to past, present and future 
events. These references, which are situated within the oscillatory patterns of the play, are 
also part of a bigger imagery that has especially to do with mankind. Precisely, they are part 
of the imagery that informs the question, ‘how should we live,’ which then ties into the 
intellectual enquiries seen in fifth- and fourth-century Greece and into social and political 
theory in general.149 The event that serves as the catalyst for that question is man’s ascent 
from a cave-dwelling being to an articulate political thinker, triggered by Prometheus in the 
first play of the trilogy. 
 In an often-cited passage in Diogenes Laertius, Protagoras states: ‘man is the measure 
of all things’ (πάντων χρηµάτων µέτρον ἄνθρωπος).150 Hall argues, “Oedipus in Oedipus 
Tyrannus and Creon in Antigone might both have been listening to Protagoras when they 
assume that they can rely exclusively on their own, human intelligence in order to solve major 
problems of statecraft.”151 I think Prometheus might have been listening as well, as it is clear 
that the temporary defeat of Zeus in the first play, set in motion by Prometheus’ gifts to 
mankind, affects the role the gods play in human development. For along with mankind’s 
																																								 																				
149 Cf. Hall 2010a: 174. 
150 Diogenes Laertius, 9.8.51. Cf. Plato, Theaet. 152a. 
151 Hall 2010a: 179. Cf. Farrar 1988: 48, “the point [for Protagoras] was not to argue for a 
different account of the world…but to claim that truth and knowledge are grounded in human 
experience, and relative to human concerns.” See also Farrar 1988: 49, “for Protagoras, man 
the measurer is both what we would call a ‘sensing’ and a ‘judging’ being, and his standard is 
his own…” 
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ascent, their assumption that it is sufficient to trust their human intellect alone and nothing 
else arises as well. Herrick writes:152 
  
 this assumption marks a profound change in thought, for it indicates that the Greek 
 public gradually rejected the idea that human destiny was shaped by the gods, and 
 accepted in its place a new notion: human destiny is shaped by human rationality and 
 persuasive speech. 
 
This unadulterated (Protagorean) trust in the human intellect poses more questions, namely 
whether “that social development [that follows from it] has any fixed foundations, is actually 
beneficial, or offers any insight into how humans ought to behave. If there is no place for the 
gods in human development, what kind of anchor can there be for Greek ethics?”153 
 The language used in the tragedy to refer to Prometheus’ gifts, which, among others, 
include speech, reason, arithmetic, and the ability to form communities and establish laws and 
political institutions, reinforces the significance of these questions, as do the Platonic 
dialogues discussed later on in this chapter.154 Specifically, it is the political and legal 
language that exists within the cyclical imagery discussed above, that allows us to address the 
potential consequences to which the answers to these questions may lead. For instance, as the 
Protagorean image of the ascent of man triumphs in the tragedy, reason, rhetoric and 
arithmetic (which includes the ‘measurement’ of speeches, as I will demonstrate in the section 
on Plato’s Protagoras), experience a triumphant moment as well, which becomes especially 
clear when linking these skills to the question posed above, ‘how should we live?’.  
It is the combined force of these skills that not only brings to mind Plato’s Gorgias’ 
definition of rhetoric (‘the ability to persuade others with speeches to do or think what you 
																																								 																				
152 Herrick 1997: 33. 
153 Ruffell 2012: 75-6. 
154 PV 506. πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προµηθέως. (“know that all the skills that mortals have 
come from Prometheus”). 
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want them to’),155 but also the cyclical nature of law-making and exchange of opinions in 
fifth-century and early fourth-century Greece to which PV clearly alludes. After all, when one 
man can use rhetoric to persuade his audience to think one way, another one can use it to 
persuade them to think another way. As the sophists say, every logos can be met with an 
antilogos.156 This reflects Aristotle’s observation of the sophists at Eth. Nic 1181a when he 
notes that they are ignorant of the nature of politics and the subject matters with which it 
deals; otherwise, they would not identify it with rhetoric or even subordinate it to rhetoric (οὐ 
γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν). The sophists, Strauss writes (and he 
draws from Eth. Nic. 1181a here), “believed that it is ‘easy’ to discharge well the non-
rhetorical functions of government and to acquire the knowledge needed for this purpose: the 
only political art to be taken seriously is rhetoric.”157 
 The sophistic notion of rhetoric illuminates the enactment and establishment of laws 
and the consequences of certain speeches and actions, which in turn can trigger moments of 
ascent and descent; and it is clear that PV is packed with both. It is now time that we turn to 
this rhetorical legal imagery and examine how it continuously recalls the major themes of the 
																																								 																				
155 Gorg. 452e. Cf. Hall 2010a: 181. On the note of triumph, see also Antigone 322: πολλὰ τὰ 
δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει. ‘Many things arouse awe, but none is more 
awesome than man.’ 
156 Cf. Farrar 1988: 63. “Protagoras was infamous in antiquity for his ability to argue both 
sides of any question (DK 89 A20), and to ‘make the weaker argument (logos) the stronger’ 
(DK 89 A21).” This ability (and promise to instruct students to do the same) is condemned by 
Aristotle at Rhet. 1402a.  
157 Strauss 1964: 17. Cf. Strauss 1964: 23, “the sophists – believing in the omnipotence of 
speech – were blind to the sternness of politics.”  
 Later, Lucian creates comic material from Prometheus’ influence on the sophists. See 
Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 6, who writes, “in his dialogue Prometheus, Lucian depicts the Titan as 
a mirror image of himself: Prometheus delivers a ‘sophistic lecture’ in the Caucasus 
Mountains to Hermes and Hephaestus…” As Hermes says to Prometheus at 4: τὴν ἐν τῷ µέσῳ 
δὴ ταύτην σχολὴν καλῶς ἂν ἔχον εἴη εἰς ἀκρόασιν καταχρήσασθαι σοφιστικήν, οἷος εἶ σὺ 
πανουργότατος ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. (“This interval of leisure may as well be employed in listening to 
a sophistic speech, as you are a very clever scoundrel at speech-making”). 
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trilogy discussed above. This discussion also paves the way for the next sections, which 
address how the role of persuasive rhetoric and human intellect in the Gorgias, the Statesman, 
and the Protagoras tie into the themes of the trilogy, the aim to make sense of legal reforms 




II. The use of cyclical legal and constitutional imagery in Prometheus Vinctus 
	
 As noted above, the themes of ascent, descent, and recurrent change tie into the 
discussions about the establishment and enactment of laws. They also connect with the basic 
narrative of the play, which “is concerned with tyranny and rebellion…the presentation (and 
critique) of the gods and the presentation of autocratic rule,” and it addresses “questions of 
legitimacy and the relationship between ruler and ruled.”158 The latter is especially 
emphasised by the Protagorean notion of man’s ascent from a cave-dweller to a political 
being found in Prometheus’ words at 452-3. He says before he came along, mankind “dwelt 
underground, like tiny ants, in the sunless recesses of caves” (κατώρυχες δ᾽ ἔναιον ὥστ᾽ 
ἀήσυροι µύρµηκες ἄντρων ἐν µυχοῖς ἀνηλίοις). As man moves up and develops as political 
being, the debate about political and juridical practices in different polities and various 
applications of power develops alongside him – this development can be traced in PV as well, 
which is in the end also “a study of the nature and application of power.”159 
 The description of Zeus’ power at the beginning of the play is especially noteworthy 
here. At lines 148-51, the Chorus assert:  
νέοι γὰρ οἰακονόµοι  
κρατοῦσ᾽, Ὀλύµπου: νεοχµοῖς  
																																								 																				
158 Ruffell 2012: 25. 
159 Ruffell 2012: 29. 
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δὲ δὴ νόµοις Ζεὺς ἀθέτως κρατύνει.  
τὰ πρὶν δὲ πελώρια νῦν ἀιστοῖ. 
  
 New rulers wield the helm on Olympus, 
 and Zeus rules arbitrarily by new-made laws; 
 what once was mighty he now casts into oblivion. 
 
 
The words νεοχµός (and νεοχµόω) and ἀιστόω connect with the assertion made previously 
about the cyclical nature of the play. On the one hand, νεοχµός points at the newness of Zeus’ 
regime and at the change that has taken place between the end of the first play and the 
beginning of this one. ἀιστόω emphasises this by making clear that the regime from the first 
play has been annulled and that its laws and rulers are ‘no longer seen.’ On the other hand, 
these words also have the potential to hint at the future of the new regime and assert that this 
regime, too, will become unseen at some point and replaced by another one. This connects 
with both the arrival of rhetoric mentioned earlier and the meaning of νεοχµόω, which, like 
the Latin novae res, often means ‘to make political innovations;’160 this in turn reinforces the 
idea that what Zeus has done will be done to him as well at some point. ἄθετος, meanwhile, 
suggests that the ways in which Zeus has annulled the previous regime and established the 
new one, were not legitimate but unsuitable. This reflects the questionable status of his 
authority that shines through the play, but also the debate about different political and judicial 
practices in different places.  
The legal language that follows in the next passages characterizes both notions. Let us 
begin by looking at the descriptions of Zeus’ status in the tragedy. The words used show that 
he is indeed a tyrannical οἰακονόµος who steers his way through Olympus just like an 
absolute monarch might ‘sail’ through the city without any properly established laws. For 
instance, at lines 403-4, the Chorus remark, ἀµέγαρτα…τάδε Ζεὺς ἰδίοις νόµοις κρατύνων. 
																																								 																				
160 Griffith 1983: 117. 
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(‘Zeus, exercising this unlimited control under laws of his own making’), thereby making 
clear that Zeus governs with personal laws which he can alter anytime he wishes.161 The 
relentless attitude that comes with Zeus’ appointment of laws is, amongst others, described in 
line 164: ὁ δ᾽ ἐπικότως ἀεὶ θέµενος ἄγναµπτον νόον. (‘He, with constant anger, making his 
resolve inflexible’).162 His malicious nature is exacerbated by his hard-heartedness, which the 
chorus point out in line 160: τίς ὧδε τλησικάρδιος θεῶν, ὅτῳ τάδ᾽ ἐπιχαρῆ; (“What god is so 
hard-hearted as to take delight in this”)?163 Hermes’ words in line 981 reinforce this point: 
ὤµοι; τόδε Ζεὺς τοὔπος οὐκ ἐπίσταται. Zeus does not know the word ‘alas’.164 
 These tyrannical characteristics are further underlined by Prometheus’ words in lines 
224-5 where he makes clear that Zeus does not only oppress his enemies but also his friends. 
He says: 
 
ὁ τῶν θεῶν τύραννος ὠφεληµένος  
 κακαῖσι ποιναῖς ταῖσδὲ µ᾽ ἐξηµείψατο.  
 ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι  
 νόσηµα, τοῖς φίλοισι µὴ πεποιθέναι. 
  
Such are the benefits that the autocrat of the gods has received from me, and this is 
 the evil reward with which he has recompensed me! It seems that this malady is built 
 into autocracy, that of not trusting one’s friends. 
 
τυραννίδι νόσηµα is particularly noteworthy here because it points out that this is the (moral) 
disease that automatically comes with the establishment of any tyranny, namely the loss of 
trust in your friends and political loyalties.165 This theme is reiterated shortly later in lines 
																																								 																				
161 Trans. Griffith. See lines 49-50 for a description of the unrestrained freedom that comes 
with this position. 
162 See also lines 34 and 160. 
163 Cf. PV, 187-8. 
164 PV, 166 and 981. 
165 A similar statement can also be found in Aristotle’s Pol. 5.1313b, where he compares 
monarchy with tyranny and says, καὶ ἡ µὲν βασιλεία σῴζεται διὰ τῶν φίλων, τυραννικὸν δὲ 
τὸ µάλιστ᾽ ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, ὡς βουλοµένων µὲν πάντων δυναµένων δὲ µάλιστα τούτων. 
(“…Whereas friends are a means of security to royalty, it is a mark of a tyrant to be extremely 
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306-8 when Prometheus greets Oceanus with the words: δέρκου θέαµα, τόνδε τὸν Διὸς φίλον, 
τὸν συγκαταστήσαντα τὴν τυραννίδα, οἵαις ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πηµοναῖσι κάµπτοµαι. “Behold the 
spectacle, then – me, the friend of Zeus, who helped establish his autocracy, what torments I 
am now racked with at his hands.” Prometheus, the former friend of Zeus, is now forced to 
submit to him after helping him establish his sovereign status. These lines demonstrate both 
Prometheus’ disgust at the way Zeus treats him (like a mere spectacle, θέαµα) and Zeus’ 
tyrannical definition of friendship (ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς φίλοις), which can also be found in Aristotle 
(see n. 165). 
 The freedom of speech is also restricted in Zeus’ tyranny, which is highlighted by 
Hephaestus’ and Kratos’ conversation in lines 66-68: 
  
 Hφ. 
 αἰαῖ, Προµηθεῦ, σῶν ὑπερστένω πόνων. 
 
 Κρ. 
 σὺ δ᾽ αὖ κατοκνεῖς τῶν Διός τ᾽ ἐχθρῶν ὕπερ  
 στένεις; ὅπως µὴ σαυτὸν οἰκτιεῖς ποτε. 
 
Heph. 
 Ah, Prometheus, I groan for your sufferings! 
  
 Kr. 
 Hesitating again, are you? Grieving for the enemies of Zeus? Take care you don’t 
 have cause to pity yourself, one of these days! 
 
 
Kratos advises Hephaestus to be careful with his words because taking pity with the tyrant’s 
enemy (i.e. Prometheus) is unlikely to bode well. At the end of the day, this kind of behaviour 
will only lead to a situation where Hephaestus will have to pity himself as well because then it 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
distrustful of his friends, on the ground that, while all have the wish, these chiefly have the 
power”). 
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might be he who is chained to the rock. This warning fits in with the cyclical nature of the 
trilogy as well as with the theme of ascent and descent: while it is not Zeus who is portrayed 
as the future victim in this passage but Hephaestus, it does imply that the tables can be turned 
anytime. At the same time, it also highlights the restriction of speech in Zeus’ tyranny, which 
brings to mind the following (presumed) fragment from Prometheus Pyrphoros: σιγῶνθ᾽ ὄπου 
δεῖ καὶ λέγων τὰ καίρια. (‘keeping silent where one should and speaking to the point’).166 
 The tyrannical features of Zeus’ regime are perhaps best summarised by Prometheus 
in lines 735-7: ὁ τῶν θεῶν τύραννος ἐς τὰ πάνθ᾽ ὁµῶς βίαιος εἶναι (“the autocrat of the gods 
is equally brutal in all his dealings”).167 Like in any other tyranny, Prometheus does not have 
any choice but to submit to Zeus, accept the new regime, and repent his crime. The 
implications of this task are highlighted three hundred lines later by Oceanus’ advice:168  
 
																																								 																				
166 PP fr. 208 N = 351 M, Aulus Gellius NA 13.19.4. See Griffith 1983: 283, who says that 
this “line is almost identical to Aesch. Cho. 582 σιγᾶν δ᾽ ὄπου δεῖ καὶ λέγειν τὰ καίρια, and it 
is possible that the attribution is mistaken (πυρφόρωι for χοηφόροις...).” Both, however, 
emphasise the point made above. 
 It is worth noting that the instruction to keep silent is, in some way, contradictory to 
the ‘new regime talk.’ Precisely, it brings to mind the old education praised by the Strong 
Argument in Clouds, which refers to the instalment of absolute silence in young men (963). In 
this vein, it readily recalls Spartan (and Utopian) education, which, as noted in the 
introduction, teaches the same. See David 1999: 119, who writes on the Spartan notion of 
silence, “In the course of the upbringing as well as in adult life silence…was a basic tool for 
discipline, self-restraint, uniformity and conformity. On the psychological level, one of the 
main reasons for this multi-purpose instrumentality is the very suppression of the self required 
by silence; on the sociological level, its integrative and authoritarian power… .The Spartan 
system of building up communication skills put a special emphasis on learning when, where, 
why and how not to talk, and the proper amount of talk versus silence.” Cf. David 1999: 136 
n. 7 and Ducat 2006: 36. 
The muddling of old education elements and new regime features emphasises the 
oscillatory pattern of PV as well as the intertextual allusions to the previous play and the 
subsequent one. At the same time, the arguable contradiction also underlines the point made 
above, namely that the fragment may not be from Pyrphoros, but from a different play. 
167 Cf. Griffith 1983: 220. “Zeus’ rule, based on force, is characterized by violence, 
lawlessness, treachery, and lechery, all the traditional qualities of the ‘bad tyrant’…” See also 
Fitton-Brown 1959: 57. 
168 PV 308-12. 
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καὶ παραινέσαι γέ σοι  
θέλω τὰ λῷστα, καίπερ ὄντι ποικίλῳ.  
γίγνωσκε σαυτὸν καὶ µεθάρµοσαι τρόπους  
νέους: νέος γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἐν θεοῖς. 
 
and I also want to give you advice, the best advice, cunning though you are. Know 
yourself and change to a new pattern of behaviour, because there is also a new 
autocrat in the gods’ realm. 
  
Oceanus urges Prometheus to be pragmatic and “to change with the times,”169 which again 
recalls the recurrent notion of change (µεθαρµόζω) and newness (νέος) that informs the 
trilogy. It also reinforces the first two parts of the sequence (see n. 147), namely crime and 
punishment, and the low state to which Prometheus has descended. He has gone from 
triumphant fire-bearer in the first play to defeated prisoner in the second play who is ‘left here 
to wither, bound to this rock// by these degrading bonds of adamant’ (πέτραις 
προσαυαινόµενον ταῖσδ᾽ ἀδαµαντοδέτοισι λύµαις).170 It is a descent which he has not yet 
quite grasped, according to Oceanus.  
 As Oceanus urges Prometheus to acknowledge the new patterns and change his 
behaviour accordingly, he also alludes to the restricted freedom of speech already mentioned 
earlier. In his opinion, the adaptation of a different kind of speech is necessary, as the old one 
is not suitable for this regime. It is, after all, the use of wrong speech at the wrong time, which 
brought about Prometheus’ descent in the first place: τοιαῦτα µέντοι τῆς ἄγαν ὑψηγόρου 
γλώσσης, Προµηθεῦ, τἀπίχειρα γίγνεται (“but these, Prometheus, are the wages of an over-
arrogant tongue”).171 This brings to mind the point made previously, namely that rhetoric 
works both ways. While it can be used to help a regime arise (and convince the audience to 
think one way), it can also be used to destroy another one (and persuade the audience to think 
																																								 																				
169 Griffith 1983: 144. 
170 PV 146-7. 
171 PV 318-9.  
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another way); this emphasises both the recurring nature of arguments and the language of the 
tragedy.172 
 Furthermore, Oceanus’ words show that hubris and grandiloquence usually have 
consequences, especially in a tyranny. This brings to mind a point made by More (cf. pp. 34-
5), namely that one should be able to adapt oneself to the current situation no matter how 
dramatic or tyrannical it may be, and act one’s part neatly and appropriately. In this way, 
Oceanus’ advice continues to help us make sense of patterns of political debate and change, 
because it shows how Aeschylus exhibits a political discourse similar to that of More. 
Oceanus and Prometheus discuss the acclimatisation (or, refusal to do so) to the new 
tyrannical situation, just like More and Hythloday argue over the acceptance of absolute 
monarchy almost two thousand years later. 
 Oceanus’ advice is emphasised when linking it to other passages that refer to 
Prometheus’ ‘over-arrogant tongue’ and theft. For example, at 8-9, Kratos states: τοιᾶσδέ τοι 
ἁµαρτίας σφε δεῖ θεοῖς δοῦναι δίκην (“for such an offence he must assuredly pay his penalty 
to the gods…”).173 ἁµαρτία has a variety of meanings, for while it can mean ‘offence or 
crime’ on the one hand, it can also mean ‘error of judgment’ on the other hand.174 I think both 
meanings are applicable here, but the notion of ‘error of judgment’ is especially appropriate 
because it links to Prometheus’ error in the first play (i.e. his theft and unsuitable speech, 
which leads to the ascent of man), which sets in motion his descent and Zeus’ ascent in the 
second play, and thus the trilogy’s chain of events. 
 ἁµαρτία shines through the entire tragedy and thus also through its vacillating notions 
																																								 																				
172 Utopia 36. 
173 PV 8-9. 
174 Griffith 1983: 84 notes that the basic sense of ἁµαρτία here is “missing a target, failing to 
execute what is intended or required.” The same use of ἁµαρτία also appears in Thucydides 
1.32, when the Corcyraeans apologise for advocating political isolation, which, in retrospect, 
was in error of judgment. 
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of ascent and descent. For instance, at 172-4, Prometheus says that Zeus is wrong to assume 
that his rhetorical skills will prevent him from descending: καί µ᾽ οὔτι µελιγλώσσοις πειθοῦς 
ἐπαοιδαῖσιν θέλξει (“and he will not charm me by the honey-tongued spells of 
persuasion…”). The use of ἐπῳδή and θέλγω clearly brings to mind Gorgias’ Encomium of 
Helen, especially the following two sections. At 10, Gorgias writes: ‘the power of the 
incantation (ἐπῳδή) beguiles [the soul] and persuades it and alters it by witchcraft (γοητεία).’ 
This links to his description in 14 of different kinds of λόγοι, including the ones that ‘drug 
and bewitch (γοητεύω) the soul with a kind of evil persuasion.’175 The kind of rhetoric 
described here “works through ‘magic’ and ‘enchantment’ rather than the objective factuality 
of aletheia,”176 and it informs Prometheus’ words above. For they make clear that even 
charming persuasion and Gorgianic rhetoric will not change the fact that Zeus will fall; it is an 
error of judgment to think so. They also recall the Protagorean notion that there are two sides 
to everything: while charming rhetoric can be effective and used to do either good or bad, it 
can also be ineffective and not achieve the desired effects when it is met with a 
counterargument. 
 The cyclical nature of the tragedy thus prevails; and it is further reinforced by the 
connecting rhetoric in lines 151 and 907-10. At 151, Prometheus’ descent is described almost 
linearly: τὰ πρὶν δὲ πελώρια νῦν ἀιστοῖ. (“what was once mighty he now casts into oblivion”). 
This is a direct link to Zeus’ fall described at 907-10: Ζεύς καίπερ αὐθάδης φρενῶν, ἔσται 
ταπεινός, οἷον ἐξαρτύεται γάµον γαµεῖν, ὃς αὐτὸν ἐκ τυραννίδος θρόνων τ᾽ ἄιστον ἐκβαλεῖ. 
(“Zeus, arrogant though his thoughts are, will yet be brought low: such is the union he is 
preparing to make, which will cast him out of his autocracy and off his throne into oblivion”). 
																																								 																				
175 Gorgias, Helen 10, 14. 
176 Segal 1962: 112. For a discussion on (Gorgianic) rhetoric being a ‘magical’ gift that 
beguiles the audience, see de Romilly 1975, especially 1-22. 
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In this vein, καίπερ αὐθάδης φρενῶν also reflects Prometheus’ warning above and the 
structure that characterizes the trilogy: regardless of what Zeus may think, unless he changes, 
his autocracy is not going to last but will be altered and one day he too will be cast into 
oblivion (ἄιστος), just like Prometheus.  
 However, although Zeus’ rule is new and tyrannical, and subject to change in 
Prometheus Unbound, where Zeus compromises and matures, which in turn makes a new 
settlement, in PV it is the only regime that is recognised, thus making him the legitimate ruler. 
Certainly, this stays in tune with the logic of the sequence noted earlier, and the words used to 
describe his position accentuate this further. Specifically, while Zeus is referred to as τραχὺς 
µόναρχος, he is also described as ταγὸς µακάρων and µακάρων πρύτανις; and the 
connotations of ταγὸς and πρύτανις seem to be less negative than those of µόναρχος.177 
  Nonetheless, despite the orderly element of his rule, the fact that Zeus’ laws are not 
set up properly, underlines the idea that they can be subject to change. On the one hand, this 
reinforces Zeus’ autocratic rule and power (and thus the negative aspects of the possibility of 
change, which also reflects More’s contempt for absolute monarchs and their tampering with 
laws) since he can alter the laws as many times as he wishes. On the other hand, the lack of 
fixation also bears positive connotations, namely that anyone (be it or Zeus or anyone else) 
can reject and change the laws.178 In this sense, we are also presented with a version of the 
																																								 																				
177 PV 96 and 170. For example, in Aeschylus’ Persians 21-7, ταγοὶ is used to refer to four 
praiseworthy Persian marshals. Thus, while Zeus may lead without θέµις, he does not 
necessarily lead without τάξις. This is also implied by the inclusion of πρύτανις, which 
represents Zeus as someone who is the rightful commander, or chief magistrate, of his polity, 
as well as by the military language at PV 150 (δὲ δὴ νόµοις Ζεὺς ἀθέτως κρατύνει) which is 
used to define his rule. 
178 There is a similar definition of ἄθετος meaning ‘to be rejected’ in a military context at 
Diodorus Siculus, Library 11.15. Furthermore, at Polybius’ Histories 18.9.10, ἄθετος means 
‘to no avail’ or (ultimately) ‘fruitless’ when it is decided to allow Philip to send an embassy to 
Rome. Connecting these two definitions of ἄθετος to the use of the word in Zeus’ regime, it 
underlines the idea that his rule is ultimately unavailing and it can, and will, be rejected.  
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sophists’ belief, which, contrary to Oceanus’ advice stated earlier, advocates the release of 
their pupils from the expectation to conform to the ordinances of Athens, so they are free to 
pursue anything they wish without feeling any sense of constraint or moral obligation. 
 This alludes to Callicles’ opinion in the Gorgias, when he argues against restrictive 
moral laws because they give rights to those who do not deserve them, namely the naturally 
weaker, and it also describes the nature of Zeus’ regime. Specifically, on the one hand, there 
is Zeus, whose position as the naturally stronger puts him in an enviable place because he is 
not bound by civic laws but able to satisfy his appetite in any way he wishes. On the other 
hand, Callicles’ sophistic opinion also reflects Prometheus’ warning, namely that change will 
come regardless of the conventions of Zeus’ rule.179 This, in turn, recalls the point made 
earlier in regards to persuasive rhetoric: when someone can propose one regime without 
feeling restrained by the existing one, then another can do the same. It is clear that the change 
that occurs in Prometheus Unbound is brought about by a prophecy (and a compromise) 
rather than persuasive rhetoric, as is the case in the Aristophanic comedies discussed in the 
subsequent chapters, since neither Zeus nor Prometheus are persuaded by the other’s words.  
However, the key components of Callicles’ sophistic rhetoric, namely that it is possible to 
formulate alternative responses to already established ideas, do reflect the nature of the 
description of Zeus’ rule in PV as well as the relationship between ruler and ruled.180  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 Cf. Birds, especially 1494-1552. The entire play involves a comic rebellion against the 
divine establishment and suggests that it is possible to (re-) claim leadership. On the 
comedy’s parallelism with PV, see Herington 1963b.   
179 Gorg. 483-492. It is, however, also necessary to distinguish Callicles (whose sophistic 
nature may be a Platonic invention) from real historical sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias, 
and Antiphon. See Klosko 1984: 128. 
180 Cf. Poulakos 1995: 25. Cf. Farrar 1988: 64. “In arguments about knowledge, as in political 
discussions in the assembly, all claims could be questioned, and no one disputant could trump 
the others by appealing to some privileged access to things as they really are. The point of 
exploring opposing claims was to discover the best argument, to be assessed in terms of 
persuasiveness and plausibility or…reflective acceptability.” “…men can believe and show 
	 71	
 In this vein, even though the reference to persuasive rhetoric is a contrast to some of 
the fundamental elements of PV, linking it to the cyclical imagery that informs the trilogy, it 
does show that while Zeus’ rule is undeniably dominant it is also not the only rule that is 
possible. However, if we anchor the possibility of proposing a different regime in man’s 
ascent and the Protagorean reliance on human intellect and rhetoric, rather than the gods, the 
following question, asked by Herrick, arises: “If truth and reality depend on who can speak 
the most persuasively, what becomes of justice, virtue, and social order?”181 The subsequent 
passages on the Gorgias, the Statesman, and the Protagoras present the significance, and 
potential consequences, of this question, especially when considering it in light of the theme 
of change analysed in PV.   
 
 
III. Plato’s Critique of Rhetoric in the Gorgias 
 
It is clear that the view that a tyrant’s power is desirable because it allows him to do 
whatever he desires, surfaces in PV, and it is this opinion that links to a wider debate about 
the nature of moral life and to the moral basis of politics itself.182 At 491e-492c of the 
Gorgias, Callicles joins this debate when he states that the strong man is in an enviable 
position because he is always able to satisfy his appetite. This opinion connects with his 
distinction between φύσις and νόµος, and his belief that it is only natural and fair for the 
stronger to rule over the weaker.183  At 483a, he notes that it is only by convention that doing 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
one another to be mistaken, but nothing that a man believes is in an absolute sense false, and 
all ‘measurings’ must be taken into account.” 
181 Herrick 1997: 38. 
182 Dodds 1959: 1-2; Klosko 1984: 137. 
183 Gorg. 483d. Cf. Laws 690b, where the Athenian compares different claims to rule and be 
ruled. In regards to the fifth claim, he says, οἶµαι τὸ κρείττονα µὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἥττω δὲ 
ἄρχεσθαι. (“…I suspect, that the stronger should rule and the weaker be ruled”). To which 
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wrong is worse than suffering wrong; by nature, it is the opposite. The reason is this: weak 
lawmakers make laws for themselves and their own interests; and they wish to prevent those 
who are naturally stronger from gaining an advantage over them.184 They draw up νοµοί, 
which determine what is just and unjust, and ignore the fact that they may contradict φύσις.  
For example, their laws may state that it is unjust for the strong to have an advantage 
over the weak, but there are numerous examples based on φύσις (such as the animal world 
and certain historical events) that state the opposite. This is why the lawmakers are weak 
according to Callicles: they enforce restrictive moral laws, and they “frame social attitudes 
condemning such ‘seeking the advantage’ as wrong, shameful, and unjust.”185 
 Callicles’ opinion is undoubtedly provocative and, as Stauffer points out, he gives “a 
harshly realistic defense of the strong in their universal oppression of the weak.”186 His point, 
that true justice requires action against conventional rules in order to strip the weak of the 
rights they do not deserve, is exemplified further by his words at 492c where he says: “luxury 
and licentiousness and liberty, if they have the support of force, are virtue and happiness” 
(τρυφὴ καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ).187 The significance of this view is 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Cleinias replies, µάλα γε ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχὴν εἴρηκας. (“A form of rule with a compelling logic 
to it”). 
184 Gorg. 483b-c. 
185 Vickers 1998: 103. The historical Gorgias expresses a similar view in Helen 6 when he 
says that it is not Helen’s fault that she was overcome by the will of the gods, but rather the 
law of physis. “For it is the nature of things, not for the stronger to be hindered by the weaker, 
but for the weaker to be ruled and drawn by the stronger, and for the stronger to lead and the 
weaker to follow.” 
186 Stauffer 2002: 634. See also Dodds, who notes that Callicles’ vision of the strong finally 
overcoming the weak, and throwing off the chains, which conventional justice lays on him, 
leads him to use “words [at 482a-b] suggestive of a religious revelation.” Dodds 1959: 266-7. 
187 Cf. Klosko 1984: 128. See also Stauffer 2002: 640, who argues, “Callicles is not simply a 
debunker of justice and virtue but…he believes in a kind of justice based on a certain view of 
virtue: the superior…deserve to rule and to have more.”  
Callicles’ argument brings to mind Clouds 1036-40 (and Aristophanes’ tendency to 
create comic material out of sophistic arguments), where the Weak Argument expresses his 
desire to confound (συνταράσσω) the Strong Argument; it is this desire which earned him his 
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stressed further at 494b when he talks about the essential attributes of a pleasant life. 
Callicles’ opinion here brings to mind the point made earlier, namely how the debate in the 
Gorgias belongs to a bigger debate about the nature of morality, and the moral basis of 
politics. Stauffer asserts that “Callicles is not simply amoral, despite his efforts at times to 
present himself that way,” but he is attached “to a certain understanding of morality,” which 
he outlines in the discourse presented above.188   
 Callicles is not alone in his opinion. His opposition to conventional morality actually 
bears a resemblance to the view which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates in the Republic 
and which he seems therefore to endorse, and it is clear that Callicles “seems in various ways 
close to Plato’s heart.”189 Moreover, as Vickers notes, “Callicles represents an antidemocratic 
attitude with which Plato fundamentally sympathized.”190 Plato, like Callicles, advocates the 
rule of those who have supreme human qualities, and even though the qualities he has in mind 
are different from those of Callicles, his ideal society where the superior, i.e. the philosophers, 
rule over the weak, recalls that of Callicles in some ways. Of course, Plato would argue that 
this political set-up is necessary because it ultimately only benefits the weak, whereas 
Callicles is not concerned about their wellbeing. Additionally, there are many human 
pleasures of which Callicles is fond (such as appetite, luxury, and licentiousness), which Plato 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
name, because he pioneers the idea of arguing against established principles of justice. Cf. 
Farrar 1988: 63-4. 
188 Stauffer 2002: 640-1. Cf. Rendall 1977: 175, who asserts, “the plurality of interlocutors in 
the dialogue…reflects the fact that each individual has his own point of view, his own 
assumptions, and his own moral character, and must be dealt with in respect of these 
qualities.” Klosko, on the other hand, thinks that Callicles “has thought about moral questions 
and has developed his distinctive brand of immoralism.” Klosko 1984: 136. Similarly, 
referring to Polus’ opinion that a tyrant’s power is desirable, Vickers notes: “Gorgias was 
merely inept, but Polus is amoral, putting orators and politicians in the role of being able to do 
wrong at their pleasure.” Vickers 1998: 99. 
189 Klosko 1984: 134. 
190 Vickers 1998: 102. See also Dodds 1959: 13, and Sørensen 2016: 35, who notes that the 
Gorgias is “the most uncompromisingly antidemocratic of Plato’s works and the one most 
explicitly and unswervingly critical of his native Athens.” 
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does not support. However, their general moral judgment about the political necessity, and 
natural right, to have a superior class rule over an inferior one, is comparable. In this way, 
they also seem to share at least elements of a view, which relates to the problems they find in 
the existing structure of society, as both pertain to certain hierarchical issues within it.  
A similar comparison can be made between Socrates and Gorgias in the dialogue 
because they too, despite their different opinions of the value of rhetoric, base their thoughts 
on the existing political and legal structure of Athens. In their exchange, Socrates expresses 
clearly his “hostility to the democracy of Athens, to its social structure, legal system, and to 
the medium which sustained that system – the oratory of the rhetores or public speakers in the 
Council, the Assembly, and the lawcourts.”191 Similarly, when Dodds answers his own 
question, ‘Why is the Gorgias so bitter?’, he asserts that it “stands out among the early 
dialogues…by the direct and bitter criticism which it levels against Athenian politics and 
politicians.”192 Gorgias meanwhile, praises the oratory of the Athenian rhetors and he draws 
attention to its meritorious aspects – the same ones that are shameful, according to Socrates. 
The following outline of Gorgias’ and Socrates’ opinions on rhetoric is long, but I 
think it is worth paraphrasing them at this length because it informs the subsequent chapters, 
especially the discussions of the use and misuse of rhetoric in Birds, Lysistrata, and 
Ecclesiazusae. Plato’s critique of rhetoric introduces us to the kind of thinking necessary for 
the following chapters; it helps us understand the consequences of persuasive and deceptive 
rhetoric as a key tool in Athenian politics; and it shows what these consequences mean, not 
just for Aristophanes and Plato, but also for us. It also emphasises the implications of the 
point made in the introduction, namely that we live in a world where rhetoric is under ever 
increasing scrutiny and that the right to speak does not always come with the willingness and 
																																								 																				
191 Vickers 1998: 85. 
192 Dodds 1959: 19. 
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ability to contribute effectively to political debate. This in turn links to the question asked at 
the end of the section on PV: if the ascent of man, and the subsequent development of law and 
politics, depends solely on who is the most eloquent, clever, and opportunistic, then how does 
this affect our political virtue, justice, and social system? 
In the Gorgias, Plato presents two opposing opinions on rhetoric. On the one hand, 
there is Gorgias, who believes that rhetoric deals with the greatest and the best of human 
affairs (τὰ µέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγµάτων καὶ ἄριστα), namely the ability to persuade 
others. He states:193 
 
τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ᾽ οἷόν τ᾽εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν 
βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ συλλόγῳ παντί, 
ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς σύλλογος γίγνηται. 
 
I call it the ability to persuade with speeches either judges in the law courts or 
statesmen in the council-chamber or the commons in the Assembly or an audience at 
any other meeting that may be held on public affairs. 
 
Moreover, because rhetoric deals with the kind of persuasion that you find in law-courts and 
public gatherings, it also “deals with what is just and unjust” (περὶ τούτων ἅ ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ 
ἄδικα).194 Gorgias asserts that this ability is so powerful that it enables you to have “the 
doctor as your slave” (δοῦλον µὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν) and “the trainer as your slave” (δοῦλον δὲ 
τὸν παιδοτρίβην); and “your money-maker will turn out to be making money not for himself, 
but for another, - in fact for you…” (ὁ δὲ χρηµατιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλῳ ἀναφανήσεται 
χρηµατιζόµενος καὶ οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ).195  
Gorgias advocates this power of rhetoric because it appeals to the mind of people, and 
																																								 																				
193 Gorg. 452e. Cf. Segal 1962: 105. “Plato in [the] Gorgias...describes the aim of Gorgianic 
rhetoric as ‘putting persuasion in the psyche of the audience.’ It is thus apparent that Gorgias 
regarded his rhetoric as having more than a superficial effect on the ear, as actually reaching 
and ‘impressing’ the psyche of the hearer.” 
194 Gorg. 454b. 
195 Cf. Phaedrus 267a-b. 
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it is, according to him, its main function.196 It is due to this power of rhetoric that Gorgias 
believes it “is the greatest good, and a cause not merely of freedom to mankind at large, but 
also of dominion to single persons in their several cities” (µέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅµα µὲν 
ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅµα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ πόλει ἑκάστῳ).197 
 Socrates, on the other hand, does not agree with Gorgias. He believes that rhetoric 
incorporates too many negative elements in order for it to be part of the greatest and the best 
of human affairs.198 Firstly, while he does think that rhetoric is a form of persuasion, he also 
thinks that there are two kinds of persuasion – “one providing belief without knowledge, and 
the other sure knowledge” (τὸ µὲν πίστιν παρεχόµενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιστήµην). 
Socrates believes that rhetoric falls under the former category, which is why he asserts, 
“rhetoric is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and 
wrong” (πειθοῦς δηµιουργός ἐστιν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε καὶ 
ἄδικον).199 Secondly, Socrates states that rhetoric is a branch of flattery (κολακεία), which, in 
turn, “is a semblance of a branch of politics” (ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐµὸν λόγον 
πολιτικῆς µορίου εἴδωλον).200 This is problematic because, according to Socrates, flattery is a 
																																								 																				
196 Gorg. 452e-453a. Haden 1992: 320, points out that the historical Gorgias employs a 
similar position in Helen 10-14. “According to Gorgias, the power of logos is to manipulate 
and mold the psyche ‘as it wishes.’ Furthermore, logos is not subject to objective reality, but 
is itself an independent agent; speech being a human convention which we cannot transcend, 
together with its relations to psyche it effectively defines reality for us.” Cf. Phaedrus 261a.  
197 Gorg. 452d. See Irwin’s translation, which makes this point even clearer: rhetoric is 
“responsible for freedom for a man himself, and at the same time for rule over others in his 
own city.” See also Rosenmeyer 1955: 231-2, who remarks that Gorgias acknowledges the 
autonomy of speech. For him, “speech is not a reflection of things, not a mere tool or slave of 
description, but…it is its own master.”  
198 Cf. Vickers 1998: 88. “Socrates practices dialectic but wholly rejects rhetoric…Dialectic 
involved individuals, rhetoric approached the masses, and was therefore corrupt.” 
199 Gorg. 454e-455a. Cf. Frogs 1396, πειθὼ δὲ κοῦφόν ἐστι καὶ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον. (“Persuasion 
is a lightweight thing and has no mind of its own”).  
200 Gorg. 463b-d. See Dodds 1959: 225, who points out that κολακεία, while usually 
translated as ‘flattery,’ “applies to a wider range of actions and also carries a more emphatic 
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disgrace (αἰσχρός) “because it aims at the pleasant and ignores the best” (ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος 
στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου).201 
 Thirdly, argues Socrates, because rhetoric is a branch of flattery, it is irrational and 
therefore cannot be an art. He says, “I refuse to give the name of art to anything that is 
irrational” (ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἄλογον πρᾶγµα).202 Thus, Socrates’ contempt for 
rhetoric is clear: (i) rhetoric’s only concern is to make people believe rather than instruct them 
in what is right and wrong; (ii) rhetoric is a branch of flattery and therefore a disgrace; (iii) 
rhetoric is not rational and therefore also not an art. It is also clear that Socrates seems to 
justify this outlook by basing it on three binary oppositions: persuasion (πειθώ) versus 
instruction (διδαχή), belief (πιστεύω) versus actual knowledge (ἐπιστήµη), and speech (λόγος) 
versus actual content of the speech (πρᾶγµα).203 Referring to 454e-455a, McComiskey writes, 
“Gorgias concedes that his technê merely creates belief, and does not provide knowledge of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
implication of moral baseness,” the sort of “time-serving opportunism which panders to 
public taste instead of trying to educate it.” 
201 Gorg. 465a. This view is picked up at 481e and 482b, where Socrates scolds Callicles for 
constantly changing his speeches in the Assembly until the demos agrees with him, and until 
he says what it desires. Socrates asserts that it is better to have a number of people disagree 
with you than to face internal disagreement in one’s self. 
This brings to mind Achilles’ statement in Il. 312-13, ἐχθρὸς γάρ µοι κεῖνος ὁµῶς 
Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν ὅς χ᾽ ἕτερον µὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ. (‘For hateful in my eyes, 
even at the gates of Hades, is that man that holds one thought in his mind while saying 
another’). See also Aristotle Rhet. I.xi.18, καὶ τὸ κολακεύεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδέα: φαινόµενος 
γὰρ θαυµαστὴς καὶ φαινόµενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. (“Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant, 
the latter being a sham admirer and friend”). 
202 Gorg. 465a. 
203 Cf. McComiskey 1992: 208. Cf. Tim. 51d-e, νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθής ἐστον δύο γένη….τὸ 
µὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡµῖν ἐγγίγνεται: καὶ τὸ µὲν ἀεὶ µετ᾽ ἀληθοῦς 
λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον: καὶ τὸ µὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῖ, τὸ δὲ µεταπειστόν: καὶ τοῦ µὲν πάντα ἄνδρα 
µετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. (“Reason and true opinion are 
two distinct kinds…. For the one of them arises in us by teaching, the other by persuasion; 
and the one is always in company with true reasoning, whereas the other is irrational; and the 
one is immovable by persuasion, whereas the other is alterable by persuasion; and of the one 
we must assert that every man partakes, but of Reason only the gods and but a small class of 
men”). 
	 78	
what is right and wrong.”204  
However, despite eventually agreeing with Socrates that rhetoric only creates belief 
and not knowledge, to Gorgias, this is not necessarily a bad thing. For example, at 456b, he 
says rhetoric can be used to persuade a reluctant patient to take their medicine or undergo 
surgery.205 Thus, rhetoric can be a life-saving art because not only does it persuade the patient 
to take their medicine, but it also enables them to start believing that it will help. “By 
extension,” Kastely writes, “the public office of rhetoric is to serve the community by 
persuading it to undertake advantageous actions when through ignorance or fear the 
community is unwilling to do so.”206 
In Gorgias’ opinion, this underlines the power of rhetoric once again: “for there is no 
subject on which the rhetorician could not speak more persuasively than a member of any 
other profession whatsoever, before a multitude” (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν περὶ ὅτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον 
εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν τῶν δηµιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει).207 At the same time, despite 
																																								 																				
204 McComiskey 1992: 209. 
205 Later, Maximus of Tyre uses the patient-argument the other way around. See Ní 
Mheallaigh 2014: 86, who writes, “in Plato…rhetoric, one of the false arts, causes an 
unhealthy swelling when it is employed in political life, and Maximus of Tyre compared those 
who take pleasure in empty rhetoric, failing to recognize its deceptiveness, with fevered 
patients who gorge themselves on food and drinks against their physician’s advice…” The 
same comparison appears in Lucian’s Philopseudes where Eucrates’ “gouty swelling in [his] 
feet is evidently the result of dietary overindulgence…but it is a by-product also of his 
appetite for lies which is described in gastronomic terms at the dialogue’s close when the 
philosophers ‘feast themselves’ on lies after Tychiades’ departure, and when Tychiades finds 
himself in need of an emetic after his over-indulgence in the strong wine of the philosophers’ 
lies.” Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 86. 
 Ní Mheallaigh 2005: 95 notes that this scenario (“philosophers and other 
intellectuals…gathered around the sick-bed of the eminent philosopher Eucrates”) “recalls 
that of the Phaedo, where a group of friends congregate about Socrates’ death-bed in his 
prison-cell, but in a humorous reworking of that poignant scene, Eucrates has merely been 
laid up with gout as a result of his luxurious lifestyle…” 
206 Kastely 1991: 100. 
207 Gorg. 456c. Cf. 458e-459. Cf. Frogs 1391 and Antigone fr.170, οὐκ ἔστι Πειθοῦς ἱερὸν 
ἄλλο πλὴν λόγος, καὶ βωµὸς αὐτῆς ἔστ᾿ ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει. “Persuasion has no other temple 
than speech, and her altar is in human nature.” Trans. Collard and Cropp. Both statements 
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praising this positive aspect of rhetoric, Gorgias also acknowledges the more negative ones 
(and thus the ones Socrates has problems with). He makes clear that rhetoric, like any other 
form of exercise (ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγωνίᾳ), needs to be used carefully and fairly, and 
only in times when it is appropriate.208 Just because the orator is able to easily win over the 
multitude in any topic that he may wish to take up, does not mean that they should also do so. 
This is just like a boxer or a wrestler should not use his skills to strike down both his friend 
and enemy (καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν) alike.209  
This suggests that, even though Gorgias advocates rhetoric because it incorporates the 
element of persuasion, which can be used both positively and negatively, he is also committed 
to justice.210 In particular, he seems to believe that rhetoric, in order to live up to the virtue of 
its power, can be used to determine the best course of action for a community, i.e. the one 
with the most just outcome. This is why, unlike Socrates who thinks that rhetoric is to justice 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
recall one of the issues Socrates has with rhetoric: it does not know the truth about things but 
is merely a technique of persuasion, which allows any speaker to appear more knowledgeable 
among the masses than the actual expert in the subject matter. 
 Cf. Apol. 18a-c, where Socrates asserts that it is ‘an orator’s virtue to speak the truth,’ 
but that his accusers have been telling very persuasive lies.  
208 Gorg. 456c-d. 
209 Gorg. 456d; 457a-b. Cf. Helen 14, where the historical Gorgias recognises the following: 
“the effect of speech upon the structure of the soul is as the structure of drugs over the nature 
of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring 
an end to disease, and others to life, so also in the case of speeches some distress, others 
delight, some cause fear, others embolden their hearers, and some drug and bewitch the soul 
with a kind of evil persuasion.” Cf. PV 172-4, where Prometheus states that even Zeus’ 
beguiling rhetoric will not save him from his downfall. 
Segal notes that “in establishing the parallel with the pharmaka of medicine, [Gorgias] 
does not conceal the fact that the art of persuasion, like its medical counterpart, can be 
dangerous as well as beneficial...Thus Gorgias cannot be charged with complete moral 
naiveté; he is aware of the consequences of his techne...” Segal 1962: 116.  
For more information on the term φάρµακον, which has both magical and medical 
connotations, see Lloyd 1979: 44. 
210 Cf. the Protagorean vision of the ascent of man discussed on pp. 57-8: if human 
inventiveness, especially in regards to political and legal institutions, can do either good or 
evil, so can rhetoric. Cf. Hall 2010: 181. 
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what sophistry is to legislation,211 and unlike Polus who thinks that rhetoric is a means for 
orators to rule like tyrants,212 Gorgias believes that rhetoric is “an art existing for the benefit 
of the community.”213   
 Nonetheless, despite their different opinions on the usefulness of rhetoric, both 
Socrates’ and Gorgias’ approaches are based on a kind of “situationality of philosophical 
reflection,” which show their attitude to rhetoric as a key tool of contemporary Athenian 
politics.214  Consequently, as Vickers writes, the Gorgias is not “a universally valid critique of 
rhetoric” but “the product of a specific time and place [i.e. early fourth-century Athens].” 
Segal asserts similarly: “[Gorgias] is primarily a rhetorician, but one with broad interests – 
practical rather than theoretical – and a grounding in some of the ontological and physical 
conceptions current in his day.”215 Likewise, while Gorgias (like Callicles), may be overly 
provocative with some of his assertions, and Socrates overly polemical with his responses 
																																								 																				
211 Gorg. 465c. Cf. Vickers 1998: 98. “Regarding the mind and body there are four genuine 
arts, and four spurious ones...” The genuine arts for the body are ‘gymnastics’ and ‘medicine,’ 
and the ones for the mind are ‘legislation’ and ‘justice.’ The spurious ones, meanwhile, are 
‘cosmetics’ and ‘cookery’ for the body, and ‘sophistic’ and ‘rhetoric’ for the mind. Thus, to 
emphasise Socrates’ analogy, he thinks rhetoric is a spurious art in comparison to justice, just 
like sophistry is spurious in comparison to legislation. 
212Gorg. 466b-c. οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασίν τε ὃν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται 
χρήµατα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ὃν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς; (“Are they not like the despots, 
in putting to death anyone they please, and depriving anyone of his property and expelling 
him from their cities as they may think fit?”). 
213 Kastely 1991: 100. Note that both Gorgias and Polus recognise the unlimited agency of 
rhetoric; however, while Polus admires this agency because it allows an orator to manipulate a 
community in whatever way they wish, Gorgias values it for the reasons stated above. 
Moreover, while Polus emphasises the advantages rhetoric can offer to individuals (for 
example, tyrannical power), Gorgias focuses on the good it can do for groups of people. 
214 Rendall 1977: 174. Cf. Vickers, who argues that much of Plato’s criticism is rather unfair. 
“He mentions the dockyards (517c; 519a) but not the Parthenon; he condemns the dramatists 
along with the politicians for flattering the prejudices of the mob (502b), but forgets the 
Trojan Women and the Knights; he ignores the economic condition which made the Periclean 
introduction of payment for service on juries and other bodies (515e) ‘a necessity if 
democracy was to be more than a façade.’” (Vickers quotes Dodds 1959: 33 here).  
215 Segal 1962: 101. Cf. Segal 1962: 104. The historical Gorgias “reflects the continued 
interest of the late fifth century in the internal processes of the psyche, and the application of 
this awareness of the area of psychic phenomena to rhetoric and a techne of persuasion.”  
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(although according to Haden, all Socrates wants is “to stimulate his respondents to become 
thinking and acting citizens, gaining individuality and independence under the guidance of 
reason”),216 both draw attention to the status of rhetoric in late fifth-century and early fourth-
century Athens. This is why it is worth stressing the importance of the ‘situationality’ of their 
philosophical reflections.  
Indeed, it is this situationality of philosophical reflections, as well as that of political and 
legal rhetoric, which informs many important strands of the works discussed here. More 
importantly, it gives way to an analysis of the different ways in which νόµος is alterable and 
the role rhetoric plays in these alterations. Firstly, it is clear that Callicles attacks the entire 
existing Athenian democracy because it enables the weaker Athenians to be strong; it deprives 
the stronger ones of their natural superiority; and it ignores the laws of nature in favour of 
conventional interests. Moreover, as Vickers states, “he [is] an antidemocratic advocate of 
political power as achieved through the spoken word.”217 Like Gorgias, Callicles sees the 
personal advantages orators can gain when skilfully using (and misusing) rhetoric in a 
specific community. Unlike Hythloday and More who warn about the consequences of 
internal strife and who prefer silence to inappropriate speech, Gorgias and Callicles value the 
very intemperance in talking for which More has a disdain. 
Secondly, it is clear that Plato is closer to More’s heart than to his two contemporaries in 
this regard. Throughout the Gorgias, he attacks rhetoric because he links it to the desires to 
gain power in Athens and to live an indulgent life.218 The intensity of his polemic against the 
use of rhetoric in the Athenian democracy, and especially in the assembly where it is used to 
																																								 																				
216 Haden 1992: 326. 
217 Vickers 1998: 91. Cf. Kennedy 1963: 14-5. 
218 The following fragment from the comic poet Platon expresses the same sentiment: γλώττης 
ἀγαθῆς οὐκ ἒστ᾽ἄµεινον οὐδὲ ἔν. ἐκ τῶν λόγων δ᾽ἄττ᾽αὐτὸς ἐπιθυµεῖς ἔχεις. (“There is 
nothing better than a good tongue. The tongue possesses power by its words; from words you 
get what you desire”). Fr.52, Orion Anthology 1. 
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form opinions, which might not bode well in the end, is noteworthy because it points at the 
real perpetrator that is being attacked in the dialogue. As Vickers writes: “the real target [of 
the Gorgias] is Athenian politics, but rhetoric is put in the same boat, and sunk without 
trace.”219 This sentiment is visible throughout the entire dialogue, and it is also reiterated at 
the end when Socrates concludes, “and that every kind of flattery, with regard either to 
oneself or to others, to few or to many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric is to be used for this 
one purpose always, of pointing to what is just, and so is every other activity.” (καὶ πᾶσαν 
κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς, 
φευκτέον: καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀεί, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει).220 In 
this sense, it is not only κολακεία that must be avoided, but also the κόλακες, and Athenians 
should shift their attention to the only genuine use of rhetoric, namely the attainment of 
justice. 
 However, this is no easy task. As the Statesman, written approximately thirty years 
after the Gorgias, makes clear, it is not only about avoiding κολακεία and κόλακες, but also 
about understanding the rhetoric from different, internal, factions in Athens. The dialogue 
portrays the problems of epistemological and rhetorical political exercise because it 
exemplifies, by using several analogies and myths, that Athenians are often unable to evaluate 
judgments objectively because of their affiliation with one particular faction, and hostility to 
others. They praise the qualities which belong to their faction and with which they are 
familiar, but tend to blame the ones from different factions because they feel peculiar and 
alien to them. This suspicion, as the Statesman makes clear, is rooted in rhetoric: different 
groups are incapable of judging one another’s political statements impartially because they 
use different words and metaphors. This in turn makes it challenging to determine who is 
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merely a κόλαξ and who is an epistemic politician who knows how to focus on what is really 
best for the polis.  
 The myth of the reversed cosmos, told from 269c to 274b, is a good starting point for 
this discussion. It not only offers a mythical explanation for the incessant failure in finding a 
sincere political expert but it also paints a picture of the political situation in Athens, which 
continuously seems to be marked by Athenians going round in circles due to their inability to 
understand one another properly. In this vein, it also enriches the discussion of the PV and the 
argument that the cyclical presentation of the trilogy can help us understand recurrent patterns 
of political change and rhetoric, as well as their consequences. For both the dialogue and the 
myth within it feature notions of ascent and descent, which relate to the ones seen in 
Aeschylus; and like the tragedy, it presents us with a kind of imagery that reflects not only the 
past and the present but also the future.  
 
 
IV. The Myth of the Reversed Cosmos in the Statesman 
 
The myth of the reversed cosmos is told by the Stranger in order to define more 
clearly the nature of the king.221 It states, “at certain periods the universe has its present 
circular motion, and at other periods it revolves in the reverse direction” (τὸ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς 
φορὰν τοτὲ µὲν ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν κυκλεῖται φέρεσθαι, τοτὲ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τἀναντία).222 More specifically, the 
Stranger asserts:223  
 
τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τόδε τοτὲ µὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς συµποδηγεῖ πορευόµενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτὲ 
δὲ ἀνῆκεν, ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ µέτρον εἰλήφωσιν ἤδη χρόνου, τὸ 
																																								 																				
221 Rosen 1979: 59 points out that the Stranger actually makes “seven distinguishable 
statements to explain why he tells the myth.” (268a5-c10, 271e4 ff., 272d5 ff., 273e4, 274b1 
ff., 274e1, 275b1). 
222 Stat. 270b. 
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δὲ πάλιν αὐτόµατον εἰς τἀναντία περιάγεται, ζῷον ὂν καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ 
συναρµόσαντος αὐτὸ κατ᾽ ἀρχάς. 
 
during a certain period God himself goes with the universe as guide in its revolving 
course, but at another epoch, when the cycles have at length reached the measure of 
his allotted time, he lets it go, and of its own accord it turns backward in the opposite 
direction, since it is a living creature and is endowed with intelligence by him who 
fashioned it in the beginning. 
 
That is, at one time the universe is guided by a divine cause (τοτὲ µὲν ὑπ᾽ ἄλλης 
συµποδηγεῖσθαι θείας αἰτίας), and at another time it is left to itself and then moves by its own 
motion (τοτὲ δ᾽ ὅταν ἀνεθῇ, δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸν ἰέναι) in the opposite direction.224 The first 
period exhibits the following features:225 
 
(i) Every mortal creature stops aging and stands still for a while; then, it starts 
aging in the opposite direction until it disappears completely. 
(ii) The earth-born race which once existed at another time, returns out of the 
earth, as do those who are dead: the process of birth is reversed alongside with 
the reversal of the universe. 
(iii) During that time, there are neither states nor families; because every member 
of the earth-born race comes out of the earth, neither of them has any 
recollection of their former lives. 
(iv) All living beings live together peacefully and abundantly; they converse with 
one another and learn from each other. 
 
 
This, the Stranger tells Socrates, is the period, which is characterised as “the life of men in the 
reign of Cronus” (τὸν δὴ βίον µὲν τὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Κρόνου)226 or, more generally, the age during 
which the Demiurge rules.227 The other period is set in motion by the departure of the gods, 
and portrays an age where the world is left to its own devices.228 
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225 Stat. 270d-272b. 
226 Stat. 272b.  
227 For a recent discussion on the role of the Demiurge in ancient thought, see O’Brien 2015. 
228 Stat. 273a-e. 
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(i) The gods let go of the parts of the world which are under their care, which 
causes an earthquake and the destruction of all living beings. 
(ii) Eventually, the universe recovers and carefully fashions a rule over itself, 
incorporating the lessons it has learned from the former period. 
(iii) However, as time goes on, the world forgets the teachings and disorder 
prevails. 
(iv) Just as the world is about to self-destruct from within, the Demiurge steps in 




Fowler argues that the Stranger here “describes the age of innocence, the fall of man and the 
barbarism that follows, and the partial restoration of man through divine interposition and the 
gift of the various arts of civilization.”229 He further asserts, “Plato does not offer this as a real 
explanation of the existing condition of the world, but it serves…to present…a theory which 
may account for some of the facts of life.”230 Comparably, Rosen states: “the myth of the 
reversed cosmos is both a product and an interpretation of political existence. It is both of and 
beyond the polis.”231 
 I agree with Fowler and Rosen, but I also think that there is more that can be said 
about this. Firstly, like the design of the Prometheia, the myth provides us with a presentation 
of ascent and descent, and an incessant sequence of degeneration: regeneration: degeneration: 
regeneration etc. Secondly, the absence of the Demiurge in the second period shows the 
potential consequences of Protagoras’ atheism and his exclusive reliance on the human 
intellect; and it offers an answer to the question asked earlier, if there is no place for the gods 
in human development, then what kind of anchor is there for human beings? The myth makes 
clear that the answer is chaos, and it thus shows the necessity of the gods, as it is they, not 
reason, who save mankind.  
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 I disagree with the traditional interpretation of the myth, which often “generates a 
hopelessly pessimistic picture of the world now, when things just wind down from bad to 
worse, and the only hope of salvation is Doomsday.”232 That view misses the significance of 
the sequence the myth clearly possesses. This is why, drawing from Rosen’s argument, I 
suggest that the myth, and the dialogue itself, is a portrayal of epistemological, rhetorical and 
political exercise, and the problems that frequently arise with it in fifth- and fourth-century 
Athens. Additionally, I argue that the direction of the argument in the dialogue mirrors the 
cyclical nature of the universe in the myth, which is metaphorically underlined by the 
Stranger’s use of the word πάλιν on several occasions. (This is similar to the intratextual 
sequences of ascending and descending cycles seen in PV). For instance, at 264b, he asserts, 
πάλιν δ᾽ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (“so let us begin again”), and at 268d, he states, πάλιν τοίνυν ἐξ ἄλλης 
ἀρχῆς δεῖ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν ὁδὸν πορευθῆναί τινα (“then we must begin again from a new starting-
point and travel by a different direction”). Likewise at 275c, he says, τῇδε δὴ πάλιν 
ἐπανέλθωµεν (“then let us go back to this point”), and at 279a, he declares, πάλιν δὴ τὸν 
ἔµπροσθε λόγον ἀναληπτέον (“then we must take up our former argument again”).233  
On the one hand, πάλιν clearly relates to the style of the Stranger’s and Young 
Socrates’ dialogue, which includes the evocation of former arguments made earlier in the 
discussion. On the other hand, it also has the potential to highlight, like the Prometheia and 
the myth of the reversed cosmos, the recurrent nature of political arguments. Merrill argues, 
“the dialogue is organized as a ring cycle, and that seeing the dialogue as a ring illuminates its 
teaching in several respects.”234 I take this argument further and suggest that not only does the 
																																								 																				
232 McCabe 1997: 102. Rowe 1995. 
233 See also 276e and 287b, and Rosen 1979: 60n2. Cf. Philebus 66d and Tim. 48a-b. 
234 Merrill 2003: 36. Cf. Rosen 1979: 60. “The pervasive motif in the Statesman of a return to 
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cyclical nature of the Statesman (and the Prometheia) relate to the overall teachings of the 
dialogue and the myth of the reversed cosmos, but it also links to the political situations seen 
in fifth-and fourth-century Athens. This I will demonstrate especially in the discussions of 
Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae. 
 “The need to start anew,” Rosen writes, “or to repeat correctly some previously 
botched step,” is certainly appropriate to a discussion of political exercise.235 This is 
exemplified further when looking at the metaphor of weaving, which the Stranger refers to 
frequently in the dialogue as an analogy with political exercise, and the general portrayal of 
politics in the myth, which are, contrary to Callicles’ opinion in the Gorgias, depicted as a 
necessary defence against nature.236 More specifically, I suggest that the metaphor of weaving 
and the use of the word πάλιν stand in relation to the role politics play in the myth, as they 
point to the continuous crafting of political and legal systems by statesmen, which often recall 
those which have been crafted at some point before. At the same time, despite their 
repetitiveness, they also point at the need for law and politics and the difficulty to teach 
properly the virtue that should come along with it.  
  The purpose with which the Stranger tells the myth, i.e. in order to define clearly the 
nature of the king, underlines this further. Particularly, at 292c, the Stranger asserts that the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 I cannot agree with West 1987: 195, who argues against the idea that the recurrent 
images in Aeschylus are connected and have a particular structural function. He writes, 
“Aeschylus is not Wagner, placing his Leitmotive to make deliberative links between distant 
passages, still less organizing them into a ‘highly intricate system’… .He has certain favourite 
images and fields of imagery to which he has recourse again and again because he likes 
them…because they continue to be appropriate, not because he wishes to recall some earlier 
passages or prepare for some later one.” I agree that it is not possible to determine how 
consciously Aeschylus included the connections of different passages and how much he 
actually thought about their structural function, but I think a good case can be made that such 
connections exists, especially when we link the set-up of the Prometheia to the structure of 
the Statesman. Cf. Mossman 1996: 58. 
235 Rosen 1979: 60. See also Klein 1977. 
236 See, for instance, 308d-e. 
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definition of the king neither depends on the size of the government (οὺκ ὀλιγους οὐδὲ 
πολλούς) nor on wealth or poverty (οὐδὲ πενίαν οὐδὲ πλοῦτον) but on knowledge (ἐπιστήµη). 
More importantly, political expertise, and the ability to rule intelligently, is based on the 
knowledge of finding the right moment of action, which entails knowing what to do and 
knowing when to do it (καιρός).237 This is why, “the rule of the epistemic statesman is the 
best of all…”238 This is also why, as Popper and Lane point out, the question about the 
Statesman is not necessarily, “‘How can we so organise political institutions that bad or 
incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?’ [indeed, that is the 
question about Utopia], but rather ‘Who should rule?’”239 The dialogue makes clear that the 
person with knowledge should rule; and Lane suggests that it “goes on to ask: ‘what does rule 
consist in, and how is knowledge related to rule?’”240 I agree with Lane, but I also think that it 
is possible to build onto these questions and ask more specifically, how is the skilful 
employment of a particular kind of knowledge related to rule, and how does this relate to the 
arrangement of a specific rule? 
 These questions are noteworthy, as they point at a significant theme of this thesis, 
which is particularly highlighted in the analyses of Birds and Ecclesiazusae, namely the use 
of distinct rhetorical strategies by knowing exactly when to take advantage of a specific 
community and how to assert one’s power over it. In this way, both the art of weaving and the 
use of ἐπιστήµη portray not only the activity of statecraft as a useful competence but they also 
show that the application of it does not always bode well for the entire community, but 
sometimes only for the statesmen themselves. I agree that the Statesman invites us to consider 
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238 Miller 1980: 117. Cf. Sørensen 2016: 167. 
239 Lane 1998: 6. Popper 1995 (1945): 120. 
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“the concomitant need to define and establish the rule of the true political expert,”241 and, as 
the recurrent ending of the second period in the myth indicates, the rule of a political expert 
who does not forget the teachings from the previous period but who is able to apply them 
appropriately. However, I am also inclined to assert that this ‘true political expert’ may 
simply be a statesman who knows how to employ their expertise at the right moment for 
personal benefits rather than considering the actual needs of a community. 
 The Stranger’s statement at 301d underscores this:  
  
δυσχερανάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἕνα ἐκεῖνον µόναρχον, καὶ ἀπιστησάντων µηδένα 
τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἄξιον ἂν γενέσθαι ποτέ, ὥστε ἐθέλειν καὶ δυνατὸν εἶναι µετ᾽ 
ἀρετῆς καὶ ἐπιστήµης ἄρχοντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια διανέµειν ὀρθῶς πᾶσιν, λωβᾶσθαι 
δὲ καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι καὶ κακοῦν ὃν ἂν βουληθῇ ἑκάστοτε ἡµῶν 
 
because men are not content with that one perfect ruler, and do not believe that there 
could ever be any one worthy of such power or willing and able by ruling with virtue 
and knowledge to dispense justice and equity rightly to all, but that he will harm and 
kill and injure any one of us whom he chooses on any occasion. 
  
On the one hand, ἂν βουληθῇ ἑκάστοτε implies that the true statesman may indeed act on his 
own caprices, which may change at any given moment; but on the other hand, it also hints at 
the employment of specific expertise at the right moment, which has the potential to result in 
the exploitation of virtually the entire community.242 This recalls a problem mentioned earlier: 
the community over which the statesman wishes to establish their rule is not necessarily able 
to understand different kinds of political experts when they come from different factions. At 
																																								 																				
241 Lane 1998: 11. 
242 See also Stat. 298a-b, where the Stranger compares the rule of a capricious statesman to 
that of a corrupt doctor and a ship’s captain at sea. This tyrannical picture of the ‘ship of state’ 
connects with that of Zeus at PV 189-193, especially with the use of ἀτέραµνος in that 
passage. Linking this to Zeus’ role as οἰακονόµος, it shows that the figure of the captain is not 
necessarily positive. Brock writes, “the recognition of the chorus in the Prometheus that ‘new 
rudder-guiders (οἰακονόµοι) control Olympus makes it plain that the fundamental significance 
of the motif is of autocratic control.” Brock 2013: 55. At the same time, the passage in PV 
also shows that this control is not eternal. The inclusion of ῥαίω (or, ῥαιόµενος) and στορέσας 
indicates that Zeus will suffer shipwreck if he does not change– this emphasises the cyclical 
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307c, the Stranger asserts, “and almost always we find that the restraint of one class of 
qualities and the courage of the opposite class, like two parties arrayed in hostility to each 
other, do not mix with each other in the actions that are concerned with such qualities.” (καὶ 
σχεδὸν ὡς τὸ πολὺ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν σώφρονα φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον 
πολεµίαν διαλαχούσας στάσιν ἰδέας, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλήλαις µειγνυµένας ἐφευρίσκοµεν ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα πράξεσιν).  
 The reason for this is this: “men who are akin to each class…praise some qualities as 
their own and find fault with those of their opposites as alien to themselves, and thus great 
enmity arises between them on many grounds.” (κατὰ γὰρ τὴν αὑτῶν ἑκατέροις συγγένειαν τὰ 
µὲν ἐπαινοῦντες ὡς οἰκεῖα σφέτερα, τὰ δὲ τῶν διαφόρων ψέγοντες ὡς ἀλλότρια, πολλὴν εἰς 
ἔχθραν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πολλῶν πέρι καθίστανται).243 This brings to mind Plato’s disdain for 
rhetoric in the Gorgias, and his contempt for the media (such as the assembly and the law-
courts), which help sustain it. Athenians praise words which sound good and with which they 
are familiar (or could see themselves becoming familiar with), but they struggle to understand 
the words that arise from a different faction, even though the political proposals incorporated 
in them may actually be beneficial to them. 
Specifically, the Stranger’s statement shows that different factions are unable to 
approach (new) judgments objectively because of their admiration of one particular set of 
qualities and hostility to another. They praise their own qualities because they know them 
well; but they tend to blame the ones from other factions because they feel strange to them. 
This suspicion of the unfamiliar, and the fondness for the well-known, is rooted in rhetoric: 
different factions are unable to judge one another objectively because the language they use is 
different. Thus, not only are they from different groups but also from different rhetorical 
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backgrounds, which prevents them from evaluating one another’s words and planned actions, 
and therefore also which political action might really be the best.244  
This exemplifies why κόλακες often find certain Athenians easy game: if they use 
language that derives from the specific Athenians’ faction they wish to address, they are able 
to persuade them easily and quickly because they share the same language, which allows them 
to construct a narrative of belonging. For example, as I show in the chapter on Birds, 
Peisetaerus does this when he talks to the birds: he mentions (alleged) aspects of their past 
when they were kings (465-482) and he promises them that once they have established their 
city, they can demand the rulership back from Zeus (554). Likewise, Tereus charms them by 
saying if they give Peisetaerus a chance, they will be able to expand their proto-pastoral 
setting, thus appealing to the importance of the birds’ environment (421-5).  
Praxagora employs a similar style when she convinces her audience to elect her 
general, as I demonstrate in the chapter on Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae. By combining male 
and female rhetorical strategies, and by reformulating metaphors from the household and 
placing them into the political realm of the men, she is able to situate herself within the 
communities of both men and women.245 This in turn enables her to generate a feeling of 
belonging in both communities, as she is able to focus on the shared interests in both groups. 
This also shows that Praxagora is exceptionally clever because she manages to address 
multiple factions and overcomes the difficulty that often comes with it, as described by the 
																																								 																				
244 Cf. Lane 1995: 281, who suggests: “the conflicts between these factions are presented as 
conflicts between two ideologies, each believing itself the exclusive path of politic virtue, and 
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Statesman.” 
245 See, for instance, lines 109; 174-5; 183-5; 205-9; 217-8; 221-8. Cf. Rhet. 1390a17-21, ἐπεὶ 
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speeches may appear to be of such and such character”). 
	 92	
Stranger. However, there are also moments when it seems impossible to persuade Athenians 
from different factions (regardless of whether it is flatterers or genuine politicians who 
attempt to do so) because they are so unfamiliar with the language that is being used to 
address them that they cannot comprehend what is being said. This is, for example, the case in 
Lysistrata when the Proboulos is unable to overcome his hostility towards Lysistrata because 
he understands neither her rhetoric nor her political proposal (501-3, 527-8).  
These examples make clear that both Aristophanes and Plato reflect issues which 
occur frequently in the assembly and the law-courts of late fifth-century and early fourth-
century Athens. Miller states: “…Greek politics in the fourth century continues to be the same 
wearying and disastrous mix of internal faction and external war which Thucydides described 
in the fifth.”246 More importantly, this continues to show that while the art of statecraft, like 
the art of weaving, often aims to combine opposites and settle disputes among factions – and 
indeed, this is Lysistrata’s aim in her argument with the Proboulos – this is not always the 
case. It certainly works in Ecclesiazusae, and it also works towards the end of Lysistrata 
because the comedy finishes on a peaceful note where men and women have reconciled and 
resolved their differences. However, as stated above, and as I demonstrate later on in this 
thesis, in the scene with the Proboulos, it only heightens the conflict.247  
 This emphasises the rationale for Utopia (and also shows once again how More is not 
only influenced by the political situation of his time, but also by that of the past): if 
conflicting internal factions are prohibited, they can do no damage. Additionally, it illustrates 
that, inasmuch as the purpose of the Statesman is “to accomplish something through 
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247	That being said, in Ecclesiazusae, it is technically different as well. Praxagora’s statecraft 
may have eliminated conflict in theory, but it is clear that in reality her style of leadership, and 
use of καιρός, will only benefit herself and not the Athenians. Cf. Eccl. 229-232; 239-4; 246; 
725-7. 
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discourse, and inasmuch as discourse accomplishes its results by weaving together 
appropriate elements of speech, the ability…to achieve [this] goal depends on success in this 
weaving process.”248 The Stranger in the Statesman inadvertently reflects Lysistrata’s 
exchange with the Proboulos when he says, “Now this opposition of these two classes is mere 
child’s-play; but when it affects the most important matters it becomes a most detestable 
disease in the state.” (παιδιὰ τοίνυν αὕτη γέ τις ἡ διαφορὰ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν εἰδῶν: περὶ δὲ τὰ 
µέγιστα νόσος συµβαίνει πασῶν ἐχθίστη γίγνεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν).249 This state of childishness 
(παιδιὰ) can affect the whole course of life (περὶ ὅλην τὴν τοῦ ζῆν παρασκευήν), according to 
the Stranger, because it prevents the Athenians from engaging in proper matters of discourse 
to such a degree that it might lead them directly from freedom into slavery (ἔλαθον αὑτοὺς 
γενόµενοι δοῦλοι).250 Or, as the myth of the reversed cosmos and the repeated use of πάλιν 
exemplify, it leads to the reversal of times; and the Athenians find themselves back where 
they started.  
 The Stranger asserts that this fate can only be avoided when the true statesman steps in 
and fixes the lack of understanding between the different factions with his epistemological 
and legislative art. It is this art, which has the potential to fill the gap between the different 
factions, which in turn allows them to overcome their natural differences. Specifically, this 
statesman fashions divine bonds in the eternal parts of the souls of the citizens (µὲν κατὰ τὸ 
συγγενὲς τὸ ἀειγενὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν µέρος θείῳ συναρµοσαµένη δεσµῷ); after that, “it 
																																								 																				
248 Sayre 2006: 94. Sayre notes that the goal of the Sophist is similar to that of the Statesman 
because it is concerned with “the weaving together of Forms with one another” (τὴν ἀλλήλων 
τῶν εἰδῶν συµπλοκὴν). Relevant points are made at 262 when the Stranger asserts that speech 
achieves its goal by “weaving together verbs and names” (συµπλέκων τὰ ῤήµατα τοῖς 
ὀνόµασι). “The remarks,” Sayre writes, “illustrate an underlying theme of the Sophist to the 
effect that speech, on whatever level of generality, depends on the weaving together of 
appropriate constituents.”  
249 Stat. 307d. 
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binds the [mortal] part of them with human bonds” (µετὰ δὲ τὸ θεῖον τὸ ζῳογενὲς αὐτῶν 
αὖθις ἀνθρωπίνοις).251 This is done by weaving the citizens together via institutional 
arrangements of (inter-) marriages and the sharing of children.252  
However, like the societal structure of Plato’s Kallipolis and More’s Utopia, so the 
existence of the statesman who is able to weave the citizens together in this manner is an 
unattainable ideal. As the Stranger points out at 301d-e: “But, as the case now stands…no 
king is produced in our states who is, like the ruler of the bees in their hives, by birth pre-
eminently fitted from the beginning in body and mind…” (νῦν δέ γε…οὐκ ἔστι 
γιγνόµενος…ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν σµήνεσιν ἐµφύεται, τό τε σῶµα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν 
ψυχὴν διαφέρων εἷς).253 
One reason for this is the complicated and partial use of καιρός. Both the rule of the 
kingly art in the Statesman, and that of the guardians in the Republic, require deciding “upon 
the right or wrong time for the initiation of the most important measures in the state” 
(γιγνώσκουσαν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρµὴν τῶν µεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε πέρι καὶ 
ἀκαιρίας).254 The Republic makes this clear at 546c-d, when Socrates states, if the rulers of 
Kallipolis choose the wrong moment (παρὰ καιρόν) to get married, their “children will be 
neither good natured nor fortunate” (οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται). This in turn 
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252 Stat. 310b. This employment of the weaving metaphor brings to mind that of Lysistrata 
when she demonstrates how she intends to weave all of Greece into one single fabric. See Lys. 
568-570 and 574-586. 
253 It is worth noting that the task of the political expert in the Statesman is different from that 
of the philosopher-king in the Republic. The aim of Kallipolis is to prevent political conflict 
(between different factions) from arising in the first place; this is why the tripartite structure 
of the city is organised the way it is: to prevent any form of mixing. The political task of the 
Republic is therefore the opposite of that of the Statesman: eliminate the possibility of a clash, 
and misunderstandings brought on by different rhetorical styles, between opposing groups by 
separating them. The political task in the Statesman, however, is to weave together, rather 
than split up, these opposing arguments into the fabric of the state itself. Cf. Lane 1995: 278-
9; 281. 
254 Stat. 305d. 
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will lead to civil war, which will then fundamentally alter the constitution of Kallipolis.  Thus, 
the choice of the wrong moment leads to the degeneration of the city.  
This is similar in the Statesman: as stated above, the inability of the Athenians to find 
καιρός, and to act on it appropriately, leads to problematic situations in Athens and to the 
reversal of the cosmos in the myth. Likewise, the ability of the κόλακες to find, and use, 
καιρός also leads to complicated conditions in the polis, albeit only for the others and not for 
them. Their decision to act on καιρός is based on relevant knowledge and rhetoric, which 
allows them to initiate the measures they deem best in the state – this is also Peisetaerus’ 
mission in Birds, and Praxagora’s in Ecclesiazusae. This καιρός may be the statesman’s 
personal one, as opposed to one that benefits the entire polis, but it nonetheless portrays the 
benefits that can arise from choosing καιρός wisely. For the more altruistic statesmen, the 
decision is based on choosing the right moment, which will allow them to persuade the 
Athenians to pick policies, which will truly be of advantage to them. However, as discussed 
above, this undertaking is more difficult because it requires the persuasion of different 
factions who do not necessarily share the same language. Lastly, for the Athenians 
themselves, the decision is based on choosing the right moment to listen carefully to the 
altruistic statesman, rather than to the κόλαξ, if they want to escape the recurrent cycles of 
political conflicts. 
 In this manner, we are indeed back (πάλιν) at the beginning and required to take up the 
former argument again (πάλιν δὴ τὸν ἔµπροσθε λόγον ἀναληπτέον).255 Like the Gorgias, the 
Statesman shows that καιρός is related to epistemology and rhetoric; in order for statecraft to 
be successful (whether it is successful for the entire polis or merely for the κόλαξ), it must be 
able to harness rhetoric in the assembly and the lawcourts, and in the state itself. The 
																																								 																				
255 Stat. 279a. 
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enactment of politics is supposed to be a defence against nature in the myth of the reversed 
cosmos, but as shown above, it is not just about politics but also about epistemology and 
rhetoric. In this way, as much as the task of the ideal statesman is to weave the citizens 
together, they must also be concerned with weaving together different forms of knowledge 
and rhetoric if they want to break the continual cycles of political conflicts. I am certain More 
is influenced by this task in one way or another, when he offers a serio-comic version of the 
weaving process on Utopia and presents one group of citizens only that is innately weaved 
together.256  
 Meanwhile, the citizens in the Statesman must learn to remember the teachings from 
the first period; however, as is the case in Gorgias where the Athenians’ task (to use rhetoric 
only for the attainment of justice and nothing else) is easier said than done, this is no easy 
undertaking. The Protagorean dependence on the human intellect that comes with the ascent 
of man complicates this further. As seen in the myth of the reversed cosmos, ultimately the 
Demiurge offers the necessary solution human beings seek, not reason. The failure of reason 
(or, the insufficiency of it) is examined in more detail in the Protagoras, written 
approximately thirty years before the Statesman. The dialogue discusses a question that 
automatically arises with the ascent of man, namely whether it is actually possible to teach 
political virtue and excellence, or whether that undertaking is bound to fail from the 
beginning.257 It thus continues to enhance the significance of the question asked at the end of 
the section on Aeschylus: if political virtue cannot be taught, but is only about who is the 
most persuasive speaker in the assembly, then what does that mean for the Athenians’ 
political, legal, and social system?  
 In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that wisdom, which is both the highest form and 
																																								 																				
256 Cf. pp. 30-1. 
257 The same question is also asked in the Meno, written a couple of decades later. 
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the unity of all virtues, is something that cannot be taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, 
disagrees. He believes neither that wisdom unites the other virtues nor that it is impossible to 
learn how to be virtuous. The analysis of both their arguments is significant because, like the 
oscillatory layout of the Prometheia, the critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias, and the 
examination of καιρός, πάλιν, and language in the Statesman, it continues to ask whether the 
Athenians are able to break free from their recurrent political cycles by applying political 




V. The Instruction of Political Virtue in the Protagoras 
 
 At 319a, Socrates summarises Protagoras’ previously announced goal and asserts: 
“…you appear to be speaking of the civic science, and undertaking to make men good 
citizens” (δοκεῖς µοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς 
πολίτας). Protagoras replies, “That, Socrates, is exactly the purport of what I profess.” (αὐτὸ 
µὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελµα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλοµαι). Socrates, as stated at the 
end of the last section, does not believe that men can be taught how to be good citizens; 
Protagoras, on the other hand, thinks otherwise and asserts that this virtue is teachable.258 
Moreover, he believes that everybody is able to advise on virtue: “Take my word for it, then, 
that they have good reason for admitting everybody as adviser on this virtue, owing to their 
belief that everyone has some of it…” (ὅτι µὲν οὖν πάντ᾽ ἄνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται περὶ 
ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύµβουλον διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαι παντὶ µετεῖναι αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω).259 
 Protagoras’ goal is, as Nussbaum asserts likewise, “to make human beings good 
																																								 																				
258 Prot. 323c. 
259 Prot. 323c. 
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citizens, teaching them good deliberation both about their household and about the affairs of 
the city.”260 She further argues that moral education in Protagoras’ speech “is characterized as 
answering to a need that is part of our nature. Zeus gave us a natural tendency towards justice; 
but it must be developed by communal training.”261 This approach brings to mind that of 
More analysed in the introduction: citizens’ excellence is developed early on by installing 
rhythm and harmony in them when they are children because “for the whole of man’s life 
requires the graces of rhythm and harmony” (πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθµίας τε καὶ 
εὐαρµοστίας δεῖται).262 Comparably with Lycurgus and More, the training (and correction) of 
children is important here:263  
 
ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόµενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ µήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ 
αὐτὸς ὁ πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαµάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ᾽ 
ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύµενοι ὅτι τὸ µὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ 
ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε µὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε µὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ 
τὰ µὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ µὴ ποίει. 
 
as soon as one of them grasps what is said to him, the nurse, the mother, the tutor, and 
the father himself strive hard that the child may excel, and as each act and word occurs 
they teach and impress upon him that this is just, and that unjust, one thing noble, 
another base, one holy, another unholy, and that he is to do this, and not do that. 
 
Moral training, in Protagoras’ view, is supposed to ensure the development of good citizens 
who are able to focus clearly, without distraction, on the civic excellences and gifts of Zeus 
(justice, moderation, and piety).264 As is the case in More’s Utopia, and his interpretation of 
Lycurgus’ Sparta, the implication here is that moral training guarantees not only excellent 
																																								 																				
260 Nussbaum 1986: 103. 
261 Nussbaum 1986: 103. 
262 Prot. 326b. 
263 Prot. 325c-d. Cf. Utopia, 104. 
264 Meanwhile, traits such as injustice and impiety are opposed to civic virtue. See Prot. 323e-
324a. Cf. Bartlett 2003: 616. “...according to Protagoras’ account of it, ‘political virtue 
(323a6-7, b2, 324a1) is limited to moderation, justice, and piety, or to what might be called 
ordinary decency…” 
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citizens but also a healthy government that eradicates problems, which tend to arise from the 
negligence of the civic excellences. This metaphor highlights this further: in case the child 
disobeys, he or she must be straightened just like a piece of wood that is bent and twisted 
(ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόµενον καὶ καµπτόµενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς).265 Moral 
education thus includes the ‘straightening’ of children; and moral excellence, the desired end 
result, incorporates this straightness, which in turn links to a healthy (and straight) 
government. 
 It also includes the teaching of the laws of a city; and it instructs the children in how to 
live accordingly to them. “And when they are released from their schooling the city next 
compels them to learn the laws and to live according to them as after a pattern, that their 
conduct may not be swayed by their own light fancies” (ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων 
ἀπαλλαγῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε νόµους ἀναγκάζει µανθάνειν καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν κατὰ 
παράδειγµα, ἵνα µὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῶν εἰκῇ πράττωσιν).266 This constraint to be governed by 
existing laws that condemns the possibility to be led astray on a whim and without a real plan 
brings to mind the law-making of Solon, who is said to have made his laws binding and 
unalterable for a hundred years.267 In case anyone fails to abide by this constraint, they will 
have to face correction, which again links to the straightening component of the moral 
training Protagoras proposes. 
It seems then that Protagoras bases at least parts of his claim (that civic virtue is 
teachable) on the training of youth.268 This basis of his argument links directly to Socrates’ 
																																								 																				
265 Prot. 325d. On that note, Bartlett asserts: “…the so-called education necessary to instill 
[moderation, justice, and piety] consists of exhortations, forced memorizations, threats, and 
even beatings: ‘Do these things!’ ‘Don’t do those!’” Bartlett 2003: 616. 
266 Prot. 326c-d. 
267 Aristotle, Const. Ath. 7.2. 
268 At the same time, it also seems to be based on instruction and learning in general. For 
example, there are certain elements in Protagoras’ argument, which bring to mind Lysistrata’s 
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concern: he thinks that in both private and public life, “the best and wisest citizens are unable 
to transmit this excellence of theirs to others” (οἱ σοφώτατοι καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην 
τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι).269 (He refers to Pericles as an 
example, who has been unable to teach Cleinias).270 Additionally, when the Athenians wish to 
hear about a particular craft (for example, ship-building or shoe-making) they only listen to 
the opinion of the trained expert and dismiss that of the one who merely claims to be an 
expert. (For example, they would not listen to a ship-builder who attempts to give advice on 
how to make shoes because they know that it is outside his field of expertise).  
However, when it comes to matters of the state, anyone, regardless of their 
background and occupation, can give advice; and “his attempt to give advice is justified by no 
instruction obtained in any quarter, no guidance of any master; and obviously it is because 
they hold that here the thing cannot be taught.” (ὅτι οὐδαµόθεν µαθών, οὐδὲ ὄντος 
διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συµβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἡγοῦνται 
διδακτὸν εἶναι).271 Protagoras offers a response to this by referring to the roles of Zeus and 
Hermes in his version of the Prometheus myth. His interpretation of the myth links to PV and 
the ascent of man discussed earlier, as he “gives a ‘progressivist’ version of human evolution 
typical of Greek thought in the fifth century B.C.”272 By portraying Zeus as the facilitator of 
civilization and by offering a symbolic account of the different stages of human evolution, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
and Praxagora’s appropriation of male speech: both learned the (male) civic art and 
deliberation by listening to men in the assembly and by studying their tricks and expertise. 
Despite some of the questionable aspects of the female characters’ plans, this does support 
Protagoras’ point that at least aspects of political virtue (and politics) can be taught. In 
Praxagora’s case, this also shows again that she is very clever because she combines a natural 
ability (automatically given to her by the etymology of her name) with training (listening to 
other orators), and demonstrates that political success does not only depend on opportune 
moments but also on a distinct capability. Cf. Prot. 327b-c and Yona 2015: 377. 
269 Prot. 319e. 
270 Prot. 320a. 
271 Prot. 319c-d. 
272 Yona 2015: 361. 
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Protagoras merges the themes of ascent and descent that inform both PV and the Statesman. 
Particularly, Zeus’ role in the myth sheds light on the importance of the Demiurge in 
the Statesman, on the absence of divine intervention prompted by Prometheus’ theft in the 
Prometheia, and thus also on the sophists’ reliance on reason. It does so by presenting an 
ascending sequence similar to the one seen in the Prometheia, using the names of the gods. 
Epimetheus: Prometheus: Zeus. It is clear that Epimetheus represents the primordial period 
during which humans had to rely on instinct rather than the arts of civilization. Prometheus, 
meanwhile, represents the development of technical wisdom (speech, reason, arithmetic etc.). 
The zenith of the sequence, however, is reached with Zeus, because in Protagoras’ version of 
the myth it is he who equips man with political wisdom and thus with the capability to 
establish governments.273 The emphasis is thus again on divine interference (as is the case in 
the myth of the reversed cosmos) rather than just reason (as seen in the historical Protagoras’ 
trust in the human intellect).   
Specifically, Protagoras asserts that Zeus asked Hermes to distribute right (δίκη) and 
respect (αἰδώς) among men, “to the end that there should be regulation of cities and friendly 
ties to draw them together” (ἵν᾽ εἶεν πόλεων κόσµοι τε καὶ δεσµοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί).274 
When Hermes asks him to whom exactly he should give right and respect, Zeus responds: “To 
all…let all have their share; for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these as 
of other arts.” (ἐπὶ πάντας…καὶ πάντες µετεχόντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι 
																																								 																				
273 Prot. 321c-d. Cf. Yona 2015: 366. 
274 Prot. 322c. This friendly characterization of Zeus, which focuses on union and 
benevolence, stands in contrast to the one in PV, which is marked by alienation and tyranny. 
However, it does have the potential to hint at the theme of reconciliation in Prometheus 
Unbound where Prometheus and Zeus have established friendly ties. It also recalls the 
following passage from Ag. 165-6, πλὴν Διός, εἰ τὸ µάταν ἀπὸ φροντίδος ἄχθος χρὴ βαλεῖν 
ἐτητύµως. (“Only in the thought of Zeus can the heart be free from its vain burden of 
distress”). Trans. Dodds. 
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αὐτῶν µετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν).275 In this version of the story, the gifts of Prometheus 
only include the wisdom of daily life (περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν), not civic wisdom, for that is in 
the possession of Zeus (ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ Διί).276 The skill to form civilizations thus comes 
from Zeus (via Hermes), and not from the development of the human intellect.277 This is why 
Zeus’ role here is similar to the one of the Demiurge in the Statesman: both demonstrate the 
limits of human wisdom, and the importance of divine, and thus superior, skills. 
According to Protagoras, it is because of this divine distribution of civic virtue that 
Athenians listen to everyone when it comes to matters concerning the state: everybody has 
some of it and therefore everybody can participate in such discussions. This is in contrast to 
discussions about matters such as craftsmanship and other trades, which are based on specific 
expertise and training. Moreover, not only is everyone capable of participating in political 
discussions, but everyone should participate, because the state cannot exist otherwise.278  
Socrates points out that not everyone may be able to apply civic art wisely (for example, there 
may be ‘bad’ sons who are unable to learn from their good, deliberative, fathers) to which 
Protagoras offers a rather unsatisfactory response. First of all, says he, even the most unjust 
person among all human laws and societies appears just, in comparison with someone who 
not only lacks any form of laws and law courts, but also the urge to pursue this civic virtue 
constantly.279 That is, it is better to be unjust than to lack justice altogether. Secondly, every 
teacher does their best to teach civic virtue as well as possible,280 and thirdly, it is not always 
																																								 																				
275 Prot. 322d. 
276 Prot. 321c-321d. 
277 Cf. Theophil. Antioch. Ad Autolycum 2.8. καὶ Σιµωνίδης· οὔτις ἄνευ θεῶν ἀρετὰν λάβεν, 
οὐ πόλις, οὐ βροτός. θεὸς ὁ πάµµητις· ἀπήµαντον δ᾿ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. (“And Simonides 
said, no one ever attained excellence without the gods, no city, no mortal. The all-clever one 
is God: for mortals nothing is free from misery”). 
278 Prot. 322e. See also Farrar 1988: 84 and Sørensen 2016: 167. 
279 Prot. 327c-d. 
280 Prot. 327e. 
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fair to judge sons because often they are still young and have a lot left to learn (ἔτι γὰρ ἐν 
αὐτοῖς εἰσιν ἐλπίδες: νέοι γάρ).281 
Protagoras’ point that it is better to be unjust than to not have any form of justice at 
all, and the implication that “political society will endure perfectly well if only a few 
understand the truth about justice,”282 is problematic. It underestimates both the fatal 
consequences of injustice in societies and the role insufficient deliberation can play in the 
destruction of certain societies. It also points at one of the underlying problems of his 
argument in general: just because everyone is theoretically able to learn political virtue does 
not mean that everyone is also able to use it wisely and for the community. For instance, as I 
demonstrate in the chapter on Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae, Praxagora does learn civic virtue 
(and very well at that), but she does not use it for wise and just things, which would benefit 
the entire polis.283 (In Lysistrata, on the other hand, Lysistrata does use it to help the Athenian 
community).284 The instruction of civic virtue may therefore be possible but it cannot 
																																								 																				
281 Prot. 328d. The use of νέος here brings to mind again the role of Zeus in PV and the 
development he supposedly undergoes from the second play of the trilogy to the third. He is a 
new and young tyrant and, as Hephaestus points out at 35, ‘everyone is harsh whose power is 
new’ (ἅπας δὲ τραχὺς ὅστις ἂν νέον κρατῇ), implying that these are the early stages of the 
regime and that Zeus still has a lot to learn. However, the presumed sequence of the 
Prometheia suggests that Zeus will eventually learn, just like the young sons Protagoras refers 
to will learn how to apply civic virtue as they continue to grow.  
282 Bartlett 2003: 616. 
283 This becomes clear when looking at Praxagoras’s definition of conflict resolution. A 249-
60, after being asked how she intends to resolve conflicts in the assembly, she essentially 
replies, ‘I will resolve them by using violence.’   
284 This brings to mind two of the main questions Jason Brennan poses in Against Democracy. 
Drawing from John Stuart Mill and Joseph Schumpeter, he asks: “How much do we really 
want people to participate in politics? How much should people even be allowed to 
participate?” He asserts, “Mill hoped that getting people involved in politics would make 
them smarter, more concerned about the common good, better educated, and nobler. He hoped 
getting a factory worker to think about politics would be like getting a fish to discover there’s 
a world outside the ocean. Mill hoped political involvement would harden our minds yet 
soften our hearts. He hoped that political engagement would cause us to look beyond our 
immediate interests and instead to adopt a long-term, broad perspective.” Brennan 2016: 2. 
However, as is the case in Protagoras’ argument (and in many assembly scenes in 
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guarantee that it will also produce wise and good citizens.285  
 One aspect of Protagoras’ original question is what teachable skill there is that enables 
human beings to be good at political deliberation and in control of political decisions, which 
affect the polis. Nussbaum asserts, rightly, that his answer shows us “that a capability for 
social excellence and for its proper development are a deep part of our human nature and way 
of life.”286 However, as argued above, this answer also exposes a problem: for many citizens 
this capability only exists in theory, as they may not have the desire to receive instructions or 
to study them well. This in turn may lead to problematic moments in the assembly when 
citizens are neither willing nor fully able to participate in political debates, let alone attend 
assembly in the first place.287 Furthermore, as seen in both Ecclesiazusae and the Statesman, 
just because someone is happy to learn civic virtue from others, does not mean they are also 
happy to use it for the good of the community. (Or, as the myth of the reversed cosmos 
shows, just because someone is able to learn it, does not mean they will also remember it). On 
the contrary, using the knowledge of this civic virtue in combination with clever rhetoric, they 
may end up using it to pursue personal goals. In that sense, Socrates is right when he says that 
it is not possible to teach everyone (as is the case with Cleinias).  
 It is for these reasons, and especially because of the misuse of civic virtue in 
combination with deceptive rhetoric, that Socrates proposes the application of a science of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Aristophanic comedy), often the opposite is true, as people are led astray by ideas of power, 
injustice, and selfishness. (This is also one of the reasons why Brennan argues for less 
political participation, rather than more, in his book). 
285 On that note, see also Irwin 1995: 79, who argues that Protagoras and Socrates seem to 
overlook an important issue. “For it is not clear how far the skills and abilities that promote an 
individual’s success are connected with the virtues of justice and shame that are attributed to 
all the citizens alike. If my own success requires ruthlessness and deception rather than 
justice, will Protagoras teach me to be ruthless or to be just?” 
286 Nussbaum 1986: 103. 
287 This was an actual problem in late fifth and early fourth-century Athens. An attempt was 
made to solve it by paying men to attend assembly.  
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measurement (ἡ µετρητικὴ τέχνη) in order to evaluate the different sides, which emerge in 
deliberations, more carefully.288  Socrates primarily refers to the power of appearance but his 
argument can also be applied to points made previously about the power of speech. 
Specifically, when posing the question what skill has the ability to save our lives, he asks:289 
 
ἆρα ἡ µετρητικὴ τέχνη ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινοµένου δύναµις; ἢ αὕτη µὲν ἡµᾶς ἐπλάνα καὶ 
ἐποίει ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω πολλάκις µεταλαµβάνειν ταὐτὰ καὶ µεταµέλειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς 
πράξεσιν καὶ ἐν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν τῶν µεγάλων τε καὶ σµικρῶν, ἡ δὲ µετρητικὴ ἄκυρον 
µὲν ἂν ἐποίησε τοῦτο τὸ φάντασµα, δηλώσασα δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἡσυχίαν ἂν ἐποίησεν 
ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν µένουσαν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἔσωσεν ἂν τὸν βίον;  
 
Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of appearance? It is not the latter 
that leads us astray, as we saw, and many a time causes us to take things topsy-turvy 
and to have to change our minds both in our conduct and in our choice of great or 
small? Whereas the art of measurement would have made this appearance ineffective, 
and by showing us the truth would have brought our soul into the repose of abiding by 
the truth, and so would have saved our life. 
 
 
This science of measurement is supposed to minimise any uncertainty Athenians might have 
about what actually is a good political speech and appearance, and maximise the skill to select 
																																								 																				
288 See Nussbaum 1986: 108, who writes: “the idea that deliberation is, or could become, a 
kind of measuring is not itself alien to ordinary conceptions. It is as common for a Greek as 
for us to speak of weighing one course against another, measuring the possibilities.” For 
example, in ll. 22.248-54, Zeus takes out his golden scales and in them places two fates of 
death, one for Achilles and one for Hector, which is ultimately Hector’s doom, as his side 
goes down. Likewise, in Aristophanes’ Frogs, when Dionysus needs to decide whether to take 
Aeschylus or Euripides with him, he suggests putting the respective playwrights’ verses on a 
scale in order to determine their value. The same idea of weighing also appears in Euth. 7c-d, 
written around the same time as the Protagoras, where Socrates demonstrates the art of 
measurement as a model for political deliberation to Euthyphro. Similarly, in Rep. 602c-d, 
measurement is used to underline the danger of misperception and the need to avoid it; and at 
Phil. 41e-42, the science of measurement is used for the comparison of pleasures and pains. 
Meanwhile, at Phil. 55d-56c, Socrates refers to it when evaluating which parts of the manual 
arts are more allied to knowledge and which ones less; a similar use is also found in 
Statesman 284e-285b. 
289 Prot. 356d-e. 
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the best political proposal, one that actually has the potential to bode well for all of them.290 It 
is also supposed to maximise knowledge (ἐπιστήµη) because the science of measurement 
Socrates proposes is also knowledge of measurement. Specifically, he asks Protagoras, 
“…what would save our life? Would it not be knowledge; a knowledge of measurement, since 
the art here is concerned with excess and defect, and of numeration, as it has to do with odd 
and even?” (τί ἂν ἔσῳζεν ἡµῖν τὸν βίον; ἆρ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ἐπιστήµη; καὶ ἆρ᾽ ἂν οὐ µετρητική τις, 
ἐπειδήπερ ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἆρα 
ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθµητική;).291 
 It is clear that Socrates believes that there is nothing stronger than knowledge 
(ἐπιστήµης µηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον),292 but this response does contradict, anachronistically, 
some of the points made in the Statesman approximately thirty years later. For the Statesman 
shows that it is not always possible to apply knowledge and measurements properly – as seen 
in the myth of the reversed cosmos, eventually the Demiurge has to step in in order to rectify 
the problems caused by the limits of the human intellect. Furthermore, as demonstrated 
previously, when it comes to evaluating, and measuring, speeches from different factions, the 
specific knowledge needed for such an undertaking is not necessarily available to someone 
who is from a faction that is alien to the one whose speeches they are supposed to measure. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether there actually is as great a benefit in having this 
knowledge of measurement as Socrates says there is and whether it is possible to measure all 
political deliberation by the same standard. It may be beneficial to someone who wishes to 
evaluate speech and sight within their own faction, but it might not be much use to them when 
																																								 																				
290 Cf. Richardson 1990: 26. “In the Protagoras, as in the Republic, Socrates presents the 
importance of measurement for technê in terms of the need to avoid being fooled by illusions 
of perceptions and their analogues.” 
291 Prot. 357a. 
292 Prot. 357c. 
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it comes to evaluating the same in a different group.  
 Socrates’ proposal then exposes similar problems to the art of Protagoras: it is not 
necessarily possible to use the science of measurement in every situation, because situations 
are not always commensurable, which in turn makes it difficult to assimilate political 
deliberation to the science of measurement. It also makes it difficult to assimilate the pursuit 
of pleasure to it, because it may not be feasible to determine the best, most pleasurable, 
outcome when it is not possible to understand all the benefits of every outcome. (This is the 
case with Lysistrata and the Proboulos, who does not understand the connotations and values 
of her metaphors).293 On that note, Richardson argues: “the underlying supposition is that the 
hedonism put forward in the Protagoras allows one to define a maximum because all goods 
are commensurable. But…hedonism does not imply commensurability, nor does 
commensurability imply hedonism.”294 
It seems then, what we need is “a unit of measure, some external end about which we 
can all agree, and which can render all alternatives commensurable.”295 Richardson’s 
interpretation of Plato’s conception of the science of measurement (he says he sees it as a 
measurement that is preliminary to choice) has the potential to function as such as unit. He 
writes: “It is measurement in this preliminary sense, as the unitary estimation of ascertainment 
of quantities providing the data for choice rather than the binary or comparative choice itself, 
that is the real fruit…of Socrates’s science of measurement.”296 In this way, Socrates’ point 
that the precision of knowledge and measurement will ‘save our lives’ brings to mind many 
assembly scenes (both off and on stage) where Athenians struggle to estimate the prospective 
benefits (or lack thereof) that are being offered to them in a political speech. If they had this 
																																								 																				
293 Cf. Lys. 501-3; 527-8. 
294 Richardson 1990: 7.  
295 Nussbaum 1986: 110. 
296 Richardson 1990: 25. 
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Socratic precision in knowledge and measurement, the basis on which they elect leaders and 
vote for decrees would presumably change and the illusions of perception would slowly wane. 
Socrates’ proposed precision has thus also to do with estimating prospective levels of 
advantages and disadvantages in political proposals, which then, quite literally, underlines the 
‘life-saving’ aspect of it. As he says at 356e, this precision includes “knowing when to make a 
right choice of the greater and when of the less” (ὁπότε τὸ πλέον ὀρθῶς ἔδει ἑλέσθαι καὶ 
ὁπότε τὸ ἔλαττον). This in turn highlights the knowledge of measurement further, as it shows 
that the art is concerned with “excess and defect, and of numeration, as it has to do with odd 
and even” (ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη; ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου, ἆρα 
ἄλλη τις ἢ ἀριθµητική).297 It also includes making the right choice of “pleasure and pain” 
(ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης).298 Especially the usage of ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας and περιττοῦ τε 
καὶ ἀρτίου emphasise the relevance of this measurement to the listening of political speeches 
in the assembly; meanwhile ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης has the potential to hint at the consequences 
of the choices the Athenians may make.  
 For instance, if the Athenians were able to apply this knowledge of measurement 
properly, they would be able to detect excessive superiority, extravagance and unnecessarily 
strong statements (i.e. ὑπερβολή) in speeches given in the assembly. In the same way, they 
would be able to uncover the deficiencies of the speeches, and question closely the things that 
they lack (ἔνδεια). Likewise, while περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου primarily refer to the numeration 
component of measurement here, they do link to the metaphorical use of ὑπερβολή and 
ἔνδεια. Specifically, it is true that περιττοῦ means ‘odd’ in the mathematical sense, and it also 
means ‘remarkable’ and ‘extraordinary’ when used to refer to people; however, it also means 
‘superfluous,’ and ‘excessive.’ All of these are meanings which may be present in a speech, 
																																								 																				
297 Prot. 357a. 
298 Prot. 357a. 
	 109	
and the Athenians need to unravel and measure them carefully before choosing a leader. The 
meaning of ἀρτίου underlines this nicely: while it is used to refer to ‘even’ numbers, it is also 
used to express when something is ‘suitable’ or ‘most perfect.’ Thus, being able to measure 
περιττοῦ and ἀρτίου would allow the Athenians to vote for the decree (and candidate) that 
really is most suitable for them and dismiss the one that only appears suitable, but is in reality 
superfluous.299 
 This vote determines the levels of ἡδονή and λύπη the Athenians will experience 
afterwards. It is likely that if they apply the knowledge of measurement correctly, there will 
be more ἡδονή (and indeed, that side will be heavier than the other one) whereas if they do 
not apply it properly, the scale will tip towards λύπη, the consequences of which are unlikely 
to bode well for many of the Athenians.300 In this manner, as the terminology used makes 
clear, the science of measurement in the dialogue plays the ideal role of assuring a precise 
calculation of consequences in situations where sight and sound alone are unreliable and 
misleading.301 However, like the societal construction of Kallipolis, the weaving-skills of the 
true statesman in the Statesman, and More’s Utopia, this ideal calculation remains just that: 
an ideal, which, at the end of the day, is unattainable, largely due to the different 
communication styles used in different factions, the lack of a universal commensurability, and 
																																								 																				
299 Aristotle expresses a similar sentiment in Rhet. 1375b7 when he compares the judge to “an 
assayer of silver, whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine justice” (καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ 
ἀργυρογνώµων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές). 
300 The need to measure pleasure and pain is also based on the following. “Since short-term 
pleasures and pains seem greater than they really are, we make mistaken judgments about 
pleasure and pain, and so we choose the result that will actually be less pleasant because we 
believe it will be more pleasant (356c-e)… .If we are to avoid [that] error…we need the 
measuring craft that calculates the prospective quantities of pleasure and pain.” Irwin 1995: 
85. 
 This also emphasises the notion of ἁµαρτία analysed in PV (cf. pp. 67-8), and its 
relation to the chain of events that are set in motion by Prometheus’ error in the first play. If 
Prometheus had calculated the consequences of his actions more carefully (and stayed true to 
the etymology of his name), the story might have developed differently. 
301 Cf. Richardson 1990: 32. 
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the limits of the human intellect. The same is true for Socrates’ effort to establish a unity of 
virtue with wisdom being the unifying element in the Protagoras. Since the virtues come 
together in knowledge, there is no guarantee that they will generate a single practical principle 
that works for all factions, and that they will stop conflicting incommensurably with one 
another. In this vein, it is clear that neither in the Protagoras nor in the Statesman is it truly 
possible to weave together the virtues and to provide a unified method of precise 
calculation.302 
I am inclined to agree with Protagoras and say that the theory of political virtue can be 
taught; however, when it comes to the practical application of it in pivotal situations 
pertaining to the Athenians’ future, I am not convinced it is teachable due to the points raised 
in the discussion above. This is why, as Frede states likewise, “the Protagoras should…be 
read as an aporetic dialogue”303 because it leaves us with an impracticable solution to the 
problems discussed. It seems that Protagoras is aware of that at least to a certain extent 
because he quotes the following from the poetry of Simonides: “for a man, indeed, to become 
good truly is hard, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without reproach.” 
(ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθὸν µὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ 
ψόγου τετυγµένον).304 Socrates provides the next line a few sections later: “God alone can 
have this privilege.” (θεὸς ἂν µόνος τοῦτ᾽ ἔχοι γέρας).305 
																																								 																				
302 Cf. Richardson 1990: 31. “The appeal of a single maximizing principle that implies the 
commensurability of all goods is that this model would indeed provide the account that 
unifies virtue with a precise numerical way of unifying it.” However, neither in the 
Protagoras nor in the Statesman is this ultimately given.  
303 Frede 1986: 736. 
304 Prot. 339b. Cf. pp. 35-6, with n. 115 on the Morean notion, ‘it is impossible to make 
everything good unless all men are good and that I don’t expect to see for quite a few years 
yet.’ 
305 Prot. 341e. Cf. Semon. 42 West Stob. Ecl. 2.1.10, Σιµωνίδου· ῥεῖα θεοὶ κλέπτουσιν 
ἀνθρώπων νόον. “From Simonides: the gods easily steal the wits of men.” On the note that 
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This quotation highlights the aporetic aspect of the Protagoras, but it is necessary to 
treat it with caution.306 As ideal and useful as Socrates’ proposed science of measurement may 
be, in reality the Athenians are not able to use it as wisely and as well as they should. They 
may be able to use it on certain occasions and in certain situations but ultimately they lack the 
ideal level of goodness in order to use it all the time.307 More importantly, they lack a 
permanent kind of goodness in order to apply it properly all the time. As Socrates, now 
supposedly quoting from both Simonides and Pittacus of Mytilene, says: “to become…a good 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
perfection belongs to the gods, see also fr. 590 from Sophocles’ Tereus, Plato’s Tim.29c-d, 
and Pindar’s Isth. 5.14 and Pyth. 3.81. 
306 Many of Simonides’ quotations survive only in the dialogue. It is not clear, “whether 
Socrates and Protagoras are quoting, paraphrasing, misremembering, or deliberately falsifying 
the original text”, or whether Plato just puts words in their mouth (Carson 1992: 112). 
Moreover, most scholars cannot even agree on a basic level on what it is that Simonides is 
actually saying. Some say that the poem quoted in the Protagoras exhibits the contrast 
between being good and becoming good (Woodbury 1953: 141); others claim that there is no 
such distinction at all (Wilamowitz 1913: 165).  Some suggest that the poem compares two 
different ideas of the good man, namely an aristocratic ideal and an ethical concept of 
goodness (Frede 1986: 741-2); others state that there is nothing ethical at all about the poem 
(Adkins 1960: 166-7; 355-9). Some argue that the poem teaches moral innovation (Donlan 
1969: 71) while others say it is not innovative but conventional (Parry 1965: 301). Some 
interpret the poem’s topic “as foil to praise a virtue or virtues which are attainable by man” 
(Dickie 1978: 21); others assert that the poem is supposed to console Scopas (Woodbury 
1953: 138; Parry 1965: 298); and others again argue that the poem is a critique of Pittacus 
(Carson 1992: 111). It is also unclear why Plato includes the poem in the first place. Taylor 
1926: 251 asserts that it is a humorous interlude on his part that is meant to provide a relaxing 
relief from the discussion because ‘the most difficult part of it is yet to come’; some believe 
that it is supposed to show the inferiority of poetry and rhetoric to philosophy (Goldberg 
1983: 160); and others think that the inclusion of the poem is crucial to Socrates’ entire 
rhetorical strategy (McCoy 1999: 349). 
 It is also worth drawing attention to Xenophon’s Mem, 1.2.56, which offers yet 
another possible interpretation, namely that Socrates only brings up the poem for malicious 
intentions – this is something his accuser alleged he did on a regular basis. However, 
generally, it can be agreed upon that the poem in the Protagoras focuses on the impossibility 
of human perfection and the limits of human reason, and that is the important point here. 
307 Likewise, sometimes they may not have a choice but be bad: ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι µὴ οὐ 
κακὸν ἔµµεναι, ὃν ἂν ἀµήχανος συµφορὰ καθέλῃ. (“For that man cannot help but be bad 
whom irresistible mischance has overthrown”). Prot. 344c. This view is picked up at 345d in 
another quoted passage: πάντας δ᾽ ἐπαίνηµι καὶ φιλέω ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδῃ µηδὲν αἰσχρόν: 
ἀνάγκῃ δ᾽ οὐδὲ θεοὶ µάχονται. (“I praise and love everyone willingly committing no 
baseness; for against necessity not even the gods make war”). 
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man is truly hard (not but what it is possible for a certain state of what one has become, and to 
be a good man is, as you say, Pittacus, impossible, and not within man’s reachable means…” 
(ὅτι γενέσθαι µὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε µέντοι ἐπί γε χρόνον τινά: 
γενόµενον δὲ διαµένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἕξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Πιττακέ, 
ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον).308 
This emphasises the point made earlier: in theory, the teaching of political virtue may 
be possible, and human beings may even be able to retain it for a period (as seen in the myth 
of the reversed cosmos); eventually, however, this knowledge wanes due to the ephemerality 
of the teachings and human beings’ limited means.309 This is a direct conflict with Plato “who 
believes that philosophy can raise us above ordinary morality and its failings and lead us to 
what Simonides declares impossible: knowledge that makes us immune to all the pressures of 
misfortune and emotion.”310 However, if this knowledge is only ephemeral, as both the 
Statesman and the Protagoras seem to imply, then it is questionable whether it is possible to 
be immune to the pressures of misfortune and emotion on all occasions and to escape the 
continual political cycles to which the Athenians (and others) seem to be subject. Protagoras’ 
goal, to make the Athenians good at deliberation about affairs regarding the household and the 
city, thus faces great difficulty, as there are seemingly uncontrollable factors that interfere 




308 Prot. 344b-c. Trans. Lamb, adapted.    
309 According to the historical Gorgias, this is why “most men take opinion as counsellor to 
their soul.” They are not omniscient and thus “it is not easy for them to recall the past nor to 
consider the present nor to divine the future…” Helen 11. Cf. Farrar 1988: 108. 
310 Beresford 2008: 255. 
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VI. The Myth of Atlantis 
  
At the end of the section on the Protagoras, it is worth looking at the myth of Atlantis 
as told in the Timaeus and the Critias, because it not only outlines some of the consequences 
of the problems examined above but it also paves the way for the final section of this chapter. 
The Platonic myth is a tale of stability and change – it depicts an Athens that undergoes 
recurrent cycles of ascent and descent, and it shows an Atlantis that is destroyed and 
subsequently barred from ever rising again.311 The relevance to the themes of the Prometheia 
and the Statesman is evident, as is the connection to the Greek idea of the circular movement 
of the cosmos: “everything returns to what it was before, and what has been will be again.”312 
																																								 																				
311 White 1958: 449. On the authenticity of the myth, see Cameron 1983: 81, who argues that 
Plato made the whole story up. Gill 1979: 64 states similarly that Plato’s Atlantis story is one 
of the earliest works of narrative fiction in Greek literature. See Ní Mheallaigh 2008: 405, 
who writes, “the complex framing devices prefacing some of Plato’s dialogues [such as 
Timaeus and Critias] establish a genealogy for the reported dialogues [e.g. the reference to 
Solon and his encounter with the Egyptian priest and the elder Critias’ conversation with 
Solon], which serves both to assert and simultaneously to undermine the dialogues’ 
authenticity, to naturalize and at the same time advertise their potential fictionality in a way 
that foregrounds, and invites the reader to reflect upon, issues of authority.” Cf. Ní 
Mheallaigh 2008: 412. 
 The questionable authenticity of the story humorously brings to mind the following 
passage from the Phaedrus 274c: “I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but 
whether it is true, only they know.” (ἀκοήν γ᾽ ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς αὐτοὶ 
ἴσασιν). However, as Socrates says at 275b (and the same is true for the Atlantis myth), it is 
not the source of the story that is important, but the truth of the message that it seeks to 
deliver. Cf. Rep. 382d. 
312 Guthrie 1957: 63. The relevance is further emphasised by the idea that the Timaeus and the 
Critias are part of a projected tetralogy, which was intended to include a Hermocrates as the 
final dialogue (Crit.108a). The proposed order was this: Republic, Timaeus, Critias, 
Hermocrates. (See Bury 1929: 3-4). Clay 1997: 53-4 speculates that Hermokrates might have 
brought the tetralogy to a close by scolding contemporary and imperial Athens for their 
enslavement of others. This would provide a direct link to Rep. 351b, where Socrates talks 
about Athens’ enslavement of the rest of the Greek world, which in turn would leave us with a 
ring composition comparable with that of the Prometheia. (Similarly, Tim.17c recaptures 
statements made in regards to the Republic the previous day, thus recalling events from the 
first text). See also Gill 1979: 72-4. 
 Moreover, the allusions to the Republic as the first part of the projected tetralogy, 
leave us with an ‘ascent-turned-descent’ sequence that brings to mind that of the Prometheia. 
At Tim. 26c-d, Critias describes Kallipolis and its citizens as a fable, which must now, in the 
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At Timaeus 22c-d, Critias tells a story which he heard from his grandfather when he 
was young who had heard it from Solon who in turn got it from an Egyptian priest (22a). It is 
a tale about recurrent destructions of mankind, some of which are caused by fire due to a 
change in the rotation of the heavenly bodies that orbit the earth (22e), others by water (22e-
23a) when the gods purge the earth with floods, and others by different means (22c). The 
flood is the more significant catastrophe in this context, asserts the priest (via Critias), 
because it wipes out the city-dwellers and leaves behind “none of you but the unlettered and 
uncultured, so that you become young as ever, with no knowledge of all that happened in old 
times in this land or in your own.” (καὶ τοὺς ἀγραµµάτους τε καὶ ἀµούσους ἔλιπεν ὑµῶν, 
ὥστε πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἷον νέοι γίγνεσθε, οὐδὲν εἰδότες οὔτε τῶν τῇδε οὔτε τῶν παρ᾽ ὑµῖν, ὅσα 
ἦν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις).313 The emphasis on youth and new beginnings that contain 
neither knowledge nor any of the other arts of civilization alludes to the (recurrent) origin of 
political government.314 Comparably with the myth of the reversed cosmos, Plato offers an 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
second part of the tetralogy, be transported into the realm of facts in order to make it more 
tangible. The realm of facts is ancient Athens, whose citizens are the citizens of Kallipolis and 
the descendants of the contemporary Athenians. In order to transform the tale from fiction to 
fact, it is necessary to discuss the creation of the cosmos and mankind in order to understand 
how the perfect ancestors came into existence (Tim.26d). It is difficult to work with the 
Critias and the Hermocrates due to the abrupt ending of the former and the nonexistence of 
the latter. However, it is still possible to suggest the following ring-like sequence of the four 
parts: first part (fable): second part (creation of the world and its inhabitants): third part (ideal 
citizens of ancient Athens in action): fourth part (moral). 
 The circular architectural design of Atlantis (Crit. 115c-116c) and the allusions to 
circular features in the creation process in the Timaeus (e.g. 34a-b; 36 c-e; 37b; 38b) informs 
this ring composition – and the ascending notion at Tim. 30a (disorder becomes order) adds to 
the series proposed above. 
313 Tim. 23a-b. 
314 Cf. Laws 676a. Cf. Met. 1074b10 (‘every art and philosophy have been discovered and 
forgotten again’). Cf. Pol. 1269a. Aristotle speaks of the ‘first men’ here who, “whether 
sprung from the earth [as is the case in the Statesman] or the survivors of some destructive 
cataclysm, were just like ordinary foolish people.” (πρώτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ᾽ ἐκ 
φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν, ὁµοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους).  
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account of the evolution of civilization from its primordial stages, and he places it in a series 
of recurrent cataclysms and foundations.315 
 Furthermore, as is the case in the myth of the reversed cosmos, the periodic 
destructions contain elements of forgetfulness: the people only remember one deluge even 
though many have occurred (23d) and, more importantly, they lack memories of ancient 
Athens, a state that “was the bravest in war and supremely well organised also in all other 
respects. It is said that it possessed the most splendid works of art and the noblest polity of 
any nation under heaven of which we have heard tell.” (ἀρίστη πρός τε τὸν πόλεµον και κατὰ 
πάντα εὐνοµωτάτη διαφερόντως. ᾗ κάλλιστα ἔργα καὶ πολιτεῖαι γενέσθαι λέγονται κάλλισται 
πασῶν ὀπόσων ὐπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἠµεῖς ἀκοὴν παρεδεξάµεθα).316 
 The story of ancient Athens, and its relationship with Atlantis, emphasises the themes 
of stability and change. During the time it exists, Atlantis exists also, and although Atlantis is 
powerful already, it seeks to expand its empire, which is why it decides to advance against 
Athens (24e). A war ensues and, even though Athens wins the war, both empires are 
destroyed: Athens falls victim to an earthquake and Atlantis sinks into the ocean – thus, both 
regimes swap a long period of stability for a cataclysm (25c-d).317 In the case of Atlantis, the 
																																								 																				
315 Cf. Meteor. 1.3 (‘for the same opinions appear in cycles among men not once or twice, but 
infinitely often’). See also Polybius 6.5.4, “what then are the beginnings…and what is the first 
origin of political societies? When owing to floods, famines, failure of crops…there occurs 
such a destruction of the human race as tradition tells us has more than once happened, and as 
we must believe will often happen again, all arts and crafts perishing at the same time, then in 
the course of time…men have again increased in numbers...” 
316 Tim. 23c-d. Cf. Crit. 109d-e; 112e. This ancient Athens existed 9,000 years ago (Tim. 23e; 
Crit. 111a-b) and it was “a model city [with perfect moral excellence], that is to say, a city 
constructed according to Plato’s own principles.” Vidal-Naquet 1992: 300. 
317 The fact that ancient Athens falls victim to an earthquake and is then born again not only 
brings to mind the earth-born race in the myth of the reversed cosmos but also Kekrops, the 
Athenians’ first king and ancestral parent who is autochthonous and who embodies the 
fundamental identity of the Athenian people. This also links to the description of the element 
Earth at Tim. 40c, as ‘the first and the eldest of all the gods’ (πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν). 
In the case of Atlantis, however, the fact that it is a maritime city, and thus linked to the 
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demolition is permanent, whereas in the case of Athens, it is another catastrophe in a long 
sequence of interchanging moments of foundation and destruction – albeit this time it is 
especially significant because it destroys ancient Athens and gives way to a less satisfying 
version.318   
 The destruction of Atlantis is especially noteworthy when combining it with its 
foundation myth in the Critias. The myth is part of the wider foundation myth of the world 
when the gods furnish the earth with countries and rear up mortals whom they guide just as 
shepherds guide their flocks (109b-c).319 Poseidon is assigned Atlantis and he designs it in 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
element of water (which, according to Tim. 58d is mobile and non-uniform), underlines its 
instability.  
 At Crit. 108e, Critias asserts that Atlantis was also “sunk by earthquakes,” but the 
important point here is that even though the cataclysm might have been the same, Athens 
sinks into the earth (and, by doing so, secures its ability to rise again) and Atlantis into the 
ocean (and, due to the fluidity of water, is unable to rise again).  
318 See Crit. 111b, “what now remains compared with what then existed is like the skeleton of 
a sick man…” (πρὸς τὰ τότε τὰ νῦν οἷον νοσήσαντος σώµατος ὀστᾶ).  
 Vidal-Naquet 1992: 302 argues that the “Athens and Atlantis of ancient lore represent 
the two faces of Plato’s own Athens. The former, the old primordial Athens, is what Plato 
would have liked the city of which he was a citizen to be; the latter is what Athens was in the 
age of Pericles or Cleon, an imperialistic power whose very existence constituted a threat to 
other Greek cities.” (See also Gill 1977: 296). I agree with Vidal-Naquet, but would also 
argue more generally that the former Athens embodies what Plato wishes to see in the current 
Athens (an idea which he pursues in the Republic) whereas the city to which it is reduced (‘a 
mere bone of the ancient city’ Vidal-Naquet 1992: 301), is the Athens of his time, which he 
criticizes. On the relevance of Thucydides’ history, see for example Naddaf 1994: 199-200 
and Johansen 2004: 11-13. 
 Yet, the fact that Athens does rise again (even if it becomes a less glamorous version) 
also points to an element of stability. Its embodiment of both stability and instability not only 
underlines the cyclical nature of the story about the creation of civilization, told at the 
beginning of the Timaeus, but it also recalls one of the concepts of the myth of the reversed 
cosmos. Despite all its negative and destructive aspects, the fact that civilization does rise 
again is also reassuring, and it offers a sense of security and uniformity. 
319 This is comparable with one of the periods of the myth of the reversed cosmos when the 
Demiurge watches over the human beings. Cf. Tim. 35a-36d and 41d on the construction of 
the world soul and the human soul. Plato compares the activities of the Demiurge to that of a 
craftsman and the technical language he uses, which refers to that of metalworking, brings to 
mind the language of the true statesman in the Statesman, which is analogous to that of 
weaving. Zedda 2000: 25 argues that Plato describes, “the actual, practical series of 
operations needed in order to construct a model, or representation, of the world soul.” 
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such ‘brilliant colours’ that it (in true fashion of Platonic Utopianism) emerges as “a maritime 
empire of vast dimensions ruled by a federation of kings.”320 A lengthy description of the 
layout of Atlantis follows, but the essential points are this: Poseidon is the god of Atlantis 
(which is why there is a temple dedicated to him and his wife, Cleito, in the centre of it, 
115c), and his precepts determine the Atlantean kings’ authority over one another (118c) and 
ensure that their intentions are true and noble (120e).   
 However, as is the case in Kallipolis and the myth of the reversed cosmos, in the end 
even the best constitution cannot keep the kings and inhabitants of Atlantis from moral 
degeneration. They forget the divine teachings, succumb to human temper and lawlessness, 
and lose perception of what is virtuous (121a-b).321  Zeus decides to discipline them in order 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Johansen 2004: 16 writes, “like all craftsman [the demiurge] used material that he found prior 
to the creation. This material was disorganized and chaotic before he imposed rational order 
[κόσµος] on it.” (Again, this underlines the initial ascending sequence of the tetralogy). Cf. 
Gorgias 508a, where Plato uses κόσµος to refer to the universal order that binds man, nature, 
and state together. 
 On the influence of the pre-Socratics who refer to a similar concept of universal order 
containing rational, moral and social effects, see Naddaf 1997, especially pp. 29-32, and 
Johansen 2004: 5. 
 Lastly, see Crit. 109c, where Plato employs nautical language that is similar to the 
technical language discussed above. The language Plato employs underlines the gods’ 
authority, which fits in with the ways in which he often uses nautical metaphors, namely as an 
appeal to accept the rule of the expert practitioner. (See Brock 2013: 58). This obligatory 
acceptance of the helmsman’s authority, and the maritime language, recalls that of Zeus in 
PV.  
320 Rosenmeyer 1956: 166. The fact that Poseidon is assigned Atlantis, which ultimately fails, 
recalls the ancient quarrel of Poseidon and Athena over Attica, which Athena (like Athens in 
the Atlantis myth) ultimately wins. 
321 Naddaf 1994: 200 n. 40 notes that the growth of the human element “seems to be 
anticipated by Plato since he makes the Atlantean kings descendants of both a mortal and an 
immortal, viz., Poseidon and Cleito.” Cf. Tim. 69c-d on the irrational affections of the human 
body, which are described as a necessary element of the immortal soul’s embodiment.  See 
Johansen 2004: 18, “as human beings, we are fundamentally rational because of our immortal 
soul but we are also subject to irrational forces through our body.” These irrational forces are 
caused by the construction of the human body, whose biological set-up causes six rectilinear 
motions (44d-45b). This is why we are by necessity (i.e. by the necessary biological 
construction of the human body) subject to irrational motions. If our bodies were constructed 
differently, then they might not cause some of these motions, but then we would experience 
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to bring them back to their old noble lifestyle…and here, the Critias ends, at 121c. It is not 
clear what happens next but it is fair to assume that it includes a destruction of some sort. The 
language used suggests that Zeus employs a form of corrective justice (which would be 
similar to his role in PV): he “desired to inflict punishment upon them, to the end that when 
chastised they might strike a truer note” (δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βουληθείς, ἵνα γένοιντο 
ἐµµελέστεροι σωφρονισθέντες).322 As seen in the myth of the reversed cosmos, and as 
Rosenmeyer speculates about the ending of the Critias, “divine intervention is capable of 
reversing the cosmic trend toward degeneration.”323 
 This ending would provide another counterargument for the sophists’ hubristic attitude 
that the gods are not needed and that reliance on the human intellect is sufficient. As already 
seen in the Protagoras and the Statesman, ultimately Zeus (or, the Demiurge) is needed in 
order to (re-) distribute political wisdom and opportunities of ascent among human beings. 
This interpretation would also fit in with the recurrent theme of ascent and descent that shines 
through this chapter. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, Plato does not seem to see this 
corrective justice as successful, and it appears that Zeus’ lesson is a one-time lecture only, as 
he helps Atlantis rise again, only to lure it into attacking Athens, which he knows will be its 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
other problems (75b-c). Therefore, while necessity “puts constraints on the creation,” it also 
operates for the best. Johansen 2004: 17. See Tim. 48a. 
 The irrational motions that run through our body reflect the points made earlier in 
regards to deceptive rhetoric (cf. pp. 89-92). Regardless of how rational we are (or, think we 
are), at the end of the day we are also emotional beings with limited capacities of reason and 
thus subject to the influence of rhetorical strategies, circumstances that surround us, and 
motions within us. This point was made during the Q&A of the ‘Rhetoric of Fear in 
Republican Rome: The Ciceronian Case’ talk, given by Francisco Pina Polo at the University 
of Birmingham on 28 June 2017. 
322 Crit. 121b-c. 
323 Rosenmeyer 1956: 167. Cf. Gorgias 478e, σωφρονίζει δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ 
γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. (“The justice of the court reforms us and makes us more just, and 
acts as a medicine for wickedness”). The court to which Socrates refers is not related to the 
divine justice of Zeus mentioned above, but σωφρονίζω is used in the same way, which is 
why it has the potential to highlight the argument above. 
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doom.324 In this sense, the end of the Critias links to the beginning of the Timaeus (and it thus 
provides us with a cyclical notion within the projected tetralogy) because its degenerative 
aspect connects with the notions of being and becoming discussed at Tim. 28a.325 
 Ultimately, however, while these speculations emphasise the ring composition the 
tetralogy might have contained, the ending of the Atlantis story in the Timaeus shows that the 
real moral lesson here is, ‘hubris comes before the fall.’ The Atlanteans who seek to expand 
their already grand empire and who are incapable of tending to the divine elements in their 
polity, present us with a Protagorean portrait of men in military action who ultimately dig 
their own grave.326 The Athenians, meanwhile, are portrayed as the superior power who “by 
their virtue overcome their evil opponents.”327 The tale of Atlantis presents us with an ascent 
turned descent, triggered by hubris and forgetfulness, and it paints a picture of reverse fate: 
what Atlantis attempts to do to ancient Athens, happens to it instead.  
																																								 																				
324 Cf. Gill 1977: 297-8. Cf. Welliver 1977: 36. Following this interpretation, the role of Zeus 
here is opposite to that of the Demiurge in the Statesman: the former does not seem to believe 
in re-education whereas the latter clearly does. This brings to mind the contrast between Zeus 
in PV (where he is tyrannical and destructive) and in the Protagoras (where he is benevolent 
and giving). 
325 Cf. Clay 1997: 52. 
326 Cf. Rosenmeyer 1956: 167. In this vein, “the catastrophe was merely a device to achieve 
this [moral] end, a detail rather than the essence of the story.” Cameron 1983: 90. 
327 Johansen 2004: 8. Johansen argues that this is why “the Atlantis story reads as an example 
of…encomiastic poetry.” He refers to Rep. 607a, where it says: ‘you should know that the 
only poetry we can admit into our city is hymns to the gods and encomia of good men.’ The 
fact that the philosophical discussion presented here takes place during the Panathenaea 
accentuates this. 
 See also Johansen 2004: 21, where he recalls the influence of the polities’ elements 
(water and earth) and argues that the reason Atlantis fails is because it seeks to expand beyond 
the borders of their element “by bringing water to earth.” This undertaking is described as a 
physical illness since “physical health consists in keeping each element within its proper 
boundaries.” “The political arrangements of Atlantis,” states Johansen, “allow pleonexia [‘the 
transgression of one element upon the territory of another in physical illness’] to take over in 
contrast to the institutionally secure justice…and moderation…of the Athenians.” 
 Cf. Cameron 1983: 90. “Antediluvian Athens and Atlantis both represent different 
aspects of the historical Athens: antediluvian Athens the sturdy, virtuous farmers of the days 
before the Persian Wars; Atlantis the corrupt, imperialist seapower that developed out of the 
Delian League.” 
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 In this way, the speech in the Timaeus might serve as a proud tale that celebrates the 
victory of ancient Athens over Atlantis, and the story of the Critias (as complicated as it may 
be due to the sudden ending) as a reminder for the Athenian audience to remain virtuous and 
modest.328 Both dialogues thus inform the next chapters because they show once again the 
limits of human reason, the inevitability of recurrent events, the impact divine elements can 
have, and that ascent can be exchanged for descent anytime. More precisely, as the permanent 
descent of Atlantis makes clear, it shows that a divine craftsman (Poseidon) can found a 
polity, and that an absence of a divinity (or, divine attributes) can destroy it again.329 The 
foundation myth of Atlantis implies that it mainly exists because of its divine elements; when 
these begin to wither, so does the city itself. This notion then continues to question the 
optimistic Protagorean opinion of human reason, and it also reinforces the Platonic view that 





328 Gill 1977: 298 notes, “there are hints that Athens’ history could be an influential model 
here also. It was by the overweening ambition of its Sicilian expedition that, in Thucydides’ 
account, post-Periclean Athens provoked her own downfall.” Gill continues, “in essence, the 
story was intended to be a politico-philosophical myth constructed out of historical ingredient, 
and specifically designed as a cautionary tale—and possibly a protreptic—for an Athenian 
audience.” 
 Finally, the Atlanteans’ attitude to luxuries, and their eventual inability to deal with 
them, also brings to mind Lycurgus’ reforms in Sparta (as described by Plutarch, Lyc. 9.4), 
which put a stop to the importation of foreign luxuries, and Xenophanes’ criticism of useless 
luxuries (fr. 3), mentioned in the introduction. See also Laws 742a: no private individual in 
Magnesia is allowed to own any gold or silver, but only the currency needed for everyday life 
in order to avoid scenarios like these (Cf. 705b). 
329 Cf. Tim. 41a. Moreover, as stated previously at Tim. 22d-e, it is the gods, not the humans, 
who cause the recurrent periods of destruction in the Timaeus. Unlike the Demiurge in the 
Statesman, who is benevolent and educational, the gods in the Timaeus destroy rather than re-
create and re-educate, which links to their portrayal in the Critias, as noted above. 
330 Cf. Rep. 546a. 
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VII. The (Symbolic) Consequences of Poor Political Deliberation and Discourse   
   
The Promethean cycles discussed at the beginning of this chapter and the political 
sequences analysed in the Statesman, the Protagoras, and the Timaeus, as well as the 
ambiguous nature of the Critias, all focus on human beings and their nature as political 
animals. The Gorgias portrays the significance of rhetoric in that regard because it 
demonstrates, as Aristotle later does, the ways in which the power of speech can be used “to 
set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust.”331 
Moreover, by examining questions such as whether it is possible to teach political virtue 
reliably and permanently, and to swap recurrent political events for genuine progress, they 
also focus on the ultimate destiny of human beings. The cyclical notion of the Prometheia and 
its sequences of ascent and descent; the tale of recurrence in the Timaeus; the fate of Atlantis; 
the circular tale of the myth of the reversed cosmos, and the metaphorical use of the word 
πάλιν in the Statesman, all investigate the development of human beings as political animals. 
The difficulty of providing a credible answer to the problem of how to best organise societies 
is clear throughout. Certainly, as seen in the discussions above, approaching the answer to this 
question from a mere rational point of view is met with great challenges and does not really 
provide the responses that are sought.  
It might thus be wise, in fashion of the Stranger in the Statesman, to start again from a 
new starting-point and approach the question from a different direction.332 Firchow asserts 
that the question of the meaning of human life and development “cannot be asked (or 
answered) logically, but only symbolically.”333 This is why this question frequently appears in 
the utopian writings of the late nineteenth-century, “a period often designated as the Age of 
																																								 																				
331 Cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1253a, ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον… ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν 
ἐστι τὸ συµφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. 
332 Cf. Stat. 268d. πάλιν τοίνυν ἐξ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς δεῖ καθ᾽ ἑτέραν ὁδὸν πορευθῆναί τινα.  
333 Firchow 2007: 25. 
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Symbolism.”334 Wells’ The Time Machine is a representative work of that period and it is 
clear that it examines the question of what will eventually become of the human intellect and 
civilization.335 Incorporating elements similar to those of the first cycle of the myth of the 
reversed cosmos and the progressive degeneration of the Atlanteans, Wells imagines “a 
canonic sociobiological ‘converging series of forms of gradually diminishing complexity’ as 
devolution retraverses the path of evolution backward to a fin du globe.”336  
I have chosen to discuss The Time Machine, because it shows how the ancient texts 
examined in this thesis can be compared with modern political thought when connecting them 
with More’s Utopia in the process. In particular, looking at the Statesman, Utopia, and The 
Time Machine as another ‘ascent-turned-descent’ sequence, they illustrate what might happen 
if More’s solutions to the problems discussed in the Platonic dialogues were realised. 
Precisely, we would look at this: Plato (inability to understand rhetoric from different 
factions): More (elimination of different factions and the need to understand them): Wells 
(consequences of the removal of diverse political debate). As my analysis of Wells’ work 
																																								 																				
334 Firchow 2007: 25. 
335 Borges 1952: 87 praises Wells’ earlier novels (amongst others, The Time Machine, The 
Island of Dr. Moreau and The Invisible Man) because “they tell a story symbolic of processes 
that are somehow inherent in all human destinies. ….Work that endures is always capable of 
an infinite and plastic ambiguity; it is all things to all men…it is a mirror that reflects the 
reader’s own features and it is also a map of the world.”  
336 Suvin 1973: 336. The quotation in the sentence is taken from Wells’ teacher T.H. Huxley’s 
1894 Evolution and Ethics: Prolegomena. It is worth quoting the entire paragraph here in the 
footnote to highlight its relevance. “That the state of nature, at any time, is a temporary phase 
of a process of incessant change, which has been going on for innumerable ages, appears to 
me to be a proposition as well established as any in modern history. Palaeontology assures us, 
in addition, that the ancient philosophers who, with less reason, held the same doctrine, erred 
in supposing that the phases formed a cycle, exactly repeating the past, exactly foreshadowing 
the future, in their rotations. On the contrary, it furnishes us with conclusive reasons for 
thinking that, if every link in the ancestry of these humble indigenous plants had been 
preserved and were accessible to us, the whole would present a converging series of forms of 
gradually diminishing complexity, until, at some period in the history of the earth, far more 
remote than any of which organic remains have yet been discovered, they would merge in 
those low groups among which the boundaries between animal and vegetable life become 
effaced.” Huxley 1894: 3-4. 
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shows, the initial ascent seen in Utopia turns out to be a descent in the end, because the 
absence of different factions and communication styles, does not actually solve the problems 
that come with the presence of them.  
Like More, Wells presents his imagination in style of a travelogue that recalls not only 
the Lucianic fantastic (such as the journey to the moon) but also the adventurous tales of 
Vespucci, Hythloday, and Gulliver (especially the voyage to the floating island of Laputa). 
Indeed, in The Time Machine, Wells creates a world, which is, like Lucian’s moon, both 
“removed but also connected to our world [and] it offers the reader a unique and subversive 
perspective on ‘reality’…”337 The sailing vessels used in the earlier accounts may have been 
swapped for a time machine but the art of transportation to an unknown and differently 
organised society is the same.338 The way in which the story is told is also comparable with 
that of Utopia: like Hythloday, the time traveller tells it in his home to a small group of 
friends.  
 Again, two overarching properties of narrative art are used: while More combines the 
satiric with the serious, Wells weaves together the progressive with the regressive and thus 
“unites the two antithetical characteristics of the bourgeois ideology of progress and 
entropy.”339 In this vein, he echoes the concept of Aeschylus in the Prometheia and that of 
Plato in the Statesman, Timaeus, and Critias, as he too combines elements of ascent and 
descent. Additionally, like More, Wells “takes up and refunctions the ancient mundus 
inversus;”340 and he imagines an inversion of Social Darwinism brought about by political 
																																								 																				
337 Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 216. 
338 Cf. Fitting 2010: 139. 
339 Jameson 2005: 127. That being said, The Time Machine certainly has a satirical edge as 
well since many of its aspects do bear relevance to Wells’ contemporary world and its 
problems.  
340 Suvin 1973: 345. 
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and social atrophy (again recalling aspects of the myth of the reversed cosmos and the tale of 
Atlantis).341 
 The atrophic notion of The Time Machine is emphasised when relating it to Socrates’ 
epistemological science of measurement discussed in the Protagoras. Firchow points out that 
the other meaning of ‘time machine’ is, of course, “a machine for telling time, a meaning 
Wells is fully aware of.”342 The symbolic significance of the dual meaning of the time 
machine is clear: not only does it travel through time (and, more importantly, to the end of 
time) but it also intends to measure, and predict, our political and social progress throughout 
the ages. (In this manner, like the subtitle of Utopia, it is also both entertaining and beneficial 
at the same time). More specifically, it shows the limits of the human intellect and the 
consequences of false, or imprecise, measurements and mistaken judgments. 
 Furthermore, by portraying a political and social degeneration, Wells not only 
imagines the consequences of false measurement but also the consequences of a lack of 
measurement altogether. In the case of The Time Machine, it is clear that the absence of both 
measurement and political deliberation in general is brought about by the achievement of 
utopia as well as by the (false) sense of security human beings subsequently developed. As 
the time traveller reports: “…the balanced civilisation that was at last attained must have long 
since passed its zenith, and was now far fallen into decay. The too-perfect security of the 
Upper-worlders had led them to a slow movement of degeneration, to a general dwindling in 
size, strength, and intelligence.”343 The human intellect, the time traveller says, “had set itself 
																																								 																				
341 This recalls A.L. Huxley’s fear noted in the introduction that, one day, human beings 
might stop engaging with politics altogether. (Cf. p. 49 n. 143). However, unlike Huxley, who 
ends Brave New World on a relatively positive and progressive note, Wells ends The Time 
Machine with a notion of de-evolution and regress.  
342 Firchow 2007: 30. 
343 The Time Machine, 49. The narrator of the story makes a similar point in regards to the 
time traveller in the epilogue, for he says: “He, I know…thought but cheerlessly of the 
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steadfastly towards comfort and ease, a balanced society with security and permanency as its 
watchword, it had attained its hopes” only to now face its decline.344 
 The time traveller’s observations recall those of Socrates and Glaucon in Rep. 546 in 
many important respects. When discussing the potential future of their city, Socrates asserts, 
“It is hard for a city composed in this way to change, but everything that comes into being 
must decay. Not even a constitution such as this will last for ever. It, too, must face 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Advancement of Mankind, and saw in the growing pile of civilisation only a foolish heaping 
that must inevitably destroy its makers in the end.” The Time Machine, 91. Cf. Crit. 121a-c. 
344 The Time Machine, 79. See also p. 78, “I grieved to think how brief the dream of the 
human intellect had been. It had committed suicide.” 
Wells’ description of the declining civilization recalls the following passage from 
Appian’s The Third Punic War 20.132. “Scipio, beholding this city, which had flourished 700 
years from its foundation and had ruled over so many lands, islands, and seas, rich with arms 
and fleets, elephants and money, equal to the mightiest monarchies but far surpassing them in 
bravery and high spirit (since without ships or arms, and in the face of famine, it had 
sustained continuous war for three years), now come to its ends in total destruction – Scipio, 
beholding this spectacle, is said to have shed tears and publicly lamented the fortune of the 
enemy.” Specifically, Appian writes, Scipio quoted the following from Il. 6.531-3: “the day 
will come when sacred Troy must die, Priam must die and all his people with him, Priam who 
hurls the strong ash spear.”  
Cf. Gibbon LXXI.I. “[Rome’s] primeval state, such as she might appear in a remote 
age, when Evander entertained the stranger of Troy, has been delineated by the fancy of 
Virgil. This Tarpeian rock was then a savage and solitary thicket: in the time of the poet, it 
was crowned with the golden roofs of a temple; the temple is overthrown, the gold has been 
pillaged, the wheel of fortune has accomplished her revolution, and the sacred ground is again 
disfigured with thorns and brambles. The hill of the Capitol, on which we sit, was formerly 
the head of the Roman Empire, the citadel of the earth, the terror of kings; illustrated by the 
footsteps of so many triumphs, enriched with the spoils and tributes of so many nations. This 
spectacle of the world, how is it fallen! How changed! How defaced! The path of victory is 
obliterated by vines, and the benches of the senators are concealed by a dunghill. Cast your 
eyes on the Palatine hill, and seek among the shapeless and enormous fragments the marble 
theatre, the obelisks, the colossal statues, the porticos of Nero's palace: survey the other hills 
of the city, the vacant space is interrupted only by ruins and gardens. The forum of the Roman 
people, where they assembled to enact their laws and elect their magistrates, is now enclosed 
for the cultivation of pot-herbs, or thrown open for the reception of swine and buffaloes. The 
public and private edifices, that were founded for eternity, lie prostrate, naked, and broken, 
like the limbs of a mighty giant; and the ruin is the more visible, from the stupendous relics 
that have survived the injuries of time and fortune.” 
 The passages from Appian, and the inclusion of the fall of Troy, and Gibbon bring to 
mind the sequences of degeneration seen in Aeschylus, Plato, and Polybius, and they 
emphasise the ephemerality of constitutions, which, as the time traveller witnesses in the 
future, has not changed throughout time.  
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dissolution.” (χαλεπὸν µὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω συστᾶσαν: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ γενοµένῳ παντὶ φθορά 
ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα µενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται).345 Thus, even 
Kallipolis cannot last forever - and this humorously contradicts Hythloday’s claim that Utopia 
will never decline at the same time as it underlines its satiric element because this appears to 
be a claim so bold that it is not even made by Plato in regards to Kallipolis (or Atlantis for 
that matter).346 More importantly, it reflects both Socrates’ concern in the Protagoras that 
clever parents and teachers are not necessarily able to pass their knowledge onto the next 
generation, and the significance of καιρός in the Statesman. As Socrates asserts at 546a-b:  
 
γένους δὲ ὑµετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ ὄντες σοφοί, οὓς ἡγεµόνας 
πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν µᾶλλον λογισµῷ µετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ 
πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον. 
 
Now, the people you have educated to be leaders in your city, even though they are 
wise, still won’t, through calculation together with sense perception, hit upon the 
fertility and barrenness of the human species, but it will escape them, and so they will 
at some time beget children when they ought not to do so. 
  
The consequence of this miscalculation is, as discussed in the section on the Statesman, that 
there will be marriages taking place at the wrong time and “the children will be neither good 
natured nor fortunate.” (οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται).347 Even the best of these 
children, who will eventually become Guardians, will not be able to maintain the structure of 
																																								 																				
345 Rep. 546a. This brings to mind Polybius’ cycle of political revolution, the natural course of 
events during which constitutions change, transform, and return to their original stage 
(6.9.10). Like Kallipolis, the ‘perfect’ Rome is not going to last: “…especially in the case of 
the Roman state will this method [i.e. the perception that constitutions can change] enable us 
to arrive at a knowledge of its formation, growth, and greatest perfection, and likewise of the 
change for the worse which is sure to follow some day” (6.10.12).  
346 In fact, this claim is so ludicrous that it does not even apply to Zeus’ regime in PV. As 
shown earlier, even his autocratic rule is bound to change eventually due to the compromise 
made with Prometheus in the third play. 
347 Rep. 546d. In this case, it appears to be a literal miscalculation. At 546b-c, Socrates 
mentions different numbers and asserts that it is the “whole geometrical number [that] 
controls better and worse births.” He refers to the Muses’ story of the geometrical number, 
which in turn provides the explanation for how civil war breaks out. See Rep. 545d-e. 
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Kallipolis. “First, they will have less consideration for music and poetry than they ought, then 
they will neglect physical training, so that your young people will become less well educated 
in music and poetry.” (ἡµῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀµελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ᾽ ἔλαττον τοῦ 
δέοντος ἡγησάµενοι τὰ µουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυµναστικῆς, ὅθεν ἀµουσότεροι γενήσονται 
ὑµῖν οἱ νέοι).348 The eventual consequences of this, as mentioned previously, are civil war and 
the decline of the original constitution of Kallipolis.349 
 Like the time traveller’s explanation of the decline of humanity in the future, the 
reason for the decline of Kallipolis is based on the degeneration of the human intellect (which 
underlines its limits at the same time: it is not eternal and can decline), which sets in motion 
the decay of knowledge, arithmetic, and ability to notice καιρός. Kastely notes likewise: “The 
tale that Socrates tells of the collapse of the Kallipolis begins not with a challenge by any 
ambitious or aggressive individual or class. It does not even directly flow from the unruliness 
of desire; rather, it begins as a simple problem of calculation.”350 He continues: “However 
skilful the rulers are at calculation, they inevitably make errors, and these errors are 
consequential.”351 The way Kallipolis is set up prevents individuals or classes from rebelling 
against the societal order (and thus eliminates a potential threat); but it does not prevent the 
ruling class from making fundamentally human errors.  
																																								 																				
348 Rep. 546d. Cf. Rep. 424c, οὐδαµοῦ γὰρ κινοῦνται µουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόµων 
τῶν µεγίστων. (‘When modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the state always 
change with them’). This point is made primarily to refer to the dangers of innovations 
(424b), but it also underlines the decline of Kallipolis described above, which begins with a 
lack of interest in music. 
349 Rep. 547a-c. Cf. Bell 2015: 123. 
350 Kastely 2015: 165. 
351 Kastely 2015: 165. The following fragment (592) from Tereus may have referred to 
something similar in regards to the, at times, erroneous nature of human beings, τὰν γὰρ 
ἀνθρώπου ζόαν ποικιλοµήτιδες ἆται πηµάτων πάσαις µεταλλάσσουσιν ὥραις. (“For the life of 
men is transformed by the cunning wiles of ruinous error that bring calamities at all seasons”). 
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This brings to mind the point made in regards to Simonides’ poem in the Protagoras. 
Human beings may be able to maintain true political knowledge, and the (arguably) best 
constitution for a while; however, because human beings have limited means (which includes 
even the Guardians in Kallipolis and the citizens of Atlantis), this knowledge and 
maintenance of the best constitution is also limited and will eventually wane. Socrates’ 
allusion to the Muses’ story of the geometrical number underlines the notion expressed in the 
poem that only the gods have this ability. Van Noorden writes, “the notorious obscurity of the 
Muses’ long mathematical exposition reinforces their point that humans cannot explain and so 
hold on to perfection.”352 The consequences of the lack of perfection and proper calculation 
will eventually lead to the previously mentioned civil war, which in turn leads to a phased 
deterioration of Kallipolis. The phases are increasingly worse in corruption and inadequacy: 
first, there is a Spartan-like timocracy, then an oligarchy, then a democracy, and then, at the 
end, there is a tyranny.353 In this way, like the time traveller’s observation of the societies in 
																																								 																				
352 Van Noorden 2015: 134. 
353 Rep. 547b-562b. Cf. Aristotle, Pol. V for his list of various regime changes. Again, this 
sequence of degeneration is comparable with Polybius’ order of decline and his identification 
of six types of constitutions. Monarchy: tyranny: aristocracy: oligarchy: democracy: 
ochlocracy (6.4.7-10). Polybius asserts, “The truth of what I have just said will be quite clear 
to anyone who pays due attention to such beginnings, origins, and changes as are in each case 
natural. For he alone who has seen how each form naturally arises and develops, will be able 
to see when, how, and where the growth, perfection, change, and end of each are likely to 
occur again” (6.4.11-12).  Cf. Laws 676b-c: 
 
 µῶν οὖν οὐ µυρίαι µὲν ἐπὶ µυρίαις ἡµῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν 
 αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρµέναι; πεπολιτευµέναι δ᾽ αὖ 
 πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ τοτὲ µὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων µείζους, τοτὲ δ᾽ ἐκ 
 µειζόνων ἐλάττους, καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόνασι καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων; 
 
During that time, don’t we find, thousands upon thousands of cities have existed, and 
by the same reckoning, as many have been destroyed. And as for each one’s social and 
political arrangements at various times, haven’t they been of every possible kind, as 
cities have at one time grown greater from smaller, and then smaller from greater, and 
worse from better, and better from worse?” (Trans. Griffith, adapted). 
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the future, Socrates’ description of the decline of the best city resembles that of an almost 
linear regression. 
 This decline, which is based on the lack of human perfection, links to Protagoras’ 
atheism at the beginning of the chapter and his assumption that it is sufficient to rely 
exclusively on the human intellect (cf. pp. 58-9). This assumption, which, as written 
previously, marks a change in thought because it promotes the idea that human destiny is 
shaped by rationality and persuasive speech alone, rather than by the intervention of the gods, 
now appears in a new light. Especially, the questions that arose earlier, namely whether the 
social development that follows from this change in thought has any fixed foundations and 
whether it is possible to live without a divine anchor in (Greek) ethics, are now all the more 
significant. The declines of the constitutions stated above (and the decay of Atlantis), which 
are evidently triggered by the limits of humanity, show that the social development that 
follows after the ascent of man in the Prometheia, is not fixed but loose, and that it is not 
possible to establish just constitutions that last eternally without a form of divine anchor. (As 
seen in the myth of the reversed cosmos and the Prometheus myth in the Protagoras, the 
Demiurge and Zeus have to step in eventually to fix issues that humans cannot fix themselves. 
Likewise, in the Timaeus, the universe is held together solely by the Demiurge’s will).   
  The absence of the Demiurge informs the pessimistic picture of the phased 
degeneration that Wells’ time traveller experiences in the future. Specifically, the further he 
travels, the worse the de-evolution gets. First, there are the Eloi in the year 802,701; then 
there is the crab-like creature several years later; and another thirty millions years later, there 
is no trace of animal life left but only an eclipse, which marks the end of the phased 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Cf. Herodotus, 1.5, “I will cover minor and major human settlements equally, because most of 
those which were important in the past have diminished in significance by now, and those 
which were great in my own time were small in times past. I will mention both equally 
because I know that human happiness never remains long in the same place.” 
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degeneration, and also the end of time.354 The consequences that arise from a mere human 
mathematical error are dire and they illustrate, similarly to Plato’s concern, “what a human 
political community might do or suffer when the guidance of reason alone fails.”355 In this 
vein, both Plato’s and Wells’ visions are shaped by anthropological regression, and the 
decline they describe “starts with a human being (and a city) in a natural condition and 
decomposes it piece by piece.”356  
In The Time Machine, the regression also begins in an aristocracy and the time 
traveller alludes to the horrors the former ‘human political community’ suffers from because 
of the decline of human intellect. Referring to the Morlock’s insatiable appetite, he reports:357 
 
Then I tried to preserve myself from the horror that was coming upon me, by 
regarding it as a rigorous punishment of human selfishness. Man had been content to 
live in ease and delight upon the labours of his fellow-man, had taken Necessity as his 
watchword and excuse, and in the fullness of time Necessity had come home to him. I 
even tried a Carlyle-like scorn of this wretched aristocracy in decay. 
 
 
Both Plato and Wells portray symbolically the potential consequences of the Protagorean 
reliance on reason alone and of the problems examined in the Platonic dialogues discussed 
earlier. As reason and human intellect lose control, and rulers (or ruling classes) become more 
and more susceptible to their appetites and use various excuses (such as necessity) to justify 
these appetites, order and structure decrease as well.358   
																																								 																				
354 Cf. Tim.38b, χρόνος δ᾽ οὖν µετ᾽ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅµα γεννηθέντες ἅµα καὶ λυθῶσιν. 
(“Time, then, came into existence along with the Heaven, to the end that having been 
generated together they might also be dissolved together”). 
355 Hitz 2010: 109. 
356 Hitz 2010: 109. 
357 The Time Machine, 62. 
358 Cf. Hitz 2010: 107 and 122. The role appetite plays in this recalls both the position of Zeus 
in PV and Callicles’ positive opinion of appetite in the Gorgias. Both Zeus and Callicles 
prefer the rule of appetite to that of established legal systems, which also take care of the 
weaker, and not just the stronger. However, relating this to the downfall of Kallipolis, 
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Especially, when there is no reason or human intellect, there is also no ability at all to 
weigh sight and sound carefully, and to make decisions based on those measurements. As 
argued earlier, this is a difficult craft to begin with (it is, after all, an error in measurement that 
sets in motion the decline in the first place), but as it deteriorates alongside reason, it will 
soon be impossible to use altogether. In this way, it also becomes clear that the conflicts 
triggered by a lack of understanding among different factions, as discussed in the Statesman, 
are taken to a whole other level. Hitz asserts that the conflicts that bring down the regimes in 
the Republic must be understood “not as conflicts among the multifarious appetites, all 
competing for first place, but as conflicts between weak rational or lawful structures and 
appetitive forces, personal or political.”359 
 Furthermore, the political cycles analysed earlier are also taken to a new level because 
we have now reached the final consequences. It is clear, as mentioned previously, that the 
time traveller sees traces of these cycles, and the past in general, in the future. The buildings 
of the Eloi remind him of the culture of the Phoenicians (“I saw suggestions of old Phoenician 
decorations as I passed through”), and he sees a sculpture that evokes the image of the Sphinx 
in him (“it was of white marble, in shape something like a winged sphinx”).360 More 
importantly, he finds decaying books (“The brown and charred rags that hung from the sides 
of it, I presently recognized as the decaying vestiges of books”), which highlight the decay of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Atlantis, and Hitz’s argument, the potential consequences are clear, as a rule led by appetite 
rather than strong lawful structures, can lead to conflicts, which in turn can bring down the 
entire regime. This in turn recalls the theme of ascent and descent seen in PV. 
 See also Tim.73a on the consequences of appetite related to food and drink, 
παρέχουσα ἀπληστίαν, διὰ γαστριµαργίαν ἀφιλόσοφον καὶ ἄµουσον πᾶν ἀποτελοῖ τὸ γένος, 
ἀνυπήκοον τοῦ θειοτάτου τῶν παρ᾽ ἡµῖν. (“…causing insatiate appetite, whereby the whole 
kind by reason of its gluttony would be rendered devoid of philosophy and of culture, and 
disobedient to the most divine part we possess”). Cf. Laws 696e: self-control is the 
precondition of all other virtues (wisdom, justice, and courage). 
359 Hitz 2010: 123. 
360 The Time Machine, 26 and 21. 
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civilization and of what it used to contain, namely writing, deliberation, and knowledge.361 As 
the time traveller observes when he looks at the changed constellations of the stars: “…all the 
activity, all the traditions, the complex organizations, the nations, languages, literatures, 
aspirations, even the mere memory of Man as I knew him, had been swept out of existence. 
Instead were these frail creatures who had forgotten their high ancestry…”362 
 The notion of forgetfulness the time traveller mentions is especially noteworthy 
because not only have the human beings of the future forgotten their ancestry, they have also 
forgotten how to make fire. The time-traveller observes: “In this decadence, too, the art of 
fire-making had been forgotten on the earth,” and they had also “forgotten about matches.”363 
The fact that they do not know how to make fire, for they possess neither the art nor the 
modern tools, emphasises the progressive de-evolution the time traveller witnesses further. 
Particularly, it brings to mind a pivotal event in human evolution, namely the discovery of 
fire, which subsequently led to various cultural advancements. Thus, even though the time 
traveller finds himself several hundred thousand years in the future, it feels as if he has gone 
back in time by the same amount of years. Certainly, the traces of the past he sees in the world 
of the Eloi go then back even further than the Phoenician civilization because they bring him 
back all the way to some of the earliest human communities, which existed before the 
discovery of fire.364 
																																								 																				
361 The Time Machine, 67. 
362 The Time Machine, 61. Cf. Crit. 111b, Tim. 23b-c. Cf. also the beginning of Herodotus’ 
Histories the purpose of which ‘is to prevent the traces of human events from being erased by 
time, and to preserve the fame of the important and remarkable achievements produced by 
both Greeks and non-Greeks…’ In Wells’ narrative, the anxiety that the marvellous 
achievements of men may be erased by time, has become reality. 
363 The Time Machine, 72 and 36. This contrasts with Tim. 48b, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἰδόσιν πῦρ ὅτι ποτέ 
ἐστιν. (“But we assume that men know what fire is”). 
364 Cf. Tim. 23a-b. 
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 More importantly, they bring him back to the world of Epimetheus (and thus the world 
before Prometheus and the ascent of man), where there is no stolen fire available. While 
Prometheus’ rebellious act in Prometheus Pyrphoros marks the beginning of human 
civilization, the time traveller now faces its ending. This emphasises the consequences of the 
divine absence further. As the Platonic Protagoras remarks in his version of the Prometheus 
myth, the only reason human beings attain fire (which triggers their social development) is 
through Prometheus’ rebellious act against the gods; and the only reason they gain political 
wisdom is through Zeus’ intervention when he steps in to fix the chaos that he sees.365 Now, 
however, the sequence of the Protagoras (cf. p. 101) has gone from ascending to descending, 
as it has changed from Epimetheus (primeval stage): Prometheus (possession of fire and civic 
wisdom): Zeus (possession of political wisdom) to Zeus: Prometheus: Epimetheus. This 
continues to explain the lack of development and incessant regression. 
 The absence of the Promethean arts also explains the forgotten skills of measurement 
and calculation. As Prometheus exclaims at PV 459-6, “Look: I gave them numbering, chief 
of all the stratagems.” (µὴν ἀριθµόν, ἔξοχον σοφισµάτων, ἐξηῦρον αὐτοῖς).366 Additionally, it 
explains the lack of reason. At 443-5, Prometheus says, “Still, listen to the miseries that beset 
mankind – how they were witless before and I made them have sense and endowed them with 
reason.” (τἀν βροτοῖς δὲ πήµατα ἀκούσαθ᾽, ὥς σφας νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρὶν ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ 
φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους).367 Years later, Plutarch builds on to this claim and equates Prometheus 
with reason. He asserts that if man had neither mind nor reason, his life would be nothing 
better than that of wild animals (οὕτως ἕνεκα τῶν αἰσθήσεων, εἰ µὴ νοῦν µηδὲ λόγον ὁ 
																																								 																				
365 Cf. Prot. 321e-322e. 
366 Trans. Nussbaum. 
367 Cf. Tim. 53a-b. 
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ἄνθρωπος ἔσχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν διέφερε τῷ βίῳ τῶν θηρίων).368 However, it is neither by fortune 
nor by chance that we surpass them, “but Prometheus (that is, reason) is the cause” (νῦν δ᾽ 
οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ᾽ αὐτοµάτως περίεσµεν αὐτῶν καὶ κρατοῦµεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Προµηθεύς, 
τουτέστιν ὁ λογισµὸς αἴτιος).369 These remarks highlight further the fact that the world the 
time traveller finds in the future is fundamentally Epimethean. 
The Epimethean aspects of it become especially clear when listening to the time 
traveller’s description of the Eloi and the Morlocks who, despite their human form, behave 
more like animals than human beings do. He says, “These Eloi were mere fatted cattle, which 
the ant-like Morlocks preserved and preyed upon – probably saw to the breeding of it.”370 
This animal-like behaviour recalls not only the Polybian cycle of governments, which begins 
and ends with catastrophe and ‘herd-like’ demeanour but also the de-evolutionary aspects of 
the myth of the reversed cosmos. For it continues to show that the society the time traveller 
encounters in the future bears closer resemblance to the early human communities from many 
hundred-thousand years ago that are marked by chaos and primeval instincts, than to a highly 
advanced civilization.371  
In this vein, these aspects also draw attention to some of the points raised in the 
introduction, especially to the questions that I pose about the differences between human 
beings and animals. I assert there that the accounts which grant speech to animals, and which 
endow them with the faculty of the human mind, (such as Aesop’s animal fables, 
																																								 																				
368 Plutarch, De Fortuna 98c.  
369 Plutarch, De Fortuna 98c. This also brings to mind the following fragment from Platon, 
προµηθία γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις ό νοῦς. (“For men the mind is something Promethean”). 
Fr.145, Syncellus p. 174.22 Mosshammer. 
370 The Time Machine, 62. Cf. PV 452-3. Before Prometheus came along, mankind “dwelt 
underground, like tiny ants, in the sunless recesses of caves.” Cf. Laws 766a. 
371 This also echoes the point made earlier about the circular movements seen in the Timaeus 
and the Critias, ‘everything returns to what it was before, and what has been will be again.’ 
Cf. p. 113. Cf. Guthrie 1957: 63. 
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Aristophanes’ Birds, and Plutarch’s Gryllus) offer insight into the merits and faults of human 
beings. In Wells, however, it is the reverse scenario: human intellect and speech exist only in 
an elementary form, and the future human’s lifestyle recalls that of animals rather than that of 
human beings.372 In this way, much like the stories that feature clever animals who have been 
given speech and reason, so they can teach us something about our institutions and ourselves, 
The Time Machine teaches us a similar lesson, just the other way around.  
 It shows not only where the unadulterated Protagorean trust in the human intellect can 
lead but also what happens when the development of civilization and evolution of language 
(which go hand in hand) are inverted, and when declining linguistic capabilities eliminate a 
trait that is often seen as uniquely human. (I analyse this argument more in the next chapter). 
Particularly, the elimination of language also removes the ability to establish and live in a 
community with a complex societal and political structure, rather than in an animal-like 
existence whose only aim it is to eat other, weaker, animals. Wells realizes that, “less verbal 
regulation would allow the resurgence of primitive instincts, with speech degenerating into 
unconscious noise.”373 The time traveller comments:374 
																																								 																				
372 See Nevins 2016: 213. This animal-like lifestyle brings to mind Polybius’ concept of 
cyclical degeneration, seen earlier (cf. n. 353). At 6.5.4 and 6.9.9, he makes clear “that the 
series [of degeneration] began and ended with the same socio-political order- an elementary 
form of monarchy. This [elementary form of] monarchy preceded [the form of] monarchy in 
the first instance and followed mob rule in the last, and it was understood to be the natural 
rule over men when their behaviour and conditions of existence are the most animal-like.” 
Thus, using Polybius’ model, “one could…prognosticate not only the most likely immediate 
destiny of a given constitution but also the eventual reversion of all political societies to a 
primitive state, a state which he associated with bestiality or the vulgar herd, and with the 
emergence of a strong monarchical master [in this case, the Morlocks].” Trompf 1979: 6.  
See also the discussion of political change at Laws III, especially 676-680, which 
begins and ends with a comparable notion of catastrophe. 
373 Abberley 2015: 83. Wells echoes his teacher here. See Huxley 1863: 132. As I 
demonstrate in the next chapter, this assertion readily brings to mind that of many ancient 
philosophers who assert that one of the most important differences between humans and 
animals is that we speak and they do not. It also recalls Gorg. 452e, because with the 
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Either I missed some subtle point, or [the Eloi’s] language was excessively simple – 
almost exclusively composed of concrete substantives and verbs. There seemed to be 
few, if any, abstract terms, or little use of figurative language. Their sentences were 
usually simple and two words, and I failed to convey or understand any but the 
simplest propositions. 
 
This emphasises further the Epimethean features of the narrative: without language, books, 
and writing (as stated earlier, the only books that are left are a ‘sombre wilderness of rotting 
paper’), “society’s accumulation of knowledge and ideas falls away, returning humans to raw 
instinct.”375  
 At Politics 1253, Aristotle asserts that it is because of their reasoning speech that 
human beings set themselves apart from other animals in the household and city (I will 
analyse this more in the next chapter); however, with the return to a raw instinct and forgotten 
teachings of former civilizations, this ability, too, has vanished. The Eloi’s means of 
communication, which are too rudimentary to allow any genuine political development, bring 
to mind the second period of the myth of the reversed cosmos. Except this time, comparably 
with the ending of Atlantis, there is no divine being who steps in and saves human beings 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
resurgence of primeval instincts and the disappearance of skilfully articulated speech, so the 
‘best and greatest of human affairs,’ i.e. persuasion, vanishes too. 
374 The Time Machine, 39. Cf. Plato, Sophist 262a-c, Crat. 425a and 431b, Aristotle, Poet. 
1456b, and Plutarch, Quaest. Plat. X. These passages, while emphasizing the decline of 
language the time traveller observes, also make clear that, despite everything, the Eloi still 
manage to combine the two most fundamental components of sentences, namely nouns and 
verbs, which puts their speech above that of animals. 
375 Abberley 2015: 83. Cf. Tim. 23b. This brings to mind section 262 of the Sophist, 
mentioned earlier (cf. p. 93 n. 248), where it is said that speech achieves good by weaving 
together verbs and names. Without proper speech, the ability to do this diminishes, and thus 
also the ability to create good things.  
 The Morlocks may exhibit a form of political behaviour when they feed, clothe, and 
eat the Eloi, as that does bring to mind Aristotle, HA 488a where he states that there are some 
animals, such as bees, wasps, ants, and cranes, who share one common activity and thus a 
kind of political organisation. The Morlocks certainly share a common activity, but ultimately 
their demeanour is too rudimentary in order for them to establish any political organization 
that could reach the level of the now decayed institutions. This is primarily due to their lack of 
reasoning speech, which prevents them from establishing ‘the expedient and inexpedient, and 
therefore likewise the just and the unjust.’ 
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from their destiny (again, this highlights the implications of Protagoras’ hubristic opinions of 
the human intellect and the consequences of the missing divine ‘anchor’). This time, the 
world continues to deteriorate. As the world deteriorates, so reason and speech, too, disappear 
and eventually it reaches a point where the boundary between human and animal is so blurred 
that it is difficult to ascertain to which category they really belong. 
 
 
VIII. Chapter Conclusion 
 
Wells’ The Time Machine reflects the problems examined in Aeschylus and the 
Platonic dialogues in the following symbolic ways. Like the power struggle between Zeus and 
Prometheus in PV, the myth of the reversed cosmos (and the theme of change that is present 
in both texts), Wells’ story is a tale that is both a product and an interpretation of political 
existence. More importantly, like the Prometheia and the myth, it is both of and beyond the 
polis. As stated previously, like the declines of Kallipolis and Atlantis, it serves as a portrayal 
of what might happen to a human political community when the guidance of reason fails. It 
also shows what might happen when human beings only subscribe to rhetoric and external 
factors, such as appearance and temporary security. In this way, as discussed earlier, the 
Prometheia, the Platonic dialogues, and The Time Machine provide a (symbolic) answer to 
the question posed at the beginning of the chapter. ‘If the ascent of man and the development 
of law and politics depends solely on who is the most eloquent and clever, then how does this 
affect our political virtue, justice, and social system?’ 
Specifically, the discussion in this chapter shows that dependence on speech and 
intellect is not sufficient. By portraying the limits of human reason and the consequences of 
the hubristic attitude that reason will always be there to establish systems of justice and 
	 138	
politics, it makes clear that Protagoras’ dismissal of a divine anchor is foolish, regardless of 
how comfortable and secure he thinks his situation may be. Especially, the analysis of the 
different factions in the Statesman, and their general inability to understand one another due 
to the limits of their intellect, show that an exclusive reliance on the intellect may bear 
dangerous consequences. Additionally, it seems clear that the neglect of reason and education 
(potentially triggered by the assumption that those things will always be there), and the 
subsequent growth of human elements such as appetite and greed (which is what happens to 
the Atlanteans), are the cumulative causes of the declines of the regimes mentioned here.  
Hitz argues, referring to Plato’s Republic, “it is the neglect of reason that allows for 
the growth and fragmentation of appetite - and so ultimately it is what drives the division, 
violence, and instability found in bad regimes.”376 In this vein, The Time Machine also 
demonstrates where political weariness may lead. As noted in the introduction, the right and 
ability to speak does not necessarily come with the willingness to contribute effectively, and 
continuously, to political debate. Wells depicts, in accordance with the Platonic dialogues, a 
symbolic scenario that may occur when human beings fail to, or even refuse to, evaluate what 
is right in front of them, but listen only to their appetites. In this vein, he also portrays, in 
accordance with More’s Utopia, what might happen when reason is no longer available to 
represent justice and teach citizens virtue and social excellence (cf. p. 17). Human beings will 
swap their status of eloquent political thinkers to that of inarticulate cave-dwelling beings 
(which is exemplified by the Morlock’s habitat in the underground). 
It is clear that The Time Machine paints a very dark picture of the potential 
consequences that might arise when human beings fail to tend to reason and learn concepts of 
political virtue, however, it does help us to make sense of patterns of political change and 
																																								 																				
376 Hitz 2010: 113. 
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debate. In conjunction with the Promethean cycles of ascent and descent, and the fate of the 
Atlanteans, it underlines a point already made clear in the Statesman. Specifically, it portrays 
the importance of having a true political expert who does not forget the lessons from the 
previous periods but who is able to learn from them, rather than swapping one cycle for the 
next. At the same time, despite the complications that may come with them, it also shows that 
it is necessary to have political discussions among different factions, because it keeps the 
human mind alive. It thus portrays the potential consequences of Utopia and the dangers that 
come with the lack of individual idiosyncrasy and freedom of speech.  
If the citizens do not learn, then one day they may have to face more serious problems 
than just deceptive speech, unjust laws, and reasoning that is, at times, inadequate. For there 
may come a day where the cycles collapse, which would subsequently result in the decline of 
speech and intellect, and humans’ ability to secure their existence as political animals. 













CHAPTER 2  




I. Aristophanes’ Birds: The Role of Tereus 
 
This chapter illuminates in more detail the significance of the human ability to secure 
their existence as political animals by the means of speech and intellect, and it looks at the 
differences between human beings and animals when it comes to concepts of speech, political 
thinking, and founding of cities. Precisely, the story of Birds offers an answer to the question, 
‘what makes human beings human?’ which not only highlights the development of political 
and legal thought, the reliance on rhetoric, and the themes of change and oscillation analysed 
in the previous chapter, but also the fifth-century fascination with city-planning and other 
ways of organising society. I contextualize Birds against other relevant sources that examine 
fifth-fourth centuries rhetoric (Isocrates, Lysias), animal rationality and political theory 
(Aristotle, Plutarch), and modern political animals (Orwell) who correspond elegantly with 
some of the key dimensions found in the ancient accounts. 
It is clear that Aristophanes’ comedies are packed with animals that are employed in 
numerous ways.377 However, for this chapter, the following point is the most important one: 
																																								 																				
377 Birds, along with Frogs and Wasps, employs animals to symbolize human characteristics 
by playing with the categories of human and animal with comic verve and by approaching the 
borderlines of the two. In contrast, as Pütz also notes, are the comedies that are concerned 
with the consequences of the Peloponnesian War for Athens such as Acharnians, Peace, 
Lysistrata, Ecclesiazusae, and Wealth. (See Pütz 2015: 62). In these comedies, animals appear 
predominantly as food rather than as the inhabitants of a place away from Athens (Birds), or 
as chorus members (Frogs and Wasps). For instance, Ach. 1005-117 depicts Dicaeopolis’ 
dinner preparations, and Peace 1149-51, 1195-6, and 1312 describe the preparations for 
Trygaeus’ wedding feast. In Knights 354-72, we witness a bragging contest between 
	 141	
the representation of Peisetaerus and Euelpides as non-humans provides a figure within which 
the blurred boundaries of humans and animals can be explored. Moreover, the gap between 
humans and animals, and the unyielding difference in hierarchy between them, can be more 
easily examined if it is expressed through a character that portrays both. Birds fulfils these 
conditions and thus provides the ideal textual space within which this examination can take 
place. This, in turn, can help us answer the question posed at the end of the previous chapter 
(‘what makes human beings human?’), and understand more clearly the implications of the 
time traveller’s observations in the future. Romer writes, “Birds is a politically engaged play, 
and the question of what it means to be Athenian is explored more broadly in the Hesiodic 
terms of what it means to be human.”378 
More importantly, Birds (and, as I demonstrate towards the end of this chapter, Animal 
Farm as well) features a cyclical imagery and a ‘return to origins’379 that resembles not only 
the paradoxical interpretation of tyranny seen in Utopia, where More frees his citizens from 
one system only to enslave them in another, but also the ring compositions of the Prometheia 
and the Statesman, Timaeus, and Critias. Like the trilogy and the Platonic dialogues, the 
comedy presents elements of recurrent political cycles by presenting birds that attempt to 
reclaim kingship and characters who leave Athens only to find themselves in a city very much 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Paphlagon-Cleon and the Sausage-Seller about what, and how much, they can eat and Knights 
645-62, 929, 934, 1177-99 portray a contest to provide Demus with food.  
In addition to being employed as chorus-members, media to illuminate differences 
between humans and animals in an entertaining manner, or as delicious food, animals also 
appear in various other situations. They turn up in sacrifice-settings (Peace 929-38, Lys. 192 
and 202, and Wealth 138 and 820), insults (Ach. 907, Eccl. 1072), proverbs (Peace), sexual 
comparisons (Lys. 618-0, 723-4), oracles (Lys. 770-6, Knights 132, 138, 1013-22, 1037-44), 
curses (Wealth 604), terms of endearment (Wealth 1011), as monsters (Frogs 288-92), and in 
mythological allusions (Birds, Frogs, and Wealth). See Pütz 2015: 62. See also Olson 1998; 
Sommerstein 1990; Sommerstein 2001; Austin & Olson 2004.  
378 Romer 1997: 53-54. 
379 Cf. Romer 1997: 51. 
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reminiscent of Athens at the end of the play.380 Like More, who dismantles the problematic 
government of his time only to re-assemble it in a different form on a strange island, 
Aristophanes takes apart the Athenian political system in Birds, only to put it back together in 
the sky.  
This echoes the recurring movement of the cosmos discussed in the previous chapter 
(cf. p. 113): ‘everything returns to what it was before, and what has been will be again,’ and it 
joins one of its fundamental themes, namely that the past is inevitably contained in the future. 
In this vein, Utopia, in conjunction with Animal Farm and Birds, also continues to express 
part of the Greek legacy to western culture and literature and its significant position in the 
realm of authors whose works offer an imaginative interplay of topical allusions and fantastic 
elements.  
Let us start at the beginning of the story, that is, with Tereus, for he has lived amongst 
the birds longer than Peisetaerus and Euelpides have. Tereus is a useful character to discuss 
here, because his behaviour weaves together the various elements of the play. I suggest that 
his meta-theatrical presence (in that he represents aspects from both Tereus and Birds at the 
same time) and Promethean-like demeanour (in that he gives language to the birds and starts 
their civil evolution) serve as a paramount representation of what it is like to have speech but 
to lack certain attributes that should come with that possession (such as debate). In this vein, 
the subsequent section (pp. 143-157) also sheds further light on some of the phenomena 
Wells’ time-traveller comes across in the future, such as the civil de-evolution and the 
unfortunate implications of the inability to engage in political discourse even though 
rudimentary speech still exists. 
																																								 																				
380 See the scholia (vol 1. p. 423) on this: “[Aristophanes] gets rid of the earth but not of its 
associations. In his discontentment with the like things in Athens, he represents the birds as 
deliberating and meeting together.” 
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The audience already knows Tereus from myth and, more particularly, from 
Sophocles’ lost tragedy Tereus. Aristophanes’ Tereus is, in fact, Sophocles’ Tereus some 
years later.381 His wrongdoings from the past are forgotten (or at least not directly addressed 
in the comedy), and he is a respected member of the realm of the birds where he lives 
contentedly with his wife Prokne.382 He still occasionally refers to his past life and complains 
about Sophocles’ unfair treatment of him, i.e. having made him become a bird. He says: 
τοιαῦτα µέντοι Σοφοκλέης λυµαίνεται ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαισιν ἐµὲ τὸν Τηρέα. “It’s how 
Sophocles distorts Tereus – that’s me – in his tragedies.”383 The recourse to Tereus in the 
following passages is fruitful, because it shows how Birds is a contrafact of the tragedy, an 
Aristophanic antic that expresses its tragic heritage through a reversal of the situation at hand 
which concentrates on the possession of language. However, even without actively resorting 
to Tereus, the argument presented below works because the comedy marks its relation to the 
tragedy on its very own, by presenting a linguistic juxtaposition of Athenians and barbarians 
(cf. p. 157). 
The relation to the tragedy is evident despite the fact that virtually all features of 
Tereus’ violent background story (the rape of Philomela, the glossectomy, and the sacrifice of 
Itys) are absent from the comic stage (his complaints notwithstanding). The only passage that 
mentions Itys’ killing is found at lines 211-2, where Tereus says that he and Prokne still 
lament Itys’ death: οὓς διὰ θείου στόµατος θρηνεῖς τὸν ἐµὸν καὶ σὸν πολύδακρυν Ἴτυν. 
																																								 																				
381 See, for instance, Hofmann 1976: 73, Griffith 1987: 60 and Dobrov 1993: 215. More 
generally, see Alink 1983, Zannini-Quirini 1987 and Dunbar 1997. For the Tereus myth and 
other myths that feature ‘men in bird form’, see Pollard 1977: 162-171. For an overview of 
the hoopoe in Greek thought, see Thompson 1895: 54-57, and especially p. 57 for the hoopoe 
in Aristophanes. On the mythology of the hoopoe in general, see Oder 1888. 
382 Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 1453a36-39. 
383 Birds, 100-101. 
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(“…Lament once more through lips divine for Itys, your dead child and mine”).384 Instead the 
focus is on something else, because in Birds, Tereus’ main purpose is to have taught Greek to 
the birds to create a linguistic setting for Peisetaerus’ and Euelpides’ later activities. 
Specifically, he has two purposes: (1) he gives language to the birds, so they are no longer 
‘barbarian’, and (2) he serves as a catalyst who starts the process of civilizing the birds until 
Peisetaerus and Euelpides come by to move it along. In fact, it is his catalytic role, as Dobrov 
notes likewise, that connects the various themes of the comedy.385 
 Let us begin at (1) and explore Tereus’ role as a Greek teacher, because Aristophanes’ 
ideas to have a barbarian teach Greek to other barbarians is significant. At 199-200, Tereus 
exclaims: ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτοὺς βαρβάρους ὄντας πρὸ τοῦ ἐδίδαξα τὴν φωνήν ξυνὼν πολὺν χρόνον. 
“[The birds] used to be inarticulate, but I’ve lived with them a long time and I’ve taught them 
language.” Tereus teaches Greek to the birds as a clever and, at least initially, benevolent 
barbarian, which is different from his role in Tereus where he appears as brutal and 
unsophisticated, two characteristics that accentuate his barbarian status. There, he performs 
the glossectomy on Philomela in order to strip her of her Greek voice but is seemingly 
																																								 																				
384 McCartney 1920: 267 notes, that Tereus’ exclamation of Ἴτυν “is not without parallel 
[because] the notion that birds lament old human sorrows is quite common.” He recounts an 
African bird story from Andrew Lang, which says “from one end of Africa to another the 
honey-bird, schneter, is said to be an old woman whose son was lost, and who pursued him 
till she was turned into a bird, which still shrieks his name, ‘Schneter! Schneter!’” See also 
Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe 1.27, where Daphnis tells Chloe the story about a girl who 
prayed to the gods to become a bird after the loss of eight cows to her herd. For other 
examples of humans having turned into birds after the loss of a loved one, see McCartney 
1920: 267-8. 
 Similarly, Pausanius i.41.9 asserts, “[Prokne’s and Philomela’s] reported 
metamorphosis into a nightingale and a swallow is due, I think, to the fact that the note of 
these birds is plaintive and like a lamentation.” This informs the portrayal of Prokne in Birds, 
where she does not have a speaking role, but is only referred to as still lamenting the loss of 
her son. See Euripides, Hecuba 337 for another example, when Hecuba instructs Polyxena to 
sing sorrowful notes like the nightingale in order to move Odysseus to feel pity for her. Cf. 
McCartney 1920: 277 on the note, ‘when Greek literature dawns, the nightingale already has a 
well-established reputation as a grief-stricken bird.’   
385 Dobrov 1993: 216. 
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unaware that loss of speech does not equate with loss of communication.386 This reflects the 
fact that Tereus is from a less civilized society at the same time as it reveals Philomela’s 
superior level of civilization. Her capability to communicate with her sister through inanimate 
materials (when she weaves her story into a tapestry) makes this clear. Thus, the Thracian’s 
attempt to suppress communication by violent mutilation is ‘defeated’ by the cunning of two 
Athenian women.387 
 In Tereus, we are therefore presented with a case that is opposite to the one we 
experience in Birds. In the tragedy, Tereus takes speech away; in the comedy, he disseminates 
it. Dobrov writes:388 
 
The reversal of Sophokles’ Tereus is complete: in the tragedy the Atheno-Thracian 
antithesis provides the context for Tereus’ efforts to suppress communication by 
means of the incarceration and ‘lingual castration’ of Philomela […] Aristophanes 
makes his Tereus a benevolent teacher and disseminator of language, and not any 
language, at that, but Greek!  
 
 
To Dobrov, it seems clear that beyond his transformation from man to bird, Tereus has also 
undergone a metamorphosis from an unkind into a benevolent character.389 However, as I 
demonstrate below, there is more to be said about this subversion of theme from Tereus, 
because the tragedy actually continues to inform the comedy. In particular, it highlights an 
																																								 																				
386 Cf. Gera 2003: 204. This recalls the behaviour of the Eloi seen in chapter 1 (cf. p. 135). 
Their language has been reduced to nouns and verbs, but they are still able to communicate 
with one another in rudimentary manners. 
387 Cf. Gera 2003: 204. See Torrance 2010: 218, who notes that the voice “through which the 
mute Philomela revealed to her sister the awful truth of her rape and glottectomy by her 
Thracian brother-in law, included a written message. The problem remains, however, that the 
woven image would work powerfully as a communication without a written message (cf. 
Helen’s weaving of the Trojan war in Iliad 3). Perhaps the names ‘Tereus’ and ‘Philomela’ 
featured in the tapestry as names often do on vase paintings, and were read aloud by Procne as 
she recognized her sister.” See also Dobrov 1993: 204, who asserts that it is “clear that 
Philomela’s weaving involved a written message, a feature invented by Sophokles for his 
dramatic purposes.”  
388 Dobrov 1993: 225-6. 
389 Cf. Dobrov 1993: 190. 
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essential aspect of the comedy when it becomes clear that the birds’ Greek is not sufficient in 
order for them to engage intelligently in political debate. 
 It is clear that Tereus civilizes the birds when he teaches them Greek, which in turn 
sets in motion the creation of νεφελοκοκκυγία. Dobrov remarks: “Tereus’ activities of 
disseminating language are catalytic for this metacomedy, allowing Peisetairos’ political 
career to mirror, among other things, the improvisational creativity of a comic poet.”390 I 
agree with Dobrov, but I take his argument further and assert that Tereus’ language lessons 
also present us with an unwritten prologue that alludes to the time that is yet to come (i.e. the 
time during which the story of Birds will take place). Tereus’ distribution of Greek not only 
enables the arrival of Peisetaerus and Euelpides and the founding of νεφελοκοκκυγία, but also 
serves as the initial clash between (former) human and birds, which sets in motion further 
clashes, which then take place on a rhetorical level. Consequently, Tereus’ lessons amount to 
a display not only of the birds’ forthcoming civil evolution but also of the trademarks that 
inevitably come with it, such as debate (or, lack thereof), city building, and law-making.391   
 This unwritten prologue and Tereus’ dissemination of Greek amongst the birds can be 
connected to Prometheus, particularly to his claim in PV to have distributed wisdom and 
speech amongst mankind, which in turn triggered their ascent and development as political 
beings. Dunbar asserts the wording Tereus uses when he describes his dissemination of 
language, ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτοὺς βαρβάρους ὄντας πρὸ τοῦ ἐδίδαξα τὴν φωνήν, ξυνὼν πολὺν χρόνον 
(“Look, I’ve lived with them a long time, and they’re not the barbarians they were before I 
																																								 																				
390 Dobrov 1993: 226. 
391 The evolutionary aspect is highlighted by the fact that in Birds, being (or, becoming) a bird 
is seen as an ascent. The reverse hierarchical system (man-god-bird), the Athenians’ 
transformation into birds, the gods’ descent (i.e. the loss of rulership), and the birds’ ascent 
(the return to rulership) comically echoes the notions of ascent and descent present in PV. 
 Cf. the metempsychosis in Tim. 91a, where flawed men are transformed into women, 
and Tim. 91e-d, where ‘light-minded’ (κοῦφος) men descend into birds and other animals. 
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taught them language”), may have been influenced by Prometheus’ claim at PV 443-5.392 
There, he says, ὤς σφας νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρὶν // ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ὲπηβόλους. “How 
infantile they were before I made them intelligent and possessed of understanding.” The birds 
were uncivilized and inarticulate before Tereus’ Greek lessons, just like mankind was witless 
and devoid of reason before Prometheus’ gifts of civilization. 
Griffith asserts that these two lines serve as an introduction to the subsequent lines, 
which amount “virtually to a display speech (ὲπίδειξις) on man’s cultural evolution (450-
506n.).”393 Prometheus enables man to undergo a transformation from an uncultured being to 
a political thinker who knows the art of rhetoric; and Tereus guides the birds away from their 
barbarian lifestyle by teaching them the Greek language (however, as it turns out, the birds do 
not know the art of rhetoric). I do not wish to assert that Tereus appears as a true second 
Prometheus here (as stated earlier, in the end Peisetaerus and Euelpides are the ones who 
really move along the founding of the bird city). However, I do agree with Dunbar that there 
are important connections to be made between the wording in PV 443-4 and Birds 199-200, 
especially because of the catalytic nature of both. 
Additionally, in the Aristophanic text, Prometheus stays true to his tragic form in that 
he loathes the gods, but is fond of man: ἀεί ποτ᾽ ἀνθρώποις γὰρ εὔνους εἴµ᾽ ἐγώ…µισῶ δ᾽ 
ἅπαντας τοὺς θεούς, ὡς οἶσθα σύ. “I have always been friendly to human beings…and I hate 
all the gods, as you know.”394 Herington points out that this scene shows that both Birds and 
																																								 																				
392 Birds 199-200. See Dunbar 1997: 200. “βαρβάρους: i.e. speaking an unintelligible tongue; 
the Greeks disdainfully compared foreigners speaking their own languages to birds, especially 
swallows, twittering.” Cf. Aeschylus, Ag. 1050-1. 
393 Griffith 1983: 164. 
394 Birds, 1545-7. Cf. PV 975-6, ἁπλῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πάντας ἐχθαίρω θεούς, ὅσοι παθόντες εὖ 
κακοῦσί µ᾽ ἐκδίκως. (“Quite simply, I hate all the gods who are so unjustly harming me after 
I helped them”). 
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PV alike “hinge on the idea of a revolt against the divine establishment.”395 Indeed, it is 
Prometheus’ character in Birds who directs the negotiations that lead to Zeus eventual 
dethronement when he orders Zeus’ sceptre to be handed over to the birds. He tells 
Peisetaerus: ὑµεῖς δὲ µὴ σπένδεσθ᾽, ἐὰν µὴ παραδιδῷ τὸ σκῆπτρον ὁ Ζεὺς τοῖσιν ὄρνισιν 
πάλιν, καὶ τὴν Βασίλειάν σοι γυναῖκ᾽ ἔχειν διδῷ. “But don’t you ratify a treaty unless Zeus 
returns his scepter to the birds and gives you Princess for your bride.”396  
Herington notes that this command echoes the prophecy shouted by Prometheus in PV 
168-172, ἦ µὴν ἔτ᾽ ἐµοῦ, καίπερ κρατεραῖς ἐν γυιοπέδαις αἰκιζοµένου, χρείαν ἕξει µακάρων 
πρύτανις, δεῖξαι τὸ νέον βούλευµ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ὅτου σκῆπτρον τιµάς τ᾽ ἀποσυλᾶται. “I tell you that 
even though my limbs are held in these strong, degrading fetters, the president of the 
immortals will yet have need of me, to reveal the new plan by which he can be robbed of his 
sceptre and his privileges.”397 The imagery of the ephemeral tyranny of Zeus and the 
inevitability of change that shines through PV, as discussed earlier on pp. 55-8, then 
satirically re-emerges in Birds, which provides the theme for the climax of the comedy when 
the sceptre is indeed handed over to the birds. 
Nevertheless, even though Tereus civilizes the birds by teaching them Greek and 
Prometheus tells them that it is possible to reclaim leadership, over the course of the comedy 
it becomes clear that their Greek and political leadership skills are largely ineffective. They 
may have the theoretical language skills (and they may have re-claimed leadership in theory), 
																																								 																				
395 Herington 1963b: 237. This brings to mind the point made in chapter 1 in regards to Zeus’ 
rule, namely that it is possible to (re-) claim leadership and that already established regimes 
and laws do not necessarily stay established forever. Cf. pp. 69-71. 
396 Birds, 1535-6. The use of the word πάλιν underlines both the point made above as well as 
the recurrent imagery analysed in PV, Statesman, Timaeus, and Critias. Echoing the 
ascending and descending sequences in the tragedy and the Platonic dialogues, this line in the 
comedy makes clear that previously overthrown regimes can rise again and current regimes 
can fall. It is clear that in both plays, Zeus and Prometheus are the two characters who inform 
that notion. 
397 Herington 1963b: 239. 
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but they have been given no sophistication to use them properly. To some extent this is due to 
them being animals; they are, as stated above, barbarians and thus not cut out to speak Greek 
properly. Furthermore, there is something to be said about the comic element that arises when 
a barbarian teaches Greek to other barbarians, for an overly ambitious undertaking like this is, 
arguably, bound to fail from the very beginning.398  
However, I argue that it is also possible to look at it another way, and this is where the 
relation of Birds to Tereus becomes especially clear. Tereus, it appears, serves as an agent of 
speech once again, as he decides who has the right to speak, whether effectively or 
ineffectively, and who does not. By linking the Aristophanic Tereus to the Sophoclean one, 
we can thus create a window into the gap between the right to speak and the right to be heard, 
and we are reminded of the fact that these two rights do not necessarily entail one another. 
This becomes particularly evident when looking at the ostensible differences between the two 
portrayals of Tereus. It is true that, at first glance, we witness a reversal of roles when we 
watch Tereus transform from a language-taker into a language-giver. Yet, upon closer 
inspection the two cases that we are presented with in Aristophanes and Sophocles are more 
alike than previously assumed, because in both stories speech is being manipulated. (This also 
demonstrates that, for Tereus too, the past is contained in the future). 
This, in turn, shows an important feature of νεφελοκοκκυγία: the city in the sky is a 
city of language and its citizens, the birds, show what it is like to be given speech but no 
agency, or motivation, to use it. Indeed, this is the point that is being argued here: the birds 
may lack motivation because they are ‘bird-brained,’399 but, more importantly they 
demonstrate what it is like to have speech but to lack lasting deliberative rhetoric (cf. p. 49). 
																																								 																				
398 Cf. Plutarch De fac. 941c and Quaest. Rom. 269a, on the notion that Greek language 
atrophies in a barbarian environment. 
399 Cf. Dunbar 1997: 279. “If the chorus were not bird-brained they would notice that he has 
not proved that the birds may benefit from listening to anything that their enemy has to say.” 
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The passages below illuminate the birds’ inferior command of the Greek language and their 
incapability to untangle the hidden meaning behind Peisetaerus’ and Tereus’ words at the 
same time as they portray the latters’ superior rhetorical skills. It is worth discussing these 
passages, I think, because they enrich our understanding of the connotations of Plato’s 
polemics against the use of rhetoric in the assembly (cf. pp. 81-2), as they point at the 
dangerous patterns of political debate and the effects of the deceptions of sight and sound. 
Tereus serves once again as the catalyst. Early on in the comedy, he tells the birds to 
go to the meeting that Peisetaerus and Euelpides have scheduled in order to announce the 
good news (i.e. their intention to find νεφελοκοκκυγία): δεῦρ᾽ ἲτε πευσόµενοι τὰ νεώτερα, 
πάντα γὰρ ἐνθάδε φῦλ᾽ ἀθροιζοµεν...ἀλλ᾽ ἲτ᾽εἰς λόγους ἂπαντα, δεῦρο δεῦρο δεῦρο δεῦρο. 
“Come hither to learn the news; for we are assembling here all the tribes…come to the 
meeting, all of you, hither, hither, hither, hither!”400 Tereus makes clear that the news the 
birds are about to hear will change their lives for the better: κοινόν, ἀσφαλῆ, δίκαιον, ἠδύν, 
ὠφελήσιµον. “News that concerns you all: something safe, honest, pleasurable and to your 
advantage.”401 The chorus-leader is suspicious at first and wonders whether there is an ulterior 
motive for this. ὁρᾷ τι κέρδος ἐνθάδ᾽ ἄξιον µονῆς, ὅτῳ πέποιθ᾽ ἐµοὶ ξυνὼν κρατεῖν ἂν ἢ τὸν 
ἐχθρὸν ἢ φίλοισιν ὠφελεῖν ἔχειν; “Does [Peisetaerus] see any worth-while gain in staying 
here, which gives him confidence that by living with me he may be able either to overcome 
his enemy or to help his friends?”402 
However, the birds’ suspicions are quickly erased by Tereus’ eloquent words. λέγει 
µέγαν τιν᾽ ὄλβον, οὔτε λεκτὸν οὔτε πιστόν: ὡς σὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ τῇδε καὶ τὸ κεῖσε καὶ τὸ 
																																								 																				
400 Birds, 252-3; 258-9. Tereus’ use of ἀθροιζοµεν underlines a point that I will make later on, 
namely that, animals can, and do, have assemblies. 
401 Birds, 316. 
402 Birds, 417-420. Cf. 451-2, δολερὸν µὲν ἀεὶ κατὰ πάντα δὴ τρόπον πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος. (“A 
treacherous thing always in every way is human nature”). 
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δεῦρο προσβιβᾷ λέγων. “[Peisetaerus] speaks of great felicity, too great to speak of or to 
credit; for he will argue, and convince you, that all this expanse is yours, in this direction, and 
in that, and in this.”403 Especially, ‘οὔτε λεκτὸν οὔτε πιστόν’ hints at the questionable nature 
of Peisetaerus as politician since Tereus does not actually tell the birds why they should 
choose him as leader.404 Likewise, ‘προσβιβᾷ λέγων’ suggests that it has already been decided 
that Peisetaerus will argue his case, and that he will be successful in doing so. The fact that 
προσβιβᾷ is in the future tense makes this all the more telling, because it shows that the birds’ 
fate has been sealed before they have even agreed to let Peisetaerus speak. 
Tereus continues by saying that Peisetaerus is ‘incredibly clever’ (ἂφατον ὠς 
φρόνιµος) and the ‘smartest of foxes’ (πυκνότατον κίναδος), who ‘succeeds in everything’ 
(κῦρµα) and, more importantly, ‘who is experienced in the things of the mind’ (τρίµµα).405 
Here, the use of ‘πυκνότατον κίναδος’ in reference to Peisetaerus clearly does not exclusively 
refer to his allegedly marvellous leadership skills, but also to his shrewd scheme, which will 
ultimately be fatal to the birds. The choice to use κῦρµα and τρίµµα in the next line 
emphasises this even more, especially in combination with the etymology of Peisetaerus’ 
name, because it shows that he knows how to stimulate someone’s mind successfully, and that 
he has done it before. (In this way, ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος and perhaps even ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ 
δαίµων, are also applicable).406 
Nonetheless, (staying true to the optimistic nature of Aristophanic comedy), the birds 
are elated at the prospects of Peisetaerus’ government, which is why the chorus leader tells 
Tereus: λέγειν λέγειν κέλευέ µοι. κλύων γὰρ ὧν σύ µοι λέγεις λόγων ἀνεπτέρωµαι. “Tell him 
																																								 																				
403 Birds, 421-5. 
404 Tereus’ phrasing here is comparable with that of Praxagora who, as I will show later, 
advertises the leadership of the women in a similar way: µηδὲ πυνθανώµεθα τί ποτ᾽ ἄρα δρᾶν 
µέλλουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῷ τρόπῳ ἐῶµεν ἄρχειν. Eccl. 229-232. 
405 Birds, 427-430. Cf. Clouds, λέγειν γενήσει τρῖµµα κρόταλον παιπάλη. 
406 On the etymology of his name, (‘to persuade’), see also Kanavou 2011: 106-7. 
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to speak, to speak, I beg you! On hearing the words you’ve spoken to me my heart has taken 
wing!”407 Especially, ‘ἀναπτερόω’ shows how eager the chorus leader is to hear Peisetaerus’ 
plan, which is later emphasized by the chorus in line 629: ἐπαυχήσας δὲ τοῖσι σοῖς λόγοις.408  
Tereus’ persuasion techniques, then, allow Peisetaerus to address the birds, which he 
does largely by referring to their supposedly lost status as kings (οἵτινες ὄντες πρότερον 
βασιλῆς), and by instructing them to reclaim their rulership from Zeus (τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸν Δί᾿ 
ἀπαιτεῖν).409 He employs a form of rhetoric that installs anger in the birds and a desire to take 
revenge and, by doing so, anachronistically echoes Aristotle’s definition of anger in the Art of 
Rhetoric.410 The chorus, reduced to tears (ἐδάκρυσά) because they have found out what the 
birds once had, declare Peisetaerus their god-sent saviour and entrust themselves to him (σὺ 
δέ µοι κατὰ δαίµονα καί τινα συντυχίαν ἀγαθὴν ἥκεις ἐµοὶ σωτήρ).411 
Additionally, Peisetaerus is able to persuade the gods (and his success in doing so 
demonstrates the brilliance of his rhetorical technique, because his persuasion skills convince 
animals and gods alike to accept his proposal). At 1606-1621, he tells Poseidon that the 
																																								 																				
407 Birds, 431-433. See also lines 371-385 for more examples. For instance, at line 385, the 
Chorus Leader says to Tereus, ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο σοί πω πρᾶγµ᾽ ἐνηντιώµεθα. (“Well, 
we’ve surely never opposed you in any past dealings”). 
408 Cf. Aeschylus, Lib. 229, where Electra’s excitement, after recognising Orestes’ footprints, 
is described in the same way: ἀνεπτερώθης κἀδόκεις ὁρᾶν ἐµέ. 
409 Birds 468 and 554. 
410 See especially II.ii.2, ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις µετὰ λύπης τιµωρίας φαινοµένης διὰ 
φαινοµένην ὀλιγωρίαν εἰς αὐτὸν ἤ τι τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγωρεῖν µὴ προσήκοντος. (“Let us 
then define anger as a longing [i.e. the longing for kingship in the birds’ case], accompanied 
by pain [lack of sacrifices], for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight [the loss 
of the scepter and suffering from indignities], affecting a man himself or one of his friends, 
when such a slight is undeserved”). Aristotle continues, διατρίβουσιν ἐ τὦ τιµωρεἶσθαι τἦ 
διανοία. ἠ οὖν τότε γινοµένη φαντασία ἠδονὴν ἐµποιεῖ, ὤσπερ ή τῶν ἐνυπνίων. (“Men dwell 
upon the thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before us produces the same pleasure as 
one seen in dreams”).  
This not only connects with Tereus’ rhetoric but also with Peisetaerus’ suggestion in 
line 557 that, in case the gods do not oblige, the birds should declare a holy war (ἰερὸν 
πόλεµον) against them. On the use of ἰερὸν πόλεµον, see the scholia 556. 
411 Birds 540-7. 
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Olympian gods will be even more powerful (µεῖζον ἰσχύσετ᾽) than they are already once the 
birds are in charge. He promises him that men will no longer be able to get away with false 
oaths once the gods have the birds as their allies, because then men will have to swear by both 
the birds and the gods. In case they break their oaths, the birds can fly down and pick their 
eyes out. Furthermore, at 1671-3, Peisetaerus promises Heracles kingship and an abundance 
of milk and honey, if he accepts the conditions of the birds (καταστήσας σ᾽ ἐγὼ τύραννον 
ὀρνίθων παρέξω σοι γάλα). These false promises can be compared to the tempting promises 
any orator is able to make in the assembly off stage, and they lay the groundwork for what 
will later become the political ideals of νεφελοκοκκυγία.  
Therefore, both Tereus and Peisetaerus are aware of the relationship between speech 
and reason, and of the things to which it can lead by employing it skilfully.412 This is what 
makes the construction of νεφελοκοκκυγία possible, and thus the creation of civilization. Both 
Peisetaerus’ and Tereus’ use of rhetoric in these passages reflect their strong oratorical skills, 
as they manipulate the language of the birds and the gods with ease by addressing them in a 
manner which appeals to them.	In Tereus’ case, this recalls the point made in the section on 
the Statesman (cf. p. 91), namely that he is able to convince the birds by alluding to the 
benefits Peisetaerus will bring to their environment. He knows, as argued previously, that in 
order to persuade them, he not only needs to address them with a language with which they 
are familiar, such as the one that relates to their land, but also with words that emphasise 
Peisetaerus’ arguable strengths. This continues to show that, even though Tereus has escaped 
																																								 																				
412 Like Praxagora who manages to address the Athenians in a way to which they can relate (I 
will analyse this in the next chapter), Peisetaerus is able to trick the gods into believing him 
by constructing a narrative of belonging. He appeals to their already existing power and 
promises them that they will be even more powerful once he and the birds are in charge. (See 
also Aristotle, Rhet. 1337 and his description of ethos, a rhetorical device which Peisetaerus 
and Praxagora employ equally well). 
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the tragic stage and entered the comic one, he still possesses certain tragic elements that 
influence the comedy.  
This in turn suggests that Tereus does not only serve as a model for the manipulation 
of speech in Birds, but also as a sketch for the tyrannical and deceptive nature and political 
design of νεφελοκοκκυγία. This is further underlined by the idea that Tereus also seems to be 
driven by desire, which is, to a certain extent, the reason why he manipulates the birds in the 
first place. Holmes argues:413   
 
Aristophanes depicts a comic Tereus who shows from the beginning latent tyrannical 
 and, in particular, erotic qualities that Peisetairus exploits and who thus provides the 
 bridge for erotic human beings to establish an imperial, aerial polis among the 
 contentedly self-sufficient birds. 
 
Sophocles’ Tereus serves as the model for this imperial polis, a polis that, even before 
it has been officially founded, exploits the birds by addressing them with charming, but 
ultimately deceptive, rhetoric.414 At the same time, Tereus is addressed with rhetoric that is 
equally deceptive, as Peisetaerus uses Tereus’ gullibility to his advantage; indeed it is clear 
that it is Tereus’ desire that ultimately enables him to build νεφελοκοκκυγία since he has to 
convince him first before he can persuade the birds.415 Peisetaerus does this by promising 
Tereus a powerful position in the bird-society: ὥστ᾽ ἄρξετ᾽ ἀνθρώπων µὲν ὥσπερ παρνόπων, 
τοὺς δ᾽ αὖ θεοὺς ἀπολεῖτε λιµῷ Μηλίῳ. (“And then you’ll rule over humans as you do over 
																																								 																				
413 Holmes 2011: 1. Cf. Reckford 1987: 342. “In part Aristophanes’ [Birds] reveals the 
madness of imperial Athens; or better, it reveals the underlying Athenian and human wish for 
nothing less than everything. We recognize much of the delusion, the passion, even the lunacy 
of Athens beneath the conduct of the birds under Peisetaerus’ leadership and manipulation.” 
414 This brings to mind the point the historical Gorgias makes in Helen 14, namely that 
rhetoric has the power to bewitch and beguile the soul. 
415 See also DeLuca 2014: 171.  
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locusts; and as for the gods, you’ll destroy them by Melian famine”).416 Furthermore, at 191-
3, he tells him: ἢν µὴ φόρον φέρωσιν ὐµῖν οἰ θεοί, τῶν µηρίων τὴ κνῖσαν οὐ διαφρήσετε. 
(“You won’t let the aroma of the thigh bones pass through unless the gods pay you tribute”). 
Tereus is delighted to hear these prospects (as he says at line 195, µὴ 'γὼ νόηµα κοµψότερον 
ἤκουσά πω. “I’ve never heard a more elegant idea”), which in turn leads him to betray the 
birds and provide a bridge for Peisetaerus to get to them.417  
 In this vein, both the birds and Tereus are blinded by eros, as the language of desire 
has made its way into their lives.418 Holmes notes, adding to his argument above, “in Birds, 
eros is a fundamentally and uniquely human (and, anthropomorphically, Olympian) trait that 
invades the quiet and self-sufficient bird life.”419 In addition to the acquisition of language, 
the birds have thus also acquired specific human behaviour patterns, such as the tendency to 
follow what is desirable. (This clearly accentuates the humanization of the birds – something 
																																								 																				
416 Birds 185-193. In a way, this is another example of Tereus, the barbarian, being 
outsmarted by Athenians. In Tereus, he is subject to Prokne’s and Philomela’s cunning 
revenge; in Birds, he falls victim to Peisetaerus’ superior rhetorical skills. This is despite the 
fact that Tereus, in both the comedy and the tragedy, does not speak a barbarian dialect but 
Attic Greek. See Holmes 2011: 4. More generally, on the absences of dialectical differences 
in Greek tragedy, see Hall 1989: 117-8. 
417 The betrayal is highlighted further by the fact that Tereus has been transformed into a 
hoopoe. In HA VIII, 633a, Aristotle quotes a passage, which he attributes to Aeschylus, which 
describes the hoopoe as a shape-shifter who not only changes its colour but also its form 
depending on the season. Furthermore, the hoopoe is described as a bird, “which presides over 
its own evils” (τοῦτον δ᾽ ἐπόπτην ἒποτα τῶν αὐτοῦ κακῶν), and this clearly recalls Tereus’ 
violent past. The same phrasing also appears in fr. 581 of Tereus, τοῦτον δ᾿ ἐπόπτην ἔποπα 
τῶν αὑτοῦ κακῶν, which continues to underline the link between the comic and the tragic 
Tereus. On a similar note, McCartney 1920: 269 writes, “The large beak of Hoopoe, which 
has a facies armata, is a memorial of the cuspis with which as Tereus he pursued Procne and 
Philomela.” 
 Nonetheless, this is not to say that there is no humour in the first scenes. As Holmes 
2011: 3 writes: “…much of the humor of the initial scene is derived from the comic deflation 
and inversion of the tyrannical and violent figure from the tragedy…[however]…the power of 
Peisetairus’ words re-awakens Tereus’ latent human and tyrannic eros, so manifest in 
Sophocles’ tragedy.” 
418 Arrowsmith 1973: 126. 
419 Holmes 2011: 2. 
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which I will discuss later). Before Peisetaerus and Tereus install fundamentally human traits 
in them, the birds enjoy a self-sufficient life in nature, which, when we believe Tereus’ words, 
suggests a pastoral-lyric.420 At lines 57-160, he remarks, οὐκ ἄχαρις ἐς τὴν τριβήν: οὗ πρῶτα 
µὲν δεῖ ζῆν ἄνευ βαλλαντίου…νεµόµεσθα δ᾽ ἐν κήποις τὰ λευκὰ σήσαµα καὶ µύρτα καὶ 
µήκωνα καὶ σισύµβρια. “Not a disagreeable life to spend. Here, in the first place, you have to 
live without a purse…and we feed in gardens on white sesame, myrtle-berries, poppies and 
bergamot.”421   
However, swayed by promising rhetoric and eros (the expansion of land) and 
revolutionary politics (re-claim of leadership), the birds are happy to swap their existing 
lifestyle for something they believe is better.422 In this way, it is clear that, even though 
Tereus does not stay until the end of the comedy, his meta-theatrical presence informs Birds 
in many important respects.423 He provides a link to the tragedy and, by doing so, offers a 
model for the match ‘Peisetaerus against Birds’ (i.e. Athenian against barbarian) that takes 
place in the theatre. It is a match in which the birds are hopelessly inferior, as they are being 
																																								 																				
420 The term ‘proto-pastoral’ is probably more accurate here since ‘pastoral’ has not happened 
yet, which is why a discussion of it with reference to Aristophanes is technically 
anachronistic. Yet, such a discourse is not implausible and it is certainly worth pursuing in 
this context. See Moulton 1981 and Pozzi 1985-86. 
421 See also lines 227-259 and 1088-1101, where Aristophanes provides similar proto-pastoral 
lyrics. 
422 Cf. Ludwig 2002: 12-13. “Eros tends to be reserved for situations in which the agent 
already has his basic needs met…Indeed eros is often used to describe situations in which the 
agent gambles more basic goods, risking life or limb in an attempt to obtain a beautiful object 
of dubious material or practical value… . Eros occurs in cases in which the desire, whether 
sexual or not, becomes obsessional and the subject of desire becomes willing to devote nearly 
all of his or her life, time, or resources to achieving the goal.” 
423 Cf. Dobrov 2001: 126. Dobrov notes that Sophocles’ Tereus is refracted through 
Aristophanes’ ‘metafictional prism,’ which is especially evident when looking at the 
“definition of ‘Athenian’ and ‘polis’ against a barbarian Other,” as stated above. He ends his 
comparison of the two with the words: “In creating his own masterpiece by transforming and 
distorting a product of Sophokles’ dramatic genius, Aristophanes was, quite clearly, honoring 
his older contemporary with the highest praise.” On metatheatre and the intersection of 
tragedy with comedy, see Dobrov 2001: 1-13. 
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deceived by Peisetaerus’ unsound arguments.424 The audience is presented with a para-
tragedy where tragedy invades comedy, politics enter (bird-) fantasy, humans occupy the 
realm of animals, and the audience sees humans from the point of view of the birds: as 
charming but ultimately also as oppressive. The tragic aspect of the play is only accentuated 
by the fact that Euelpides (the character whose name is based on ‘hope’) eventually 
disappears, and Peisetaerus (whose name is based on the word ‘persuasion’) stays.  
At the same time, I maintain that the argument presented here works even without the 
recourse to Tereus (cf. p. 143) because Birds portrays its very own crisis of linguistic and 
social oppositions between different factions. The comic genre’s prominence as a way to 
express rhetorical entertainment and utopian schemes (marked by feelings of superiority and 
dreams of a Golden Age) enables Aristophanes to flaunt his own tragic element in the play 
when he juxtaposes the fate of the inarticulate ‘Other’ with an amusing game of deliberative 
discourse brought on by clever Athenians. The comic element of this is accentuated by the 
fact that Aristophanes presents us with a game within a game: Tereus’ persuasion techniques 
are grounded in the nuances of the oratory of persuasion – which is why they work even 
without resorting to Sophocles, as they are clearly manifest in the comedy (cf. pp. 150-2). 
Yet, while he concentrates on persuading one faction, another faction is busy persuading him 
in turn (and this may reflect the notion that even though Tereus speaks good Attic Greek, at 
the end of the day, he is no Athenian). 
																																								 																				
424 Cf. Dunbar 1997: 316. “Whether Ar. intended Peis. to be…revealed as a ‘sophistic’ 
character, blatantly deceiving the simple birds by cunning, unsound arguments, or conceived 
him simply as a typical Athenian, resourceful, energetic and bold (cf. the famous 
characterization of the Athenians by the Corinthian envoy in Thuc. 1.70.), and deftly 
deploying the various means of persuasion available by 414 BC to any Athenian prepared to 
notice and imitate them, is a difficult question, dependent upon the answer (if there is one) to 
the wider question of Ar.’s possible intentions in writing Birds…” 
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It may not be possible to determine whether the birds are on the losing end of the 
game because they are indeed ‘bird-brained,’ or because they have been humanized and are 
now driven by the lust for power, just like Tereus. However, it is clear that the misuse of 
rhetoric, and the skillful employment of certain words, play a central role in their fate. They 
are neither able to see the consequences of Tereus’ words nor, as will become clear later on, 
those of the legal system Peisetaerus implements in their city. Thus, while chattering away 
mindlessly, they march right into the trap of νεφελοκοκκυγία.425  
 
 
II. Nεφελοκοκκυγία as a City of Language 
 
The passages above show that the possession of language and the development of 
civilization go hand in hand, and that the skilful employment of speech is a prerequisite for 
building a city.426 Slater writes, “[Peisetaerus] has been creating citizens for the bird-city by 
language, and the city is a city of language.”427 Dobrov notes similarly: “In distinction from 
the comedies of the 420s in which linguistic play may figure as seasoning, so to speak, the 
prologue and Great Idea of Birds are essentially displays of the creative power of 
language.”428     
Surely, this connects with the idea that speech, as well as logical qualities related to 
speech, is at the core of civilization. Heath asserts:429 
																																								 																				
425 The etymology of νεφελοκοκκυγία accentuates this, too. Specifically, while νεφέλη means 
‘cloud’, it can also mean ‘bird net,’ and κόκκυξ may refer to the repeated calls of cuckoos. Cf. 
Ach. 598, ἐχειροτόνησαν µε κόκκυγές γε τρεῖς. The scholia assert that the use of κόκκυγές 
suggests that the vote was ‘uncultivated, that is disorderly. The cuckoo has an unrefined note.’ 
426 This continues to highlight the de-evolution witnessed at the end of Wells’ Time Machine. 
As stated there (cf. pp. 135-6), the decline of speech and civilization happens simultaneously.  
427 Slater 2002: 145. 
428 Dobrov: 1997: 100. 
429 Heath 2005: 11. 
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The success of the polis, the establishment of laws, the rise of justice, the exercise of 
our humanity—civilization itself—are tied to the use of, and depend upon, 
speech…This connection becomes commonplace in later rhetoric, where command of 
language makes civilization possible and thus makes Athens, the locus classicus of 
loquacity, superior to other Greek city-states and Greeks superior to other cultures. 
 
Heath’s argument, that it is due to the Athenians’ ability to make use of the advantageous 
aspects of speech that they were able to rise above other cultures, illuminates Peisetaerus’ 
employment of rhetoric in Birds. Even though he does not wish to live in Athens anymore, he 
makes use of a distinct Athenian faculty (i.e. logos) and, by doing so, does what many other 
Athenians have done before him: he founds a city and invents laws. This is one of the first of 
many indications that it may be possible to take Peisetaerus out of Athens; however, it is not 
possible to take the Athenian out of him. 
 By having his character systematically use this natural Athenian aptitude, 
Aristophanes portrays a kind of thinking that is common in other contemporary texts as well. 
For example, Isocrates states:430 
 
τοῖς µὲν γὰρ ἄλλοις οἷς ἔχοµεν οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων διαφέροµεν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ 
τῷ τάχει καὶ τῇ ῥώµῃ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις εὐπορίαις καταδεέστεροι τυγχάνοµεν ὄντες. 
ἐγγενοµένου δ᾽ ἡµῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡµᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν ἂν 
βουληθῶµεν, οὐ µόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγηµεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις 
ᾠκίσαµεν καὶ νόµους ἐθέµεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕροµεν, καὶ σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ δι᾽ ἡµῶν 
µεµηχανηµένα λόγος ἡµῖν ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας. 
 
For in the other powers which we possess we are in no respect superior to other living 
creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other 
resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each 
other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped 
the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws 
and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man 
which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. 
 
 
Additionally, at Antid. 293-4, he writes:431 
																																								 																				
430 Isocrates, Nicocles or the Cyprians 5-6.  
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ἀλλὰ τούτοις οἷς περ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων τῶν βαρβάρων,	 τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἄµεινον 
πεπαιδεῦσθαι τῶν ἄλλων. 
 
…But in those qualities by which the nature of man rises above the other animals, and 
the race of the Hellenes above the barbarians, namely, in the fact that you have been 
educated as have been no other people in wisdom and in speech. 
 
Lysias even stresses that it is man’s duty to convince by argument rather than by force, as that 
is an approach reserved for wild beasts:432 
   
ἡγησάµενοι θηρίων µὲν ἔργον εἶναι ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων βίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι, ἀνθρώποις δὲ 
προσήκειν νόµῳ µὲν ὁρίσαι τὸ δίκαιον, λόγῳ δὲ πεῖσαι, ἔργῳ δὲ τούτοις ὑπηρετεῖν, 
ὑπὸ νόµου µὲν βασιλευοµένους, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ διδασκοµένους 
 
For they deemed that it was the way of wild beasts to be held subject to one another by 
force, but the duty of men to delimit justice by law, to convince by reason, and to 




Lysias’ speech is arguably the most ‘Athenian’ of these passages (since Isocrates seems to 
point at the weaknesses of the government of his time by associating the good points he 
attributes to monarchy in Nicocles “with the early democracy of Athens”),433 and Peisetaerus 
clearly brings to mind his argument in Birds, when he convinces Tereus, the birds, and the 
gods by speech and reason.434 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
431 Isocrates, Antid. 293-4. Cf. Plato, Apol. 29d. This readily brings to mind Gorgias’ positive 
opinion on rhetoric, analysed in chapter 1 (cf. pp. 75-6), which suggests that speech enables 
man to establish anything they wish. See Gorgias 452e. 
432 Lysias, Funeral Oration, 19. Trans. Lamb, adapted. 
433 Norlin 1928: 75. 
434 This undermines the birds’ proposed plan when Peisetaerus and Euelpides first enter their 
realm, and they are not very pleased to see them. They suggest attacking them (343-351), 
rather than convincing them by speech to leave, which further shows that they lack the ability 
(or willingness) to engage in debate. 
 That being said, 500 years later, Gryllus praises this exact quality (that animals defend 
themselves by strength of the body rather than by craft and deceit). See Gryllus 987c-d. 
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 In this vein, he also epitomises Socrates’ critique of rhetoric discussed in chapter 1 (cf. 
pp. 76-8). He does not truly convey ‘what is just and noble, but only what will seem to be so’ 
(οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλὰ ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα δόξει), and he relies on the fact that ‘persuasion 
comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth’ (ἐκ εἶναι τὸ πείθειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς 
ἀληθείας).435 Certainly, νεφελοκοκκυγία is based on a foundation of false promises and lies 
since Peisetaerus promises Tereus, the birds, and the gods a better life but neglects to mention 
that it is only his life that will improve in the theocratic tyranny he is about to establish.436 
Utilizing Gorgianic rhetoric, Peisetaerus charms them and, by doing so, portrays one of 
Socrates’ key reasons for holding rhetoric in contempt: it is a branch of flattery and thus a 
disgrace.437 Tereus, the birds, and the gods are all swayed, and they do not realise that what 
Peisetaerus is saying does not truly reflect the future he has actually planned for them.438  
 
III. The metamorphoses in Birds 
 
The rhetorical elements that inform Peisetaerus’ character also suggest that, despite 
the fact that he has become a bird and is far away from Athens, he still possesses all sorts of 
																																								 																				
435 Phaedrus 260a. Cf. Gorgias 452, Philebus 58a-b, and Encomium of Helen DK 82 B11. 
436 This brings to mind Rep. 566d-e, when Socrates and Glaucon describe the nature of the 
tyrant. ἆρ᾽ οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς µὲν πρώταις ἡµέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται 
πάντας, ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι ὑπισχνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ 
δηµοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε καὶ γῆν διένειµε δήµῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς 
τε καὶ πρᾷος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; ὅταν δέ γε οἶµαι πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς µὲν καταλλαγῇ, 
τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον µὲν πολέµους τινὰς ἀεὶ κινεῖ. 
 (“Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile upon all men and greet 
everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and 
public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own 
associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all? ...but when, I suppose, he has come 
to terms with some of his exiled enemies and has got others destroyed and is no longer 
disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war…”)  
437 Gorg. 465a. 
438 This in turn recalls the importance of measurement discussed in the section on the 
Protagoras (cf. pp. 107-109). In this case, both the birds and the gods fail to measure Tereus’ 
and Peisetaerus’ words.  
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human attributes. Neither he nor Euelpides can let go of their humanness. They act like men, 
speak like men (although at 1199 and 1510, Peisetaerus’ Greek does sound a little like bird-
chirping, ποῖ ποῖ ποῖ and ἰοὺ ἰού),439 and they think like political men. Konstan writes: 
“Pisthetaerus…perhaps, represents the kind of ambitious individualism associated with a 
sophistic conception of human nature, which takes advantage of the weakness of 
credulousness of simpler creatures.”440 Romer notes similarly: “[in νεφελοκοκκυγία] human 
nature (albeit in a very Athenian way) run[s] its natural course.”441 Moreover, Romer 
continues, “[Aristophanes reaffirms] the idea that human life is somehow cyclical, that, 
however much things change, they return to something very like their original condition, that 
the new is old.”442  
The metamorphosis is thus incomplete because human nature has not been 
transformed. This shows that the idea of a metamorphosis into true birdhood is nothing but a 
comic fantasy in the play.443 This becomes also clear when looking at the ways in which they 
mock each other after their transformation. Peisetaerus makes fun of Euelpides’ wings and 
tells him he looks like a cheap imitation of a goose, and Euelpides responds by saying that 
Peisetaerus looks like a close-shaven blackbird.444 Not only does this highlight the comic 
effect of the entire situation, but it also shows once again that Peisetaerus and Euelpides have 
																																								 																				
439 Cf. Pütz 2008: 234. 
440 Konstan 1997: 16. 
441 Romer 1997: 51. 
442 Romer 1997: 51. Again, this echoes the cyclical theme seen in PV, Statesman, Timaeus, 
and Critias. Birds, like PV and the Platonic dialogues, shows that we are subject to recurrent 
political cycles when it states that birds are able to reclaim kingship. It also highlights the 
statement made on pp. 70 and 141, namely that both PV and Birds contain elements of a 
divine rebellion, which demonstrate that it is possible (and even inevitable) to regain a 
previously fallen leadership. Additionally, it points at something which will later characterize 
Praxagoras’ regime as well: despite the new and revolutionary aspects of it, it is also 
undeniably tied to old political problems. 
443 Cf. Pütz 2008: 234. 
444 Birds, 803-805.  
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not transcended human nature, as they have only achieved a half-metamorphosis.  
At the same time, while Peisetaerus and Euelpides may not become true birds in the 
comedy, the ‘real’ birds certainly humanize over the course of the play, as already suggested 
on pp. 155-7. Pütz notes:445   
 
Es lässt sich zusammenfassen, daß die Mischfiguren in den Vögeln...immer 
 menschlicher werden je später sie erscheinen...Die komische Phantasie der 
 Verwandlung von Menschen in Vögel wird also stärker gebrochen. Die Vögel des 
 Chors unterlaufen die gleiche Entwicklung, indem sie immer menschlicher werden. 
 Sie erfinden ihren Erschaffungsmythos, bauen eine Stadt und werden letztendlich wie 
 Menschen wegen Verrats bestraft. 
 
 
Pütz argues that the animals become gradually more and more human by inventing a story 
about their origin and by building a city.446 Towards the end of the play, they are punished for 
rejecting the city Peisetaerus built, just like human beings would be punished if they 
committed a similar crime. The humanization of the birds is further accentuated by the fact 
that their humanization is also an ‘Athenisation’ at the same time (cf. pp. 142 and 154 n. 413), 
which is especially highlighted by Peisetaerus’ use of the word οἰκίζω in line 183, when he 
tells Tereus that the birds’ πόλος will become a πόλις as soon as he has settled and fortified it. 
Prometheus later underlines this in line 1515, when he says to Peisetaerus that he has 
‘colonized the air’ (ᾠκίσατε τὸν ἀέρα). 
 This development of the birds, which begins with the acquisition of language and 
fundamentally human traits (such as desire), and continues with Peisetaerus’ settlement, 
serves as a comment on the collapse of the traditional virtues in the birds’ realm, as it 
																																								 																				
445 Pütz 2008: 235-236. 
446 The fact that the birds invent a mythological background story for their city (which reaches 
its comic zenith when, in lines 1353-4, Peisetaerus bases his justification for the birds’ laws 
on an ‘ancient pillar of the storks’) brings to mind the story of ancient Athens in the Timaeus 
and Critias, which, while containing many important connotations, also serves as a 
genealogical study of contemporary Athens. 
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continues to break the already blurred boundaries between humans and animals. At the same 
time, it continues to inform the circular nature of the comedy, because Peisetaerus’ new polis 
begins to bear trademarks of the one he wished to leave behind, before the construction has 
even officially begun. 
 The humanization and Athenisation of the birds climaxes in the comic bird-roasting 
scene that takes place towards the end of the play, already alluded to by Pütz above. It 
emphasises the birds’ humanization by showing that they have been introduced to lawsuits 
and punishment, and it also outlines one of the problems that come with civilization, namely 
discrimination.447 At 1580, Peisetaerus asks for the cheese-grater, as he is in the process of 
preparing a few birds for roasting.448 When Heracles asks what sort of meat this is, 
Peisetaerus replies, ὄρνιθές τινες ἐπανιστάµενοι τοῖς δηµοτικοῖσιν ὀρνέοις ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν. 
“It’s a number of birds who have been found guilty of attempting to rebel against the bird 
democracy.” Peisetaerus and Euelpides want the birds to follow their laws; the birds that do 
not oblige break the law and must face the consequences.449  
																																								 																				
447 Cf. Birds 526-33, where Peisetaerus tells the birds that it is normal practice for human 
beings to hunt birds (whether they are in bird costumes or not). 
448 Birds, 1580-1585. Like a true tyrant, Peisetaerus does here what a thousand lines earlier, 
he had described as one of the indignities human beings always do to birds (and from which, 
he said, the birds would be protected if they built a city with him). For at lines 532-4, he tells 
the chorus: ὀπτησάµενοι παρέθενθ᾽ ὑµᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπικνῶσιν τυρὸν ἔλαιον σίλφιον ὄξος. 
“[human beings] are not content to have you roasted and served up; no, they grate on cheese, 
oil, silphium, vinegar…” This underlines not only the contradictory nature tyrants tend to 
possess, but it also shows once again that Peisetaerus still acts very much like a human being. 
 Peisetaerus’ words humorously bring to mind the following fragment from 
Pherecrates’ lost comedy Miners, which cannot be dated exactly but was probably performed 
a few years before Birds. It describes the tales of two miners, who break their way into the 
underworld and discover an abundance of food: ὀπται κίχλαι γὰρ εἰς ἀνάβραστ᾽ἠρτυµέναι 
περὶ τὸ στόµ᾽ ἐπέτοντ᾽ἀντιβολοῦσαι καταπιεῖν, υπὸ µυρρίναισι κἀνεµώναις κεχυµέναι. 
(“Roast thrushes ready for boiling flew round our mouths, begging us to eat them, spread out 
beneath myrtle trees and anemones”). Athenaeus 268d-69c. Cf. Stobaeus 4.53.18, vol. V p. 
1102 H on the notion that the underworld is paradise-like. 
449 It is not clear how legal the laws are, as it appears that the law-making for the bird-city 
takes place off stage. I discuss this in more detail on pp. 188-197. 
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Apart from the fact that this illustrates that the birds have humanized, it also implies 
that Peisetaerus and Euelpides have no problems with lawsuits, litigiousness, and punishment 
if they are not in the centre of them. They might tell the birds that they left Athens in order to 
avoid those things but towards the end of the comedy it becomes clear that this is not entirely 
true. (Not that there is anything inherently odd or reprehensible about wanting the rule of law 
and not wanting to be at the rough end of justice, but it does point at one of the fundamental 
characteristics of	νεφελοκοκκυγία). What seems to be true instead is the fact that Peisetaerus 
and Euelpides only want to evade the lawsuits and arguments of which they are not in charge. 
Romer writes: “Peisetairos and Euelpides are tricky Athenians, for whom justice is clearly the 
working of the laws in favor of those who already hold power, a paradoxically tyrannical but 
ordinary arrangement.”450  
 This also shows that, ultimately, νεφελοκοκκυγία is also a barbarian polis; and 
Peisetaerus’ and Euelpides’ desire to rule over it echoes their patriotism for Athens (which 
shows once again that it is possible to take them out of Athens, but evidently impossible to 
take the Athenian out of them). At Pol. 1252b7-9, Aristotle comments on the subjection of a 
barbarian race (in this case, the birds) to the Greeks. He invokes Euripides and writes, ‘διό 
φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ, ‘βαρβάρων δ᾽ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός.’ “This is why the poets say: ‘it is right 
that Greeks should rule over barbarians.’”451 Hall argues, “it is thus the poets, and a tragic 
poet in particular, whom [Aristotle] selects as supreme illustrators of the self-evident ‘truth’ 
that all barbarians are naturally inferior to Hellenes.”452  It seems to me that these quotations 
																																								 																				
450 Romer 1997: 52. 
451 Pol. 1252b7-9. Aristotle is quoting Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis, 1400 here, βαρβάρων δ᾽ 
Ἔλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ βαρβάρους, µήτηρ, Έλλήνων. “Hellenes should rule 
barbarians, mother, but not barbarians Hellenes.” 
452 Hall 1989: 165. There is a similar line in Euripides’ Telephus, paraphrased by 
Thasymachus when the people of Larissa are threatened by the Macedonians, ‘Shall we, as 
Greeks, be slaves to barbarians?’ (85 B 2 DK, Eur. fr. 127). See also Herodotus 8.144, where 
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can convincingly be linked to Birds; and they allow us to look at the tyrannical scenes, in 
addition to the interpretation offered above, as contemporary expressions of Greek superiority 
over barbarians, especially when connecting them with Peisetaerus’ clever use of rhetoric.453 
 Peisetaerus and Euelpides, then, may have undergone a comic physical transformation 
when they put on their bird costumes, but evidently they keep most of their human features. I 
do not agree with Romer when he argues, “to all appearances Pisthetaerus and Euelpides are 
men, but they deny their humanity and claim birdhood (lines 64-68).”454 Romer bases his 
argument on the language the two characters use in line 64 (ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐσµὲν ἀνθρώπω) and 
lines 65 (Ὑποδεδιὼς ἔγωγε Διβυκὸν ὄρνεον) and 68 (Ἐπικεχοδὼς ἔγωγε Φασιανικός), but I 
think this has more to do with their initial departure from Athens and their (comic) arrival in 
the sky, rather than with their representation throughout the rest of the play. I do believe that 
they wish to deny specific aspects of their humanity, specifically the ones that are not in their 
favour, such as personal lawsuits and debts, but I do not think that they deny their humanity 
as a whole.  
Firstly, if they did, it is unlikely that they would use as many human features 
throughout the play as they do. Secondly, it is questionable whether they would be able to 
form a community in νεφελοκοκκυγία if they rejected humanity entirely. Aristotle’s concept 
of κοινωνία illuminates this: τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ µόνον 
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν: ἡ δὲ τούτων 
κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. “For this is proper to human-beings as compared with other 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
he expresses similar sentiments, and Hall 1989: 164-5 and 197 for more examples and a brief 
discussion of how patriotic orations were considered to have an important didactic function in 
the fourth-and fifth-century, specifically in connection with the tragic genre and the 
Panhellenic festival at Olympia. 
453 See also DeLuca 2014: 163 who argues: “In Pisthetairos, Aristophanes shows that it takes 
an Athenian to do universal empire right.” 
454 Romer 1983: 141. 
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animals: the human alone has perception [αἴσθησις] of what is good and bad and just and 
unjust and the others; and a community [κοινωνία] of these beings makes a household and a 
city.”455 According to Aristotle, only human beings are able to form a community because 
they alone have αἴσθησις. Animals lack this skill, which implies they do not have 
commonality. Therefore, it is questionable whether νεφελοκοκκυγία would be able exist (or 
have any sort of communality) if Peisetaerus and Euelpides rejected their humanity and 
claimed birdhood.  
 However, what we do witness is the animalisation of human emotions, at least at the 
beginning of the comedy: Peisetaerus and Euelpides put on wings in order to fly away from a 
current situation with which they are not pleased. They do not look for a city that is greater 
than Athens but for a place that is easier than, but ultimately also similar to, Athens.456 It 
seems that in Birds, this place can only be found in the sky, which is why Peisetaerus and 
Euelpides need wings in order to get there.457 The wings then—and the rest of the bird 
costume—can also be seen as a mode of transportation that liberates the protagonists from 
their unpleasant life in Athens. Thumiger writes similarly:458  
  
The middle ground [between man and animal] is also confirmed by the fact that 
 human  emotions themselves can be animalised: especially (but not exclusively) in the 
																																								 																				
455 Aristotle, Pol. I.2, 1253a15-18. 
456 This seemed to have been a popular theme in 414. See, for instance, the fragments of 
Phrynichus’ Monotropos, which was produced in the same year and at the same festival as 
Birds (Birds came second, Monotropos came third), and which depicts a similar escape from 
the city and law-courts. On escape from the city in Old Comedy, especially in plays that date 
from the period of the Peloponnesian War, see Ceccarelli 2000 and the scholia, vol. 1, p. 425. 
457 Cf. Peace 124-126, καὶ τίς πόρος σοι τῆς ὁδοῦ γενήσεται; ναῦς µὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄξει σε 
ταύτην τὴν ὁδόν. (“But how will you make the journey? There’s no ship that will take you 
there”). πτηνὸς πορεύσει πῶλος: οὐ ναυσθλώσοµαι. (“No, but this winged steed will”). 
458 Thumiger 2008: 7. The motif of emotional affection being represented as winged and 
feathered appears frequently in Greek drama. For instance, at Or. 1593, Menelaus tells 
Orestes, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτι χαίρων, ἤν γε µὴ φύγῃς πτεροῖς, and Hermione at Andr. 861-5 exclaims, 
Φθιάδος ἐκ γᾶς κυανόπτερος ὄρνις ἀρθείην, πευκᾶεν σκάφος ᾇ διὰ Κυανέας ἐπέρασεν ἀκτάς, 
πρωτόπλοος πλάτα. See also Helen 1487, ὦ πταναὶ δολιχαύχενες. 
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 image  of the bird...the subject as ‘flying away’ [is] an exchange that underlines the 
 equation between the animalised subject and the animalised emotional affection. 
 
This ‘middle ground’ is informed by a comic element in Aristophanes. In particular, while the 
wings may serve as a tool for liberation, the sky has specific limits here, as the plot of Birds 
draws up certain boundaries, which compel the story to stay in a specific location. This is 
especially highlighted by the city-walls that Peisetaerus orders the birds to build around 
νεφελοκοκκυγία, and by his use of the word φράσσω in line 183.459 “This wall,” Kosak 
writes, “is the essence of the bird-city: it is the first and only physical structure that is 
reportedly built.”460 Additionally, she states, “the focus on the need for and construction of 
the wall…plays upon an old topos in Greek literature: the argument that men [whether in bird-
costume or not] are the true defenders and thus the true essence of the polis.”461 It thus seems 
evident to me that the funny-looking costumes do not keep Peisetaerus and Euelpides from 
remaining fundamentally human.  
The interim answers to the opening question (‘what makes human beings human’) are 
then the following: Firstly, human beings have lawsuits, litigiousness, and debts; animals do 
not (though, as is the case in Birds, they may be introduced to them). Secondly, a human 
being is someone who, even if they have been transformed (physically or metaphorically) into 
something else, still has the desire to build cities, establish laws, and rule over others. Even if 
they do not assume the role of a human being, they cannot seem to shake off their humanity – 
in Peisetaerus’ and Euelpides’ case, it is clear that they do not want to do this anyway. 
Thirdly, human beings recognise the power and sophistication of language and use it to their 
advantage. This becomes clear in Birds, as the comedy clearly shows the fundamental powers 
																																								 																				
459 Birds, 550. 
460 Kosak 2006: 173. 
461 Kosak 2006: 173. Cf. Birds 180-184. 
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of language (and, simultaneously, the consequences of the decline of it seen in chapter 1). 
However, the concept of language, and the manipulation of another’s language, is 
difficult. In Birds, the matter is complicated even further by the theatrical illusion, the fact 
that the birds who have been taught Greek by a Thracian are not real birds, but chorus 
members pretending to be birds, and by the generally fluid nature of Aristophanic comedy 
(meaning, many masquerades in his plays are subject to change. For example, in Frogs 
Dionysus and Xanthias exchange costumes incessantly and in Ecclesiazusae, women dress up 
as men in one scene only to go back to being women in the next scene). 
It is therefore debatable whether the acquisition of language really humanizes the birds 
when they have been human all along. Yet, if we look at them as ‘real’ birds, the fact that they 
speak Greek (or were able to learn Greek), even if their command of the language is not as 
sophisticated as it could be, this does question the alleged superiority of human beings.462 A 
further discussion, therefore, is required, which I will begin by examining some of the ancient 
concepts of language, especially the Aristotelian notion. This will provide further insight not 
only into the issue addressed above, but also into the linguistic foundation of νεφελοκοκκυγία 
and the human activities of law-making and city-building. 
 
IV. Ancient ideas of language as uniquely human: Aristotle 
 
There is, perhaps, no other ability that has been so eagerly defended as being unique to 
human beings as the possession of language. Heath asserts, “…the most important early 
Greek vision of the difference between humans and other animals was the most obvious one 
																																								 																				
462 Additionally, as the discussion in the first chapter demonstrates, superiority is not 
necessarily eternal and can decline. 
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of all: we talk; they do not.”463 Newmyer writes, “Some ancient philosophers eager to 
maintain that the boundary between animalkind and humankind is fixed and unbridgeable 
posited the capacity for language as evidence that animals could never cross that 
boundary.”464 At the heart of this argument is the denial that animals have a capacity for 
reason, and their ostensible lack of proper language is supposed to serve as a manifestation of 
this. This is mainly because some ancient philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, view the 
possession of language as a demonstration for rational faculty, saying that without language 
there is no rationality. One reason for that is this: ‘speech’ and ‘rational thought’ are 
undistinguishable in Greek since logos means both word and reason. Etymologically 
speaking, by having speech (logon echein) one automatically possesses reason too, and vice 
versa.465 However, as I will examine below, there are also other reasons why many ancient 
philosophers assert that without speech there is no rationality. 
Aristotle asserts that all human beings are by nature political animals. While he 
believes that all animals have some natural instinct for social learning and perhaps even 
political thinking, he distinguishes human beings from other political animals. This is despite 
the fact that he observes “many imitations of human life in the other animals, and more 
especially in the smaller than in the larger animals one may see the precision of their 
intelligence…” (πολλὰ ἄν θεωρηθείη µιµήµατα τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῆς ὰνθρωπίνης ζωῆς, καὶ 
µᾶλλον ἐπι τῶν ὲλαττόνων ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν µειζόνων ἲδοι τις ἂν τὴν τῆς διανοὶας ὰκρίβειαν).466 For 
example, swallows build their nests just as humans build their houses, beginning with the 
																																								 																				
463 Heath 2005: 9. For general discussions of language as the quintessential characteristic of 
human beings, see Dierauer 1977; Buxton 1982; Thalmann 1984; Sorabji 1993; Pelliccia 
1995. For a good survey of animal communication in antiquity (and some of the different 
philosophical school’s opinions), see Fögen 2014. 
464 Newmyer 1999: 101. 
465 As shown in chapter 1 (cf. pp. 134-7), this is also true in reverse, as speech declines 
alongside reason. 
466 Aristotle, HA VIII (IX), 612b7. 
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foundation and then adding the rest.467 More importantly, Aristotle notes that there are other 
animals that are political in addition to human beings (cf. p. 136 n. 375). He believes bees, 
wasps, ants, and cranes exhibit a form of political behaviour because, like humans, they ‘have 
some one common activity’ (κοινὸν γίγνεται πάντων τὸ ἒργον).468 The comparison of these 
animals to human beings is particularly charming and significant because Aristotle lists them 
all in the same sentence: ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπος, µέλιττα, σφήξ, µύρµηξ, γέρανος.    
Additionally, there are differences in political organisation among different groups of 
animals, just like the government styles of human beings vary: “Some of them live under a 
ruler, some have no ruler; examples: cranes and bees live under a ruler, ants and innumerable 
others do not.” (καὶ τούτων τὰ µὲν ὐφ᾽ ἠγεµόνα ἐστὶ τὰ δ᾽ ἄναρχα, οἶον γέρανος µὲν καὶ τὸ 
τῶν µελιττῶν γένος ὐφ᾽ ἠγεµόνα, µύρµηκες δὲ καὶ µυρία ἄλλα ἄναρχα).469 
Nonetheless, ultimately human beings are more political than other animals because of 
their unique capacities for language and reason.470 It is these capacities that allow them to 
organize communal life [κοινωνἰα] around shared communication and verbal concepts of 
justice.471 Aristotle makes clear that without speech it is not possible to have a community at 
all. This is because – and this is similar to what will later become a Stoic doctrine – humans’ 
																																								 																				
467 Aristotle, HA VIII (IX), 612b7. 
468 Aristotle, HA I, 488a. A similar reference to bees, wasps and ants appears in Phaedo 82b, 
where Socrates and Cebes discuss the concept of metempsychosis and assert that those who 
have portrayed practical political virtues such as moderation and justice will be transformed 
“into some such political and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the 
human race again…” (εἰς τοιοῦτον…ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικὸν καὶ ἥµερον γένος, ἤ που µελιττῶν 
ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ µυρµήκων, καὶ εἰς ταὐτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος).  
469 HA I 488a. In this vein, Aristotle also acknowledges that cranes are clever animals 
(φρόνιµα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς γεράνους δοκεῖ συµβαίνειν). Cf. Statesman 263d. See also 
Gerson 1999: 327. 
470 Note that Aristotle sees an undeniable link between logos and humans, and alogia and 
non-humans. For scholarship on his view on men and animals see: Fortenbaugh 1971; Clark 
1975; Dierauer 1977; Lloyd 1983; Preus 1990; Sorabji 1993; Fontenay 1998; Lorenz 2000; 
Heath 2005. 
471 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a1-18 
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unique possession of speech and language enables them to share their conceptions of the 
advantageous, the just, and the good. “Language has its telos in pursuing justice, thus making 
the polis possible.”472 The citizens of the polis interact and cooperate with one another in 
ways that are far more complex than the ways other political animals use.473 This is why, “the 
social formations of other political animals have not attained the degree of organization and 
specialization exhibited by human beings…their means of communicating with one another 
are too rudimentary to allow further development.”474 
 Nevertheless, Aristotle does recognise the abilities of other animals to 
communicate.475 For instance, at HA 536b, he analyses the birds that teach their young to 
sing, and he sees that the songs they teach vary in different places. This, he believes, is 
comparable to the diversity of human languages, which suggests that among birds ‘language 
is not natural in the same way as voice but can be trained.’476 The parrot, for example, does 
this by listening to and mimicking humans. Aristotle writes, there “is the Indian bird, the 
parrot, that is said to be human-tongued” (τὸ Ἰνδικὸν ὂρνεον ἠ ψιττάκη, τὸ λεγόµενον 
ἀνθρωπόγλωττον, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι).477 Similarly, at 660a, he notes that all birds use their tongue 
for communication with one another, which implies that they have the ability to exchange 
some form of information between them. This, in turn, implies that Aristotle believes that 
																																								 																				
472 Heath 2005: 10. 
473 Aristotle, Pol. 1253a1-18. Aristotle says that those who do not live in a political society 
are either inferior or superior to men: animals are incapable of forming such a society; gods 
do not need one because they are self-sufficient. See Politics, 1253a2-4 and 1253a27-29. See 
also Gera 2003: 37.  
474 Payne 2012: 114. 
475 DA 420b5-21a7; HA 488a30-35, 504b1-6, 535a28-36b24, 60810-18; PA 659b2-60b11, 
664a18-65a; GA 786b6-88a32. 
476 Aristotle, HA, 536b18-20. Note that Aristotle does not equate voice and language since at 
HA 4.9, he writes: “Voice [φωνή] and sound [ψόφος] are different from one another; and 
language [διάλεκτος] differs from voice and sound” 
477 Aristotle, HA VII (IX) 597b27-29. 
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some animals have natural instincts for (social) learning.478 This is despite the fact that human 
beings are the superior animals and that their capacity for learning surpasses that of other 
animals.479 
 Arnhart infers from this Aristotelian notion that “just as some birds are predisposed by 
nature to sing, human beings are predisposed by nature to speak…in both cases a natural 
predisposition is fulfilled through social learning.”480 Birds learning to sing and humans 
learning to speak then are two cases that illustrate the natural instincts for learning.481 Arnhart 
asserts further, “both humans and birds are inclined by nature to learn particular kinds of 
verbal signals in particular ways at particular periods in their lives.”482 However, exactly how 
much or how well they learn depends on their social training. Those deprived of a proper 
training will not be able to communicate in a sophisticated and effective manner.483  
 As noted above, Aristotle recognises that birds are able to learn diverse dialects, or 
different ways of singing, just as human beings can learn different languages. Darwin, who 
sees it as evidence that “an instinctive tendency to acquire an art is not peculiar to man,” picks 
																																								 																				
478 However, while this does show that parrots have the ability to pick up words and 
sentences, it simultaneously highlights a (Cartesian) human capacity, “namely the ability to 
create and understand sentences which have never before been uttered.”  Zirin 1980: 325. At 
the same time, it is also this ability, which, according to Thorpe, takes away part of the human 
superiority here. He states, “Human speech is unique only in the way in which it combines 
and extends attributes which, in themselves are not peculiar to man, but are found also in 
more than one group of animals.” Thorpe 1974: 300. 
 On a related note, at Met. 980a-b, Aristotle states that animals that are born with the 
power of sensation are able to acquire the faculty of memory, which in turn enables them to 
learn. Animals who are deaf, however, such as the bee, may be intelligent (and political, as 
stated above) but they cannot learn due to the lack of sensation. 
479 Another example can be found at HA VIII (IX) 630b, where Aristotle mentions the 
intelligence found in elephants. Years later, Aelian notices a similar capacity for learning 
among elephants. See Characteristics of Animals 2.11. On elephants’ high renown in 
antiquity, see also Toynbee 1973 and Scullard 1974. 
480 Arnhart 1994: 467. 
481 See also Baker and Cunningham 1985; Kuhl 1991; Marler 1991a, 1991b. 
482 Arnhart 1994: 470. 
483 Arnhart 1994: 470. 
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up this notion many centuries later.484 Drawing from the Aristotelian treatise mentioned 
above, he believes that human beings are not quite as unique as they think they are when it 
comes to communication and language. Animals may not be able to form a centralized state 
because any legal institution requires human speech, as Aristotle asserts, but they do exhibit a 
form of communication that resembles human speech; this is true regardless of the fact that 
their cognitive and linguistic capacities are not as complex as those of human beings. 
 These Aristotelian treatises are significant in comparison with the comic utopia of 
Birds, and they enable us to draw up another appraisal of the reality that informs the linguistic 
and political machinery of νεφελοκοκκυγία. Indeed, they show that it is not a pure image of 
the oppositions between Athenians and barbarians, but contains an element of realia. This, in 
turn, is significant for my interpretation of the play and it corresponds with the question posed 
at the beginning of this chapter, ‘what makes human beings human.’ Specifically, Aristotle’s 
stance sheds light on Tereus’ role as Greek teacher, because it suggests that the birds were not 
quite as barbarian as Tereus claims they were before he came along. Instead, they emerge as 
animals that always had the potential to acquire a kind of language, just like human beings, 
and do more with their verbal signals than ‘just’ singing.485 
																																								 																				
484 Darwin 1871: 462-63. 
485 Cf. Newmyer 1999: 102, who notes that the ancients were quite fascinated by ‘talking’ 
birds, such as parrots, as can be seen in Ovid’s Amores 2, 6 and Statius’ Silvae 2, 4 both of 
which mourn the deaths of loquacious parrots.  
Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura. Lucretius sees the first form of human language as 
an expression of feelings and an array of diverse, animal-like, sounds. This language was 
spoken in a manner of cries and gestures (vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent, 5.1022) 
and was thus composed of voces rather than properly articulated names, nomina rerum. This 
suggests that, according to Lucretius, once upon a time, human language was also inarticulate 
before it developed into something more eloquent. 
 This recalls the de-evolution humanity has undergone in the future. In the society 
Wells’ time-traveller visits, human beings have gone back in time to some of the earliest 
communities, where language is inarticulate and underdeveloped. Cf. pp. 134-6. 
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 Tereus’ language lessons, then, emphasise the birds’ civil evolution; he recognises 
their natural instinct for social learning and uses it to improve their linguistic abilities so that 
they not only sing their own songs but also those of the Greeks.486 Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the birds’ Greek is imperfect, as they lack the ability to be true rational agents who engage in 
political debate. In this vein, they emerge as a prime example of the inattentive Athenians 
whom Aristophanes and Plato criticise in their works. They are linguistically advanced but 
unable to use their skills to do any of the things that they should be doing (at least, according 
to Aristophanes and Plato), such as measuring what they hear carefully (instead of dismissing 
their concerns as soon as they hear promising rhetoric), or offering a counterargument.487 
																																								 																				
486 A counterargument for this is found in an anecdote that appears much later in Claudius 
Aelianus’ VH 14.30. He writes about the Carthaginian Hanno who is said to have obtained a 
number of birds whom he taught the phrase, ‘Hanno is a god.’ Once the birds had learned this 
sentence, Hanno liberated them and let them fly out to the world, hoping that his fame would 
spread through their utterances. However, the birds soon forgot what they had learned and 
returned to singing their own songs instead. Cf. HA 488b25-27. See also Fögen 2014: 226. 
 There is a different version of the story in Hippolytus’ Refutation of All Heresies 6.8, 
where the Libyan Apsethos wanted to become a god. He gathered some parrots and taught 
them to say, ‘Apsethos is a god.’ Once the parrots had mastered this phrase, Apsethos set 
them free, and they flew all over Libya and Greece, uttering the sentence they had been 
taught. The Libyans believed them and began to worship Apsethos as a god until a cunning 
Greek became aware that the parrots were making false claims. So, he retaught them to say: 
“Apsethos shut us up and forced us to say ‘Apsethos is a god.’” Once the Libyans heard this, 
they killed Apsethos. (There are also two ‘successful’ versions of the story. See Maximus of 
Tyre, Phil. Orat. 29.4, and Dio Chrysostom, Orat. 1.14).  
 These stories, while different genres from different places, and from a different time, 
underline a principle of the Stoics: the birds possess parrot talk, and utter what someone tells 
them to, but lack rationality and internal speech. They also show what can happen when 
someone is used as a mouthpiece and the ignorant masses believe (and repeat) everything they 
say without evaluating (‘measuring’) their words first. This in turn brings to mind the point 
made in the section on the Protagoras, namely that it is important to use the science of 
measurement in order to estimate prospective levels of advantages and disadvantages in 
political proposals (cf. pp. 107-109). 
487 Cf. Plutarch, Them. 29.4-5, where Themistocles compares human speech to embroidered 
tapestries which must be unrolled before the pattern can be displayed properly. For when the 
tapestries are rolled up, they conceal and distort the pattern. Themistocles uses this simile to 
convey his unease about using an interpreter with the Persian King. It shows the principles of 
hidden meaning in speech that must be discovered. See Gera 2007: 451-453 and Zadorojnyi 
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  The birds’ lack of agency reflects both the behaviour of the Athenian masses off stage 
who are quickly persuaded by eloquent (but empty) rhetoric without giving it proper thought, 
and what happens when someone superior (i.e. an Athenian) takes advantage of someone 
inferior (i.e. a barbarian) who may give consent to something they do not fully comprehend. It 
also presents an unpleasant vicious cycle: the birds are unable to master the Greek language, 
because they lack the political agency that human beings have, and they are unable to acquire 
said agency, because it only comes when one has completely mastered Greek.488 In this sense, 
it seems that human beings are indeed unique in this respect because they are able to do what 
the birds are not. This continues to underline the ability to use a fully structured language 
setting, which defines Peisetaerus as a distinct rational agent and political orator.  
Finally, there is one last point that I would like to make before ending this section: 
even if the birds were able to perfect their Greek and use it as eloquently as Tereus and the 
two protagonists do in the comedy, it does not really eradicate the boundaries between them. 
For even though the birds humanize over the course of the play, and even though Peisetaerus 
and Euelpides have been put into bird costumes, at the end of the day they are still human 
beings, whereas the birds end up as just roast chicken. Thus, the joke continues to be on 
them.489 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
2014: 307. This anecdote relates to Birds because it reminds of the birds’ inability to work out 
(and ‘unroll’) the true meaning of Tereus’ and Peisetaerus’ speech. 
488 In a way, the birds’ dilemma hints at a problem that is later conceived by thinkers such as 
Rousseau. He sees speech and sociability as a chicken-and-egg problem: society is necessary 
for the invention of language, and language is essential for the formation of societies. See 
Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. See also Gera 2003: 161. 
489 There is a modern parallel, which illuminates this aspect further. At the annual meeting of 
the International Monetary Fund in Lima, Peru in 2015, Christine Lagarde urged the delegates 
to take action on global warming and said: “If we collectively chicken out of this we’ll all turn 
into chickens and we’ll all be fried, grilled, toasted and roasted.” Failure to take action, the 
Business Standard wrote afterwards, “will condemn humanity to the same fate as the Peruvian 
poultry that so many delegates to the group’s annual meeting are enjoying this week in a 
country famed for its cuisine.” Business Standard, 8 October 2015. 
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V. Plutarch’s Moralia 
 
 500 years after Birds, Plutarch offers a counterargument to the belief that animals 
cannot be rational agents who are able to offer alternative arguments. The recourse to 
Plutarchan political theory is profitable, because the comparison of some of the rhetorical 
strategies seen in de sollertia animalium and Gryllus with those in Birds highlight the rhetoric 
of the birds at the beginning of the comedy when they express their dismay to Tereus who has 
allowed human beings to enter their realm. The comparison suggests that the birds may 
actually be able after all to visualise more than one way of life (i.e. one with human beings 
and one without). In this vein, the discussion presented here also conforms to some of the 
themes discussed in chapter 1 (e.g. change and sophistic rhetoric) and the general undertaking 
to unravel the nuances of discourse seen in texts from different periods.  
In de sollertia animalium, Plutarch argues that it is wrong for human beings to believe 
that only they are capable of rationality and proper use of language, and animals are not. He 
builds his argument on the fact that not all humans possess the faculties of rationality and 
language to the same degree. For example, infants are likely to have a lower degree of 
rationality and language.490 Even though in their cases, these degrees usually develop over 
time, Plutarch takes this as evidence that at least some species of animals have higher 
capacities of rationality and language than infants or other ‘marginal cases’ of humans.491 
																																								 																				
490 De. Soll. An. 360c-d. 
491 Newmyer 1996: 40 asserts that “such ‘marginal cases’ [could, for example, include] 
infants, the mentally feeble, or perhaps the severely physically handicapped.” Note that this 
does not mean that animals’ rationality is always higher than that of humans. Generally, 
Plutarch asserts that animals have some reason but they cannot attain to the full capacity of 
reason to which education and practice can lead humans (De. Soll. An. 962c). The main 
difference between animal reason and human reason to Plutarch then, is quantitative rather 
than qualitative. See Becchi 2000: 207 and Newmyer 2014: 227. 
 There is a similar comparison of animals to children at Rep. 441a-b, where Socrates 
states, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ᾽ ἄν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυµοῦ µὲν εὐθὺς γενόµενα µεστά ἐστι, 
λογισµοῦ δ᾽ ἔνιοι µὲν ἔµοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε µεταλαµβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. (“For 
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This is why, asserts Plutarch, human beings cannot deny rationality to animals that possess 
the same capacities of reason they ascribe to such classes of human beings. In this vein, he 
opens up a debate that discusses the extent to which animals may possess rationality.  
 At de animae procreatione 1026a, Plutarch gives the following definition for speech, 
λόγος δὲ λέξις ἐν φωνῇ σηµαντικῇ διανοίας. “Speech is the expression of the mind by 
significant utterance…” Plutarch defines speech as a sound that signifies thought, and he 
believes that it is not just human beings who are capable of uttering significant sounds but 
animals are as well. The fact that animals are able to constitute genuine language by means of 
their vocalizations, regardless of whether humans understand them or not,492 continues to 
emphasise the argument that animals do have rationality. For example, Plutarch states, at 
moments of slaughter, animals are said to cry out for justice even if it sounds just like 
inarticulate noises to the slaughterers.493 
Plutarch tackles the question of animal rationality in the following three treatises: de 
sollertia animalium, de esu carnium, and bruta animalia ratione uti or Gryllus. The first one 
discusses the question of who is more clever, sea-dwelling animals or land-dwelling animals 
to which no real conclusion is reached (cf. de. soll. an. 985c), but Plutarch seems to suggest 
that both are equally intelligent. The second, de esu carnium, presents a case for 
vegetarianism, and in Gryllus, Plutarch portrays an imaginary account of Odysseus on Circe’s 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
that much one can see in children, that they are from their very birth chock-full of rage and 
high spirit, but as for reason some of them, to my thinking, never participate in it, and the 
majority quite late”). To which Adeimantus replies, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, 
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. (“And further, one could see in animals that what you say is true”). 
492 Newmyer 2014: 229 states: “The problem with animal language may…not lie with the 
animals themselves, but with humans who have not yet mastered their language, a 
circumstance which Plutarch would argue, in De esu carnium…has devastating consequences 
for animals.” 
493 De esu carnium 968e and 994e. This also echoes the notion that Plutarch, unlike the 
Stoics, believes that animals deserve to be treated justly by humans.  
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island. As noted at the beginning of this section, Gryllus is the most relevant source here and I 
offer below an interpretation of Gryllus’ sophistic tendencies and their relevance to Birds. 
In the dialogue, Odysseus has come to Aiaia to rescue his companions who, by Circe’s 
magic, have been transformed into pigs. However, one of the pigs, Gryllus, declines 
Odysseus’ offer to help persuade Circe to transform him back into a human being, because he 
prefers being a pig.494 Gryllus believes that animals are superior to human beings because 
they possess every virtue of them but none of their vices, such as lust or excess.495 
In particular, he thinks that animals are by nature more capable of a virtuous lifestyle 
than human beings are, which is especially evident in the rhetorical question he asks 
Odysseus: τίνος µὲν οὖν οὐχὶ µᾶλλον ἢ τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων; (“what virtues do they 
not partake of in a higher degree than the wisest of men”)?496 Indeed, it is Gryllus’ insistence 
on nature (τὸ ὅλον ἡ φύσις) that makes up the basis of his argument.497 Gryllus’ elaborate 
explanation (presented below) underlines Plutarch’s belief that animals do possess rationality, 
and that they have the capacity to make reasoned judgments, at the same time as it provides a 
comic counterargument to the Stoic debate that denies rationality to animals. It is evident in 
Gryllus’ way of argumentation that animals do have the capacity for “deliberating and acting 
pragmatically in cases involving things that are ‘relative to us’, including those things that are 
																																								 																				
494 Achilles’ talking horse Xanthus (Il. 19.404-17), who reminds Achilles of his mortality, 
belongs to the same tradition of talking animals. 
495 Herchenroeder 2008: 362 notes that none of Plutarch’s other extant work assumes that 
animals are superior to human beings. They may be attributed comparable powers of 
sensation, judgment, and perception but they are not superior. On another note, this also 
shows again the extent to which Aristophanes’ birds have humanized, because they now 
possess some of the human vices which Gryllus dislikes. 
496 Gryllus 4. 
497 Gryllus 990d. See also Newmyer 2014: 227 and Newmyer 2017: 66. Herchenroeder 2008: 
359-360 connects this persistence on phusis with the general parodic aspect of the text. As he 
asserts: “Apart from epic material, the dialogue parodies philosophy too, especially the 
concentration on physis and its counterpart, the theme of the Golden Age, that appear in much 
philosophical discourse.” 
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subject to chance and, sometimes, things tainted by what is irrational.”498 This is why human 
beings have no right to mistreat or belittle them. 
  Plutarch chooses specific examples for Gryllus to illustrate that, in some aspects, 
animals surpass human beings in terms of intelligence, behaviour, and character.499 Gryllus 
makes many important points; amongst others, he mentions that animals never beg or sue 
(δέησις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ᾽ οἴκτου παραίτησις), that another animal would never enslave them 
(οὐδὲ δουλεύει λέων λέοντι καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ δι᾽ ἀνανδρίαν, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ), and 
that they are by nature inclined to be courageous, unlike human beings (οἷς δὴ µάλιστα δῆλον 
ὅτι τὰ θηρία πρὸς τὸ θαρρεῖν εὖ πέφυκε).500  
 The point Gryllus makes in regards to animals having a greater natural capacity for 
bravery is especially significant. Gryllus bases this claim upon his observation that in 
situations of conflicts and crises, animals show courage as genuine impulses. Human beings, 
on the other hand, only show courage because they are afraid of possible punishments and 
																																								 																				
498 Horky 2017: 110. This is in direct contrast with Aristotle’s claim, βουλευτικὸν δὲ µένον 
ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τῶν ζώων. (“The only animal which is deliberative is man”). ΗΑ 488b24-5. 
499 Cf. Newmyer 1996: 42. Gryllus’ speech is a typical expression of the Golden Age. It has 
often been argued that Gryllus adapts Cynic thinking, mostly because of his key point that 
animals are wiser than human beings, but at the end of the day, it is not just about whether his 
arguments are Cynic, anti-Stoic, anti-Epicurean or something else because his “expressions 
offered a conventional form of response to the political and social inadequacies one perceived 
in the world.” Herchenroeder 2008: 369. See also Mossman 2006: 7. Certainly, like 
Aristophanes in Birds, Plutarch in Gryllus is also interested in discussing human beings, their 
institutions, and human nature, and not just animals. 
500 Plutarch, Gryllus 4. Aelian makes a similar point at Characteristics of Animals 6.1, when 
he asserts that unlike men, who need language to persuade others to be good, animals do not 
need extraneous encouragement, because they are able to stimulate their prowess for 
themselves. (Aelian specifically refers to boars, lions, elephants, and bulls here).  
 Following this logic, Tereus lives more as a human than a hoopoe in Birds because he 
has a slave (70). This is also evident in the subsequent lines when the slave-bird mentions 
some of Tereus’ favourite foods, such as pea-soup (ἔτνος), which, according to the slave-bird, 
he likes because it reminds him of the time when he was a man (75-8). It is also made clear by 
the allusion to his representation in line 103, when Euelpides asks him about his lack of 
feathers (σοι ποῦ τὰ πτερά;). On that, see also the scholia 103. 
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sanctions that may be placed on them.501 Human courage, Gryllus argues, is a matter of 
“slavish submission (douleuousan) to custom and censure,” which is not courage but merely 
fear of punishment. He says:502 
 
ὥσθ᾽ ὑµεῖς, κατὰ νόµων ἀνάγκην οὐχ ἑκούσιον οὐδὲ βουλοµένην ἀλλὰ δουλεύουσαν 
ἔθεσι καὶ ψόγοις καὶ δόξαις ἐπήλυσι καὶ λόγοις πλαττοµένην, µελετᾶτε ἀνδρείαν καὶ 
τοὺς πόνους ὑφίστασθε καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους, οὐ πρὸς ταῦτα θαρροῦντες ἀλλὰ τῷ ἕτερα 
µᾶλλον τούτων δεδιέναι. 
 
It follows that your practice of courage is brought about by legal compulsion, which is 
neither voluntary nor intentional, but in subservience to custom and censure and 
moulded by extraneous beliefs and arguments. When you face toils and dangers, you 
do so not because you are courageous, but because you are more afraid of some 
alternative. 
 
This statement comes with a central implication: human beings yield to institutions, societal 
expectations, and human-established laws, and animals do not, which puts them in a position 
that is superior to that of human beings (in this regard).503 This is primarily because, Gryllus 
says, animals possess an unrestrained amount of freedom. Their natural resistance – again, 
Gryllus builds his argument on nature – to be held captive in those human institutions is, 
according to him, a sharp contrast to human society. The definition of human society here is 
an institution of slavery and an emblem of cowardice because it stems from submission.504 
																																								 																				
501 Gryllus, 987c-d. 
502 Gryllus, 988b-c. Aristotle makes a similar point at NE 1115a when he asserts, ὅτι µὲν οὖν 
µεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται. (“Courage is the observance of 
the mean in respect of fear and confidence”). 
503 Herchenroeder 2008: 364. Yet, according to Aesop, there was a time when animals did 
hold assemblies in the woods. They had political society and societal expectations, two things 
that Gryllus attributes to be specifically human. See, for example, the fable Zeus and the 
Tortoise, where the tortoise declines to fulfil a societal obligation and is punished for it. Cf. p. 
150, with n. 400 for Tereus’ use of ἀθροιζοµεν when he rallies the birds. 
504 Gryllus echoes a Cynic perspective here, and a phrase that has been attributed to Diogenes 
of Sinope, one that offers the possibility to reject institutions and society (and the corruptions 
that come with it) and to return to a more primitive lifestyle: ἐλευθερία ἡ ἐπὶ Κρόνου. See, for 
instance, Hercher 1965:32; Vidal-Naquet 1978: 135; Sorabji 1993: 158-61; Gera 2003: 60, 
and Herchenroeder 2008: 369. 
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 It is clear that Gryllus contradicts himself quite a bit here and that there are elements 
of irrationality in his argument (either that, or his definition of freedom is rather different 
from that of others). Given his place as a bewitched captive, on a remote island, whose life is 
essentially in Circe’s hands, his aforementioned position is rather absurd.505 His role as a 
domesticated pig does not really fall under the rubric of ‘animal freedom’ about which he 
brags when talking to Odysseus.506 This is accentuated by the fact that he only boasts to 
Odysseus about the advantages of being an animal in the first place because Circe has told 
him to do so. Gryllus responds to her call in a similar vein to which domesticated pets answer 
to their masters.507  
 It is true that Gryllus is free from human society, which, given his strong objections to 
it, constitutes a large part of his definition of freedom. It also continues to underline how, 
according to Plutarch, “all animals share of discursive thinking and reasoning in the process 
of employing practical wisdom,”508 that is, a form of wisdom that reflects their circumstances 
and attempt to make good choices. In Gryllus’ case, as stated previously, this practical 
wisdom stems primarily from the premise that human beings tend to enslave other human 
beings whereas animals would never enslave one another. Nonetheless, it does prompt the 
reader to ask whether Gryllus’ role as Circe’s pet, and his dependence on her, really offers the 
kind of freedom he describes in the dialogue. For what difference does it make whether he 
yields to a human as a pet, or to a human institution as a person?  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 Gryllus’ way of argumentation recalls Callicles’ assertion analysed in chapter 1 (cf. 
pp. 70-1), namely that one can (and should) reject already established conventions and 
arguments. In this vein, it also brings to mind the sophists’ approach that it is always possible 
to propose a counterargument. 
505 He even recalls the captives of the Homeric Circe: lions and wolves that were trained to 
behave like domesticated dogs (Od.10.212-9). 
506 Cf. Aesop’s The Wolf, the Dog, and the Collar, where the wolf chooses freedom over 
luxury when he sees a dog who, while well-fed, has an iron collar on his neck. 
507 Gryllus, 986a-b. 
508 Horky 2017: 110. 
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 That being said, in his defence, he has got no easy task. After all, he used to be a man 
and he has kept his human mind (according to Od. 10.239-40); making a case for the 
superiority of animals therefore when he has no real insight into their minds must be difficult. 
As Konstan writes, “…Gryllus is either pure pig, as he apparently is before Circe endows him 
with speech and reason, or else effectively a human being in the shape of a pig…”509 In this 
sense, Gryllus has no more the mind of a pig than Peisetaerus that of a bird, and, at the end of 
the day, “he is really a human being in pig’s clothing,”510 just like Peisetaerus is a human 
being in bird costume. 
 To look at this from a different point of view: at 986e, Odysseus asks Gryllus if he has 
not only lost his shape when he drank Circe’s potion but also his intelligence: 
  
ἐµοὶ σύ, Γρύλλε, δοκεῖς οὐ τὴν µορφὴν µόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
 πώµατος ἐκείνου διεφθάρθαι καὶ γεγονέναι µεστὸς ἀτόπων καὶ διαλελωβηµένων 
 παντάπασι δοξῶν. 
  
 For my part, Gryllus, I think that not just your shape but your intellect too was spoiled 
 by that potion, and that you have become stuffed with altogether absurd and 
 disgraceful beliefs. 
  
There are undoubtedly humorous elements in Odysseus’ accusation (and obviously the 
dialogue itself is intended to be funny), but if we take it literally, and presume that it is true 
that Gryllus has lost his mind, then it might offer an explanation as to why Gryllus’ arguments 
come across as absurd. In a related vein, according to Konstan, the language in the dialogue 
suggests that Gryllus was never exceptionally clever anyways, but ‘piglike in his thinking’ 
even before the transformation, which makes the task to reason well even more difficult.511 
																																								 																				
509 Konstan 2010-2011: 372. 
510 Konstan 2010-2011: 384. 
511 Konstan 2010-2011: 375. Certainly, at the end of the day, Gryllus’ illogic is also ‘simply’ 
part of the parody Plutarch presents us with in Gryllus. On that note, see also Herchenroeder 
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 Nonetheless, Gryllus’ argument is not entirely unconvincing. As stated above, his 
point recalls that of Callicles in the Gorgias, who abhors certain human institutions and the 
restrictions they put on him, but who loves the natural order of things (such as the advantage 
of the naturally strong over the weak), and also that of the sophists who assert that every logos 
can be met with an antilogos. Herchenroeder writes, “such is the cast of Plutarch’s Gryllus, a 
lowly brute rivalling the heroic speaker, Odysseus, in a sophistic contest.”512 In this sense, 
Gryllus does not appear as merely ‘piglike’ in his thinking, but also as a pupil of the sophists 
who attempts to argue against the established human institutions Odysseus represents in the 
dialogue.513  
 
VI. Gryllus in relation to Birds, 321-370 
 
 Gryllus’ sophistic tendencies have the potential to highlight the rhetoric of the birds at 
the beginning of the comedy further, especially the passages where they express their dismay 
to Tereus who has allowed human beings to enter their realm (lines 321-70). They also have 
the potential to present a comic counterargument to the opinion that animals can never be 
rational agents, and they inform the theme of change and oscillation discussed in chapter 1 
(cf. pp. 59-60) and the question, ‘how should we live and how should we behave?’ (cf. p. 61). 
This is why they should be considered in some detail; the birds’ language in lines 321-70, 
presented below, does bear strong elements of resistance and hostility, which suggests that, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
2008: 347, who argues, “Plutarch’s Gryllus [offers] a humorous portrait of elite perspectives 
regarding language and sophistic learning.” 
512 Herchenroeder 2008: 359. 
513 Odysseus himself makes this observation at 988e-f, παπαί, ὦ Γρύλλε, δεινός µοι δοκεῖς 
γεγονέναι σοφιστής. (“You, Gryllus, seem to me have been born an amazing sophist”). 
Gryllus admits this a little later, at 989b, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεί σε µὴ λέληθα σοφιστὴς ὤν. (“Since it did 
not escape your notice that I am a sophist…”). Trans. Herchenroeder, adapted. 
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like Gryllus, they are capable of visualising more than one way of life (i.e. one with human 
beings, and one without). 
 At 321, the Chorus tell Tereus that by inviting two human beings into their land, he 
has committed the biggest fault (µέγιστον ἐξαµαρτὼν) since they have known him. They feel 
betrayed (προδίδωµι) and maltreated (πάσχω), and believe that Tereus has lured them into a 
trap (εὶς δὲ δόλον ἐκάλεσε).514 Especially, the birds’ use of δόλος is significant because it 
implies that they are aware (or at least, suspicious) of the trick that is being played on them, 
because it looks like a setup.515 Additionally, at lines 344-353, the Chorus instruct the other 
birds to launch a hostile attack (ἔπαγ᾽ ἔπιθ᾽ ἐπίφερε πολέµιον ὁρµὰν φονίαν) against 
Peisetaerus and Euelpides, and to ‘pluck and peck’ (τίλλειν καὶ δάκνειν) them. The inclusion 
of words such as ἐπιφέρω, πολεµέω and δάκνω demonstrate that, before Tereus and 
Peisetaerus speak to the birds, they are more than sceptical and prepared to defend their land 
against the Athenian visitors. A related set of words is spoken at 365 when the Chorus leader 
says, ἕλκε, τίλλε, παῖε, δεῖρε (“drag them, pluck them, hit them, flay them”), thus making 
clear again that they wish to protect themselves from the human intruders.516 
 They only stop at line 375, when Tereus tells them that they should give Peisetaerus 
and Euelpides a chance because ‘the wise can learn much from enemies’ (ἀπ᾽ ἐχθρῶν δῆτα 
πολλὰ µανθάνουσιν οἱ σοφοί), and it this sentence that ultimately enables Tereus to persuade 
the birds with the speech discussed earlier. Nonetheless, this strong initial opposition is 
noteworthy, because it raises a potential counterargument to the conclusion reached earlier 
when the birds end up as mere roast chicken after they have marched into the trap of 
																																								 																				
514 Birds 321-335. 
515 See, for example, Od. 8.276 which uses the same word when describing how Hephaestus 
sets the trap for Ares, αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τεῦξε δόλον κεχολωµένος Ἄρει. (“This snare the Firegod 
forged, ablaze with his rage at War”). 
516 This demonstrates again that the birds have not really overcome their status as barbarians 
despite having learned Greek, for they pick force over debate. 
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νεφελοκοκκυγία without evaluating the political proposal that has been presented to them 
carefully. Certainly, Peisetaerus himself says that the birds on the grill are birds that attempted 
to rebel (ἐπανίστηµι) against the bird democracy (1585), and connecting this statement to the 
passages quoted above, it is possible to suggest that those are birds that have never let go of 
their initial suspicion. In this sense, those birds could be characterised as animals who are able 
to conceptualise a different set of social rules which is why they portray a courageous attempt 
at resistance against the human invasion into their realm.517 
 Given the strong language at the beginning, I think a characterisation as such is not 
entirely fruitless and it does allow us to propose that there are two groups of birds in 
νεφελοκοκκυγία and each group is part of a different political faction. In this sense, the first 
group of birds may consist of animals who will not let go of their initial distrust; they do not 
listen to Tereus, but instead look at Peisetaerus and think, ‘this Athenian is an untrustworthy 
persuasive orator who jeopardizes our pastoral setting.’ This would not only echo the 
Aristotelian sentiment discussed earlier, namely that some animals do exhibit a form of 
political behaviour and communication (cf. pp. 170-1), but also the sophistic notion analysed 
in chapter 1 (cf. p. 60), that already formulated governments and ideas do not necessarily have 
to be accepted without questioning, but that it is possible to offer an alternative argument.518   
 The second group of birds may consist of animals who resemble the Athenian masses 
off stage and, like parrots, repeat everything Peisetaerus says, as they are being deceived by 
																																								 																				
517 Similar uses of ἐπανίστηµι underline this further. See for example App. Hisp. 101, where 
Quintus Sertorius raises Spain in revolt against the Romans (Ἰβηρίαν τε αὐτὴν ἐπανέστησε 
Ῥωµαίοις). 
518 It also underlines the cultural ascent the birds have undergone before the play when Tereus 
distributed Greek among them. In addition to having been given language and reason, they 
have also been given the ability to visualise more than one way of life. 
	 187	
his rhetoric.519 They happily accept the new conditions of life that Peisetaerus puts on them, 
and repeat his promises without assessing them.520  
 It is clear that the separation of the birds into different factions may stretch the 
boundaries of the comedy a bit because, at the end of the day, the rebellious birds may merely 
be a comic representation of the fear of political rebellion and oligarchic factions off stage.521 
However, the hostile language used by the birds suggests that such an exploration is not 
entirely fruitless, because it shows how initial doubt about a politician, or proposed political 
regime, can be swept away with rhetoric, especially rhetoric which, seemingly nonchalantly, 
invents a historical past that relates to the birds’ environment and thus appeals to them. In this 
vein, the separation can also be used to revisit the problems analysed in the Statesman and the 
Protagoras, especially the difficulties that come with weighing sight and sound carefully. 
Precisely, these two factions of birds may emerge as prime examples of those 
Athenians who blindly follow any persuasive orator and elect any scoundrel as leader without 
evaluating his speeches, and those who think more carefully about it and who attempt to 
‘measure’ the words with which they are being addressed in order to ensure the best outcome 
for them.522 The behaviour of the two different factions also underlines the limitations of 
																																								 																				
519 Birds, 1705-1765. 
520 Cf. Dunbar 1997: 11-12. “…did Aristophanes expect his audience to identify with 
Peisetairos and think ‘We Athenians are a clever, enterprising lot; no other race could hope to 
keep up with us, or resist our ingenious arguments’, or to react with e.g. ‘This man is a 
dangerously persuasive orator, a typical pupil of the sophists!’?” 
521 This in turn brings to mind the prohibition of political factions in Utopia: when there are 
no factions and no opportunities to propose counterarguments, no political rebellions can be 
suggested. 
522 This brings to mind another argument Brennan makes in his book (cf. p. 103 n. 284). He 
asserts, “Countries used to exclude citizens from holding power for bad reasons…but though 
this was unjust, it remains open that there could be good grounds for restricting or reducing 
some citizens’ political power. Perhaps some citizens are incompetent participants who 
impose too much risk on others when they participate. Perhaps some of us have a right to be 
protected from their incompetence.” Brennan 2016: 18. Brennan’s point is undoubtedly 
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rhetoric: while it can be used to convince ‘the doctor to be your slave,’ as Gorgias makes 
clear, it is evidently not strong (or, nuanced) enough to convince the masses to listen 
cautiously.523 
 
VII. νόµοι in νεφελοκοκκυγία 
  
 It may be difficult to determine whether these rhetorical images suggest that some of 
the birds really are clever rebels who use certain expressions in order to voice their disdain or 
whether all of them are foolish parrots who mindlessly accept what is happening. Old 
Comedy is not fettered to the realities of any of this and is at liberty to eliminate any 
structures from the real world that would impede the plot; but it is also free to open up all 
sorts of possible interpretations, especially when they are situated within the assembly 
practices of fifth-century Athens. I think it would be more foolish to dismiss these rhetorical 
images as a mere comic element than to attempt to understand their place in the time of 
Aristophanes and their relationship to the (inattentive) Athenian masses of stage.  
 The attempt to understand these images allows for a further exposition of the para-
tragedy with which the audience is, in my opinion, presented here (cf. p. 157): politics 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
provocative (and I do not wish to agree with him), but it does highlight the problems some of 
the birds face due to the other birds’ inability to question Tereus’ and Peisetaerus’ rhetoric.  
523 Gorgias 454b. This point is true not only in regards to the masses, but also to individuals. 
For example, at Eur. Hec. 814-820, Hecuba speaks of the power of rhetoric, τί δῆτα θνητοὶ 
τἄλλα µὲν µαθήµατα µοχθοῦµεν ὡς χρὴ πάντα καὶ µατεύοµεν, Πειθὼ δὲ τὴν τύραννον 
ἀνθρώποις µόνην οὐδέν τι µᾶλλον ἐς τέλος σπουδάζοµεν µισθοὺς διδόντες µανθάνειν, ἵν᾽ ἦν 
ποτε πείθειν ἅ τις βούλοιτο τυγχάνειν θ᾽ ἅµα; (“Why is it that we mortals take pains to study 
all other brances of knowledge as we ought, yet we take no further pains, by paying a fee, to 
learn thoroughly the art of persuasive speaking, sole rulers where mortals are concerned, so 
that we might be able to persuade people of whatever we wish and gain our ends?”).  
However, at 334-5, she acknowledges that her rhetoric has failed her when she tried to 
save Polyxena, thus underlining its limitations. οὑµοὶ µὲν λόγοι πρὸς αἰθέρα φροῦδοι µάτην 
ῥιφέντες ἀµφὶ σοῦ φόνου. (“My speech pleading against your murder has been cast idly to the 
winds”). Cf. Mossman 1995: 134. 
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continue to enter (bird-) fantasy and humans persevere with infiltrating the realm of animals. I 
would like to contextualise the previous exposition (cf. 156-8) against an interpretation of the 
legal system that Peisetaerus installs in νεφελοκοκκυγία; and in what follows I situate the 
birds’ laws within the legal practices and laws of fifth-and fourth century Greece. This 
approach seems to me to be worth pursuing, because the positioning of the birds’ laws within 
the history of (Greek) legal thought adds further material to the laboratory of political thought 
I aim to draw up in this thesis. Indeed, the nuances of the birds’ legal system are worth 
exploring, because they continue to help us make sense of the patterns of legal reforms and 
political discourse throughout the history of jurisprudence. 
To begin, let us look at the birds’ punishment on the brazier and ask a few questions: 
What evidence is there for the birds’ guilt? Who found them guilty? What kind of bird 
democracy (δηµοτικοῖσιν ὀρνέοις) does νεφελοκοκκυγία actually enjoy?524 So far, we have 
learned two things about the birds’ legal system: (1) The law-making takes place off stage, 
which makes it difficult to ascertain how legal the laws are, and (2) we know that the birds 
have ‘many laws’ (πολλοὶ γὰρ ὀρνίθων νόµοι)525 most of which seem to be proclaimed at the 
whim of Peisetaerus. The νόµοι that are specifically mentioned, or implied, are the following:  
 
1. Everything that is disgraceful among humans is admirable among birds.526 
2. Foreigners are to be expelled.527 
3. All quacks are to be beaten up.528  
																																								 																				
524 Sommerstein 1987: 303. 
525 Birds, 1346. 
526 Birds, 755-6. 
527 Birds, 1012-14. ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίµονι ξενηλατοῦνται. See Dunbar 1997: 560. “The 
Spartan tendency at this period [to expel foreigners] is twice unfavourably contrasted with 
Athens’ free and open society in Perikles’ speeches in Thuc. (I.144. 2, 2. 39. I). Foreigners 
were expelled…probably at least as much as to protect the citizens from harmful foreign 
influences as to prevent foreigners from seeing what went on Sparta…” See also Figueira 
2003, who makes institutional connections about Pericles’ usage of xenelasia. 
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4. It is customary to put a bounty on (long-dead) tyrants and/or enemies of the bird 
democracy.529 
5. It is not allowed to keep birds in cages in the courtyard.530  
a. If there are birds that are caged up, they are to be released. 
b. Everyone who does not obey will be arrested. 
6. It is illegal to enter νεφελοκοκκυγία without permission.531 
a. There are border patrols that check for entry passes.532  
7. It is meritorious to strangle and bite one’s father.533 
8. There is an ancient lawcode written on the Pillars of the Storks, which must be 
obeyed.534 
9. Father-storks must take care of their young who, when grown up, must care for 
their fathers in return.535 
10. It is customary to have slave birds.536 
11. Birds convicted of crimes may face the death penalty, followed by roasting.537 
a. Treason may demand a more severe punishment than the death penalty.538  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
528 Birds, 1015-16. Peisetaerus refers to a scroll here from which he reads the same statement 
at lines 983-985. He claims that he has received these words from Apollo (981) but it is more 
likely that he is making it up, which is also what the oracle-monger, who has entered the 
scene a few lines before, accuses him of doing. (οὐδὲν λέγειν οἶµαί σε).  
529 See Sommerstein 1987: 272. “…the last ‘tyrant’ (autocrat) of Athens, Hippias son of 
Peisistratus, had been expelled in 510…nevertheless at every Assembly meeting a curse 
continued to be pronounced against any who aspired ‘to become tyrant or to join in restoring 
the tyrant’…this helped to keep the fear of tyranny alive in the popular mind…” See also 
Dunbar 1997: 583. Cf. Thesm. 338-9. 
530 Birds, 1084-7. 
531 Birds, 1175. 
532 Birds, 1214 and 1221. 
533 Birds, 1347. See also 757-9. 
534 Birds, 1353-4. See also l. 981. 
535 Birds, 1357. See Sommerstein 1987: 288. “…that young storks fed and cared for their aged 
parents was a widespread popular belief: cf. [Pl.] Alc. I 135e; Arist. HA 615b23-24; Aelian 
NA 3.23; and probably also Soph. El. 1058-62.” Note that this law contradicts the seventh 
law; this inconsistency may be there for the comic effect, underlining the comical 
arbitrariness of the laws. 
536 Tereus, for example, as mentioned earlier (cf. p. 180 n. 500), has a slave bird, which 
contradicts Gryllus’ argument that animals never enslave one another at the same time as it 
underlines the human attributes of the bird democracy. 
537 Birds, 1584. 
538 Birds, 1585-6. The ‘rebel birds’ are convicted of treason, which is why Peisetaerus grates 
silphium on them as an added indignity. See Sommerstein 1987: 303, who notes: “So in 
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The visit of the inspector offers further insight into the νόµοι of νεφελοκοκκυγία. When the 
inspector asks Peisetaerus where the honorary consuls of the δηµοτικοῖσιν ὀρνέοις are (ποῦ 
πρόξενοι;), Peisetaerus blatantly ignores the question and chases him away with the words: 
οὐκ ἀποσοβήσεις; οὐκ ἀποίσεις τὼ κάδω (“Shoo off, will you—and take your voting-urns 
with you!”).539  This implies that: 
 
12. There are no honorary consuls in νεφελοκοκκυγία. 
13. It is not customary to have voting-urns in νεφελοκοκκυγία. 
 
When a decree-seller enters the scene and proposes to the Cloudcuckoovillians 
(Νεφελοκοκκυγιεὺς) the usage of Athenian measures, weights and decrees as the Olophyxians 
do, Peisetaerus tells him to leave.540 He does not seem to believe that there is anything 
valuable in the laws the decree-seller hopes to sell, which is also indicated by his τὸ τί; in line 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
actual Athenian practice traitors (and also temple-robbers) were not only sentenced to death 
but forbidden burial in Attica (Xen. Hell. 1.7.22).” 
539 Birds, 1021 and 1032. On line 1021, see Mack 2015: 71, who notes, the Athenian “does 
not just represent the attitudes and needs of a functionary of the Athenian Empire. His need 
for information on the local political conditions prevailing in Cloudcuckooland—and advice 
for how to proceed in his mission—was the same that any other representative of a city had, 
and he, naturally, relied on his city’s proxenoi.” The fact that Peisetaerus does not answer the 
Athenian’s question, sheds further light on the uncertain political conditions of 
νεφελοκοκκυγία, and it also suggests that νεφελοκοκκυγία might not be the most hospitable 
city, which then also links to the construction of the wall earlier in the play. At the same time, 
however, it also shows how νεφελοκοκκυγία differs from Athens, and this is, after all, the 
rationale for building it in the first place – to find a place that is easier than Athens. 
540 Birds, 1040-5. Cf. Dunbar 1997: 569-70. “The main provisions of this clause, that the 
citizens of Cloudcuckootown are to use the same weights and measures (and decrees…) as 
those of another (minor) city in the Athenian empire (Olophyxos…), would be familiar to 
many of the audience from their service on the Boule.” See also Slater 1996: 100-101, who 
notes that this scene offers “evidence for a private trade at Athens in copies of assembly 
decrees” and it “shows us that some individuals were quite willing to pay money for their 
own, written copies of decrees…” 
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1039, which is his initial response to the decree-seller’s νόµους νέους ἥκω παρ᾽ ὑµᾶς δεῦρο 
πωλήσων (“I’m here to sell you some new laws”) in lines 1037-8.541 Thus:  
 
14. Athenian measures, weights, and decrees are not to be used in νεφελοκοκκυγία. 
 
These then are the laws and customs of νεφελοκοκκυγία, which seem to be characterized by a 
blend of Athenian, Spartan, and ‘Bird’ elements. However, nothing is said about the actual 
law-making except for the mentioning of an alleged ancient bird-law code. This suggests that 
there are more νόµοι than the fourteen listed above—in fact so many that it is probably easy 
for Peisetaerus to invent non-existing laws since no one knows what the laws are in the first 
place. The lack of voting-urns (and the reluctance to have any) draws further attention to the 
dubiousness of the political and legal system of νεφελοκοκκυγία.  
That being said, a lack of voting-urns does not necessarily mean lack of voting, but 
lack of secret voting, i.e. voting in the courts. It is clear that Peisetaerus and Euelpides are not 
fond of voting urns and jury-courts, because they represent “the very element of Athenian life 
that [they] detest.”542 Therefore, for Athenians like them, the removal of these two juridical 
elements is a welcome change. For others, however, this change is dubious indeed, because 
the absence of voting urns and jury-courts “removes the possibility of recourse to the courts 
that was the defence of any citizen in a democracy.”543 
 The emphasis on the ancient pillars of the Storks is particularly thought provoking. 
Apart from the fact that it provides a significant counter-argument to Gryllus’ statement that 
animals do not have to yield to νόµοι (as do the laws of νεφελοκοκκυγία in general), it also 
																																								 																				
541 See Dunbar 1997: 569. “τὸ τί; probably means ‘To what effect?’, i.e. ‘What’s in these 
‘new laws’ which you hope to sell?’.” 
542 Sommerstein 1987: 269. 
543 Bowie 1993: 170. 
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poses the question whether the pillars exist in the first place or whether anyone has actually 
ever seen them.544 Or, if they do exist, where are they located? Are they put up in the agora of 
νεφελοκοκκυγία, so that they are easily accessible and the birds can quickly consult them, as 
they go on their daily business?545 If yes, then this would imply that the Cloudcuckoovillians 
are able to read (and re-read) the actual text of the law-code as many times as they want. This 
idea is supported by the Athenian who wishes to become a citizen of νεφελοκοκκυγία because 
he is keen on their laws: πάντων: µάλιστα δ᾽ ὅτι καλὸν νοµίζεται τὸν πατέρα τοῖς ὄρνισιν 
ἄγχειν καὶ δάκνειν.546 Granted, there is the possibility that the Athenian only says this because 
he likes what he has heard about the birds’ laws. However, it could also serve as a clue that 
there is an actual written law code, which the visitor has seen and read. 
 However, even if there are pillars (or perhaps even wooden tablets and more scrolls 
like the one Peisetaerus shows to the oracle-monger), can we be sure that the 
Cloudcuckoovillians are able to read them properly? Tereus, Peisetaerus, Euelpides, the 
immigrants from Athens, (and presumably even Prokne) are certainly able to, but how good is 
the birds’ reading (and writing)? If it is as unsophisticated as their spoken Greek, there is a 
																																								 																				
544 Cf. Plato, Laws 793a-d. Here, the Athenian asserts that unwritten laws (ἄγραφα νόµιµα) 
are ‘ancestral customs’ (πατρίους νόµους) that make up the foundation of the constitution. 
They might make the law code longer (µακροτέρους ποιῇ τοὺς νόµους), however, they are 
important and must not be left out of the law code. 
545 This question is further complicated by the fact that it is unclear whether there is an agora 
to begin with. When Meton proposes to build one in lines 1004-9, he does not receive genuine 
support from Peisetaerus. On that note, see also Kosak 2006: 174: “the play makes no 
mention of building streets, temples, agorai, stoai, theaters, even new nests.” Furthermore, 
“in Birds, the center, which is also the city, comprises practically the whole world; at the same 
time, the center has no central meeting place…for exchange of ideas and commerce.” Kosak 
2006: 174 n. 5. The play does not mention the construction of law-courts either, which 
underlines further the questionability of the birds’ guilt: if there are no law-courts, how were 
the rebellious birds prosecuted? In this sense, Peisetaerus’ use of ἀδικέω at 1585 is ironic: if 
there was no law-suit and thus no real possibility of defence, this means that the verdict has 
been reached without a trial. This is only exacerbated when looking at what he says 
beforehand, ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν – the birds seemed to be guilty.    
546 Birds, 1347-8. 
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chance that they do not fully comprehend the laws even when they are visibly set up in the 
agora. If the birds are unable to properly read the laws, it is easy for Peisetaerus to add to, 
subtract from, or alter the law code. Which leads to the next question: how do we know that 
the recording of the laws has been done correctly? Can we really be sure that Peisetaerus has 
not tampered with them to adjust them to his purposes?  
 Plato discusses a similar issue in his Laws, written about half a century after the first 
production of Birds. At 722e, Plato describes written law as a ‘despotic prescription’ 
(τυραννικὸν ἐπίταγµα) because it allows tyrants and despots to order and threaten the citizens 
by simply writing a decree on the wall and then be done with it (κατὰ τύραννον καὶ δεσπότην 
τάξαντα καὶ ἀπειλήσαντα γράψαντα ἐν τοίχοις ἀπηλλάχθαι).547 A comparable sentiment is 
expressed at 718b-c when the Athenian asserts:  
 
ἃ δὲ χρὴ µὲν αὖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν νοµοθέτην ὅστις ἅπερ ἐγὼ διανοεῖται, ἐν δὲ 
σχήµατι νόµου ἀναρµοστεῖ λεγόµενα, τούτων πέρι δοκεῖ µοι δεῖγµα προενεγκόντα 
αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἐκείνοις οἷς νοµοθετήσει, τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα εἰς δύναµιν διεξελθόντα, τὸ 
µετὰ τοῦτο ἄρχεσθαι τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόµων 
 
And then there are things which a lawgiver who thinks as I do should – and indeed 
must – talk about, but which do not lend themselves to being stated in the form of a 
law. For these, in my view, he must present a model which he himself and those he is 
making laws for can follow – explaining everything else to the best of his ability – and 
only after that make a start on putting his laws in place. 
 
This leads to the next question: if there are written laws, how do we know that Peisetaerus 
explained to the birds (i) how to use them, and (ii) what he means by them? In this sense, it is 
also unclear whether the laws include Peisetaerus’ opinion on what is good and bad.548 In a 
way, this recalls the open texture of Athenian law. Aristotle, who is fully aware of this, asserts 
in his Rhetoric, written about sixty years after Birds, that this is why “one of the crucial tasks 
																																								 																				
547 For a good synopsis and general discussion of the debate about written and unwritten law, 
see Nightingale 1999. Plato’s concerns here clearly bring to mind those of More, who worries 
about despots who tamper with laws. 
548 Cf. Laws 823a. 
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facing the litigant was to define clearly the nature of the wrongdoing his case involved.”549 
Certainly, if the birds lack information about the potentially open texture of their own law-
code, it makes it difficult for them to properly use and follow their laws, which again 
questions the justification of their punishment.550 
However, in case there are not any actual pillars, or any written law code for that 
matter, then that does echo an ideology that developed in late fifth-century Athens. Thomas 
argues that this ideology associated the rule by written law with democracy and the rule by 
unwritten law with oligarchy.551 This thought is also evident in fourth-century texts. For 
example, Aeschines states that autocracies and oligarchies are administered by the whims of 
their leaders, and democracies by the written, established, laws (τυραννίδες καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι 
τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἐφεστηκότων, αἱ δὲ πόλεις αἱ δηµοκρατούµεναι τοῖς νόµοις τοῖς 
κειµένοις).552 This then would not only highlight Peisetaerus’ tyrannical autocracy, but also 
the assumption that the law-making in νεφελοκοκκυγία is based on his impulses. This is 
potentially further underlined by the possibility that Peisetaerus draws up obscure laws 
deliberately in order to release, and demonstrate, his power of decision-making in the bird-
city.553 
																																								 																				
549 Harris 1994: 139. Aristotle, Rhet. 1374a. 
550 This also brings to mind Rhet. 1368b, where Aristotle asserts that in order for an agent to 
be found responsible for a crime, the accuser must be able to demonstrate that the wrongdoing 
was committed willingly.  
551 Thomas 1995: 16-19. See also Harris 1994: 133 and Nightingale 1999: 106. 
552 Aeschines, Ag. Tim. 1.4 
553 In a way, this recalls Aristotle’s Const. Ath. 9.2, where he notes: “the laws of Athens were 
often unclear, with the result that the people had the power of decision at trials. It should 
come as no surprise that one of the first acts of the Thirty was to eliminate or alter the laws of 
Solon that contained points of dispute which might give the court broad latitude in reaching 
its decision (Athenaion Politeia 35.2). Some argued that Solon deliberately made the meaning 
of the laws obscure so as to unfetter the dicasts’ power of decision. But Aristotle rightly 
dismisses this view and argues that the alleged lack of clarity in Solon’s laws is caused by the 
difficulty of ‘defining what is best in general terms.’” Harris 1994: 138. 
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 These uncertainties and the fact that it is not clear what kind of legal system 
νεφελοκοκκυγία utilizes, emphasise the difficulty of the three questions asked at the 
beginning of this section. First of all, it is not clear what kind of evidence there is for the 
birds’ guilt, because it is unclear what kind of (written or unwritten) laws there are in the first 
place and whether the birds are able to access them.554 Secondly, it is uncertain who found the 
dead birds guilty because there is no mentioning of law courts or jurors in νεφελοκοκκυγία. 
Thirdly, and this is the only question that has become a little clearer, the bird democracy 
νεφελοκοκκυγία enjoys is not a democracy, but an autocracy that is run in an arbitrary manner 
by Peisetaerus. 
On the one hand, the inconsistencies and uncertainties of the law code are clearly only 
there for the comic effect, and they are situated firmly within the Old Comic tradition. As 
Aristotle asserts in Poetics, in comedy the broken rules are presumed by the text because if 
they were to be discussed, the comic effect would disappear. Comedy is an imitation of low 
and lawless characters, which aims at representing men at their worse.555 (This is in contrast 
with tragedy, which usually requires a full discussion of violations of laws). Moreover, by 
																																								 																				
554 That being said, even if there is no clear evidence for the birds’ guilt, they could have been 
convicted on the base of probable cause. Harris refers to Aeschines’ Ag. Tim. 1.90-91 and 
asserts: “The Athenians…did not employ different standards of proof in public and private 
cases: the accuser in a public case was not held to a stricter standard of proof. 
Aeschines…distinguishes between those who are ‘clearly’ guilty and those who must be 
convicted on the basis of probability, but he takes it for granted that men could be condemned 
to death merely for their reputation and on the basis of mere likelihood.” See Harris 2013: 
318. This would then deem Peisetaerus’ use of ἔδοξαν ἀδικεῖν in line 1585 as sufficient 
enough for the birds’ prosecution. 
555 Aristotle, Poetics, V. Years later, Leo Strauss provides a counter-argument to this. He 
believes that (Aristophanic) comedy is superior to tragedy because it is the best medium to 
portray the highest human type, the philosopher. Comedy is an excellent medium for the wise 
because they laugh and joke at death and the gods, which is why they are able to live 
peacefully and at ease, much like the Olympian gods themselves. See Strauss 1989: 106-9. 
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implanting incongruous Spartan νόµοι in νεφελοκοκκυγία, Aristophanes mocks the 
Athenians’ enemy, which is a rich source of humour in many of his plays.556  
 On the other hand, these inconsistencies in the legal structure and the reliance on 
patchy ‘historical documents’ (i.e. the ancient bird law code) reinforce the arbitrary law-
making that takes place off stage. In this way, Birds presents an autocratic lawmaker whose 
questionable laws point to the abuse of powerful rhetoric and the deterioration of objectivity 
and justice. Nevertheless, comparably with Orwell’s Animal Farm, this great seriousness 
about the nature of the autocracy and its law code is balanced by a pronounced comic sense – 
it provides the opportunity to laugh at utter human failure in a way that is distressed by an 
awful sense of despair.557  
 
 
VIII. Animal Farm 
 VIII.a. The connection between Aristophanes and Orwell 
 
 There is more to be said about the similar ideas in Birds and Animal Farm, because in 
both cases the authors employ pathos and humour, which also serves as a good example of 
political satire. It is certainly profitable to analyse these similar ideas, especially when we pin 
them to More. This comparative literary approach with historical foundations not only 
continues to interrogate the political and legal mind of human beings by looking at it from the 
																																								 																				
556 See also Nelson 2016: 233, who refers to the more general inconsistences of Peisetaerus’ 
plan (such as the fact that he presents himself as friend of the birds only to betray them in the 
end), and argues: “The inconsistences recall Athens, a city that prided itself on its leisure 
(Thuc. 2.38) and yet never rested (Thuc. 1.70), that saw itself as both tyrant (Thuc. 2.63, 3.37; 
Knights 1114) and benevolent leader (Thuc. 1.73-77, 2.40), and that seems to have risen to be 
the greatest state in Greece almost by accident.” 
557 Cf. Morse 1995: 89-90. Cf. Bakhtin 1968: 38. “We find a characteristic discussion of 
laughter in one of the most remarkable works of Romantic grotesque, ‘The Night Watches’ of 
Bonaventura…speaking through the medium of his narrator…the author offers a curious 
explanation of laughter and of its mythical origin. Laughter was sent to earth by the devil, but 
it appeared to men under the mask of joy, and so they readily accepted it. Then laughter cast 
away its mask and looked at man and at the world with the eyes of angry satire.”  
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(serio-comic) point of view of the ‘other,’ but it also traces the development of political 
thought from Aristophanes in fifth-century Greece to More in sixteenth-century England and, 
finally, to Orwell in twentieth-century England. This, in turn, connects with the task of this 
thesis, namely to make sense of patterns of legal reforms and political discourse and theories 
across time and space. 
Aristophanes and Orwell both walk a fine line by maintaining a balance between 
different political ideas that can be enjoyed by differently minded audience members and 
readers. For example, in Birds, the roasting of the recalcitrant birds is something the 
democrats in the audience might enjoy because it undermines a failed rebellion against 
democracy. The construction of the bird-democracy that turns out to be a tyranny, on the other 
hand, is something the oligarchic audience members might find funny because it portrays the 
weaknesses of democracy. A comparable phenomenon occurs in Animal Farm: we witness 
the foundation of animal socialism (with democratic elements) that turns out to be an 
oligarchy, which underscores the limitations of (democratic) socialism. At the same time, we 
observe the establishment of a pigs’ oligarchy that is eventually transformed into 
totalitarianism (with ochlocratic tendencies), which highlights the dangers of the former. 
 This satirical portrayal of different political mind-sets not only attracts a wide 
audience, but it also allows a two-sided picture to emerge that forces them to look at both 
sides of the story.558 T.S. Eliot writes in a letter to Orwell in 1944 (in which he rejects his 
																																								 																				
558 Cf. Kirscher 2004: 759. In 1945, “William Empson warned Orwell that, since allegory 
‘inherently means more than the author means’, his book might mean ‘very different things to 
different readers’. Sure enough, English communists attacked Animal Farm as anti-Soviet, 
while a conservative chided Orwell for forgetting that private property is a prerequisite of 
personal freedom. Western propagandists hijacked the book after Orwell’s death, but twenty 
years later George Woodcock found it showed the identity of governing-class interests 
everywhere, and by 1980 Bernard Crick had to caution against reading it as a case for 
revolution. In 1998 critics were still debating whether Animal Farm implied ‘that revolution 
always ends badly for the underdog, hence to hell with it and hail the status quo’. The 
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manuscript), “I think you split your vote, without getting any compensating stronger adhesion 
from either party – i.e. those who criticise Russian tendencies from the point of view of a 
purer communism, and those who, from a very different point of view, are alarmed about the 
future of small nations.”559 
Orwell, like Aristophanes, is fully aware of what he is doing. As he says in Why I 
Write, “Animal Farm was the first book in which I tried, with full consciousness of what I 
was doing, to fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole.”560 Similarly, both 
writers portray a ring-composition in their texts: they present a place, which is transformed 
over the course of the story, only for it to bear such close resemblance to its initial 
presentation at the end of it, that it is virtually indistinguishable from it in many respects. 
More importantly, both Aristophanes and Orwell demonstrate the recurrence of political 
structures, brought about by deceptive rhetoric and swayed masses who rashly surrender 
power at seemingly opportune moments of foundation and revolution. 
 Kirschner highlights their connection further: “…genuine progress, [Orwell] believed, 
‘can only happen through increasing enlightenment, which means the continuous destruction 
of myths.’ This has been the writer’s task since Aristophanes, and in the 1940s it was not 
confined to exposing Russian communism.”561 Furthermore, as stated in the introduction (cf. 
pp. 3-4 n. 9), Orwell praises Aristophanes and other humorous writers because they “show a 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
confusion, as Empson saw, came not only from readers’ prejudices but also from the story 
itself.” 
559 T.S. Eliot, 13 July 1944, letter to Orwell. However, Eliot also praises Orwell’s writing 
skills and compares him to Swift (“… [This] is something very few authors have achieved 
since Gulliver”). This recalls the connections made between Swift and Orwell in the 
introduction, and how their serio-comic narratives are applicable in discussions with reference 
to Aristophanes. (cf. pp. 41-3). 
560 Orwell 1946, Why I Write.  
561 Kirschner 2004: 766. 
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willingness to attack the beliefs and the virtues on which society necessarily rests.”562 Like 
Aristophanes, he addresses topics, “which the rich, the powerful and the complacent would 
prefer to see left alone.”563  
This approach also recalls that of More, who offers with Utopia a work that is both 
beneficial and entertaining at the same time. I argue that the ancient political satire (seen in 
Birds) can be compared with the modern one (seen in Animal Farm) when we connect both of 
them with Utopia, because the style of More echoes that of Aristophanes and resurfaces in 
Orwell. For instance, the question whether it is morally permissible for a ruler to make his 
own laws (and tamper with them) is applicable to both Aristophanes and Orwell; and it is 
clear that this question brings to mind not only Callicles’ fondness for the stronger to deal 
with the law, but also More’s disdain for monarchs and their intricate laws. At the same time, 
the comic attributes related to the different styles of contemporary governments that are 
present in both texts can be compared with More’s satirical presentation of his own 
occupation as a lawyer, as he takes one extreme and turns it into another (comic) extreme on 





562 Orwell 1945, Funny, but not Vulgar. (See Angus and Orwell 1968: 285). 
Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Rhet. 8.11, ἡ δέ γε κωµῳδία ὄτι πολιτεύεται ἐν τοῖς 
δράµασι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ, ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν Κρατῖνον καὶ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ Εὔπολιν, τί δεῖ καὶ 
λέγειν; ἡ γάρ τοι κωµῳδία αὐτὴ τὸ γελοῖον προστησαµένη φιλοσοφεῖ. (“Does it even need to 
be said that comedy in the dramas, the comedy of Cratinus, Aristophanes, and Eupolis, 
involves itself in civic affairs and philosophizes? For comedy itself, by approaching what is 
ridiculous, philosophizes”). 
563 Orwell 1945, Funny, but not Vulgar. In regards to the possibility that ‘the rich, the 
powerful and the complacent’ might be wrongdoers, the following section from Platonius’ On 
the Different Sorts of Comedy comes to mind: ἐπι τοίνυν τῆς Ἀριστοφάνους καὶ Κρατίνου καὶ 
Εὐπόλιδος κωµωιδίας ἀφόρητοί τινες κατὰ τῶν ἀµαρτανόντων ἦσαν οἰ ποιηταί. (“So then in 
the time of the comedy of Aristophanes and Cratinus and Eupolis the poets were an 
irresistible force against wrongdoers”). Koster I.2-3, 12-14. Cf. Horace’s Satires 1.4.1. 
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VIII.b. Political factions in Birds and Animal Farm 
 
 I suggested above that the birds in Aristophanes’ comedy possess two different 
political mind-sets, one that is pro-Peisetaerus and one that is against him. Similarly, the 
diversity of the animals in Animal Farm is stressed by their different personalities and 
thoughts. Like the birds, they are all subject to the same change of rule but they do not 
necessarily act as a united body. The group of animals that may be compared best to the 
recalcitrant birds in Aristophanes are the hens that attempt two rebellions upon hearing that 
they must surrender their eggs to the pigs. Neither of the rebellions is fruitful: the first one is 
cut short by setting a stop to the hens’ food rations, which results in the death of nine hens, 
and the second one ends in the slaughter of the three hen ringleaders.564  
 Nonetheless, those hens are some of the more daring animals on Animal Farm because 
they have the courage to stand up to Napoleon. “Led by three young Black Minorca pullets, 
the hens made a determined effort to thwart Napoleon’s wishes.”565 Like the rebellious birds 
in Birds, the hens possess an independence of mind that makes them question the political 
decrees the pigs put forward, despite the eloquent rhetoric with which they are being 
delivered. In the hens’ case, it is not so much about the fact that they have to surrender their 
eggs, but about the ostensible arbitrariness of that command – this becomes clear when the 
hens fly up to the rafters, lay their eggs there, and smash them to the ground afterwards. They 
still lose the eggs but it is a kind of loss that derives from their personal wish, rather than from 
the pigs’ arbitrary request. 
 The hens, then, appear as rational agents who question the logic behind the pigs’ 
orders. In a sophistic (and ‘Calliclean’) manner, they do not accept the politics established by 
																																								 																				
564 These complications highlight once again one of the features of Utopia: there are no 
political factions and thus no opportunities to rebel against the establishment (whether 
successfully or unsuccessfully).  
565 Orwell 1945: 56. 
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the pigs as authoritative only because they have become familiar through habit and speech. 
Instead, they begin to envision an oppositional set of decrees; and they apply a concept of the 
sophists when they provide a counterargument to the already formulated one. Specifically, 
they seem to think, ‘whatever we do, we will lose our eggs. But if we smash them ourselves, 
at least we will lose them of our own accord rather than of the government’s accord.’ Rather 
than accepting and adapting to the ever-changing policies, the hens attempt to resist and by 
doing so, portray a mind-set that is independent from that of the pigs. Their resistance 
therefore, comparable with that of the rebellious birds, can be considered a revolutionary act 
against the established system. 
 The group of birds that celebrates Peisetaerus as a benevolent saviour can be 
compared to two factions on Animal Farm. The first one consists of animals that mindlessly 
follow Napoleon and his commands, because they are unable to discover the true meaning of 
his agenda. A few suspicions might arise here and there, but ultimately they are all swept 
away with persuasive words whose true meanings the animals do not really question, either 
because they do not want to or because they are unable to. Their (feeble) attempts to reason 
clearly are always shut down by rhetoric and public opinion. Consequently, in a manner 
reminiscent of Birds, this group of animals may be able to speak, read, and write, but they 
cannot work out the likely consequences of the decrees that Napoleon and the other pigs 
implement on the farm. 
 The second faction consists mostly of pigs and may be best compared to Tereus and 
his ‘erotic’ qualities in Birds (cf. pp. 154-6). Like the first group, it is made up of 
impressionable followers; however, unlike the first group (and unlike Tereus), its members 
are aware of what Napoleon is doing. They celebrate him as a hero and as someone who has 
stepped in to restore justice to the animals. Tempted by freedom and led astray by power, 
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these animals are happy to please Napoleon, as they do not only believe in his politics, but 
also in the fulfilment of his promises. They may be capable of imagining a different set of 
social rules, however, it is clear that they do not want to. To them, Napoleon’s political ideas 
are the solution to their problems, and they exercise their collective consciousness to 
implement them on Animal Farm.  
In this way, the pigs praise Napoleon as an intelligent pig that has come to liberate the 
animals from their human owner, just like some of the birds celebrate Peisetaerus as a clever 
Athenian who has come along to reinstate divinity to their realm – and it is clear that both 
Napoleon and Peisetaerus are depicted as eloquent, but ultimately, deceptive rhetors. 
Additionally, in both texts, the audience witnesses a match between ‘superior against 
inferior,’ which is justified by some in both cases. In Aristophanes, as stated on p. 165, it is 
about the portrayal of an Athenian’s superiority over barbarians, and in Orwell, the following 
statement from T.S. Eliot comes to mind (taken from the same letter quoted above), when he 
tells Orwell: “…your pigs are far more intelligent than the other animals, and therefore the 
best qualified to run the farm…there couldn’t have been an Animal Farm at all without them: 
so that what was needed (some might argue), was not more communism but more public-
spirited pigs.”566 
In both Birds and Animal Farm, the animals are promised that they are about to 
advance on a mission that will right every wrong that has ever been done to them and their 
ancestors, as it will lift them from ostensible oppression up to a better state of existence. 
Unbeknownst to many of them, from this point on, law is a pure command, fabricated, and 
alterable, at the will of the leader, and based on mysterious ancient documents that may or 
																																								 																				
566 T.S. Eliot, 13 July 1944, letter to Orwell. 
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may not exist. At the end, all there is left is repression and a sense of despair. The small elite 
may have reached their goal but the majority of the animals certainly have not.  
Certainly, this is the important point here, it is not about the “complete reconciliation 
of the pigs and the humans,” as Orwell writes in the 1947 preface to the Ukrainian edition of 
Animal Farm, but about the “loud note of discord” with which it ends.567 The same is true for 
Birds (and Utopia): it is not just about the Athenisation of the birds (and the policies that keep 




VIII.c. Two missed turning points 
 
In a letter to Dwight Macdonald, Orwell writes:569  
 
I did mean [Animal Farm] to have a wider application in so much that I 
meant…violent conspirational revolution, led by unconsciously power-hungry people 
can only lead to a change of masters. I meant the moral to be that revolutions only 
effect a radical improvement when the masses are alert and know how to chuck out 
their leaders as soon as the latters have done their job. The turning point of the story 
was supposed to be when the pigs kept the milk and apples for themselves. If the other 
animals had had the sense to put their foot down then, it would have been all 
right…you couldn’t have a revolution unless you make it for yourself; there is no such 
thing as a benevolent dictat[or]ship. 
 
This accentuates the relevance of Birds to Animal Farm because both stories make clear that 
unless the masses are alert, and stop the rash surrender of power to the elite, and rebel when 
																																								 																				
567 Angus and Orwell 1968: 406. 
568 There is, of course, much more to be said about the humanisation of the animals and their 
engagement with human vices (such as desire, drinking alcohol, murder, and tampering with 
laws). This certainly relates to Birds, and to the cyclical nature which informs both texts. 
However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I focused in this section on the behaviour of 
the hens and the significance of their rebellion against Napoleon. For a good analysis of the 
humanisation of the animals, see Popescu 2012, especially pp. 198-200. 
569 Orwell 1946 – this letter is a response to Macdonald’s query about the meaning of Animal 
Farm. 
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necessary, there will be little hope for benevolence, freedom, and equality. This includes 
knowing when to protest. In Animal Farm, this should be, as stated above, when the pigs 
decide to keep the milk and apples for themselves. However, the other animals do not realise 
that they should at least try to say something, and by missing this turning point, they surrender 
what little power they have left to pig leadership. There are a few attempts afterwards (as is 
evident in the case of the hens), but at that point the pig tyranny is already too far advanced in 
order for it to be overthrown effectively.  
 A similar phenomenon occurs in Birds: here the turning point of the story is when 
Peisetaerus grills the first birds and puts cheese and silphium on them. This is when the other 
birds should wake up from their ‘dream of eros’ and understand that Peisetaerus is not really 
concerned about their wellbeing as he initially said he was. However, similarly to the animals 
in Animal Farm, they fail to seize the καιρός and, by doing so, give Peisetaerus the 
opportunity to continue with his political agenda in whatever way he wishes. (As shown in the 
discussion of the Statesman, it is the masses’ failure to recognise καιρός that enable the 
κόλαξ, who does recognise καιρός, to proceed with his agenda). The birds’ collective lack of 
agency is thus apparent once again, and this time too, it does nothing but lead to their doom. 
The rebellious birds may take a chance when they collectively attempt to challenge the 
regime, but ultimately the misled collectivism of the masses is the one that really dominates. 
This failure to know when to protest and when to be alert, underlines the point these 
stories have in common. It is not so much about giving up revolutionary hopes altogether and 
look at what is happening with a sense of hopelessness; instead, it is about the embrace of a 
kind of personal responsibility on the part of revolutionaries.570 This attitude brings to mind 
More’s civil philosophy (cf. pp. 34-6) and his optimistic outlook, which states that while it 
																																								 																				
570 Letemendia 1992: 136-7. 
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may not be possible to make everything good unless everyone is good, what can be done in 
the meantime is to work towards the confinement of the vicious and the reduction of the evil. 
This includes seeking progress through the failure of revolutions itself. Along the lines of 
Orwell’s statement, ‘all revolutions are failures, but they are not all the same failure,’ the 
rebellious animals in Aristophanes and Orwell, while unsuccessful, portray a Morean-like 
attitude and show that not all self-determination is lost.  
That being said, the failure to know when to be alert also shows, like the Statesman 
and Protagoras, that the masses must learn to listen closely to an orator’s rhetoric, since 
eloquence does not equate with political competence. If they fail to do so (and, as made clear 
in chapter 1, this undertaking is exceptionally difficult), they will never have the political 
regime that is actually beneficial to all.  
 
IX. Chapter Conclusion 
 
In addition to the points made on pp. 168-9 in regards to what makes human beings 
human, the following observations can now be added to the list. Firstly, human rhetors and 
political leaders (even when in bird-costume) may employ Gorgianic rhetoric and force their 
agenda onto others without being concerned about the consequences this might have. 
Secondly, human beings tend to miss the right point in time (καιρός) to protest, just as they 
miss the opportunity to measure the words the orator uses to address them. This in turn, as has 
been shown in the discussions of the Statesman and the Protagoras (cf. pp. 94-5 and 108-9), 
influences their levels of happiness and unhappiness. Nonetheless, as Birds and Animal Farm 
demonstrate, this does not mean that humans cannot learn through failed revolutions. By 
maintaining a sense of self-determination and an attitude that resembles that of the sophists, 
they also embrace a personal obligation on the part of revolutionaries.  
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Furthermore, this chapter illuminates some of the ways in which Orwell can be 
compared with Aristophanes and More, because all three authors highlight the connotations of 
distinct patterns of legal reforms and deliberative discourse which often include a ring-like 
composition, which not only echoes that of the cosmos in Greek thought, but also that of 
previous regimes. The serio-comic allusions to unjust laws and unsuitable rhetoric, which are 
present in all three texts, also link to some of the points made in the introduction and chapter 
1. In particular, they inform the sophists’ notion that arises with the ascent of man, namely 
that ‘every logos can be met with an antilogos’ (which recalls More’s elimination of that very 
possibility at the same time), but they also show that neither the argument nor the 
counterargument has to be necessarily free from deceit and injustice.  
Additionally, the points made in this chapter illustrate the ways in which different 
factions engage with established regimes and different forms of power, and how they are 
influenced by cyclical ideas of rhetoric and political structures (which underlines More’s 
disdain for intemperance in talking and his prohibition of political factions). The realms of the 
animals, infiltrated by human political behaviour and speech, show that the return to origins 
looms over the characters’ heads continuously and cannot be broken unless the masses begin 

















 I.a. The Figure of Lysistrata 
 
The recourse to the animal world begins to outline the importance of the problem that 
informs the continuous return to origins, and it explores cases that highlight the role 
deliberative rhetoric, legal reforms, and want of political agency play in these returns. In this 
chapter, I look at the role of women in legal discourse and state ideology. I utilize female 
societies and stories about reversed gender-roles in Aristophanes, Herodotus, Apollonius of 
Rhodes, and Gilman, and different epistemologies (comic fantasy, inquiry, myth, and modern 
political science fiction), and examine how these fantastic worlds (which, like the animal 
world, portray an ‘Other’) continue to help us think reflectively about the speeches, laws, and 
political issues of our own society.571  
I begin with Lysistrata because it conforms to the ring compositions discussed in the 
previous chapters, as it presents an Athens that is being dismantled at the beginning of the 
comedy, only for it to return to its origins at the end of it. Like the texts discussed in the other 
chapters, the play is remarkable not only for its portrayal of notions of (temporary) ascent and 
descent, but also for its interest in speech and persuasion, the forces and limitations thereof, as 
well as the understanding and lack of understanding that inevitably comes with it. In this vein, 
the analysis of the Statesman and the Protagoras is especially relevant because the play 
																																								 																				
571 Cf. Lehman 1997: 2. “We believe, rightly, that we will gain new insight into ourselves and 
our own legal system by better understanding how other societies and cultures have taken 
different paths to resolve…social questions.” 
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shows what results when articulate (and well-intended) speech, for want of political agency 
and improvement, is met with miscomprehension on the listeners’ side, and being dismissed 
as inept. However, it also shows what happens when rhetorical discourse, which 
systematically uses specific examples from histoy, tragedy, and legal and deliberative oratory, 
is used to unite groups from different places that are otherwise separate.572 
Furthermore, Lysistrata (like Ecclesiazusae) is comparable with the modern political 
and social thought presented by Gilman, and it also bears a clear literary resemblance to 
More’s Utopia when placing it within a comparative analysis of the 16th-century text. As is 
the case in Birds and Animal Farm, it is not hard to find parallels between the upheavals 
presented in the comedies (such as the juxtaposition of the sexes and their different 
communication and political styles), More (such as the abolition of intricate laws and other 
juridical concerns), and Gilman’s commentary. It is also clear that the serio-comic pairing of 
an ‘Other’ with a recourse to another world (prompted by political issues) is present in both 
Aristophanes and More; and it also appears in Gilman many centuries later when she uses the 
political and social matters of her time as the rationale for an escape to a differently organised 
world. Like the discussions of Birds and Animal Farm, the analysis below offers a discourse 
between the ancient and modern world, as it portrays the similarities between ancient political 
and legal theory and rhetoric, and our time. In this way, it continues to help us trace the 
development of this strand of Western political thought over the last two thousand years. 
At the beginning of the comedy, Lysistrata gathers the women together and announces 
that the future of all Greece is in their hands. At lines 29-30, she exclaims:  οὕτω γε λεπτὸν 
ὥσθ᾽ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐν ταῖς γυναιξίν ἐστιν ἡ σωτηρία. “So very dainty that the salvation 
																																								 																				
572 This paragraph is drawn from the panel proposal submitted to the CA 2016, ‘On Speaking 
and Not Being Heard: Rhetoric and Political Agency,’ in which I presented alongside Sarah 
Bremner, Niall Livingstone, and Helen Tank. See the bibliography for our respective papers. 
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of all Greece is actually in the hands of her women.”573 Shortly after, at line 32, she says: ὡς 
ἔστ᾽ ἐν ἡµῖν τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγµατα. “I tell you that the fortunes of the country depend on 
us.”574 And, at lines 39-41, she exclaims: ἢν δὲ ξυνέλθωσ᾽ αἱ γυναῖκες ἐνθάδε αἵ τ᾽ ἐκ 
Βοιωτῶν αἵ τε Πελοποννησίων ἡµεῖς τε, κοινῇ σώσοµεν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. “But if the wives come 
together here—those from Boeotia, those of the Peloponnesians, and ourselves—united we’ll 
save Greece.”575 The order of the polis, Lysistrata asserts, depends on its women and it is up 
to them to unify Greece and to ensure that it has a peaceful future. 
The usage of the Greek word polis (τῆς πόλεως) in line 32, as Sommerstein also notes, 
is significant and deserves further analysis.576 Usually, polis is used to describe a city or a 
city-state, but here, in this context, it is used to refer to Greece as a whole. This becomes clear 
when looking at lines 40 and 41: αἵ τ᾽ ἐκ Βοιωτῶν αἵ τε Πελοποννησίων ἡµεῖς τε, κοινῇ 
σώσοµεν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Aristophanes is certainly not the first who defines polis in the sense of 
country (see, for example, Euripides’ Ion 294 or Bacchae 58) but, “for a citizen of a particular 
Greek state to speak of all Greece as her polis—and to do so as if this were the most natural 
thing in the world—must be unique.”577 The women in Lysistrata, then, are not just concerned 
with internal peace and unity in Athens but also with a more external one that includes 
Boeotia and the Peloponnese. That is, they are also concerned with a panhellenic unity.578 
																																								 																				
573 Lys. 29-30. 
574 Lys. 32. 
575 Lys. 39-41. The theme of salvation comes with the underlying notion of a ‘return to 
origins’ (the time before warfare), which links to the circular notions seen in PV, Birds, and 
the Platonic dialogues. 
576 Sommerstein 1990: 156. 
577Sommerstein 1990: 156. Cf. Henderson 1988 whose translation of 32 bears similar 
connotations to those of Sommerstein: “Our country's fate is henceforth in our hands.” 
578 This longing for a pan-hellenic unity connects to the oikos: the women, who are used to 
maintaining peace within the household, now seek to create peace in a bigger household, 
which is Greece. (Pan-) Hellenes should not fight because they are all one big family.  
 A similar appeal to put an end to warfare appears in Peace 301-3, performed ten years 
before Lysistrata, when the Chorus Leader says that all Greeks should help end the war. See 
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This notion of a panhellenic reconciliation, and the idea that the women are best suited 
to achieve it, also appears at line 342 when the second semi-chorus remarks,’ ἀλλὰ πολέµου 
καὶ µανιῶν ῥυσαµένας Ἑλλάδα καὶ πολίτας’ (“…but rather see them rescue Greece and their 
fellow-citizens from war and madness…”) and between lines 495-500 when Lysistrata says to 
the Proboulos, ‘ἡµεῖς ὑµᾶς σώσοµεν’ (“We’ll see you safe”).579 It is also hinted at in the 
following dialogue, where Lysistrata talks about what might happen when the women do not 
step in to help:580 
 
Λυ. ἢ µηκέτ᾽ εἶναι µήτε Πελοποννησίους— 
 
Κα. βέλτιστα τοίνυν µηκέτ᾽ εἶναι νὴ Δία. 
 
Λυ. Βοιωτίους τε πάντας ἐξολωλέναι. 
 
Κα. µὴ δῆτα πάντας γ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἄφελε τὰς ἐγχέλεις. 
 
Λυ. περὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπιγλωττήσοµαι  
τοιοῦτον οὐδέν: ἀλλ᾽ ὑπονόησον σύ µοι. 
 
Lysistrata: Either there will be no more Peloponnesians— 
Calonice: Well, that would be splendid, by Zeus, for them to be no more! 
Lysistrata: --and the Boeotians will all be utterly destroyed— 
Calonice: Oh, please not all of them—do make an exception for the eels! 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
also lines 296-8, where Trygaeus calls all people, ὦ γεωργοὶ κἄµποροι καὶ τέκτονες καὶ 
δηµιουργοὶ καὶ µέτοικοι καὶ ξένοι καὶ νησιῶται, δεῦρ᾽ ἴτ᾽ ὦ πάντες λεῴ. Hermes draws from 
this pan-hellenic expression at 435-6, when he exclaims that all Greeks should be blessed. 
The emphasis seems to lie on a general pan-hellenic peace and ideology in Peace, which is 
also reflected by Trygaeus’ words at 1080-2, where he says that it is better to make a treaty 
and rule Greece together than to wage war ceaselessly. This is slightly different from the pan-
hellenic unity Lysistrata proposes, which is more rooted in the female domestic sphere rather 
than anything else, but it is still noteworthy because both plays incorporate a longing for 
peace in all of Greece and not just Athens. 
 The model for the Greeks as a loose collective can also be found in the Iliad, where 
Agamemnon, as a leader, should be concerned for the safety of all Greeks. (Unlike Lysistrata, 
however, he is not). 
579 Lys. 342; 495-500. 
580 Lys. 33-38. 
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Lysistrata: I won’t utter any words of that kind about Athens, but you can infer my 
meaning. 
 
These lines suggest that Lysistrata does not want to, even hypothetically and metaphorically, 
talk about the destruction of Athens. Anxiously, but to a certain extent also patriotically, 
Lysistrata announces that the women must save Athens from warfare and madness; speaking 
negatively about this undertaking is not an option.581 Westlake points out that another reason 
why Lysistrata avoids talking about the destruction of Athens is because she fears it will be a 
bad omen if she does.582 These feelings of fear and anxiety are further emphasized in line 590 
when the Proboulos tells Lysistrata to be quiet when she mentions losses of hoplites because 
he does not want her to bring up bad memories (σίγα, µὴ µνησικακήσῃς).583  
 Lysistrata’s very name underlines the point that she sets out to rescue Athens from 
warfare further. Lewis points out that at the time the play was produced, the position of 
priestess of Athena Polias—the highest appointment an Athenian woman could hold—was 
occupied by a woman called Lysimache.584 This name is strikingly similar to that of 
Lysistrata, Lysimache meaning ‘dissolver of strife’ and Lysistrata meaning ‘dissolver of 
armies.’585 The connection becomes even clearer when looking at line 554 where Lysistrata 
																																								 																				
581 Kanavou 2011: 137 argues that Kalonike’s name is also of significance in this passage, 
especially because she is the first woman whom Lysistrata greets in the play. She asserts, the 
name “alludes to the ‘beautiful victory’ that the women’s plan is hoped to have, and as it is 
the first name to be heard in the play, it may be interpreted as an intentional good omen; its 
message is repeated in the (similarly formed) name Νικοδίκη…” Additionally, she states, 
“Lysistrata argues that the women’s victory will benefit the city, therefore names related to 
the concept of victory (Kalonike, Nikodike) are also related to φιλόπολις ἀρετή ‘patriotism’. 
Kanavou 2011: 138. 
582 Westlake 1980: 41. 
583 The losses of hoplites are already implied in lines 524-5 where Lysistrata draws attention 
to the shortage of men in Greece. 
584 Lewis 1955: 4. 
585 Sommerstein 1990: 5. 
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exclaims: οἶµαί ποτε Λυσιµάχας ἡµᾶς ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καλεῖσθαι. “I believe that one day we 
will be known among the Greeks as the Dissolvers of Strife, [or as Lysimachai].”586   
 It is thus appropriate to associate Lysistrata with Lysimache and to link her to the 
power and wisdom of Athena, the patron goddess of Athens.587 This in turn evokes the trust 
and affection felt by Athenians for Athens and, by doing so, may lead the audience to think 
that Lysistrata is doing the right thing, namely saving Athens in a very Athenian way, with the 
help of Athena. The notion then falls once again on the rehabilitation of Athens and the 
reintegration of a Greece that has been torn apart by warfare, as well as on the return (or going 
back, πάλιν) to a more peaceful time. Lewis states likewise: “…Lysistrata is meant to 
represent the oldest and best elements in Athenian life, which, if properly emphasised, will 
reject war as the foolish thing that it is.”588  
 All these previously mentioned passages then talk about the reconciliation of Athens 
(and Greece as a whole), and the war-weariness of the Athenians, and thus echo what I stated 
at the beginning of this chapter: Athens must be rejuvenated and brought back to its status quo 
at the end of the play (and thus come full circle), a status that is not affected by warfare, 
destruction, and the separation of men and women.589 Lysistrata, linked to the virtues and 
wisdom of Athena, serves as a spokeswoman for this undertaking and it is because of her 





586 Lys. 554. 
587 Sommerstein 1990: 5. 
588 Lewis 1955: 3. 
589 Cf. fr.119 Eupolis (Etymologicum Genuinum AB), ἀµβλυστονῆσαι καὶ χλοῆσαι τὴν πόλιν 
(“For the city to spring up and flourish again”). 
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I.b. Lysistrata’s Discourse of Expertise 
 
Lysistrata’s connection with Athena is further underlined by the fact that Lysistrata 
acts primarily in the name of the patriarchal order and public affairs, and not just for oikos-
related matters.590 Unlike Praxagora in Ecclesiazusae, who makes her argument for female 
rule convincing by transforming the polis into an oikos, Lysistrata wishes to reinforce the 
established rule. However, the sex strike that takes place in the play derives from the domestic 
sphere, as do the metaphors that Lysistrata uses when she describes her plan to the men. As 
Foley points out: “Lysistrata’s strategies—the weaving of a cloak and the redirecting of 
public resources to peaceful purposes—are as appropriate to her public role as priestess as to 
that of housewife.”591 Indeed, it is the wide range of metaphors that Lysistrata uses in order to 
exercise her political power that are noteworthy here, for they show that she does have the 
specialist knowledge to run a city. 
Lysistrata’s expertise becomes especially clear in her exchange with the Proboulos 
that Foley refers to in the quotation above. The exchange takes place from lines 486-610 and 
it is worth looking at it in more detail. In lines 486-7, the Proboulos asks Lysistrata why the 
																																								 																				
590 Cf. Foley 1982: 9-10. “Like Athena, [Lysistrata] may well have been partially armed over 
her female dress, since at one point she threatens the old men with force of arms if they 
continue their attack. Like Athena in the Eumenides, she invokes πειθώ (203) and reason 
(432, 572, 1124, 1135) as her mental weapons. Like Athena, she serves as the accepted 
mediator between the sexes (1115-87) and moves them back into harmony, marriage, and a 
mobilization for non-Greek wars rather than for stasis in the Greek world. Athena, the divine 
female born from a male, is in her partial masculinity the only possible image of positive 
female role reversal. She acts for the state, not only in the interests of women and of private 
family concerns. Like Athena, Lysistrata stands on the side of the public religion of Athens, 
not for the orgiastic cults that old comic satire tends pejoratively to associate with women.” 
(Note that Foley identifies Lysistrata with Lysimache. See Foley 1982: 8). 
591 Foley 1982: 9.  
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women shut down the Acropolis in the first place, to which Lysistrata essentially replies: 
‘because this is where the money is.’592  
 
Πρ. καὶ µὴν αὐτῶν τοῦτ᾽ ἐπιθυµῶ νὴ τὸν Δία πρῶτα πυθέσθαι,  
ὅ τι βουλόµεναι τὴν πόλιν ἡµῶν ἀπεκλῄσατε τοῖσι µοχλοῖσιν. 
 
Λυ. ἵνα τἀργύριον σῶν κατέχοιµεν καὶ µὴ πολεµοῖτε δι᾽ αὐτό. 
 
Proboulos: Well then, this is the first thing, by Zeus, that I’m concerned to learn from 
them — what was your object in shutting and barring our Acropolis? 
 
Lysistrata: So we could keep the money safe and thereby prevent you from making 
war. 
 
The Proboulos is puzzled and asks Lysistrata if she thinks it is because of money-related 
matters that they are at war (διὰ τἀργύριον πολεµοῦµεν γάρ;) to which she replies, ‘yes, and 
that is also why there was all this other distress, too’ (καὶ τἄλλα γε πάντ᾽ ἐκυκήθη). When the 
Proboulos asks what the women are going to do with the money (ἀλλὰ τί δράσεις;), Lysistrata 
confidently tells him that they will manage the money from now on (ἡµεῖς ταµιεύσοµεν αὐτό) 
because they are so much better at it than the men are. After all, women already manage the 
household finances for them (οὐ καὶ τἄνδον χρήµατα πάντως ἡµεῖς ταµιεύοµεν ὑµῖν;).593 It is 
																																								 																				
592 Cf. Herodotus 5.71, where Cylon attempts a male coup d’état by trying to seize the 
Acropolis with a few other young men. This combination of seizing the Acropolis, like Cylon 
once did, and going on a sex-strike, is the first of many combinations of male and female 
politics. Specifically, this initial clash of the male political domain with the domestic one sets 
in motion the further clashes mentioned in the comedy, which then take place on a linguistic 
level. 
593 The same argument is put forward at Stat. 259b, where the Stranger asks the Young 
Socrates, τί δέ; µεγάλης σχῆµα οἰκήσεως ἢ σµικρᾶς αὖ πόλεως ὄγκος µῶν τι πρὸς ἀρχὴν 
διοίσετον; (“Well, so far as government is concerned, is there any difference between the 
grandeur of a large house and the majesty of a small state”)? The Young Socrates responds, 
οὐδέν (“No”). As stated in the introduction (cf. p. 15 n. 36), οὐδείς is a particularly emphatic 
‘No,’ thus indicating that there really is no difference at all.  
	 216	
this reference to the oikos here that is the first of many skilfully employed rhetorical devices 
by Lysistrata in the scene with the Proboulos.594  
 By specifically referring to the domestic sphere, Lysistrata puts her argument in the 
reality of everyday Athenian life and shows that the values of the oikos can be used to set the 
polis right. Like an Athenian political orator, she aims to convince the Proboulos that she (and 
all women for that matter) is a good financial adviser by drawing from real Athenian political 
speeches found, amongst others, in drama, political assemblies, and Platonic dialogues. For 
instance, she recalls Teiresias in Sophocles’ Antigone who tells Kreon: εὖ σοι φρονήσας εὖ 
λέγω. τὸ µανθάνειν δ᾽ ἥδιστον εὖ λέγοντος, εἰ κέρδος λέγοι. “I have considered for your 
good, and what I advise is good. The sweetest thing is to learn from a good advisor when his 
advice is to your profit.”595 Similarly to the Proboulos in the comedy, Kreon is not very 
impressed at first and accuses Teiresias of having taken bribes (κερδαίνετ᾽, ἐµπολᾶτε τἀπὸ 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 Cf. Prot. 318e, where Protagoras tells Socrates that if Hippocrates comes to him, he 
will teach him both how to manage his own home and the affairs of the city. Protagoras does 
not say that there is no difference between these two managements, but his words at least 
imply that these skills can be learned at the same time. Cf. Xenophon, Oeconomicus 7.14-16, 
where he states that running a household is like running a city, which is, in many ways, a 
supersized household. 
 There is also a noteworthy modern parallel for Lysistrata’s household metaphor. In 
2015, Theano Fotiou, a member of the left-wing party Syriza in Greece, said, during austerity 
negotations, that Greek families would survive the fiscal crisis because they know how to 
make cheap meals out of nothing, such as stuffed peppers. Like Lysistrata’s words, Fotiou’s 
were meant to be a compliment to the Greek people, however that intention fell flat because it 
actually led to crowds protesting on the streets with dishes of stuffed peppers in their hands. (I 
owe this reference to Ariadne Konstantinou who pointed it out to me at the ‘Prometheus, 
Pandora, Adam and Eve: Archetypes of the Masculine and Feminine and their Reception 
throughout the Ages’ conference at Bar-Ilan University in March 2017). 
594 Equally, if Lysistrata did not manage her household well, this would likely undermine her 
argument. As Aeschines writes in Ag. Tim. 1.30, τὸν γὰρ τὴν ἰδίαν οἰκίαν κακῶς οἰκήσαντα, 
καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως παραπλησίως ἡγήσατο διαθήσειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐδόκει οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τῷ 
νοµοθέτῃ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἰδίᾳ µὲν εἶναι πονηρόν, δηµοσίᾳ δὲ χρηστόν. (“For he believed 
that the man who has mismanaged his own household will handle the affairs of the city in like 
manner; and to the lawgiver it did not seem possible that the same man could be a rascal in 
private life, and in public life a good and useful citizen”). 
595 Ant. 1031-2. 
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Σάρδεων ἤλεκτρον, εἰ βούλεσθε, καὶ τὸν Ἰνδικὸν χρυσόν).596 However, like a good orator, 
Teiresias quickly defends himself and tells Kreon that he is actually well suited to speak in the 
interest of the polis, for he knows how to reason.597  
 Lysistrata does something similar in Aristophanes’ play when she makes clear that the 
comedy is, to a certain extent anyway, about λόγοι and πειθώ—words, speeches, and 
persuasion.598 In a dialogue comparable to that of Teiresias and Kreon, and to that of 
Antigone and Kreon, she and the Proboulos begin to argue over who knows best how to speak 
in the polis’ interest. In Lysistrata’s opinion, it is she, for she knows how to successfully 
manage a home.599 However, the Proboulos is not convinced, for he thinks that household 
finances and military finances are two different things—one is used to maintain peace within 
the oikos, the other is used to wage war with other city-states and to keep the polis safe.600 He 
thus believes that Lysistrata’s argument is invalid.  
 Lysistrata, in an attempt to refute the Proboulos’ accusation, tells him that the men 
should not be making war in the first place (ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεῖ πρῶτον πολεµεῖν) because it is 
neither profitable nor necessary in order to keep safe. Instead of waging war, the men should 
rely on the women to keep them safe (ἡµεῖς ὑµᾶς σώσοµεν). The Proboulos is outraged on 
																																								 																				
596 Ant. 1037-9. 
597 Ant. 1048-50. This recalls the link between speech and reason, as discussed in the analysis 
of the Greek ideas of language in chapter 2 (cf. pp. 169-170). 
598 Cf. Ober & Strauss 1990: 263. 
599 Approximately nineteen years later, Praxagora makes a similar point when she says that 
power should be given to women because “they are, after all, the people to whom we look for 
the efficient management of our homes” (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις ταύταις ἐπιτρόποις καὶ 
ταµίαισι χρώµεθα). See Eccl. 210-1. About another thirty years later, Socrates tells Critobulus 
in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus 3.15 that the increase or impoverishment of the household is not 
just up to the husband but also to the wife, for it is she who handles the money within in it.  
600 Lys. 496-8. 
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hearing this, seemingly lunatic, proposal and exclaims that Lysistrata has no right to say (and 
do) these things: νὴ τὴν Δήµητρ᾽ ἄδικόν γε.601 
 However, Lysistrata tells him that he and the fellow men must be saved whether they 
want to or not.602 This is yet another exchange in this scene where Lysistrata implies that 
women do in fact have the intelligence to do the men’s job—and not just do it for them, but 
do it better than them!603 This becomes even clearer a little later in the play, in lines 1124-27, 
when Lysistrata addresses the Athenians and Laconians:604 
 
ἐγὼ γυνὴ µέν εἰµι, νοῦς δ᾽ ἔνεστί µοι,  
 αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἐµαυτῆς οὐ κακῶς γνώµης ἔχω,  
 τοὺς δ᾽ ἐκ πατρός τε καὶ γεραιτέρων λόγους  
 πολλοὺς ἀκούσασ᾽ οὐ µεµούσωµαι κακῶς. 
  
I am a woman, but I have got a mind: I am not badly off for intelligence on my own 
 account, and I am not badly educated either, having heard a great deal of the talk of 
 my father and of other older men. 
 
The language that Lysistrata uses here might have reminded the audience of certain passages 
from Aeschylus’ Agamemnon and Euripides’ Melanippe the Wise and thus also of political 
rhetoric in Athenian tragedy.605 Especially the first line (ἐγὼ γυνὴ µέν εἰµι, νοῦς δ᾽ ἔνεστί µοι) 
																																								 																				
601 Lys. 500. The fact that the Proboulos invokes Demeter may be significant in terms of how 
emphatic his response is, because Demeter was often “named in official oaths taken by men, 
notably that of the jurors.” (Sommerstein 2014: 322. Cf. Dem. 24.151). The Proboulos’ 
choice to use Demeter and not, for example Ge (another goddess only men could swear by), 
may emphasise his point that women really have no place at all in financial and other official 
business. 
602 Lys. 501-3. 
603 There is another modern parallel to this. On 16 August 2008, in an interview with the 
Financial Times, the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko stated that women 
are better at taking care of the country than men are. She, too, based her argument on the 
household and said: “You know how, when a family breaks up, in most instances, the child 
stays with the mother? She is the more reliable caretaker. It is the same with a country. I 
simply think that we are more reliable and we are more able to give up living a normal life in 
order honourably to fulfil our responsibilities.” Cf. Brock 2013: 197. 
604 Lys. 1124-7. 
605 Hall 2010b: 30-1. 
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seems to be a direct quotation from the now fragmentary Melanippe the Wise line 482; 
Melanippe uses it in a speech in defence of women, and in a rebuttal of the opinion men hold 
about them.606 Lysistrata, similarly, uses this rhetorical device in order to emphasize her 
statement that, even though she is a woman, the audience should listen to her.  
 We see a similar piece of rhetoric being employed by Praxagora a few years later 
when she addresses the other women and the theatre audience: ἐµοὶ δ᾽ ἴσον µὲν τῆσδε τῆς 
χώρας µέτα ὅσονπερ ὑµῖν: ἄχθοµαι δὲ καὶ φέρω τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἅπαντα βαρέως πράγµατα. “I 
have as much of a stake in this country as you do; and I am vexed and grieved at the whole 
situation the City is in.”607 Likewise, in Euripides’ Children of Heracles, Macaria, albeit more 
reserved than Lysistrata and Praxagora, urges her listener to give her a chance, for even 
though she is a woman, she does have something to say.608 Additionally, the speech 
Clytemnestra gives after she has killed Agamemnon also shows similar rhetorical strategies. 
For she asserts that she is not a weak-minded woman (γυναικὸς ὡς ἀφράσµονος) but instead a 
woman who killed her husband fearlessly (ἀτρέστῳ καρδίᾳ). (Granted, this is not a positive 
precedent but it does fit in with the other examples, nonetheless). Likewise, Medea crosses 
borders in her speech to the chorus in lines 215-70 when she transforms “Corinthian 
housewives into champions of something like militant feminism, rejoicing in their next ode 
that women too will now have songs sung of the great deeds (410...).”609 
 This crossing of borders, and use of Athenian rhetoric that is usually reserved for men, 
can be further explained when looking at Willi’s concept of ‘language loyalty.’610 Willi 
writes: “However close-knit women’s social networks are, women may feel little loyalty to 
																																								 																				
606 Melanippe fr. 482. For discussions of the fragments of Melanippe the Wise and Melanippe 
Captive, see for example Cropp 1995 and Battezzato 2016. 
607 Eccl. 173-8. 
608 Children of Heracles 474-83. 
609 Pelling 2000: 202. 
610 Willi 2003: 164. 
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the traditional culture embodied in traditional language.  They may expect a real or symbolic 
bettering of their lives and social positions from the culture that is associated with the new 
language.”611 Willi further asserts that the blend of the old and the new language has the 
ability to represent two codes: a ‘power code’ and a ‘solidarity code.’ The former challenges 
existing structures and is supported by a socio-economic strength that is not controlled by the 
community itself, and the latter is meant to enforce a kind of unity, which is regulated by the 
community, in face of threats from outside.612 I think the same can be said for Lysistrata and 
the other examples mentioned above: the women’s traditional language, which derives from 
the oikos, enforces a cohesion (as households tend to do) and a shield that is meant to protect 
from the threats from the world outside. Simultaneously, as seen above, it also challenges 
these existing structures in a way that is not necessarily supported by the community, as it 
goes against traditional social norms.613 
Granted, the cases we are presented with in the plays cited above are different, not 
only because of their different plotlines, but also because they are different genres and 
separated by several decades. For example, Medea, Clytemnestra, Macaria and Melanippe are 
limited by the constraints of the tragic genre whereas comedy allows a more authentic utopian 
exploration by Aristophanes in his characterization of Lysistrata when he invokes the image 
of women as a counter-demos which is meant to mirror the world of the male civic space. 
(This does raise some interesting questions about the importance of genre in ancient utopian 
																																								 																				
611 Willi 2003: 164. 
612 Willi 2003: 164-5. 
613 Cf. McClure 1999: 27, who refers to this dramatized female speech as ‘bilingualism.’ She 
writes: “…women can be considered ‘bilingual’ in that they understand both their own 
discursive strategies and those of the dominant group, engaging in ‘code-switching’ in order 
to function in societies where they are subordinated.” Cf. Hawkins 2002: 154. 
 This also emphasises the point made in the passage on the Statesman, namely that 
Lysistrata (and Praxagora) are able to address different factions at the same time. Cf. pp. 91-2. 
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thought, such as how dreams of another Golden Age often served as the cornerstone of Old 
Comedy, but due to the limited space at my disposal these shall remain unexplored here).  
Instead, I wish to look at some of the comparisons that can be made between the tragic 
and the comic genre when it comes to masculine and feminine rhetorical discourse. 
Especially, Agamemnon and Lysistrata are worth comparing here, because both plays portray 
Athenian rhetoric that is utilized by female characters. Like Clytemnestra, Lysistrata’s 
“speech vacillates between gendered subject positions.”614 She is persuasive and eloquent like 
a man (which is only emphasized by the fact that she learned rhetoric from her father and 
other older men as indicated in lines 1124-7), but she reformulates male speech by utilizing 
metaphors from the female domestic sphere.615  
Her ability to perform both masculine and feminine discourse not only accentuates her 
connection with Athena once again, who is “in her partial masculinity the only possible image 
of positive female role reversal,”616 it also underlines the idea of the male actor impersonating 
women, and thus a central element of fifth-century Athenian comedy, namely the merging of 
male and female ideas. In the case of Lysistrata, this role reversal becomes particularly 
evident when Lysistrata launches onto the next argument in her political debate with the 
Proboulos. Like Macaria and Melanippe, she declares that the times when the Athenian 
																																								 																				
614 McClure 1999: 71. 
615 Cf. Eccl. 243-4. ἐν ταῖς φυγαῖς µετὰ τἀνδρὸς ᾤκησ᾽ ἐν πυκνί: ἔπειτ᾽ ἀκούουσ᾽ ἐξέµαθον 
τῶν ῥητόρων. “In the refugee time I lived with my husband on the Pnyx; that enabled me to 
listen to the speakers and learn off their tricks.” See also McClure 1999: 239 who notes: “As a 
fusion of both male and female characteristics and speech practices, Praxagora, like 
Lysistrata, mediates between the two realms, first as an exemplar of the tragic actor who 
rehearses his part and accurately renders the speech of the opposite gender, and later as an 
accomplished public speaker in the Assembly who seduces ‘his’ audience with ‘his’ deceptive 
speech.” Cf. Zweig 1992: 80. 
616 Foley 1982: 9. 
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women were quiet are over and that they will no longer ignore the bad decisions the men have 
made in the past.617 
The Proboulos is, once again, unimpressed and tells Lysistrata that her husband had 
every right to tell her to keep quiet (ὀρθῶς γε λέγων νὴ Δί᾽ἐκεῖνος).618 By doing so, he hints at 
the common Athenian notion found in many literary texts that women ought to be silent. For 
example, Sophocles praises female silence in his Ajax when he writes: γύναι, γυναιξὶ κόσµον 
ἡ σιγὴ φέρει. “Silence brings adornment to women.”619 Aristotle seems to quote directly from 
Sophocles when he remarks: διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἴρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νοµίζειν 
ἔχειν περὶ πάντων: ‘γυναικὶ κόσµον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει,’ ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. “All classes must 
be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women: ‘Silence is a woman’s 
glory,’ but this is not equally the glory of man.”620  
 However, Lysistrata decides that it is time to turn the tables and tells the Proboulos 
that it is now the men’s turn to be quiet. In lines 527-8, she confidently declares: ἢν οὖν ἡµῶν 
χρηστὰ λεγουσῶν ἐθελήσητ᾽ ἀντακροᾶσθαι κἀντισιωπᾶθ᾽ ὥσπερ χἠµεῖς, ἐπανορθώσαιµεν ἂν 
ὑµᾶς. “So if you’ll be prepared to listen in your turn to our good advice, and if you’ll keep 
quiet in your turn as we had to, we can put you back on the right path.” When the Proboulos 
tries to object, Lysistrata simply says: σιώπα. “Be quiet.” By audaciously declaring that the 
men ought to be quiet from now on, Lysistrata shatters social norms and poses a threat to the 
Athenian social and cultural system.621 As Clytemnestra has done before her, and as 
																																								 																				
617 Lys. 507-514. Cf. Apollodorus, Against Neaera 112, where Apollodorus (or, pseudo-
Demosthenes) draws a picture of the jurors’ wives giving them a hard time if they reach the 
wrong verdict on Neaera. 
618 Lys. 521. 
619 Ajax 293. Trans. McClure. See also McClure 1999: 20 and Finglass 2011: 226. 
620 Aristotle, Pol. 1260a31. See McClure 1999: 20 n. 71 for further examples. 
621 Cf. Konstan 1993: 437. “Women, when left to their own devices, are imagined as creatures 
of lawless desire, prone to violate the social order which is predicated on the integrity of the 
individual household.” 
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Praxagora will do after her, Lysistrata decides to take matters into her own hands upon 
realizing that the men have failed to conduct political affairs properly. By offering a different 
style of politics, all three women emerge as intelligent rebels against inadequate male politics 
and show that they are indeed more than ‘men in drag.’622 Comparably with Macaria and 
Melanippe, they epitomize the juxtaposition of female powerlessness in Athens and female 
confidence on stage.  
 The similarities to the tragic texts in this exchange suggest that Lysistrata’s political 
discourse with the Proboulos is not just a comic inversion of male and female roles, but also a 
discussion of rhetoric itself. Similarly to Sophocles, Aristophanes takes for granted his 
audience’s familiarity with political and philosophical rhetoric, and by doing so follows an 
oratorical paradigm that the audience would have recognised from drama and political 
assemblies, and also from philosophical discourse.623  
 This becomes also clear in the next part of the dialogue when Lysistrata explains to the 
Proboulos how exactly the women are going to put an end to the ostensibly pointless current 
political affairs.624 
 
ὥσπερ κλωστῆρ᾽, ὅταν ἡµῖν ᾖ τεταραγµένος, ὧδε λαβοῦσαι,  
 ὑπενεγκοῦσαι τοῖσιν ἀτράκτοις τὸ µὲν ἐνταυθοῖ τὸ δ᾽ ἐκεῖσε,  
 οὕτω καὶ τὸν πόλεµον τοῦτον διαλύσοµεν, ἤν τις ἐάσῃ,  
 διενεγκοῦσαι διὰ πρεσβειῶν τὸ µὲν ἐνταυθοῖ τὸ δ᾽ ἐκεῖσε. 
 
 It’s like when we have a tangled skein of wool. We take it, like this, and pull it gently 
 with the help of our spindles, now this way and now that. That’s how we’ll unravel 
 this war, if we’re allowed to, sorting it out by sending embassies, now this way and 
 now that. 
 
In this scene, Lysistrata not only sounds like a character from a Platonic dialogue by 
explaining political matters with the help of a wool-allegory, but also like Athena Ergane, the 
																																								 																				
622 Cf. Mossman 2001: 382. 
623 Ober & Strauss 1990: 259. Cf. Willi 2002: 135-39; 149-50. 
624 Lys. 568-570. 
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patron deity of craftsmen and artists. Not only does this underscore her domestic activities 
(and, by using διαλύω, also the etymology of her name), it is also another example of how 
Lysistrata stands on the side of public religion in Athens, and thus close to the heart of the 
polis.  
Moreover, the choice of metaphor is significant here, because it links back to the 
juxtaposition of feminine and masculine discourse mentioned earlier: Lysistrata takes 
women’s work that has to do with wool and spindles and transforms it into eloquence. On the 
one hand, this relates to a statement made earlier: Lysistrata uses arguments that derive from 
the domestic sphere in order to bring her point across because that is what she knows best.625  
On the other hand, it also shows how Aristophanes gives voice to Lysistrata through both 
women’s work and male political rhetoric. Not only does this play with the comic topsy-turvy 
idea of women in power in that Aristophanes takes a domestic element and applies it to the 
public domain of the male, it also highlights an element of Lysistrata’s speech that is quite 
different from the tragic passages quoted earlier. For while those passages portray the worst 
thing that Athenian female eloquence can do (undermine men), Lysistrata’s rhetoric is 
ultimately used to help the men.626 
Nevertheless, the Proboulos is once again not convinced and demands further 
explanation of how exactly the women intend to handle the men’s affairs (πῶς δή; φέρ᾽ 
ἴδω).627 This is when Lysistrata provides another simile: she utilizes a raw fleece as a 
																																								 																				
625 This recalls Philomela, who weaves to tell the story of her rape and glossectomy, and of 
Penelope who weaves and unravels wool in order to delay her marriage to another man. See 
also Karanika 2014, especially pp. 82-88. 
626 See also Lane 1998: 166. “Throughout the passage and the play, the domestic agility of 
women is celebrated and mockingly compared with the public incompetence of men…The 
humour of the passage as well as its polemical point depends heavily on this clear gender 
identification of weaving with women – precisely because Lysistrata is in fact proposing this 
model of civic weaving as an appropriate model for the men.”  
627 Lys. 573. 
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metaphor and makes clear that Athenian politics must be cleansed from dirt, villains, and 
tyrants. Once that it is done, a union of Athenians, immigrants, foreigners, and anyone who 
opposes tyranny, must be formed (just as it is necessary to place the wool back into the work-
basket together with other pieces of wool after it has been cleaned). Returning to the 
panhellenic concept mentioned at the beginning of the play, Lysistrata then asserts that all the 
colonies must become part of this union in order to assure peace and an effective political 
system. This is just like smaller pieces of wool that must be added together in order to make a 
warm cloak.628 
It is clear that this allegory is packed with metaphors that resemble philosophical 
discourse. First of all, it is important to note that it points to the essential thing the comedy 
attempts to do, namely renewing Athens and returning (πάλιν) to a peaceful time. This 
becomes clear when looking at the ‘cleansing’ aspect of it. For Lysistrata does not take a new 
piece of wool but an old one (i.e. Athens) that she wishes to clear from dirt (i.e. from the bad 
influence of certain people) and join together with other pieces of wool (i.e. other Greek city-
states). This allows us to construct a clear view of what the play is doing with the mythical 
idea of women in power who attempt to save the polis. For once again we are presented with 
oratory from the oikos that is used to fix problems created by men. 
Secondly, it is worth pointing out that a similar weaving-analogy appears in Plato’s 
Statesman. In the text, the Stranger applies the art of weaving to the statesman and asserts that 
the universal science of statesmanship knows how to weave everything that is within a state 
into a unified fabric.629 He bases the necessity of this on two opposing temperaments of men: 
courage and moderation. If those who are too courageous dominate the state, this will result in 
a policy that is too aggressive; similarly, if those who are too moderate dominate the state, 
																																								 																				
628 Lys. 574-586. 
629 Stat. 305e. 
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this will result in aggression against themselves.630 Thus, just as it is Lysistrata’s task in the 
comedy to weave opposing elements together, it is the task of the statesman to weave citizens 
with these conflicting temperaments into a unified social fabric.631 
 The statesman achieves this by providing both divine and human bonds for the souls 
of the citizens. The divine bond is created by implementing in men’s souls a correct opinion 
of what is just and good, and the human bond is created by the intermarriage of men and 
women, as their offspring will naturally have a balanced mixture of the two opposing 
elements.632 This is similar to Lysistrata, for at the end of the comedy, we are presented with a 
synthesis of divine and human elements. The divine principle is Athena, upon whose power 
and wisdom Lysistrata calls, and the human one is the reconciliation between men and 
women. Both Lysistrata and the statesman then weave together different people and 
temperaments in order to create a unified and harmonious society.633 
Finally, it is worthwhile comparing this piece of rhetoric with Plato’s ship of state 
mentioned at 488a-489 in Book VI of the Republic. Let us briefly summarize the parable: the 
image there is a ship, and the owner of it is stronger than everyone else on board. However, 
despite his strength, he can neither hear nor see very well nor does he actually have much 
experience with seafaring. The sailors are in a constant fight about who should steer the ship, 
each of them thinking they are the best suited for the job. (This is despite the fact that none of 
them has actually ever learned how to steer a ship since they claim that it is not teachable). If 
they do not succeed in grabbing the rudder from someone else, they execute the one who 
does. Afterwards, they drug the shipowner so that they can steer the ship and call themselves 
																																								 																				
630 Stat. 307a-8b. 
631 Hall 1981: 84. 
632 Stat. 309c-310b. 
633 See Cornford 1934: 60, who asserts that the reunion of men and women at the end of the 
play “is itself a sort of re-marriage.” 
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‘navigator;’ anyone else is dismissed as useless. The parable ends with the assertion that these 
sailors do not realise that the art of navigation is a craft that must be learned in order to do it 
successfully. For at the end of the day, it is not just about the ship itself but also about the 
things that may influence the navigation of it, such as the seasons or the winds. 
Similarly to Lysistrata’s wool-basket allegory, the connotations of this parable are 
clear. The captain (i.e. the demos) is slow-witted and unable to see how things really are, and 
the sailors (i.e. the politicians) are in a constant fight over who should control the ship (i.e. the 
polis) but are ultimately only interested in themselves. Both demos and politicians are unable 
to recognise a true captain; one who actually realizes that one must also pay attention to 
things outside the ship in order to navigate it successfully. Moreover, the ship-of-state simile 
hints at a problem encountered by Lysistrata in her dialogue with the Proboulos. Monoson 
states:634  
The parable…suggests a predicament that all the people on the boat share. How is a 
navigator to demonstrate the importance of his skill, short of being given the 
opportunity to practice it? The abstract nature of his knowledge makes it difficult for 
him to convey to the captain and crew that he indeed knows something relevant. 
 
Lysistrata, too, despite her eloquence, has problems getting her point across to the Proboulos, 
for he neither understands the metaphors she uses nor how women play a part in warfare. The 
former has already become clear on the previous pages, and the latter is exemplified by the 
Proboulos’ statement following Lysistrata’s allegory: οὔκουν δεινὸν ταυτὶ ταύτας ῥαβδίξειν 
καὶ τολυπεύειν, αἶς οὐδὲ µετῆν πάνυ τοῦ πολέµου; “It really is disgraceful that these women 
should go on like this about sticks and balls, when they’ve had absolutely no part in the 
war.”635 Lysistrata responds by saying that women do actually know something about war 
																																								 																				
634 Monoson 2000: 121. 
635 Lys. 586. 
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because of the losses of sons and husbands that are associated with it.636 But again, the 
Proboulos does not understand her, for the abstract nature of Lysistrata’s domestic argument 
makes it difficult for him to follow it. 
 The Proboulos’ inability to understand Lysistrata underlines many notions found in 
the comedy: (1) it portrays the opposition of the sexes and the imbalance that is created by it: 
the polis and oikos are separated and cannot properly communicate with one another; (2) it 
serves as a comic element, as the debate between the Proboulos and Lysistrata emerges as a 
parody of real masculine political behaviour: politicians talk to (and at) one another but are 
not really being heard by the other party; (3) similarly, even though Lysistrata is able to speak 
‘like a man’, she is still not being heard, for she uses metaphors that are outside the 
Proboulos’ realm of knowledge. As Hawkins puts it: “This [domestic language] is a language 
in which most men would not be fluent since it does not normally enter into the male 
world.”637  
 The emphasis is on ‘normally’ here because things are different in Plato, where the 
weaving metaphor is invoked frequently to discuss issues related to the state. Nonetheless, 
Hawkins’ point does recall female powerlessness in Athens and the limits placed on women 
in the domestic sphere, and it also brings to mind the differences between male and female 
speech. (4) However, the scene also shows the (rhetorical) freedom female characters have on 
the Greek stage, for Lysistrata continually counters the Proboulos’ objections and does not 
keep quiet. She argues relentlessly that the Athenian men are destroying the polis through 
warfare, and she seeks a peaceful solution. 
																																								 																				
636 Lys. 587-598. 
637 Hawkins 2002: 157. Again, the underlines the point made in the section on the Statesman 
(cf. pp. 91-2). Lysistrata and Praxagora manage to engage with different factions on a 
rhetorical level, but ultimately only Praxagora is truly successful because Lysistrata does not 
manage to get the Proboulos to understand her. 
	 229	
 Their exchange eventually ends with the Proboulos leaving the stage in line 610, 
feeling utterly insulted, saying that he does not deserve to be treated like this. He is angry at 
Lysistrata and her speech, though not necessarily at the politicians (or the demos) who caused 
the problems Lysistrata mentions in the first place. Like the Athenian demos, the Proboulos 
prefers compliments to criticism, and like the sailors in Plato’s ship-of-state parable, he 
attempts to deny Lysistrata the demonstration of the importance of her skill. In this way then, 
while certainly ensuring comic laughter, the dialogue also serves as a reminder (and perhaps 
even warning) to the audience that they are responsible for recognising the intentions of a 
speaker and for taking action when necessary.638 This is similar to the issue that Aristophanes 
deals with in Knights, namely the denial of rights to well-intentioned orators. Instead, they are 
being given to self-serving ones (Cleon) who aim to undermine the polis from within. 
 Of course, in the true spirit of Aristophanic comedy, Lysistrata’s argument is 
ultimately successful, as the comedy ends on a triumphant note. Nevertheless, the scene with 
the Proboulos still raises certain issues that were very real worries for Aristophanes’ 
contemporaries. The Proboulos has, arguably, been corrupted by flattering rhetoric and thus 
refuses to listen to Lysistrata, making it difficult for her to be heard. He fails to recognise the 
intentions of Lysistrata and does not realise that she acts for the good of the polis. Thus, while 
this topsy-turvy world is certainly very much at home in Aristophanes, it also echoes real 
problems off stage, as it portrays the Proboulos, who as an Athenian is supposed to be the 
master of logos, as acting in contrast to his own ideals.639 
																																								 																				
638 This brings to mind the behaviour of the courageous birds and animals discussed in 
chapter 2, as they take a step in the right direction and attempt to overthrow the tyrannical 
regime. Cf. pp. 184-8; 201-4. 
639 At the same time, as shown in the discussions of the Statesman and the Protagoras (cf. pp. 
89-91 and 104), this undertaking is exceptionally difficult, and the blame does not lie solely 
with the Proboulos because it is not necessarily possible for him to learn the language of a 
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	 230	
At the same time, as discussed above, we are also presented with a merging of 
masculine and feminine rhetoric. Lysistrata appears as a mediator that speaks on behalf of the 
city in order to end warfare and to guide the male and female back into harmony. By making 
use of specific metaphors (that stem from the realms of both women and men), Lysistrata 
shows that it is time to reaffirm Athens and to unify all Greek city-states. By doing so, she not 
only reiterates the panhellenic notion mentioned in the first few lines of the play, but she also 
asserts that it is time to join the oikos and the polis back together, for only then can the 
existing (military) conditions be brought to an end. 
Finally, it is worth noting that, by portraying the women as a group of people who 
engage in political action in order to stop warfare, Aristophanes a) draws up an alternative 
public that shows women with their own state institutions, and b) he makes use of the comic 
motif where men fear that women plot against them in secret meetings. This becomes further 
evident in lines 1128-1135 of Lysistrata, where Lysistrata refers to the common sacrifices of 
Athenians and Spartans in order to underline her argument that reconciliation is necessary. By 
mentioning common festivals in this context, she not only merges religious, civic, and 
military elements but she also represents the women gathering on top of the Acropolis as an 
alternate demos with their own nomoi and politics. This idea is developed further in 
Thesmophoriazusae where a women’s festival is imagined as an assembly.640 
 
 
II. The purpose of Lysistrata’s speech 
 
Aristophanes, through the characters of Lysistrata and the Proboulos, refers to the 
demos’ inability to identify a leader (and orator) with good intentions. This latent criticism of 
																																								 																				
640 See especially lines 295-310 of Thesmophoriazusae and also Konstan 1993: 439. 
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the demos not only recalls the connotations of the texts discussed in chapter 2, but it also 
brings to mind a scene from Knights, performed a little over ten years before Lysistrata. In 
lines 1355-1357, the following exchange takes place between the demos and the Sausage-
Seller: 
 
Δῆ. αἰσχύνοµαί τοι ταῖς πρότερον ἁµαρτίαις. 
 Ἀλ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σὺ τούτων αἴτιος--µὴ φροντίσῃς--  
ἀλλ᾽ οἵ σε ταῦτ᾽ ἐξηπάτων. 
 
Demos: You know, I am really ashamed of my former errors. 
 
Sausage-Seller: But you weren’t to blame for them – don’t you worry – it was the men 
who practised these deceptions on you. 
 
Here, the Sausage-Seller tells the demos that it is not their fault that they have chosen an 
inadequate leader; rather, it is the leader’s fault, for it is he who has deceived the demos with 
unsound arguments. (This, as has been shown, is the same problem that appears in Birds ten 
years later, when most of the birds are deceived by Peisetaerus’ and Tereus’ oratorical skills). 
Certainly, Aristophanes is walking a fine line by including these implications (and 
accusations) in his plays. He cannot very well assert in front of the Athenian audience that the 
entire demos is inept (although he does come close in Knights) and that that is why they 
choose inept leaders; no one who appears before the demos – be it playwright, comic hero, or 
orator – can afford to do so.641 As Henderson points out: “anyone…who for any reason 
																																								 																				
641 There are quite a few testimonia and passages in (fragmented) plays, which say that Cleon 
attacked Aristophanes for ridiculing him in his comedies. See, for example, Ach. 377-82 and 
502-3, and Wasps 1284-91. More importantly, the Scholium on Aelius Aristides Or. 3.8 
states: κατηγορήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Κλέωνος Ἀριστοφάνους ὕβρεως, ἐτέθη νόµος µηκέτι ἐξεῖναι 
κωµῳδεῖν ὀνοµαστί. (“After Cleon had accused Ar. of hybris, a law was passed forbidding 
further comic ridicule of anyone by name”). The Scholium on Ach. 378 notes that Cleon did 
take Aristophanes to court because of the insults he hurled against him in Babylonians. 
 However, it is necessary to note that these testimonia and fragments are not 
conclusive. Halliwell 1998: xlv n. 46 asserts, “to treat [Dikaipolis’ defence speech in Arch.] as 
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admonished the collectivity of citizens had to persuade its members that he was still somehow 
in conformity with collective norms and with the democratic notion that collective norms 
must always control decision-making.”642  
 Hence the pedagogical approach via satire. Rather than outright attacking the demos 
(and risking punishment), Aristophanes educates them by ridiculing (which again links him to 
Lucian and More, and their serio-comic approaches). As Loraux writes:643 
 
…one still has to get oneself heard by this Demos that prefers unconditional praise to 
lessons in morality. Because laughter, which frees from fascination, is the most 
effective weapon of criticism, the comic poet has no other strategy than to educate by 
ridiculing. One must make the Athenians laugh at the praise that they are so happy to 
address to the city and the democratic system… 
 
In Lysistrata, this is highlighted not only by the dialogue but also by the panhellenic (and thus 
collective) nature of the comedy. In this sense, Lysistrata’s comic speech is not really political 
– neither in context nor in ethos – but instead a lesson in (and reminder of) morality, as it 
functions as a means for the expression of the collectivity of the demos.644 Aristophanes thus 
again emerges as a political satirist (as he does in Birds) and once again, comparably with 
Orwell, exposes false beliefs engendered by λόγοι and πειθώ. 
 In order to avoid unnecessary problems, he does so by appealing to the intelligence 
and integrity of the demos, which is one of the reasons why we are presented with a sense of 
reassurance in Lysistrata. By presenting to the audience a celebratory image not only of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
programmatic of the author’s own stance, as has often been done, is to tear it out of the 
context of parody and metatheatre in which it is teasingly embedded.” Likewise, Rosen 2010: 
235 argues: “The problem of interpreting the allegations of a historical quarrel between Cleon 
and Aristophanes is particularly interesting because it is so easy to see the story—whatever its 
basis in historical fact—as part of the poet’s attempt to create a specifically literary persona 
for himself, a gesture that need not always have any basis in truth.” Rosen, however, does not 
seem to doubt that there was some sort of disagreement between Aristophanes and Cleon to 
which Aristophanes alludes in his plays. See Rosen 1988: 78. 
642 Henderson 1993: 309. 
643 Loraux 1986: 306. 
644 Cf. Henderson 1993: 318. 
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Athens but also of themselves, Aristophanes cultivates an affirmation of both the polis and the 
demos’ intelligence, thereby saying that they can do better. The strong Athenian nature of the 
comedy allows the audience to reflect on their Athenian heritage and virtues; and with the 
inclusion of a representation of Athena Polias, they are even provided with a blast from the 
past and reminded of the early stages of the polis when Athena was chosen to be their 
patron.645 In this sense, the comic poet presents to the audience not only a dismantled polity 
that is in need of renewed strength, but he also offers them a sense of encouragement for 
themselves – which then links to the point made in the Protagoras, namely that political 
excellence is a social achievement which is based on universal competence and 
opportunity.646 
 Aristophanes then brings Lysistrata – and the fictive world of comedy – into the 
political realm of Athens by satirically re-endorsing it through contrast and inversion. More 
importantly, like a true satirist, Aristophanes ends the play on a latent critical note when this 
endorsement becomes once again the weapon of criticism.647 For while the ending does bring 
about the desired restoration of normality, the characters fail to realise that it is normality that 
caused the problems of the play in the first place. Similarly, in Birds, Peisetaerus and 
Euelpides leave Athens in order to find a better life outside the city, only to discover that the 
only real possibility is to live within a polis, with all its discords and injustices. Neither they, 
nor the characters in Lysistrata, can escape the status quo; instead they find themselves 
																																								 																				
645 Again, this links to the interpretation of the word πάλιν, albeit this time more positively. 
Cf. pp. 86-7. 
646 Cf. pp. 102-3, with n. 278. Cf. Dio Chrysostom, Declamations 16.9. ἐκεῖνοι µὲν γὰρ 
ὑφορώµενοι καὶ δεδιότες τὸν δῆµον ὡς δεσπότην ἐθώπευον, ἠρέµα δάκνοντες καὶ µετὰ 
γέλωτος, ὥσπερ αἱ τίτθαι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅταν δέῃ τι τῶν ἀηδεστέρων πιεῖν αὐτά, προσφέρουσι 
µέλιτι χρίσασαι τὴν κύλικα. (“For the comic poets, being suspicious and fearful of the people, 
flattered them as a slave flatters a master, chiding them gently and with a smile, as nurses will 
do with children when they must give them something unpleasant to drink and put honey on 
the rim of the cup”). 
647 Cf. Loraux 1986: 307. 
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subjects to the same cycles of recurrent political events discussed throughout this thesis. This, 
then, is almost a lesson in morality in itself and thus also an affirmation that, comparably with 
the endings of PV, Birds, the Platonic dialogues, and the moral of Plato’s ship of state parable, 




III. Lysistrata’s speech in relation to Gorgias and Birds 
 
 In the analysis of the Gorgias and the Encomium of Helen, I noted that part of the 
larger picture that is being portrayed is not only the critique of rhetoric but also the powers 
and limitations thereof. Especially, Helen is worth briefly revisiting here because it is, to a 
certain extent, also about who you are and who you say you are, and about whether others are 
able to know whether you speak the truth. 
This is complicated, because according to Gorgias, both sight and sound have the 
power to manipulate and mould the mind in whatever way they wish.649 This is why, as 
Haden also notes, speech is not subject to an objective reality but is itself an independent 
agent.650 Or, as Clements puts it, “according to this model of perception…each one of us is 
fundamentally at the mercy of what we see and hear.”651 Gorgias exemplifies this in Helen 
where he justifies Helen’s actions by stating that a) the sight of Paris overwhelmed her soul, 
																																								 																				
648 This also implies that Lysistrata’s idea of the status quo is more imagined than real, 
because it does not really bring about the peace and restoration that she desires. 
649 82B11.11, 13 DK. Cf. p. 68; p. 75 n. 193; p. 76 n. 196. 
650 Haden 1992: 320. Cf. Versényi 1963: 45, who writes that Gorgias argues that logos “might 
have nothing to do with knowledge, intellect, reason, but move in an altogether different 
realm.” 
651 Clements 2014: 186. 
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and b) she came under the influence of speech against her will; she thus had no choice but to 
leave with Paris and cannot be blamed for the complications that ensued with her leaving.652 
Gorgias, comparably with the Sausage-Seller in Aristophanes’ Knights, who blames 
the leader for deceiving the demos with illogical arguments, implies that it is the people who 
are the real victims here. For it is they who have to experience both sights and sounds in a 
passive manner, as they are separated from an objective reality. This is only exacerbated by 
the problems encountered in the Statesman and the Protagoras, which show that different 
groups often genuinely struggle to understand the speech of the other group, and that the art 
(and knowledge) of measuring words is no easy undertaking. While this implies that the 
demos, like Helen, cannot be blamed for their actions, it does make progressive political 
change, which depends on the ability of the demos to understand what is being said, 
difficult.653  
This is especially significant when relating it to the scene between Lysistrata and the 
Proboulos, because it suggests that there are no accessible epistemological grounds on which 
the Proboulos can assess the truth and value of Lysistrata’s words. In addition to the reasons 
mentioned earlier (cf. pp. 228-9) that explain his inability to understand her (i.e. his inability 
																																								 																				
652 DK 82B11-12 and DK 82B15. This is opposite to the case seen in PV, when Prometheus 
tells Zeus, as noted earlier (cf. p. 68), that even his charming rhetoric will not save him from 
his fall.  
 This is not to say that Gorgias necessarily cared about Helen. See Versényi 1963: 43-
4, who argues, while “the work is designed to show that the causes of her disaffection were 
beyond her control, and to vindicate her honor…there is no reason to suppose that Gorgias 
cared much whether Helen was vindicated or not, and Helen is obviously merely a pretext for 
his argument.” See also Robinson 1973: 53. Gorgias’ (potentially) ambigious intentions in 
writing the encomium are further underlined by the ending he chose for the text: ἐβουλήθην 
γράψαι τὸν λόγον Έλένης µὲν ἐγκώµιον, ἐµὸν δὲ παίγνιον. This may relate to the serio-comic 
nature of More’s Utopia and its subtitle, ‘A Truly Golden Handbook, No Less Beneficial than 
Entertaining.’  
653 This is also why Zeus, in the myth of the last judgment in Gorgias 523d-e, asserts that 
trials should be held ‘naked’ with everyone’s soul exposed, because only then can a fair 
judgment be made. 
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links to the opposition of the sexes; it emerges as a parody of real masculine political 
demeanour; and it recalls female powerlessness in Athens), the following can be added to the 
list: the Proboulos cannot judge the legitimacy of Lysistrata’s words because he does not 
know whether what he hears and sees is true. This is why he fails to understand her argument. 
As noted previously, this is one of the underlying notions of their dialogue: the demos is 
simply not capable of recognising a leader who means well. On the one hand, this is because 
they are easily deceived by flattering rhetoric; on the other hand, it is because of the Gorgianic 
model of perception and the Platonic problem of political comprehension: they ultimately fall 
victim to the passivity and limitations of sight and sound, which prevents them from 
understanding words in a way that actually reflects their underlying meaning.654 
Gorgias’ and Plato’s troubles then, applied to Lysistrata, are yet another reminder that 
the audience must return to their senses and see political speech for what it really is. It is clear 
that the spectacle of speech that Aristophanes creates in the dialogue between Lysistrata and 
the Proboulos, links not only to political speeches off stage, but also creates something that 
can be linked to the rhetorical problems discussed in the first and second chapter.655 The birds 
especially, seem to be prime examples of the Gorgianic model of perception. They listen to 
any logos (whether it is Tereus’ or Peisetaerus’) and are moulded by its message. At the same 
																																								 																				
654 In a way, this also foreshadows certain events that would happen later on in the year. As 
Thucydides writes at 8.66, soon after the Lenaea, Peisander and Athenian hetaireiai conspired 
against democracy and subjected the city to a reign of terror. No one dared to speak against 
them and the once-active demos had become passive for fear of being subject to violence. The 
situation was only exacerbated by the fact that appearances could not be trusted. It was not 
always clear who was (or was not) complicit in the conspiracy. Similarly, the discourse 
between Lysistrata and the Proboulos is characterized by suspicion (the Proboulos is not sure 
about Lysistrata’s motives), secrecy (he fears the women have met in secret to plot against the 
men) and a general lack of trust. See also Clements 2014: 188-9, and Prot. 356d-e, where 
Socrates talks about the dangerous power of appearance.  
655 Cf. the passage on the Mytilenian Debate in Thuc. 3.38, when Cleon scolds the Athenian 
for taking pleasure in the spectacles of fine speeches that are only about what sounds good 
and what looks good but not about what actually is good. 
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time, their ability to participate actively in political decision-making slowly vanishes 
(although some of them do try, as I have demonstrated), and they are left at the mercy of 
whatever Tereus and Peisetaerus tell them. This suggests once again that, despite the fact that 
most of the birds are bird-brained, they are not necessarily to blame for their fate because it is 
Tereus and Peisetarus, the persuaders, who really commit the wrongdoing here. 
Consequently, the Helen, as well as the Statesman and the Protagoras, helps us make 
the following argument clearer: Aristophanes is concerned with teaching the demos the 
political (and often quite tragic) deception of speeches. Like Birds and the Platonic dialogues 
(and like Plato’s ship-of-state parable and Orwell’s Animal Farm), Lysistrata demonstrates to 
the audience that they must see the true meaning behind rhetoric. In Birds, this is done by 
portraying animals that are deceived by arguments that appear to be valid but ultimately result 
in death; and in Lysistrata, it is done by portraying a character who cannot identify a valid 
argument and rather chooses the destructive status quo.656 Once again then, Aristophanes 
emerges as a poet who satirically unpacks systems of political thought and speech and who 




IV.  Ecclesiazusae 
 
It is clear that the comic idea of the rule of women is present in Lysistrata and 
Thesmophoriazusae, and presumably also in other lost plays by Aristophanes and his 
																																								 																				
656 Something similar happens in Clouds and Thesmophoriazusae. As Clements writes: “Both 
[comedies]…show us an Aristophanes explicitly concerned with the disfigurement of 
democratic discourse by arguments that appear to be valid but harmfully deceive or result in 
error, and with answering the threat posed to the proper instruction of the demos by those who 
would promulgate them.” See Clements 2014: 183-4. 
657 This is also evident in Acharnians, performed in 425 B.C., where the Chorus refer to 
Aristophanes as someone who has stopped the demos from being deceived by foreigners’ 
speeches and from being persuaded by their flattery. See Ach. 633-41. 
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contemporaries.658 Lysistrata draws parallels between military and household finances, the 
dialogue between Lysistrata and the Proboulos recalls political speeches found off stage; and 
Thesmophoriazusae envisions a women’s religious festival that corresponds to male political 
institutions in Athens. However, in both plays, the rule of women is ephemeral and everything 
goes back to normal in the end, thus echoing the idea of recurrence that shines through this 
chapter. Additionally, both comedies portray crises that are very specific: Lysistrata seizes a 
polis that is debilitated by warfare, and Critylla and the other women reprimand Euripides for 
representing them in a bad light in his tragedies. In Ecclesiazusae, on the other hand, 
performed approximately nineteen years after Lysistrata, we are presented with a different, 
more radical, case. Not only is the change in leadership permanent but the initial predicament 
is also less specific: Praxagora primarily rallies the women because she believes that the 
demos keeps electing bad leaders who abuse the law for selfish reasons.659 
The rationale for the new regime is the misuse of existing laws, which is why 
Praxagora decides to abolish courts and legal processes, and to hand over the rule to the 
women. She promises a world that Peisetaerus and Euelpides seek to find in Birds, and that 
More establishes years later in Utopia, namely a world that is free from the complexities of 
lawsuits, debts, and litigiousness. Praxagora begins this undertaking by submitting a decree to 
the Athenian legislative assembly, and it is here where it becomes clear that the legal 
language, while already present in Lysistrata and Thesmophoriazusae, is taken to a whole 
																																								 																				
658 For instance, Theopompos’ Stratiotidai seems to have portrayed women serving as 
soldiers and Pherekrates’ Tyrannis suggests a plot similar to the one we see in Lysistrata and 
Ecclesiazusae: the fragments imply that women have turned the tables on the men and that 
they are seen as the saviours of Athens. See Henderson 2000: 142. 
659 Eccl. 176-8. 
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different level in Ecclesiazusae.660 Additionally, the audience is presented with a scenario that 
is contrary to the one seen in Thesmophoriazusae, where a man dresses up as a woman and 
infiltrates a female space. Now, we have women disguise themselves as men in order to gain 
access to a male space. 
The women’s infiltration of the male legal sphere is important because it calls into 
question the legality of their decree; for an assembly which consists mainly of women 
disguised as men is not the most legitimate assembly. There is certainly an argument to be 
made that the women’s decree is procedurally correct (which I will make later on in this 
chapter), and yet there is also a kind of uncertainty to it, and it is this uncertainty that allows 
us to investigate further some of the fundamental questions about the use of law in 
Aristophanic comedy, already touched upon in our discussion of Birds. For Ecclesiazusae 
clearly plays with the juridical logic of late fifth-century and early fourth-century Athens, and 
it exhibits a portrayal of an ambiguous decree that recalls the suspicious law-making of Birds. 
In the following sections, I will investigate this juridical logic by looking at a) Praxagora’s 
political and legal rhetoric, and b) the changes that were made to the Athenian legal system in 
late fifth-century Athens, which show how the women’s decree might just work, at least in 
theory. 
 
V. Praxagora’s Political and Legal Rhetoric 
 
Despite the questionable legality of the women’s coup d’état, and despite the fact that 
it is more radical and more permanent than the one seen in Lysistrata, the language Praxagora 
uses in the assembly recalls the language Lysistrata uses in her exchange with the Proboulos. 
																																								 																				
660 Cf. Fletcher 2012: 130, who writes: “the humour of women taking control in Lysistrata 
and using the language of law-making, a minor joke in Thesmophoriazusae, extends to its 
fullest capacity in Ecclesiazusae.” 
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For, similarly to Lysistrata, Praxagora employs metaphors in a political context in order to 
demonstrate that women do have the knowledge of how to run a city. She too builds her 
argument on women’s areas of expertise (e.g. household finances, weaving, food, wine, and 
sex), and she uses these Athenian female virtues in order to a) attack the politics perpetuated 
by men, and b) propose an alternative way of running the polis. Like Lysistrata, Praxagora is 
depicted as a clever and persuasive political orator who makes clear that women have just as 
much to say about the current political situation in Athens than the men.  
Moreover, like Lysistrata, Praxagora mediates between the realms of female and male 
discourse and, comparably with Clytemnestra and other tragic characters, she serves as an 
example of the actor who accomplishes the speech of the opposite gender. In Praxagora’s 
case, this is only accentuated by both the fact that she achieves the appropriation of male 
political discourse right at the beginning of Ecclesiazusae, and by the etymology of her name, 
‘one who is active in the agora.’ Both the appropriation of male speech and Praxagora’s name 
stress the similarities between the theatre of Dionysus and the assembly, and they point at the 
status of male speech in Athens, for they show the potential dangers that can arise when the 
art of persuasion is used by leaders with a suspicious agenda.661 
Additionally, as is the case in Lysistrata, the female adaptation of male political 
discourse sets in motion the disturbance of the conventional hierarchy in Ecclesiazusae, and it 
provides Aristophanes “with a vehicle for illustrating the disastrous consequences of political 
power placed in the wrong hands.”662 However, unlike Lysistrata, Praxagora’s rhetoric is 
ultimately less convincing. She never actually says how she intends to save Athens, and 
towards the end of her speech in the Assembly, she merely provides an array of empty 
rhetoric that underlines the dubiousness of her proposed government. 
																																								 																				
661 Cf. McClure 1999: 264. 
662 McClure 1999: 264. It is clear that Praxagora joins Peisetaerus here. 
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Before we look at Praxagora’s legal and political rhetoric in more detail, we must 
briefly discuss the stolen cloaks which the women use to sneak into Assembly. It is clear that 
in order for their coup d’état to be successful, they must look like men, act like men, and 
speak like men.663 Much has been written on this kind of cross-dressing (especially on the fact 
that we deal with men playing women impersonating men), and the sexual inversion and 
infertility of the Athenian men that ultimately result from it).664 However, for this section, one 
of the more important points is the following: the women’s proposed regime is not defined by 
their transformation into men (which is, after all, only temporary, and merely a key to get into 
the assembly) but by the fundamental change of Athens’ nature. The polis becomes an oikos 
and lawsuits and politics are swapped for clothing, food, and sex. Existing law and legal 
action are eliminated, and courtrooms are converted into dining rooms. In order to save 
Athens from selfish lawmakers and bad leaders, the women propose a very non-Athenian 
government and, by doing so, undermine the basis of the conventional Athenian democracy.  
The stolen cloaks are part of this proposal because this is the only way the decree can 
be brought to the Assembly in the first place.665  The masquerade is thus a tool to carry out the 
																																								 																				
663 For scholarship on what real Greek women sounded like, see, for example, Gilleland 1980, 
Sommerstein 1995, Dickey 1995, and Dickey 1996. Cf. Thesm. 266, where Euripides tells the 
relative, “but when you talk, be sure your voice sounds feminine, and be convincing!” (ἢν 
λαλῆς δ᾽, ὄπως τῷ φθέγµατι γυναικιεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς).  
664 See, for instance, Saïd 1979, Stone 1981, Foley 1982, Muecke 1982, Taaffe 1993, Zeitlin 
1996, Bassi 1998, McClure 1999, Compton-Engle 2003, and Compton-Engle 2005. 
665 In regards to this act of larceny, there is a noteworthy observation. There is a distinct type 
of offence called λωποδυσία, the act of clothes-snatching or slipping into another’s clothes. 
For instance, Euelpides refers to this act in Birds 497, Lysias mentions it in Ag. Theom.1 
10.10, and Aeschines draws on it in Ag. Tim. 1.91. (See also Phillips 2013: 337). Harris states 
that the distinction between a regular thief and a clothes-snatcher (λωποδύτης) “is probably 
between those who take another person’s property stealthily and those who seize it openly.” 
More importantly, “to arrest a thief or a clothes-snatcher, one had to catch the thief in highly 
incriminating circumstances, that is, either in the act or with the stolen object in his 
possession soon after the crime was committed. The clothes-snatcher presumably had to be 
seized during the actual assault or just after he took the clothes.” Harris 2013: 53-54.  
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mischievous plan; however, it neither transforms the women into men permanently nor does it 
provide them with male character traits. (This is, after all, the mistake Dionysus makes in 
Frogs when he falsely believes that he assumes the traits of the person whose costume he is 
wearing).666 This is also why the women’s performance of their masculinity is flawed: they 
are insulted when they cannot take their knitting to Assembly (89) and they have difficulties 
suppressing female oaths (155).667 In comic fashion, and presumably much to the audience’s 
entertainment, the women struggle to act like men. But at the same time, this comic struggle 
also underlines the statement made earlier: the women do not wish to run the city as men but 
as women. As soon as the Assembly passes the decree, the masquerade is discarded and the 
women go back to their everyday clothing. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 While the women in Ecclesiazusae take their husbands’ cloaks secretly in order not to 
jeopardize their undertaking, Praxagora is later called out on it by Blepyrus when he asks her 
why she took his cloak instead of hers (535-8). However, she is not prosecuted, presumably 
because it would push the boundaries of the comedy a bit far if she were and because by 
abolishing legal processes and making everything communal, this particular crime is probably 
no longer a problem either. 
666 Cf. Saïd 1979: 35 and Taaffe 1991: 107. The mischievous aspects of the masquerade 
highlight More’s disdain for kings and lawyers who adopt an infinite variety of disguises that 
interfere with the truth. This is why Utopian citizens possess only one persona, which 
prevents them from engaging in any kind of role-play. Cf. pp. 32-3. 
667 We see a reverse scenario in Thesmophoriazusae when the relative first swears by Apollo 
at 269, and then by Artemis at 517. 
 According to Willi 2003: 189, this shows that “oaths could be linguistic markers. 
Apart from obvious slips like mistakes or grammatical gender and wrong forms of address, 
oaths are the only gender-linguistic feature that is explicitly commented upon.” This suggests 
that oaths in the comedy are an area in which there is a clear linguistic demarcation, which the 
women have trouble crossing. Cf. Sommerstein 1995: 65-6. See also Oath ID 788 in The Oath 
in Archaic and Classical Greece database, where it says: “The fact that the woman swears by 
the two goddesses (Demeter and Persephone), although she is pretending to be a man, gives 
her away as this is a woman’s oath….” Cf. Oath ID 713 on Thesmophoriazusae 383-384, 
where Demeter and Persephone are invoked, “this oath by Demeter and Persephone had no 
special connection with the Thesmophoria but was frequently used by women (and only 
women) at all times.” Cf. Sommerstein 2014: 321. 
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The fact that the women remain distinctively female in their approach and methods668 
(even when in male disguise) also becomes clear when looking at Praxagora’s recitation of 
her political proposal in the assembly. Even though she does vacillate between male and 
female rhetoric, similarly to Lysistrata, she makes clear that even though she is a woman her 
rhetorical skills are equal to those of an Athenian man. The passage that especially 
emphasizes her eloquence, and use of political and philosophical metaphors, is found in lines 
169-261 of Ecclesiazusae. Comparably with the beginning of Lysistrata, the passage begins 
by underlining Praxagora’s concern for both Athens and Greece as a whole as well as the fact 
that just because she is a woman, does not mean she is not able to voice her opinion on 
political matters. In lines 174-5 she addresses the assembly and says: ὅσονπερ ὑµῖν: ἄχθοµαι 
δὲ καὶ φέρω τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἅπαντα βαρέως πράγµατα. “My own stake in this country is equal 
to your own, and I am annoyed and depressed at all the city’s affairs.”669 Not only does this 
connect to Lysistrata’s statement that the future of Greece is in her hands but also to the 
traditional ‘lament and blame’ topoi used by real Athenian orators who criticise current 
political affairs. By utilizing this kind of rhetoric, Praxagora not only mocks these real orators 
but she simultaneously demonstrates her own rhetorical ability. 
 The ‘blame’ aspect becomes especially clear in the next lines when Praxagora directly 
blames the demos for the state of the current affairs; she says that it is their own fault because 
they always elect bad leaders. She says: ὁρῶ γὰρ αὐτὴν προστάταισι χρωµένην ἀεὶ πονηροῖς. 
“For I see that she constantly employs scoundrels as her leaders.” The reason for this is 
similar to the one we see in Birds, Knights, and Lysistrata: the demos is easily deceived by 
																																								 																				
668 Pelling 2000: 214. 
669 Eccl. 174-5. 
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both sight and sound, and struggles to recognise the intentions of a speaker. As Praxagora 
states:670 
 
κἄν τις ἡµέραν µίαν 
χρηστὸς γένηται, δέκα πονηρὸς γίγνεται. 
ἐπέτρεψας ἑτέρῳ: πλείον᾽ ἔτι δράσει κακά; 
χαλεπὸν µὲν οὖν ἄνδρας δυσαρέστους νουθετεῖν, 
οἳ τοὺς φιλεῖν µὲν βουλοµένους δεδοίκατε, 
τοὺς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ἀντιβολεῖθ᾽ ἑκάστοτε. 
 
Even if one of them turns virtuous for one day, he’ll turn out wicked for ten. You look 
for another one? He’ll make even worse trouble. I realize how hard it is to talk sense 
to men as cantankerous as you, who fear those who want to befriend you and 
consistently court those who do not. 
 
 
Once again, Aristophanes is walking a fine line here by implying that the Athenian demos is 
unreasonable, difficult to talk to, and unable to elect a leader who acts for the good of the 
polis. Not only does this emphasise the points made earlier in regards to Knights and 
Lysistrata, and the relevance of the Gorgianic problem of perception, but it also links to a 
central problem mentioned by Aeschines in Against Ctesiphon around five decades later 
where he talks about the Athenians’ inability to figure out the long-term ramifications of 
decisions made in the assembly.671   
 Aeschines points out that the demos might make a rash decision in the assembly 
triggered by their emotions, or because they were persuaded by the words of dishonest 
orators, and that they fail to hear the wisest and most just decrees.672 “The eventual 
consequences of a quick decision made under the influence of emotion or evil rhetoric,” Ober 
writes, “might be disastrous, as was the case with the Sicilian Expedition of 415-13.”673  
																																								 																				
670 Eccl. 177-182. 
671 Against Ctesiphon 3.3-4. Cf. Thucydides 3.38.4-7, where Cleon scolds the Athenians for 
allowing themselves to be deceived and for being the victims of new-fangled arguments. 
672 Ober 1989: 301. 
673 Ober 1989: 301. 
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 Similarly to Aeschines, Praxagora asserts that the demos has ceased to listen to good 
politicians and, like Aeschines, she reminds the audience of a time when this was not the case. 
In lines 183-5, she says: ἐκκλησίαισιν ἦν ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἐχρώµεθα οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν: ἀλλὰ τόν γ᾽ 
Ἀγύρριον πονηρὸν ἡγούµεσθα. “There was a time when we convened no assemblies at all, 
but at least we knew Agyrrhius for a scoundrel.”674 This statement, which clearly criticises the 
current political system in Athens, is the first indication for the proto-communist regime 
Praxagora is about to establish. More importantly, it relates Praxagora to other Greek orators 
who insert specific historical examples at the right moment in their speech. As Worthington 
notes: “Rhetorical allusion to a particular event or period inserted into a speech was calculated 
																																								 																				
674 Cf. Eupolis’ Cities fr. 219 (Athenaeus 425b), οὓς δ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἵλεσθ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἂν οἰνόπτας πρὸς 
τοῦ, νυνὶ στρατηγοὺς <−> . ὦ πόλις, πόλις, ὡς εὐτυχὴς εἶ µᾶλλον ἢ καλῶς φρονεῖς. (“Men 
whom before now you wouldn’t even have chosen as wine inspectors, now you elect as 
generals. O my city, my city, you are more lucky than smart”). See also Eupolis fr. 384 
(Stobaeus 4.1.9), which, according to Storey, might have been part of Demes, Cities, or 
Maricas. 
 
 καὶ µὴν ἐγὼ πολλῶν παρόντων οὐκ ἔχω τί λέξω. 
οὕτω σφόδρ᾿ ἀλγῶ τὴν πολιτείαν ὁρῶν παρ᾿ ἡµῖν. 
ἡµεῖς γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω τέως ᾠκοῦµεν οἱ γέροντες, 
ἀλλ᾿ ἦσαν ἡµῖν τῇ πόλει πρῶτον µὲν οἱ στρατηγοὶ 
ἐκ τῶν µεγίστων οἰκιῶν, πλούτῳ γένει τε πρῶτοι, 
οἷς ὡσπερεὶ θεοῖσιν ηὐχόµεσθα· καὶ γὰρ ἦσαν. 
ὥστ᾿ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπράττοµεν· νυνὶ δ᾿ ὅπῃ τύχοιµεν, 
στρατευόµεσθ᾿ αἱρούµενοι καθάρµατα στρατηγούς. 
 
Well now, with so many possibilities I don’t know what to say. I am so upset when I 
look at our [your?] state of government. This is not how we old men used to live. Our 
city had generals from the greatest families, leaders in wealth and birth, to whom we 
prayed as if they were gods—and gods they were to us. And so we lived in security. 
But now we take the field in haphazard fashion, electing as our generals the scum of 
the earth. 
 
See also Frogs 718-37, where the Chorus makes a similar argument about the Athenians 
choosing bad citizens, and appeals to them to change their ways.  
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to have the desired effect on the audience and thus lend weight to the overall thrust of the 
speech.”675 
Indeed, in Praxagora’s opinion, it was easier to see a speaker’s true intentions when 
there were no assemblies; this is because assemblies tend to praise the wrong people (e.g. 
people like Agyrrhius) for the wrong reasons (e.g. financial gain), which becomes clear in the 
next lines: νῦν δὲ χρωµένων ὁ µὲν λαβὼν ἀργύριον ὑπερεπῄνεσεν… “Nowadays we do 
convene them, and the people who draw pay praise him to the skies…”676 
 In a way, Praxagora’s argument makes sense. Generally, assemblies were more or less 
representative of the Athenian citizen body but, as Ober also points out, “it was impossible 
that every Assembly could represent a full cross section of the demos.”677 Therefore, an 
assembly that leans toward one end of the political spectrum might come to a decision that is 
not in everyone’s interest. A famous example for this can be found in Thucydides 8.67: in 
411, the assembly held outside the city, at Colonus, abolishes democracy and imposes 
penalties on any Athenian who wishes to propose an alternative decree. Instead, power is 
given to the Four Hundred, and the Athenian democracy becomes an oligarchy. Granted, this 
decision was made under the stress and turmoil of the Peloponnesian War but it still brings to 
mind the places that the popular will can lead the demos, and it is fair to assume that 
																																								 																				
675 Worthington 1994: 109. That being said, Worthington continues, “that the accuracy of the 
historical information contained in speeches by the Greek orators is open to doubt is no small 
understatement.” 
676 Eccl. 185. Agyrrhius is credited with introducing the three-obol wage for attending the 
Assembly. Praxagora seems to believe that people only attend Assembly because they are 
getting paid and that they do not really care about what is actually being discussed during 
Assembly. See McClure 1999: 244-5. Also note that Praxagora’s use of ἀργύριον, meaning 
money or a small coin, could be a pun on the name Agyrrhius, i.e. Ἀγύρριος introduced 
ἀργύριον to the Assembly.  
 Cf. Gorgias’ Helen 1, ἴση γὰρ ἀµαρτία καὶ ἀµαθία µέµφεσθαί τε τὰ ἐπαινετὰ καὶ 
ἐπαινεῖν τὰ µωµητά. (‘For it is equal error and mistake to blame the praisable and to praise the 
blameable’). 
677 Ober 1989: 301. 
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Praxagora thinks about this when proposing the abolition of assemblies: when there is nothing 
to overthrow, coups like those in 411 will not happen anymore.678 
 Indeed, it is the popular will, and the fluctuations of it, that seem to be of concern to 
Praxagora. For in the next few lines she describes the constant fluctuations of the demos’ 
opinions.679 For instance, the demos wished for the city to be ratified, but when it was ratified, 
they were unhappy;680 there are always different political opinions amongst different social 
groups in the demos (τῷ πένητι µὲν δοκεῖ, τοῖς πλουσίοις δὲ καὶ γεωργοῖς οὐ δοκεῖ);681 and 
the relationships with the Corinthians are never stable.682 (It is ironic that towards the end of 
the play, a character describes Praxagora’s newly established regime in a similar way: he 
refuses to hand over his possessions to the government because they (and the demos) 
constantly change their mind anyway. He says: ἐγᾦδα τούτους χειροτονοῦντας µὲν ταχύ, ἅττ᾽ 
ἂν δὲ δόξῃ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀρνουµένους. “I know these people: they’re quick to vote on 
something then they turn around and refuse to abide by whatever it was”).683 
 This sentiment is elaborated in lines 205-209 of Praxagora’s speech when she 
compares the demos’ always-changing opinion to the tossing of a ship.684 
 
ὑµεῖς γάρ ἐστ᾽ ὦ δῆµε τούτων αἴτιοι.  
τὰ δηµόσια γὰρ µισθοφοροῦντες χρήµατα  
ἰδίᾳ σκοπεῖσθ᾽ ἕκαστος ὅ τι τις κερδανεῖ,  
τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ὥσπερ Αἴσιµος κυλίνδεται.  
ἢν οὖν ἐµοὶ πείθησθε, σωθήσεσθ᾽ ἔτι. 
																																								 																				
678 Likewise, Lysistrata’s coup against warfare and military matters would probably not be 
feasible under Praxagora’s regime. 
679 Eccl. 193-200. 
680 Eccl. 193-4. 
681 Eccl. 197-8. 
682 Eccl. 199-200. 
683 Eccl. 796. 
684 In regards to the example of Aesimus, Sommerstein writes: “The scholia assert that 
Aesimus was ‘lame, disfranchised [or dishonoured] and stupid’, apparently taking κυλίνδεται 
to mean ‘reels about like a cripple, drunkard or idiot’; but this sense of the verb is not 
otherwise attested.” Sommerstein 1998: 158. 
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And you, the sovereign people, are responsible for this mess. For while drawing your 
civic pay from public funds, each of you angles for a personal profit. Meanwhile the 
public interest flounders like Aesimus. But listen to my advice and you shall escape 
from your muddle. 
   
The use of τὸ κοινὸν κυλίνδεται is particularly significant and deserves special attention. 
Praxagora, like many orators before her, evokes the famous ship of state metaphor and 
compares the public interests (τὸ κοινὸν) to the effects of the sea (κυλίνδεται). In her opinion, 
the state tosses to and fro like a ship at sea.685 The kind of language Praxagora uses here, 
especially her usage of the word κυλίνδω, might have brought to mind certain passages in 
Homer to the audience. For instance, in Il.11.307, Homer writes τρόφι κῦµα κυλίνδεται when 
describing the constant rolling onwards of swollen waves; and in Od.2.136, he writes τοῖσιν 
γὰρ µέγα πῆµα κυλίνδεται when referring to the great despair that is rolling onto the suitors. 
Similarly, in Frogs 536, Aristophanes uses µετακυλίνδειν to equate a ship’s tossing with 
Dionysus’ changing opinion.  
 Moreover, τὸ κοινὸν also emphasises sharing. Aristotle’s concept of κοινωνία, 
discussed in the chapter on Birds, makes clear that human beings who have a perception of 
what is good and bad, and just and unjust, are a community that make a household and a city. 
Praxagora’s use of the word here is another indication for the oikos-like city she is about to 
establish. She knows that a family is also a κοινωνία, as they share the goods of the 
household. By referring to the Athenian demos in the same way, she prepares for the stage to 
become “an area in comedy in which the distinctive and the peculiar are opened up to be 
shared by all…”686 Therefore, by including τὸ κοινὸν κυλίνδεται in her speech, Praxagora 
highlights an important trademark of the new regime: there will be no more disagreements 
and wavering opinions amongst the members of the Athenian community, and thus no more 
																																								 																				
685 This recalls the circular movements seen in the Statesman, Timaeus, and Critias, especially 
the recurrent moments of foundations and cataclysms in which Athens seems to be trapped. 
686 Saxonhouse 2000: 58. 
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ring-like compositions and circular movements. Instead, there will be pre-established opinions 
that are suitable for all and that will allow for a progressive government.687 
 The idea that the gynaecocracy will be more progressive than the previous regime is 
also hinted at in a claim made earlier in the play. In line 109, Praxagora remarks: νῦν µὲν γὰρ 
οὔτε θέοµεν οὔτ᾽ ἐλαύνοµεν. “As it is, our city is oarless and becalmed.” Praxagora asserts 
that, as things are the moment, the Athenians neither sail nor row; they are motionless and not 
getting anywhere. She uses this nautical vocabulary to describe the current situation in Athens 
and to appeal to the assembly that they have to do better than this if they want to move 
forward and escape the realm of waves and circles. Like any good orator, she also tells them 
how they can do better: ἢν οὖν ἐµοὶ πείθησθε, σωθήσεσθ᾽ ἔτι. “But listen to my advice and 
you shall escape from your muddle.”688 Of course, her advice is to hand over the rule to the 
women, for only then will Athens have a progressive government: ταῖς γὰρ γυναιξὶ φηµὶ 
χρῆναι τὴν πόλιν ἡµᾶς παραδοῦναι.689  
 It is worth noting here that the meaning of Praxagora’s ship of state metaphor is 
different from Lysistrata’s. For in Lysistrata, the ship of state metaphor is used primarily to 
underscore a problem that appears frequently in the scene with the Proboulos: the Proboulos 
struggles to understand Lysistrata because of the abstract nature of her arguments (and 
because she is from a different faction) and is reluctant to offer her the opportunity to show 
her skills. In Ecclesiazusae, on the other hand, the metaphor is used to emphasise both the 
concept of unity and the removal of democratic politics. Additionally, it is used in opposite 
ways in the plays. In Lysistrata, it points at the importance of democratic decision-making 
that involves everyone and not just a select, potentially incompetent, few; and in 
																																								 																				
687 This is in line with More’s rationale for Utopia, if there is no room for private political 
debate and factions, no alternative proposals against the established regime can be made. 
688 Eccl. 209. 
689 Eccl. 210-11. 
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Ecclesiazusae, it is used to underline tyrannical decision-making that does not involve 
everyone. In this manner, Praxagora’s speech, while similar in style to Lysistrata’s, is 
ultimately also less comforting. This is because it is much more reassuring to listen to 
someone who offers democracry and metaphorical warm cloaks as a solution than to someone 
who advocates violence and the abolition of democracy. 
 However, while Praxagora uses the ship of state metaphor in a different way from 
Lysistrata, like Lysistrata, she soon launches into an argument that shows why the women are 
better suited to run Athens than the men. She begins by asserting that women are simply 
superior to men: ὡς δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἡµῶν τοὺς τρόπους βελτίονες ἐγὼ διδάξω.690 This claim of 
superiority is doubtless provocative (and presumably ridiculous) to the audience but it does 
have parallels with other texts. For instance, in Euripides’ Melanippe Captive, the speaker 
scolds men for denouncing women, for they are so much better suited at running things than 
men are.  µάτην ἄρ᾿ ἐς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρῶν ψόγος ψάλλει κενὸν τόξευµα καὶ λέγει κακῶς· αἱ 
δ᾿ εἰσ᾿ ἀµείνους ἀρσένων, δείξω δ᾿ ἐγώ. “Vainly does censure from men twang an idle 
bowshot at women and denounce them. In fact, they are better than men, as I shall 
demonstrate…”691 In this account, the claim of superiority mainly derives from the women’s 
roles in the household: νέµουσι δ᾿ οἴκους καὶ τὰ ναυστολούµενα ἔ[σω] δόµων σῴζουσιν, οὐδ᾿ 
ἐρηµίᾳ γυναικὸς οἶκος εὐπινὴς οὐδ᾿ ὄλβιος. “They manage households, and save what is 
brought by sea within the home, and no house deprived of a woman can be tidy and 
prosperous.”  
In Thesmophoriazusae, on the other hand, the female characters prove themselves 
superior through the etymologies of their names. The Chorus Leader examines whether men 
																																								 																				
690 Eccl. 214-5. 
691 Melanippe Captive 494. 
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or women are the worse (χείρους) group by contrasting them and placing the name of a 
woman and a man side by side.692 
 
Ναυσιµάχης µέν γ᾽ ἥττων ἐστὶν Χαρµῖνος: δῆλα δὲ τἄργα.  
καὶ µὲν δὴ καὶ Κλεοφῶν χείρων πάντως δήπου Ξαλαβακχοῦς.  
πρὸς Ἀριστοµάχην δὲ χρόνου πολλοῦ, πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν Μαραθῶνι,  
καὶ Ξτρατονίκην ὑµῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδ᾽ ἐγχειρεῖ πολεµίζειν.  
ἀλλ᾽ Εὐβούλης τῶν πέρυσίν τις βουλευτής ἐστιν ἀµείνων  
παραδοὺς ἑτέρῳ τὴν βουλείαν; οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς τοῦτό γε φήσεις.  
οὕτως ἡµεῖς πολὺ βελτίους τῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐχόµεθ᾽ εἶναι. 
 
 Take Nausimache and Charminos: he’s inferior—what could be 
 clearer? 
 Here’s a further example: take Kleophon—far worse than the tart 
 Salabaccho! 
 No man even tries to compete with Aristomache, Marathonian 
 woman. 
 And the same is true where Stratonike’s military might is 
 concerned. 
 But as for last year’s Councillors, not one could match Euboule. 
 They abandoned office to somebody else: they couldn’t deny it 
 themselves. 
 So that’s why we boast that women are better, much better, than  
 all you men.     
 
 
Praxagora’s statement is equally bold, and by providing this link to similar 
proclamations made in other dramatic texts, she not only offers a comic reversal of the 
traditional Athenian hierarchy but she also paves the way for the next lines where she explains 
how exactly the women are superior to the men. At first, she emphasises the old-fashioned 
																																								 																				
692 Thesm. 801-10. See also Kanavou 2011: 151-2, who writes, “Ναυσιµάχη ‘fighting at sea’, 
is appropriately superior to Charminos, the Athenian general defeated by Sparta at a naval 
battle earlier that year (Th. 8.41.3 – 43.1).” “The meanings of Ἀριστοµάχη (‘best fighter’) and 
Ξτρατονίκη (‘victory for the army’) are related and imply female success in the battle field, 
where men have appeared (in the context of current war) to be highly inadequate.” “Εὐβούλη, 
‘of right judgment’, alludes to the ability of good thinking, also a traditionally male 
characteristic.” Ξαλαβακχώ, meanwhile, “is used for a different sort of joke. It belonged to a 
well-known hetaera…and it is clearly not chosen for a positive etymological meaning, but for 
the allusion to the courtesan and for its position at the end of the line: while the other 
women’s names…introduce statements about female superiority to men, in the case of 
Salabakho’s name the joke is that the demagogue Kleophon…is worse than her, a 
prostitute…” 
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nature of the women and their respect for ancient customs (κοὐχὶ µεταπειρωµένας ἴδοις ἂν 
αὐτάς).693 She scolds the Athenian men for messing around with innovations that are not 
necessary while the women attend to traditional things as they have always done (ὥσπερ καὶ 
πρὸ τοῦ): they celebrate the Thesmophoria, enjoy cooking, baking, drinking, and sex.694 
Somewhat paradoxically then, “the radically new order is underpinned by the claim that its 
beneficiaries represent the Athenian reservoir of old-fashioned virtues.”695  
This speech about the good old days not only links to the theme of ‘return to the 
origins,’ already seen in the previous chapters, but it also feeds into Praxagora’s earlier 
criticism of the demos: back in the day, people did not take money to attend assembly; instead 
they took their civic duty seriously and acted for the good of the polis.696 Moreover, it links to 
the older characters in the play that represent the wisdom of the older generation in Athens 
(see, for instance, 895-6). At the same time, we see how this criticism and knowledge of 
ancestral customs gives way to the women’s coup d’état. Generally speaking, Praxagora is a 
lot more innovative than some of the other characters in Aristophanic comedy, and she is 
certainly more ground-breaking than Lysistrata. For Lysistrata, as mentioned in the beginning 
of this chapter (cf. p. 213), is meant to symbolise the oldest and best Athenian virtues, which 
are supposed to reject warfare as the irrational thing that it is. Praxagora, on the other hand, is 
meant to represent a new order. She may emphasise the women’s knowledge of ancient 
customs in order to underline her argument, and her regime may be modelled after the 
																																								 																				
693 Eccl. 217-8. A related statement about the old-fashioned nature of women also appears in 
Cratylus 418c, when Socrates says to Hermogenes that women ‘are most addicted to 
preserving old forms of speech.’ (µάλιστα τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σῴζουσι). 
694 Eccl. 221-8. 
695 Ober 1998: 146. 
696 Reckford 1987: 345. See also Eccl. 302a-310c. 
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traditional values of the oikos, but at the end of the day, the government she establishes has 
little to do with the Athenian status quo that Lysistrata seeks to restore. 697 
 The fact that the new government will be radically different from the democratic 
Athens is also implied in the subsequent lines of Praxagora’s speech. She does not want to say 
what exactly the new regime will entail, which is undoubtedly rather suspicious. Instead, she 
says: παραδόντες τὴν πόλιν µὴ περιλαλῶµεν, µηδὲ πυνθανώµεθα τί ποτ᾽ ἄρα δρᾶν µέλλουσιν, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῷ τρόπῳ ἐῶµεν ἄρχειν. “Let us hand over governance of the city to the women, and 
let’s not beat around the bush or ask what they plan to accomplish. Let’s simply let them 
govern.”698 This statement is far from being a trustworthy one, and it certainly suggests that 
the new government may not be the most transparent one the Athenians have ever seen. 
 The suspiciousness of these lines is also highlighted by Praxagora’s use of the word 
ἁπλῷ. Ἁπλῷ means ‘single, simple and plain,’ and initially it seems that Praxagora uses the 
word in order to underscore her good intentions for the new government. This positive 
connotation of ἁπλῷ recalls section 8.36 in Pindar’s Nemean, where he appeals to Zeus to 
help him stay away from hateful allurement (ἐχθρὰ πάρφασις) and flattering tales (αἱµύλων 
µύθων), and instead help him stay on a straightforward path in life (κελεύθοις ἁπλόαις ζωᾶς). 
Praxagora does something similar when she promises to lead her regime on a straight path 
that does not include ambiguities, hatred, and deceitful speech. It also brings to mind a 
passage from Polybius’ Histories when he uses ἁπλῷ in the superlative in order to refer to the 
simplest of lives (ἁπλουστάτοις βίοις) that is removed from extravagance and excess (τῆς ἐν 
																																								 																				
697 Cf. Saxonhouse 1992: 8. The fact that Praxagora appropriates male speech here in order to 
undermine the Athenian status quo can be compared with the role of Clytemnestra in the 
Oresteia, where “she uses her ability to mimic and appropriate masculine and public language 
to serve what from the choral perspective would be a regime that entirely undercuts the 
cultural status quo.” See Foley 2001: 204. 
698 Eccl. 229-232. 
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τούτοις περιττότητος καὶ πολυτελείας ἀφεστῶτες).699 Again, this underlines Praxagora’s goal 
to rule her government in a simple manner and to stay away from unnecessary superfluity. 
However, it is also clear that when Praxagora asserts that the demos should simply let 
the women govern (ἁπλῷ τρόπῳ ἐῶµεν ἄρχειν) she does not merely mean that they should 
just let them govern and have faith in them, but also that they should let them govern with a 
simple narrative that does not include a proper discussion about the type of government they 
are about to establish. The idea that ἁπλῷ does not only have positive connotations becomes 
also clear when looking at other Greek texts. For example, in Isocrates’ To Nicocles, Isocrates 
laments that people often fail to take pleasure in the things that are the most honourable, 
useful, and noblest to them. Instead, they pursue things, which are contrary to their best 
interest.700 By doing so, “they shun the verities of life” (τὰς ἀληθείας τῶν πραγµάτων 
φεύγουσιν), as they do not even know their own interests (ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τὰ σφέτερ᾽ αὐτῶν 
ἴσασιν).701 The reason for this is, Isocrates asserts, that people “look upon men of wisdom 
with suspicion, while they regard men of no understanding as open and sincere” (φθονοῦσι 
µὲν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν, ἁπλοῦς δ᾽ ἡγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας).702  
 Here, ἁπλοῦς is used to describe simple-minded people (‘men of no understanding’) 
who are looked up to by others. This links to the abovementioned passage in Ecclesiazusae, 
for Praxagora is also praised by people who are unable to see the truth, and who regard her as 
open and sincere despite the fact that she is ἁπλῆ, i.e. too unqualified and simple-minded in 
order to run a government that is fair to all.  Indeed, her view of the matter is too simple, and 
																																								 																				
699 Polybius, Histories 9.10.5. 
700 To Nic. 2.45. This recalls the failed measurements discussed in the Protagoras: people 
struggle to measure happiness and unhappiness accurately, and thus often choose the wrong 
side of the scale. Cf. pp. 108-9. 
701 To Nic. 2.46. 
702 To Nic. 2.46. This in turn brings to mind one of the rationales for Praxagora’s government: 
the Athenians do not know how to distinguish a wise leader from a scoundrel.  
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here ἁπλῷ also brings to mind a section in Plato’s Protagoras where Protagoras tells Socrates 
that his view of the parallels between justice and holiness is not as simple as his is. He says: “I 
do not take quite so simple a view of it, Socrates…” οὐ πάνυ µοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
οὕτως ἁπλοῦν.703 Again, ἁπλοῦν is used to describe a simple mind-set that fails to look at the 
matter at hand from different angles; this highlights the negative connotations of Praxagora’s 
speech further: she may say that the issue at hand is a simple matter for which no thorough 
discussion is necessary, but linking her use of ἁπλῷ to that of others shows us that what is 
about to happen is much larger than she says it is.  
Returning to her speech, even though she does give a few examples in the next lines, 
which highlight the resemblance between a city and a family (discussed earlier), she does not 
actually tell the audience how she and the other women intend to save Athens. She merely 
points out the women’s maternal instinct and the fact that they are skilled in household 
management. She then stops there and makes another vague claim: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ ἐάσω: ταῦτ᾽ 
ἐὰν πείθησθέ µοι, εὐδαιµονοῦντες τὸν βίον διάξετε. “I’ll pass over my other points. Adopt my 
resolution and you’ll lead happy lives.”704 While Praxagora is in good company here with 
other politicians who make ambiguous statements in the assembly, the sheer elusiveness of 
her government does not bode well for the Athenians. On the contrary, it is yet another sign 
that the audience is witnessing the descent of a democracy into a tyranny.705 
Unsurprisingly, and in true Aristophanic fashion, the characters of the play are elated 
at the prospect of the government Praxagora proposes. Like the Athenian demos, scolded 
earlier by Praxagora for not paying proper attention to an orator’s rhetoric, and like the 
gullible birds in Birds, Praxagora’s audience is swayed by her eloquence. As the Second 
																																								 																				
703 Prot. 331b. 
704 Eccl. 239-240. 
705 Cf. Rep. 547b-562b. 
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Woman remarks: εὖ γ᾽ ὦ γλυκυτάτη Πραξαγόρα καὶ δεξιῶς. πόθεν ὦ τάλαινα ταῦτ᾽ ἔµαθες 
οὕτω καλῶς; “Well said, Praxagora my sweet! What skill! Where did you learn such fine talk, 
my dear?706 The woman fails to realise that the part of Praxagora’ speech she is referring to is 
neither fine nor skilled; it may be well-spoken but, as mentioned earlier, it is nothing but 
empty rhetoric at the end of the day. Like the Athenian men, whom she and the other women 
reprimand, she does not see that Praxagora’s proposed regime may not be as great as she 
thinks it will be.707 
  The deception of Praxagora’s speech is also implied in the next few lines when she 
responds to the Second Woman’s question quoted above, saying: ἐν ταῖς φυγαῖς µετὰ τἀνδρὸς 
ᾤκησ᾽ ἐν πυκνί. ἔπειτ᾽ ἀκούουσ᾽ ἐξέµαθον τῶν ῥητόρων. “During the displacements I lived 
with my husband on the Pnyx, and learned by listening to the orators.”708 As mentioned 
earlier (cf. p. 240), this stresses the idea that Praxagora, like Lysistrata, vacillates between the 
two realms of male and female speech, as she offers an example of the actor who successfully 
appropriates the speech of the opposite gender. Indeed, as McClure asserts, Praxagora appears 
“as an accomplished public speaker in the Assembly who seduces ‘his’ audience with ‘his’ 
deceptive speech.”709 Rothwell states similarly: “Far from giving herself away as a woman 
																																								 																				
706 Eccl. 241-2. 
707 Cf. Gagarin 1994: 47, who writes: “Aristophanes’ comic caricature of rhetoric as a vehicle 
for persuasive falsehood that will sway a largely ignorant audience is the product of a 
fundamentally conservative critical position. The same basic attitude underlies the sustained 
philosophical attack on rhetoric in the Gorgias.” Comparable depictions of rhetoric can be 
found in Clouds when Strepsiades only wants to learn sophistic rhetoric, so he can escape 
from his debt-collectors, and in Wasps when Aristophanes paints “a picture of the typical 
Athenian juror as blinded by the prejudice and utterly unconcerned with the truth of a 
litigant’s case. This ignorant juror is the perfect foil for the sophists’ tricks of persuasion.” 
708 Eccl. 243-4. 
709 McClure 1999: 239. In this vein, both Lysistrata and Praxagora might be seen as examples 
of characters who blur the distinction between categories that are otherwise assumed to be 
opposite to another. (As is, for instance, the case in the Pythagorean table of opposites where 
‘male’ and ‘female’ are on opposite sides). This also recalls Lysistrata’s use of the weaving-
metaphor, which she employs in order to combine (and indeed, weave together) different 
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who is unfamiliar with oratory, she positively shines…‘a fine exercise in rhetoric,’ ‘so 
accurate is the parody that the speech would do credit to an actual speaker in the 
assembly.’”710 This is also why the First Woman makes this remark in response to 
Praxagora’s statement that she learned to speak from her husband and other orators: οὐκ ἐτὸς 
ἄρ᾽ ὦ µέλ᾽ ἦσθα δεινὴ καὶ σοφή. “Then it’s no wonder, madam, that you were so impressive 
and sage.”711  
 That being said, despite their similarities, Praxagora and Lysistrata employ different 
styles of appropriation. When Praxagora tells her audience how she learned the male 
language, she uses the verb ἐκµανθάνω. This suggests that she examined the language of the 
orators she mentions very closely and learned it by heart (cf. Laws 811a), which in turn 
indicates that she knows the relevant vocabulary through and through. Lysistrata, on the other 
hand, when she describes her appropriation of the male language, uses the verb µουσόοµαι 
(1127), which, while similar in meaning, has different connotations to ἐκµανθάνω. 
Particularly, it is passive, meaning ‘to be educated’ or ‘to be trained in the ways of the Muses’ 
rather than active as is the case of ἐκµανθάνω. This implies that Lysistrata did not study the 
male language as actively as Praxagora did (who, by using an active form, stays literally true 
to the etymology of her name). This is underlined further by Aelian’s use of the word at NA 
16.3, where he talks about an Indian bird that, if taught to utter human speech (µουσωθεὶς 
φωνήν) is more talkative than the parrot. The passive form, and its employment to describe 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
factions. Like the Pythagorean table, and the female-male rhetoric, the metaphor draws 
attention to the combination of opposites, which in turn underlines Lysistrata’s political 
potential because, like the true statesman in Plato’s Statesman, she is a “political weaver [who 
is] concerned with intertwining two opposite groups of citizens.” Lane 1998: 177. 
710 Rothwell 1990: 84. 
711 Eccl. 245. The chorus in Thesmophoriazusae uses the same word (δεινός) to describe the 
first woman’s speech, οὔπω ταύτης ἤκουσα πολυπλοκωτέρας γυναικὸς οὐδὲ δεινότερον 
λεγούσης. (“I’ve never heard a woman more intricate of mind or more impressive as a 
speaker”). 
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something similar (namely, an adaptation of a kind of human speech), suggests further that 
Lysistrata’s appropriation of the masculine language is not as active as that of Praxagora.712 
 Therefore, while both characters are undeniably very clever, ultimately Praxagora’s 
rhetorical skills are superior. Indeed, they are so ‘impressive and sage’ that she emerges, 
anachronistically, as a prime example of Aristotle’s means of persuasion. Specifically, at 
Rhetoric 1377b, Aristotle stresses the importance of pathos, which is used in order to create a 
certain mood in the audience; and it is clear that Praxagora employs that method when 
utilizing the ‘lament and blame’ rhetoric at the beginning of her speech. It is also clear that 
she employs the concept of eunoia equally well in order to establish a bond between her and 
the audience in order to ensure that the rest of her speech will do its work.713 By sharing a 
language with the group she addresses, she constructs a narrative of belonging (as Tereus and 
Peisetaerus have done before her), which in turn generates a feeling of trust in the audience. 
Furthermore, she makes use of a strategy mentioned at 1377b, namely ethos, in order to 
induce the degree of trust further and “to produce a feeling of goodwill in the audience 
towards the speaker” so she can reach the effect sought by her.714 She does this, for example, 
when she tells the other women that she learned political rhetoric by listening to other men. 
Like Nestor’s appeal to his age and experience at Il. 1.260, which is supposed to underline his 
																																								 																				
712 This also means that Praxagora, “like many other Aristophanic main heroes’ names, has 
the sound of an ‘earned’ name.” Kanavou 2011: 172. 
The idea that it is worth exploring the different styles of appropriation was given to 
me by Catherine Conybeare and Brett Rogers during the Q&A of my paper (“The Athenian 
female ideal and its opposite: female rhetors in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae”), 
given at the ‘Prometheus, Pandora, Adam and Eve: Archetypes of the Masculine and 
Feminine and their Reception throughout the Ages’ conference at Bar-Ilan University on 20 
March 2017. 
713 See Carey 1994: 29. Lysistrata does something similar when she gathers the women at the 
beginning of the play, but I would say that ultimately Praxagora is more successful because, 
unlike Lysistrata, she manages to convince both sexes. 
714 Carey 1994: 35. See also Russell 1990: 198. Cf. Mossman 1995: 98-99 to see how this 
description relates to Greek tragedy, (rather than comedy, as is the case here). 
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expertise in military matters, so Praxagoras’s reference is intended to constitute a claim to her 
authority in political affairs.  
 Finally, Praxagora also knows how to appropriate style suitably when she addresses 
the women, which brings to mind section 1408a of the Rhetoric, where Aristotle talks about 
the importance of the ‘propriety of style’ and the combination of language with external 
characteristics (such as sex and age).  He says:  
 
 πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγµα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις: παραλογίζεταί τε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς  ἀληθῶς 
 λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὥστ᾽ οἴονται, εἰ καὶ µὴ οὕτως ἔχει  ὡς 
 λέγει ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγµατα οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ συνοµοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ 
 παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν µηθὲν λέγῃ. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς 
 θορυβοῦντες. 
 
Appropriate style also makes the fact appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is 
 imposed upon under the impression that the speaker is speaking the truth, because, in 
 such circumstances, his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if it is not the 
 case as the speaker puts it) that things are as he represents them; and the hearer always 
 sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally, even though he really says nothing. 
 This is why speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise. 
 
Especially ‘καὶ συνοµοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν µηθὲν λέγῃ’ echoes 
both the women’s positive reaction to Praxagora’s proposal as well as the (negative) male 
elements of her style of delivery, which are more about making noise and provoking uproar 
than anything else.715 Again, this shows how well Praxagora appropriates masculine speech 
and how closely she must have paid attention when she observed men doing politics. 
 Ultimately, it is because of this astute observation and arguable brilliance that the 
women decide to elect Praxagora as general (στρατηγός).716 If it has not been clear before, it 
																																								 																				
715 There is another modern parallel which emphasises this point further. Earlier this year, the 
New York Times advertised their subscription services, and posted: ‘Subscribe to nuances, 
not noise.’ This highlights not only the connection between antiquity and modernity pointed 
out in the introduction, but also the dangers of Praxagora’s words.  
716 Eccl. 246. It appears that Praxagora is effectively στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, who enjoys 
extraordinary powers and authority. See Hamel 1998, esp. pp. 9, 50 and 201-3. This does not 
necessarily mean that she is ‘absolute in powers or exempt from accountability,’ (Hammond 
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should now be obvious to anyone that ‘Gynaikopolis,’ as Sommerstein calls it, “is no more 
ruled by the women than Cloudcuckooville is ruled by the birds.”717 The idea that Praxagora 
is in sole charge of Athens is later confirmed by Blepyrus when he says: φέρε νυν ἐγώ σοι 
παρακολουθῶ πλησίον, ἴν᾽ἀποβλέπωµαι καὶ λέγωσιν ἐµὲ ταδί, “τὸν τῆς στρατηγοῦ τοῦτον οὐ 
θαυµάζετε;” “Say, I’d like to tag along at your side, and share the spotlight, with people 
saying, “Look, that’s none other than the Lady Commander’s husband!”718 This sentiment is 
reiterated at lines 834-837 when the Herald proclaims: 
  
 ὦ πάντες ἀστοί, νῦν γὰρ οὕτω ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει,  
 χωρεῖτ᾽ ἐπείγεσθ᾽ εὐθὺ τῆς στρατηγίδος,  
 ὅπως ἂν ὑµῖν ἡ τύχη κληρουµένοις  
 φράσῃ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄνδρ᾽ ὅποι δειπνήσετε 
  
 Now here this, all you citizens—yes, all are included now: 
 get a move on and go straight to the Lady Commander’s  
 place, so that the luck of the draw can determine where 
 each man among you will dine. 
 
 
It is clear that Praxagora is the στρατηγός and that the Athenian citizens are no more equal to 
her than the birds are to Peisetaerus in Birds. It is also clear that Praxagora’s regime, similarly 
to the one in Birds, is shaped by a deceptive political discourse that is full of jargon and that 
fails to address the truly important things. Once again, the women epitomise Aeschines’ 
concern mentioned earlier and show that the demos has ceased to listen to the wisest and most 
just decrees to which Athens was once accustomed. The suggestion that Praxagora may not 
propose the wisest and most just decree also becomes evident when looking at the last few 
lines of the passage analysed here. When asked how she intends to handle potential 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
1969: 127), however, considering Praxagora overturns the traditional Athenian constitution, it 
is unlikely that she is accountable to any of the checks that may have been imposed by it. 
717 Sommerstein 2009: 216.  
718 Eccl. 725-7. 
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confrontations in the assembly and the city-guards (οἱ τοξόται), she says that she will slander 
their names and nudge them with her elbow (ἐξαγκωνιῶ).719 
 On the one hand, this violence is a comic feature that belongs to this fictional world 
that Aristophanes presents on the stage of the Greek theatre; it is a world in which (comic) 
violence rather than the rule of law prevails. On the other hand, it refers back to the dubious 
proclamation made earlier, namely that the demos should just let the women govern without 
asking too many questions (ἁπλῷ τρόπῳ ἐῶµεν ἄρχειν). If questions should be asked 
regardless, they may be shut down with violence and slander. In addition to the rest of 
Praxagora’s speech, this is yet another indication that the decree of the women will not 
necessarily bode well for the Athenians. 
 The selected passage above then portrays Praxagora’s political and legal rhetoric in a 
way that foreshadows the ambiguous government that is about to be established. The results 
of her speech are a prime example for where misleading advice, persuasively given, can lead 
people who are easily swayed by political jargon and who fail to measure the words that are 
given to them. Certainly, comparably with Birds and Protagoras, this passage places as much 
emphasis on poor advice as on poor judgment. However, while the birds may be excused 
because they are ‘bird-brained,’ in this case, at least part of the responsibility lies with the 
Athenians, for their judgment is so poor that Praxagora persuades them without any real 
difficulty.720 This brings to mind a section in Pindar’s Nemean 7.33-4, where he writes: 
																																								 																				
719 Eccl. 249-60. 
720 See Carter 2013: 55, who refers to this lack of judgment as “an account that is firmly 
critical of democracy, either the people are too dimwitted to recognize good advice when it is 
presented to them (the view the messenger in Euripides’ Orestes takes of some of his fellow 
citizens), or their judgment is so poor that they are routinely manipulated by unscrupulous 
politicians. In this last category we find most of Aristophanes’ Knights.” This brings to mind 
Brennan’s argument (cf. p. 103 n. 284), when he argues for less, rather than more, political 
participation because, in his opinion, not everyone is able to participate in a way that is 
actually beneficial.  
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τυφλὸν δ᾽ ἔχει ἦτορ ὅµιλος ἀνδρῶν ὁ πλεῖστος. “The heart of the mass is blind.”721 It also 
recalls a passage in Euripides’ Orestes when Orestes says to Pylades: δεινὸν οἰ πολλοί, 
κακούργους ὄταν ἔχωσι προστάτας. “The masses are a dreadful thing when they have wicked 
leaders.”722 In the case of Ecclesiazusae, the questionable legality of the decree only 
reinforces this poor judgment and it is now time that we turn to this question of legality and 




VI. The Legality of the Women’s Decree 
 VI.a. The Procedure 
 
 As mentioned on p. 238, rather than putting the decree in front of a comic assembly of 
women, as is the case in Thesmophoriazusae, Praxagora submits it to the Athenian assembly 
when the prytaneis call for a debate about the salvation of the polis (τί δ᾽ ἄλλο γ᾽ ἢ ἔδοξε τοῖς 
πρυτάνεσι περὶ σωτηρίας γνώµας καθεῖναι τῆς πόλεως;).723 The fact that the decree is 
submitted to the real assembly in the play is important, for it enhances the joke by making it 
more tangible. The rules of the assembly in Ecclesiazusae are those of the real assembly in 
																																								 																				
721 The persuasion of the masses also brings to mind Herodotus 5.97, where Aristagoras is 
able to deceive 30,000 Athenians but fails to fool one single Spartan. 
722 Orestes 772. See also Carter 2013: 52, who uses this passage in order to point out that the 
“assembly scene [in Orestes] is narrated in such a way as to keep the people insulated from 
blame, to an extent. The audience of this play has been primed to accept the view that it will 
be the politicians’ fault if the people do not decide in favor of Orestes.” 
 On a related note, see also Phaedrus 259-6a, where Phaedrus asks Socrates: οὑτωσὶ 
περὶ τούτου ἀκήκοα, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ µέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τῷ 
ὄντι δίκαια µανθάνειν ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαντ᾽ ἂν πλήθει οἵπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ 
καλὰ ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα δόξει: ἐκ γὰρ τούτων εἶναι τὸ πείθειν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας. “On that 
point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is 
really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what 
is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so; for they say that persuasion comes from 
what seems to be true, not from the truth.” 
723 Eccl. 395-7. Cf. Thesm. 943-4, which suggests that the prytaneis are able to schedule an 
emergency meeting of the council when necessary. 
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early fourth-century Athens, and while the outcome of the women’s decree is undoubtedly 
radical, it is not necessarily absurd.724 On the contrary, as I will demonstrate in this section, 
the mechanics of getting the decree passed by the assembly are not just based on deception 
but also on real legal practices of early fourth-century Athens.  
 It is, I think, a profitable undertaking to read the play’s legal fiction against what we 
know of contemporary legal reforms and practices, because it opens up several intriguing 
possibilities for how Aristophanes’ audience might have reacted to the political fantasy 
presented in Ecclesiazusae. It also makes the joke all the more telling, because the comedy 
envisions a world that is engendered by real Athenian legal and political practices, and thus 
might just work in theory. In the passages below, I adduce the legal background to the play 
and offer a subtle unravelling of its interpretative ambiguities in order to lend nuances to our 
interpretation of the play and to provide an analysis of what it can tell us about the legal 
practices in Aristophanes’ time. 
 Let us begin with the call for a debate about the salvation of the polis. Rhodes asserts 
that this kind of debate “appears to have been an open category, like the Romans’ de re 
publica, an invitation in desperate circumstances to make any proposal for the city’s benefit; 
we see an example of it in the procedure by which the Four Hundred came to power in 
411.”725 Evidence for this can be found in the resolution of Pythodorus as mentioned in 
Aristotle’s Const. Ath. 29.2-3, where he writes:726 
 
 τὸν δῆµον ἑλέσθαι µετὰ τῶν προϋπαρχόντων δέκα προβούλων ἄλλους εἴκοσι ἐκ τῶν 
 ὑπὲρ τετταράκοντα ἔτη γεγονότων, οἵτινες ὀµόσαντες ἦ µὴν συγγράψειν ἃ ἂν ἡγῶνται 
																																								 																				
724 Ober 1998: 130. 
725 Rhodes 2004: 225. 
726 Thucydides 8.1 and 8.67 tells us that these ten people were appointed in Athens after the 
Sicilian disaster to deal with the problem and to reform Cleisthenes’ constitution, which, 
according to Cleitophon in Const. Ath. 29.3, was not democratic but similar to that of Solon. 
For an account of the problems of the πάτριος πολιτεία, see Ostwald 1986: 337-411. 
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 βέλτιστα εἶναι τῇ πόλει, συγγράψουσι περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας· ἐξεῖναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
 τῷ βουλοµένῳ γράφειν, ἵν᾽ ἐξ ἁπάντων αἱρῶνται τὸ ἄριστον. 
  
That in addition to the ten Preliminary Councillors already existing the people 
 choose twenty others from those over forty years of age, and that these, after taking a 
 solemn oath to draft whatever measures they think best for the state, shall draft 
 measures for the public safety; and that it be open to any other person also that 
 wishes, to frame proposals, in order that they may choose the one that is best out of 
 them all. 
 
But in the case of Ecclesiazusae, this is complicated. While the statement above does suggest 
that anyone could offer a probouleuma before the assembly, in the comedy the probouleuma 
can be seen as specious—“specious because it has not come from a regular boule, but from a 
rogue group that does not normally vote.”727 However, while the women’s probouleuma 
comes from a group of people that is usually unable to vote, there is an argument to be made 
that it is procedurally correct nonetheless – or would be if the women were citizen men.  
 According to Aristotle, the assembly cannot discuss or vote on anything that the 
prytaneis do not put on the agenda; and the prytaneis in turn, cannot put anything on the 
agenda unless the councillors mentioned by Aristotle discuss it first.728 The fact that the 
prytaneis call for a debate in Ecclesiazusae 395-7 suggests that a) the probouleuma of the 
women is on the agenda, and b) that the council had considered it prior to the meeting.729 The 
same is arguably true for the other probouleumata that are heard that day. When Chremes 
recounts the assembly meeting to Blepyrus, he says that there were two other resolutions in 
addition to that of the women. The first one was made by Neocleides, however it is implied 
that the audience did not give him a chance to finish his speech (399-405), so we do not know 
																																								 																				
727 Fletcher 2012: 130. 
728 Aristotle, Const. Ath. 45.4. 
729 Cf. Rhodes 2004: 225, who writes: “The prytaneis, who until the early fourth century 
presided at meetings, had special benches at the front, facing the other citizens: the fact that 
Ecclesiazusae mentions the prytaneis’ benches at the front, and does not mention the 
πρόεδροι, who took over the presidency, inclines me to the view that at the time of 
Ecclesiazusae, in the late 390s, the prytaneis were still presiding.” 
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what it is that he was going to propose; the second one was made by Euaeon who asked the 
rich to donate cloaks to the poor and to provide shelter to them in the winter (415-421); and 
the third was the one made by Praxagora (427-430). 
 This implies that while the women may infiltrate the assembly by purloining their 
husbands’ cloaks in order to gain entry, they generally seem to follow protocol and do what 
others do if they wish to propose a resolution to the assembly. This is further supported by the 
fact that they are not prosecuted for illegal procedure in the play. According to Aristotle, 
anyone who attempts to introduce a decree to the assembly that has not been approved by the 
council is subject to prosecution. As he states: κατ᾽ αὐτὰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἔνοχός ἐστιν ὁ νικήσας 
γραφῇ παρανόµων. “for the proposer who carries such a measure is ipso facto liable to 
penalty by indictment for illegal procedure.”730 However, there is no mentioning of this in the 
comedy, which suggests that the women’s decree is procedurally correct.731 In fact, they even 
seem to introduce their decree to the assembly better than others, for the assembly interrupts 
Neocleides and does not seem to vote in favour of Euaeon either. This is significant on many 
levels. For not only does this comically underline Praxagora’s argument that women are better 
																																								 																				
730 Aristotle, Const. Ath. 45.4. 
731 Looking at this another way: it could also be the case that the women’s decree is 
procedurally incorrect after all, but that they are not punished because no one has the wit or 
energy to challenge them. If the Athenians of 392/1 are as weary of litigiousness and politics 
as Peisetaerus and Euelpides are in 414, perhaps they are just too exhausted to do anything. 
This weariness would then link back to the problem encountered in Birds and Animal Farm, 
where the animals fail to put their foot down and think carefully about the political regimes 
that are presented to them.  
 It is surely right to say that this argument is pressing the logic of Aristophanic comedy 
a bit far; comic fantasy often depends on certain questions not being asked and is at liberty to 
ignore the fetters of the real world as much as it wants. But it is no secret that Old Comedy 
deals with many ridiculous things and many serious things. See, for instance, the chorus in 
Frogs 389-90: ‘καὶ πολλὰ µὲν γέλοιά...πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα.’ Likewise, Dicaeopolis says in 
Achar. 498-500, ‘εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν ἔπειτ᾽ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις λέγειν µέλλω περὶ τῆς πόλεως, τρυγῳδίαν 
ποιῶν. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγῳδία.’ This is why I think it is proper to press the logic of 
comic fantasy here to some extant because, as will become clear, it does tell us something 
about the historical significance of the legal reforms made in the late fifth-century. 
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suited to running Athens than men, it also recalls a section in Plato’s Protagoras, discussed 
earlier (cf. pp. 99-100). At 319b, Socrates tells Protagoras:  
 
ὅταν συλλεγῶµεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν µὲν περὶ οἰκοδοµίας τι δέῃ πρᾶξαι τὴν 
 πόλιν, τοὺς οἰκοδόµους µεταπεµποµένους συµβούλους περὶ τῶν οἰκοδοµηµάτων, 
 ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπηγούς, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως 
 
 when we are collected for the Assembly, and the city has to deal with an affair of 
 building, we send for builders to advise us on what is proposed to be built; and when 
 it is a case of laying down a ship, we send for shipwrights; and so in all other matters  
 
 
He continues at 319c: 
 
 
 ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συµβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι µὴ οἴονται δηµιουργὸν 
 εἶναι…ἀλλὰ καταγελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ ἐπιχειρῶν 
 λέγειν καταθορυβηθείς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν ἀφελκύσωσιν ἢ ἐξάρωνται κελευόντων 
 τῶν πρυτάνεων 
  
but if anyone else, whom the people do not regard as a craftsman, attempts to advise 
 them…they merely laugh him to scorn and shout him down, until either the 
 speaker retires from his attempt, overborne by the clamor, or [the prytaneis] pull him 
 from his place or turn him out altogether by order of the chair 
 
The same phenomenon takes place in the assembly meeting in Ecclesiazusae. When 
Neocleides gets up to speak, the following happens:732  
 
 κᾆτ᾽ εὐθέως  
 πρῶτος Νεοκλείδης ὁ γλάµων παρείρπυσεν.  
 κἄπειθ᾽ ὁ δῆµος ἀναβοᾷ πόσον δοκεῖς,  
 ‘οὐ δεινὰ τολµᾶν τουτονὶ δηµηγορεῖν,  
 καὶ ταῦτα περὶ σωτηρίας προκειµένου,  
 ὃς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ βλεφαρίδ᾽ οὐκ ἐσώσατο;’ 
 
And right away Neocleides the squinter groped his way to the podium to speak first, 
 but the people started to yell as loud as you please, ‘Isn’t it dreadful that this guy 
 dares to address us on the subject of our salvation no less, when he can’t even save his 




732 Eccl. 397-402. 
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According to Chremes, the demos makes the same θόρυβος that Socrates refers to in his 
conversation because they deem Neocleides to be a non-expert on the subject of salvation. For 
how could someone who cannot even save his own eyelids possibly save an entire city? While 
it is not entirely clear if Neocleides is removed by the prytaneis or gives up voluntarily 
because of the shouts from the audience, it is implied that he withdraws from his attempt to 
speak rather quickly and goes back to his seat.  
 There is, of course, an argument to be made that Neocleides and Euaeon are 
unsuccessful because the assembly is full of women that day. As Chremes tells Blepyrus:733  
 
πλεῖστος ἀνθρώπων ὄχλος,  
 ὅσος οὐδεπώποτ᾽ ἦλθ᾽ ἁθρόος ἐς τὴν πύκνα.  
 καὶ δῆτα πάντες σκυτοτόµοις ᾐκάζοµεν  
 ὁρῶντες αὐτούς. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερφυῶς  
 ὡς λευκοπληθὴς ἦν ἰδεῖν ἡκκλησία 
  
 A huge crowd of people showed up en masse at the Pnyx, an all-time record. And you 
 know, we thought they all looked like shoemakers; really, the Assembly was awfully 
 pale-faced to behold. 
																																								 																				
733 Eccl. 383-7. Ober 1998: 136 n. 30 points out that “the Greek cultural assumption that 
‘women are pale’ [is] deep-seated.”  
 Greek writers such as Xenophon and Aristotle assert that women are by nature more 
suited to indoor life (hence the paleness) and men to outdoor life (apart from men who work 
indoors such as shoemakers). At the same time, as Ober also argues, many Greek authors play 
with this cultural norm. For instance, Plutarch (Thes. 23) tells the story of a military ruse 
initiated by Theseus: he disguises young Athenian men as women by giving them women’s 
clothing, re-arranging their hair, and by putting lotions on their skin. He also tells them to stay 
out of the sun and to take hot baths. In Ecclesiazusae, the opposite scenario takes place: the 
female characters in the play tell Praxagora that they stopped shaving and stood in the sun to 
get a suntan. Clearly, their ‘suntanning regimen’, as Ober calls it, is not entirely successful 
since the women’s paleness is commented upon a few times in the play. Firstly, this recalls a 
point made earlier: the women struggle to act like men, and are unable to cross certain gender-
related borders. Secondly, it hints at a problem, which will become clearer in the next section: 
the Athenian men may find the pale assembly peculiar but evidently not peculiar enough in 
order to act on it. Instead, they accept the pale-looking Praxagora as a young man, which 
enables her to continue with her charade. Thirdly, perhaps comparably with Praxagora’s 
vacillation between male and female speech, Chremes’ account also implies that the 
appearance of femininity and masculinity is artificial in a way and that it can be adapted if 
necessary. In Greek drama this is accentuated by the fact that all female parts are played by 
male actors. On that, see especially Taaffe 1993: 130. 
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Sommerstein, too, comments: “The Assembly meeting which votes to hand over power to the 
women is packed with voters who are women in disguise (and many of the men…have been 
prevented from attending because their wives have ‘borrowed’ their clothes…).”734 Thus, 
there is a chance that the audience interrupts the first two speakers not necessarily because 
they are bad speakers but because they want to make sure that Praxagora’s proposal is heard 
and approved. Nonetheless, the text still implies that the first two resolutions do not win 
approval of anyone present in the assembly. Chremes does not seem to be particularly 
impressed, and also Blepyrus says that he would not have voted for Neocleides and Euaeon 
had he been there. For in regards to Neocleides’ speech he says: σκόροδ᾽ ὁµοῦ τρίψαντ᾽ ὀπῷ 
τιθύµαλλον ἐµβαλόντα τοῦ Λακωνικοῦ σαυτοῦ παραλείφειν τὰ βλέφαρα τῆς ἑσπέρας,’ ἔγωγ᾽ 
ἂν εἶπον, εἰ παρὼν ἐτύγχανον. “If I’d been there I’d have said, ‘Grind up garlic and figs and 
add Spartan spurge, and rub it on your eyelids at bedtime.’”735 And in regards to Euaeon’s 
resolution, he asserts:736 
 
 νὴ τὸν Διόνυσον χρηστά γ᾽: εἰ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνά γε  
 προσέθηκεν, οὐδεὶς ἀντεχειροτόνησεν ἄν,  
 τοὺς ἀλφιταµοιβοὺς τοῖς ἀπόροις τρεῖς χοίνικας  
 δεῖπνον παρέχειν ἅπασιν ἢ κλάειν µακρά,  
 ἵνα τοῦτ᾽ ἀπέλαυσαν Ναυσικύδους τἀγαθόν. 
  
By Dionysus, what a noble thought! He’d have won unanimous approval if he’d 
 added that grain dealers should give the needy three quarts for their dinner or face 
 harsh punishment. They could have collected that benefit from Nausicydes. 
 
Therefore, while it is fair to assume that Neocleides’ and Euaeon’s probouleumata do not 
gain approval because the women want to make sure that Praxagora’s probouleuma is heard, 
Chremes and the other few men who are arguably present during the meeting, do not seem to 
																																								 																				
734 Sommerstein 2009: 216. 
735 Eccl. 404-7. 
736 Eccl. 422-6. 
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find the men’s resolutions very convincing either.737 It is therefore questionable whether their 
probouleumata would be passed even if the women were not present. 
 There are two more instances of speakers being interrupted, and they can be found in 
the women’s rehearsal scene at the beginning of the play.738 In line 144, Praxagora tells the 
First Woman to go sit down after she has made an unsuccessful attempt at giving a 
convincing speech: σὺ µὲν βάδιζε καὶ κάθησ᾽· οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶ. “You go and sit down. You’re 
worthless.” The Second Woman is even interrupted twice. Once in line 159 when she says: ὢ 
νὴ τὸν Ἀπόλλω—“Oh! By Apollo—” which is the correct oath (since she is in male 
disguise),739 but Praxagora is still annoyed with her because she used the wrong oaths 
beforehand, which is why she replies with: παῦε τοίνυν. “No, stop,” and once in line 169 
when Praxagora tells her to go back to her seat: ἄπερρε καὶ σὺ καὶ κάθησ᾽ ἐντευθενί. Even 
though this is a rehearsal and not yet the real assembly, it does stress the point that speakers 
who are not able to advise well on a subject matter struggle to get the attention of the 
audience.740  
 Praxagora, however, as has been made clear earlier, does have the expertise of 
Socrates’ ‘craftsman,’ for her language comes from an area with which she is familiar. Thus, 
																																								 																				
737 That being said, Euaeon’s probouleuma actually does resemble that of the women in a 
way. His appeal to the polis that the rich should give to the poor and open their doors for 
those who are in need of shelter reminds us of Praxagora’s proposal to share all the common 
goods and to tear down the walls, so everyone can live together. This feeds into the unequal 
distribution of wealth in Athenian society, a theme that also appears in Wealth. Blepyrus 
reflects on this in his response to Euaeon’s proposal when he says that Eueaeon would have 
been successful had he added that grain dealers should give the needy money for their dinner. 
This could be another reason why Eueaeon is unsuccessful in the assembly: wealthy 
Athenians feared that the poorer citizens could use their legislative power to enforce 
economic equality. (See Ober 1998: 148). The feeling of unfairness based on the unequal 
distribution of wealth in society also appears in More, when he echoes Plutarch’s idealised 
interpretation of Lycurgus’ reforms. (cf. pp. 21-2). 
738 Rhodes 2004: 227. 
739 See Sommerstein 2014: 321 n. 46 and Sommerstein 2009: 19-20 n. 18. 
740 This also recalls Lysistrata’s strategy discussed earlier (cf. pp. 223-4), when she bases her 
argument on the domestic sphere because that is what she knows best. 
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when she gives her speech, the demos considers her an expert, for she is able to describe how 
the women would govern (just as a builder is able to describe the ways in which he constructs 
buildings). Unlike Neocleides, and unlike the two women during the women’s practice, 
Praxagora is not interrupted, for she comes across as both competent and favourable.741 Yes, 
this may be because the assembly is full of women that day but it stresses nonetheless that a) 
Praxagora seems to follow protocol when proposing her decree to the assembly, and b) that 
she delivers her speech better than some of the other speakers deliver theirs. 
 
 
VI.b. The mutability of psephismata and nomoi 
 
 The decree of the women thus seems to be procedurally correct, or at least is not 
exposed within the play as being procedurally incorrect, however this does not answer the 
question whether the women are legally allowed to alter existing laws in the first place. The 
short answer to this question would be no, since in fourth-century Athens women are not 
allowed to participate in legal matters and attend assembly.742 However, in Ecclesiazusae, the 
women are dressed as men and the few men present in the assembly neither recognise the 
incongruity of the women’s costume nor do they question the ‘pale young man’ (i.e. 
																																								 																				
741 On interruptions in the assembly, see, for example, Hansen 1987, Tacon 2001, and Rhodes 
2004. 
742 This point will be raised later on as well, but it is worth noting here too that outside 
comedy Athenian men never seriously considered the possibility that women might attend and 
vote in the assembly, and therefore never thought it necessary to actively keep them from 
doing so. Additionally, it was never thought necessary to specify that the rights of an 
Athenian citizen were, in fact, the rights of a male Athenian citizen since that was implied in 
the laws, which treated women as legal minors. Likewise, it was presumably not thought 
necessary to specify that only biological males could be citizens since, again, few Athenians 
would have considered the possibility that anything else could ever be the case. This links 
back to a) the debate on how much the male disguise has really changed the women (as shown 
earlier, it has not changed them very much at all), and b) deeply cherished assumptions that 
keep the Athenian men from considering the option that women might have made their way 
into assembly. 
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Praxagora) when ‘he’ gets up to speak. This unfortunate misperception may be linked to the 
general anxiety about the justice of any decree leaving the assembly and an apparent 
confusion about a few new legal procedures, which had been introduced in 410 and 403 
respectively.743 Indeed (and this is based on the legal allusions which I adduce to highlight the 
play’s admixture of realia and fantasy), it is this very combination of misperception, anxiety, 
and confusion that has the potential to demonstrate that the women’s decree may not be as 
illegal as it initially seems, because the new legal situation actually leaves the possibility 
open. 
 In regards to the newly introduced legal procedures: in 410, the democrats and 
oligarchs decide to establish an anagrapheis ton nomon in order to collect and publish all 
existing laws. This decision was triggered by the constitutional struggles the Athenians 
experienced after the defeat in Sicily in 413 and the oligarchical revolution in 411. During 
those times, “both democrats and oligarchs had claimed for their side the ‘ancestral 
constitution,’” which led the Athenians to become more conscious of how tricky the concept 
of nomos could be.744 Ober states:745 
  
After the end of the war, the Athenians realized that the existing nomoi did not 
 provide an adequate statutory basis for government, and they initiated a new and 
 complicated constitutional procedure (nomothesia) for making laws. Psephismata 
 would still be passed by the demos in the Assembly, as before. But now nomoi would 
 be made by specially lotteried committees. Any psephisma that was contrary to an 
 established nomos could be challenged and overturned in the people’s courts. 
 
The fact that any psephisma that went against existing nomoi could now be challenged and 
annulled, is based on two legal procedures established in 403: (i) the “public prosecution for 
																																								 																				
743 This anxiety already appears in Birds 1040-5, when the decree-seller attempts to sell 
decrees to the newly found bird-city but is quickly asked to leave by Peisetaerus. 
744 Hansen 1991: 162. 
745 Ober 1998: 145. See also Hansen 1991: 163. 
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having proposed and carried an unsuitable nomos (graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai),”746 
and (ii) “the public action against an unconstitutional psephisma”747 (graphe paranomon). 
That is, people who propose laws and decrees that are contrary to existing law can now be 
prosecuted. The same procedure can be used “against laws or decrees that [are] perfectly in 
consonance with the rest of the laws and correctly passed, but which [are] regarded as 
unsuitable or…damaging to the democracy and the people.”748 
 It is important to note that before the beginning of the fourth-century, the words 
nomos and psephisma are being used rather interchangeably, as is, for instance, the case in 
Clouds and Birds. Pheidippides’ new nomos, that sons may beat their fathers, is based on an 
old ψήφισµα of the cocks and other animals; and the Ψηφισµατοπώλης attempts to sell new 
laws (νόµους νέους) to the citizens of νεφελοκοκκυγία.749 However, in the period of 403/2 – 
322/1, the same period in which Ecclesiazusae is performed, there is a sharper distinction 
between the two terms.750 Firstly, nomoi are now passed by the nomothetai, and psephismata 
by the ecclesia. Secondly, nomoi are now the stronger force: if a new psephisma is 
inconsistent with a current nomos, it can be declared invalid with a graphe paranomon. 
																																								 																				
746 Hansen 1991: 175; Demosthenes, Ag. Tim. 24.33; Aristotle, Const. Ath, 59.2. 
747 Hansen 1978: 317. 
748 Hansen 1991: 175. It is worth noting that law-making in the late fifth-century and fourth-
century was a big project, which went through several phases. For a good synopsis of the 
different phases, see MacDowell 1975: 73-4. For a good account on the establishment of the 
nomothetai and the historical significance of it, see Ostwald 1986: 509-524. Indeed, the 
subject is rather large and controversial, too large and controversial for it to be discussed in 
detail here, but it is exactly this controversy that forms part of the plot of Ecclesiazusae. 
749 Birds 1035; 1037 and Clouds 1428-9. 
750 Hansen 1978: 317. As will become clear in the next paragraphs, despite this new ideology, 
which contrasts supposedly permanent nomoi with ephemeral psephismata, it is still not 
entirely clear what counts as a nomos and what does not. The distinction thus remains rather 
fluid, which is especially true in the case of Ecclesiazusae. 
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Thirdly, nomoi are intended to cover long-term affairs concerning Athens while psephismata 
are meant to deal with ephemeral matters.751 
In the case of Ecclesiazusae, however, both the new distinction between nomoi and 
psephisma, as well as the new legal procedures, are potentially problematic. Considering that 
these changes had been made only a few years prior to the production of the play, it is fair to 
assume that many Athenians are still confused about them by the time the comedy is put on. 
This is presumably also why there is no clear difference between nomoi and psephisma in the 
play; instead, similarly to older plays, the two terms are merged into one. As Ober writes, 
“Aristophanes deliberately jumbles the distinction between decrees of the Assembly and 
nomoi…[and] in several passages…the hags treat the terms psephisma and nomos as if they 
were simple synonyms….”752 This is also evident when looking at the introduction of the 
women’s decree: it is introduced using the methods that are used to introduce a psephisma 
but, unlike psephismata, it is meant to last indefinitely. 
 The women, therefore, may follow protocol when submitting their decree to the 
assembly but it is the wrong procedure used at that particular moment because it is only meant 
to be used when introducing psephismata, not nomoi, which suggests that their decree is 
indeed questionable. Ironically, this questionability recalls the rationale for the gynaecocracy 
because it brings to mind the general anxiety about the justice of certain decrees leaving the 
assembly. It also recalls a point Praxagora made earlier: if legal terms and legal action are 
confusing and cause for anxiety, why not get rid of them once and for all? This would also 
solve two problems mentioned at the beginning of the comedy: first of all, the fact that many 
																																								 																				
751 Pseudo-Plato, Definitions 415b and Nightingale 1999: 105. Note that these revisions have 
created a great deal of scholarly controversy, “especially concerning the changes in the power 
of the assembly, and the (alleged) shift ‘from popular sovereignty to the sovereignty of law.’” 
(Nightingale 1999: 105-6). See Ostwald 1986 and Sealey 1987 who argue in favour of this 
shift in power, Ober 1989 and Todd 1993 who argue against it.   
752 Ober 1998: 145-6. 
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Athenians seem to attend assembly for less than patriotic reasons would no longer be an issue, 
and secondly, alternative political proposals such as the one that led to the coup in 411 would 
no longer take place.  
That being said, it is this scenario that shows once again that Praxagora, like 
Lysistrata, is very clever. Especially, when we read her fictional legal actions against what we 
know about contemporary legal reforms and practices, it allows us to lend nuance to our 
interpretation of her and characterize her as someone who takes advantage of potentially 
apprehensive and flustered people in order to establish her government. Like Lysistrata, 
Praxagora can be related to the current situation, as she uses the foibles of Athenian 
democracy to her advantage.753 Both characters build their initial plan on a loophole in 
Athenian society: Lysistrata knows that neither Athenian women nor men are able to abstain 
from sex for a long time, which is why a decision in regards to military affairs will be made 
quickly. Similarly, Praxagora—and again, this is related to the legal setting I offer to the 
play—situates her new regime within the confusions arising from recent changes made to the 
processes of enacting laws and decrees. Thus, the two women provide a subtle distinction to 
our analyses of the plays when we situate them within these loopholes and their clever 
exploitations thereof.754 
																																								 																				
753 Cf. Cratinus’ Pylaea (fr. Photius p. 595.12), “wise men should turn the present situation to 
their advantage.” (ἄνδρας σοφοὺς χρὴ τὸ παρὸν πρᾶγµα καλῶς εἰς δύναµιν τίθεσθαι).  
754 Lysistrata’s level of intelligence is highlighted further by the fact that she not only 
recognises this loophole but also the element of collective fear that seems to come with it, 
which brings to mind Aristotle’s Rhetoric 2.5.1: “for men do not fear all evils…but only such 
as involve great pain or destruction, and only if they appear to be not far off but near at hand 
and threatening, for men do not fear things that are very remote.” (οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ 
φοβοῦνται…ἀλλ᾽ ὄσα λύπας µεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐὰν µὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ 
σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὤστε µέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φοβοῦνται). By (comically) 
recognising a fear that derives from the men’s (and women’s) home, Lysistrata reflects on this 
Aristotelian notion and, like many orators before and after her, she identifies a specific danger 
that scares her audience. 
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 Still, regardless of any potential confusion about the new legal processes, the women’s 
decree does pose the question: are the Athenians theoretically able to prosecute Praxagora, 
making use of the procedure established in 403, for going against existing law? Considering 
this legal method is officially recognised by the time the play is put on, the answer to the 
question is yes. However, any graphe paranomon must be initiated by a private citizen; if no 
citizen starts one, the psephisma is valid regardless of how undemocratic or unconstitutional it 
may be.755 There is no mentioning in the play of a citizen contemplating taking legal action 
against the women’s decree, and while this may prompt some readers to ask whether the 
whole question is doubtful in this case, it does add further nuance to our unravelling of the 
play’s interpretative ambiguities, in my opinion. It is clear that comic absurdities are not 
fettered to the realities of Athenian legal practices like this, but it is also clear that comic 
fantasy includes serious elements (cf. p. 265 n. 731), which is why, I think, it is lucrative to 
adduce this apparent lack of contemplation to the play. 
 Particularly, reading this (again) against what we know about contemporary legal 
reforms, it opens up further avenues for how contemporary Athenians might have reacted to 
the comedy’s political fantasy. I am inclined to suggest that the citizens in the play do not 
offer a graphe paranomon either because of their unfamiliarity with the new legal procedure 
or because by abolishing all existing law, Praxagora likely also abolishes the right to launch a 
graphe paranomon.756 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
 On a related note, this section also recalls Peisetaerus’ strategy in Birds (cf. pp. 152-5; 
161), when he recognises the sophistication and power of language, and uses it to his 
advantage. That being said, ultimately Praxagora is much more of a revolutionary than 
Lysistrata and Peisetaerus are because she seeks to overturn the status quo, whereas the other 
two seek to restore and/or keep it. 
755 Hansen 1978: 325. 
756 Cf. Ober 1998: 139 n. 38, who writes: “The women presumably fear a graphe paranomon, 
the standard legal means by which decrees of the Assembly could be invalidated…but since 
the women intend to close down the lawcourts…this legal remedy will soon be cut off.” 
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  Presumably, by abolishing the right to launch a graphe paranomon, Praxagora is also 
exploiting the Athenian people’s weariness. As fond as they are of lawsuits and litigiousness, 
it is clear that they are also tired of dealing with these things (which is, after all, also the initial 
reason why Peisetaerus and Euelpides leave Athens). My reading of Ecclesiazusae (and the 
subtle allusions I make to Athenian legal history) shows us, in a somewhat ironic manner, that 
there will never be a graphe paranomon if people are politically weary by presenting a 
character who abolishes the right to launch one in the first place. This also feeds into one of 
the key points on Praxagora’s political agenda: the graphe paranomon is arguably a key tool 
in the male political game of litigiousness and aggression among rival political parties. By 
cutting off this legal remedy, Praxagora recalls the foundation of her proto-communist 
government that does not include different political cliques and opinions, but only one 
political programme that is meant to be fitting for all. 
 This brings to mind the problems caused by the diverse rhetorical styles in the 
Statesman and Lysistrata, where different political cliques struggle to find a common 
language. In the world Praxagora creates, these issues are no longer relevant. Likewise, her 
solution is in line with More’s rationale for Utopia, where he prohibits political factions and 
private debates in order to prevent tyrannical groups from arising. The Utopians’ high opinion 
of simple legal matters (‘the most simple and apparent sense of the law is open to 
everyone’)757 echoes that of Praxagora, when she advocates a simple (ἁπλόος) legal system. 
Furthermore, her reasoning emphasises the fault the Utopians find with other nations, whose 
‘mass of incomprehensibly intricate laws prevents them from having a straightforward and 
fair government.’758 
																																								 																				
757 Utopia, 87. 
758 Utopia, 86-7. Cf. pp. 253-5. 
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Nonetheless, Praxagora’s actions do pose the question: is she allowed to propose 
(unsuitably) the abolition of the law that is meant to keep people from making unsuitable 
proposals?759 When we continue to read the play’s fantasy against what we know of the legal 
practices in Aristophanes’ time, and acknowledge that comedy deals with both ridiculous and 
serious things (καὶ πολλὰ µὲν γέλοιά...πολλὰ δὲ σπουδαῖα, Frogs 389-90) even though it is 
obviously not bound to the realities of many things, the short answer to this is no. Praxagora 
is not a male citizen, and thus she is not allowed to propose decrees; and she is not a member 
of the nomothetai either, which means she is not allowed to make laws. Moreover, as stated 
above, while the decree is procedurally correct, Praxagora does not acknowledge the 
distinction between psephisma and nomos and their different legal processes. Thus, her decree 
may indeed be considered illegal.  
But looking at it another way, the question could also be answered with a yes: 
persuasive Athenians once established the existing legal system, so why should not the same 
persuasion methods be used to abolish it and propose something else instead? This response 
brings to mind a conversation Strepsiades and Pheidippides have in Clouds, performed 
approximately thirty years prior to Ecclesiazusae, where Pheidippides tells his father that it 
was only a man who came up with the law that prohibits a son to beat his father. Therefore, 
another man can propose a new law that allows sons to beat their fathers.760 Pheidippides’ 
																																								 																				
759 As noted on p. 272, ‘unsuitable’ here (µὴ ἐπιτήδειον) means not fit for, or favourable to, 
democracy. µὴ ἐπιτήδειον also frequently appears in other Greek texts. For example, at 5.81, 
Thucydides uses it in order to refer to the establishment of an oligarchy, which is suitable for 
Sparta (καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπιτηδεία τοῖς Λακεδαιµονίοις κατέστη); and in Lysias’ Against 
Agoratus 13.51, it is used to state that Agoratus worked against the interests of the Athenian 
people (καὶ οὐκ ἐπιτήδεια τῷ δήµῳ τῷ ὑµετέρῳ πράττοντας). Like ἁπλόος discussed on pp. 
257-9, µὴ ἐπιτήδειον indicates that Praxagora’s government may not necessarily bode well for 
the Athenian people. Cf. p. 109 for Socrates’ use of ἀρτίου in Prot. 
760 Clouds 1420-1424. There is a similar law in Birds, which states that it is admirable to 
strangle and bite one’s father because that is what is written on the pillars of the storks (1347; 
1353-4). This suggests again that Aristophanes does not hesitate to parody sophistic 
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statement can be linked to the continual jokes in Aristophanic comedy about the Athenians’ 
fondness for lawsuits and litigiousness, a theme that is also present in Ecclesiazusae. Indeed, 
Pheidippides states what Praxagora seems to think as well: if someone creates a law, why 
should someone else not challenge its legitimacy? Or, if someone founds a court of law, like 
Athena in the Eumenides, why should someone else not abolish it like Praxagora does in 
Ecclesiazusae?761  
However, in this case, it is more complicated than that: Praxagora wants her challenge 
to be the final challenge in order to stop the constant going back and forth at law once and for 
all.762 Consequently, she would be the last Athenian (for a while at least) who could call into 
question existing law’s validity. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
arguments, which question codes of conduct among human beings, by drawing comic 
parallels with animals. See Quass 1971: 25-26 and Dunbar 1997: 653. The comic argument 
clearly brings to mind Callicles’ opinion in the Gorgias and the sophists’ thinking in general, 
namely that it is possible to propose an alternative argument to any proposition. 
See Gardner 1989: 59-60, who notes that this comic law could also refer to the 
perturbation adult male Athenians felt towards the end of the fifth-century about their 
relationships with younger Athenians, particularly the younger’s apparent lack of respect for 
the elderly. Strepsiades arguably refers to a law attributed to Solon here which punishes sons 
who mistreat their parents with disfranchisement. See also MacDowell 1978: 92. 
761 This sentiment goes against Athena’s words in Eum. 693-4, when she founds the court of 
law and says that citizens should refrain from polluting the law with (bad) innovations. It also 
goes against Pol. 1269a12-18, where Aristotle asserts that it is usually better to refrain from 
changing laws even when the magistrates may be in error. He bases his opinion on people’s 
bad habit of abrogating laws easily (a concern that also appears in Eccl.) and concludes that 
this bad habit does not teach people anything except how to disobey their authorities.  
See also Const. Ath. 7.2, where he says that Solon made his laws binding, and thus 
unalterable, for a hundred years. This reference also appears in Plutarch’s Life of Solon 25.1 
and Herodotus 1.29. (More, who clearly voiced his concerns about monarchs who tamper 
with laws whenever they wish, might have supported this). Similar opinions can be found in 
Demosthenes’ Ag. Lep. 20.90-2, where he views the frequent changes made to the laws as a 
sign of disorder, and Ag. Tim. 24.139, where he tells of the Locrians who have everyone who 
proposes a new law legislate with a halter around their neck. If the new law is accepted, the 
one proposing survives; if it is not accepted, the halter is drawn tight and they die. Lastly, see 
Antiphon De Choreut. 6.2 and Thucydides 3.37.3 for other examples, and Harris 2013: 324-5. 
762 Pollux and the Antiatticist mention the comic poet Thugenides, who, if the name is 
correctly restored on the victors’ list for the Dionysia, won with a play called Jurors around 
440. (Storey 2011: 355). One of the few surviving lines is the following: τί 
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 It is here where it becomes clear once again that Ecclesiazusae, like Lysistrata and 
Birds, is largely about λόγοι and πειθώ—words, speeches, and persuasion. For we are once 
again presented with a character who claims to know what is best for the polis. Certainly, both 
Lysistrata and Praxagora believe that they have not only got the mind but also the eloquence 
to do the men’s job for them—and, as already stated in the section on Lysistrata, not just do it 
for them, but do it better than them. In the case of Ecclesiazusae, this is highlighted by the 
seemingly utopian ending, for Praxagora accomplishes what the democrats hoped to achieve 
when introducing the new legal procedures in 410 and 403: avoidance of both oligarchic 
coups and propositions of unsuitable laws that are damaging to democracy. (After all, if there 
is no democracy, no damage can be done to it).763 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
ὦγάθ᾽ἀντιδικοῦµεν ἀλλήλοις ἒτι; “Why do we still go back and forth at law, my friend?” 
(Photius, b, Sz, a2096. Trans. Buis). The play is very fragmented, which makes it difficult to 
work with, but this surviving line may still be used to a) underline Praxagora’s rationale for 
her regime and b) point at Aristophanes’ jokes about the Athenians’ love for lawsuits and 
litigiousness. 
 See also Math. 2.34-5, where Sextus Empiricus writes: “where rhetoric is nonexistant 
or very rare, laws remain unchanged, but among those who admit it laws change daily, for 
example at Athens…” (παρ᾽οἶς ἢ οὐδ᾽ ὄλως ἢ σπανίως ἔστι ῥητορική, τοὺς νόµους 
ἀσαλεύτους µένειν, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς προσιεµένοις αὐτὴν ὀσηµέραι νεοχµοῦσθαι, ὤσπερ καὶ 
παρ᾽Ἀθηναίοις...). Sextus attributes this to Platon who, allegorically, tells of a traveller who 
goes away for three months and does not recognise his city when he comes back because the 
laws have changed so much. 
763 Linking this back to the point made earlier (cf. p. 265 n. 731), namely that the Athenians in 
this play are perhaps as weary of politics as Peisetaerus and Euelpides are in Birds, the 
abolition of democracy could indeed be a good thing. If the point here is that democracy is 
about people deciding what they want, maybe politics and responsibility for decision-making 
is precisely what the male characters in Ecclesiazusae do not want. This eagerness to vote for 
a politician who will abolish politics is also evident in Blepyrus’ and Chremes’ dialogue in 
lines 460-4, when Blepyrus joyfully expresses that he will no longer have to get up early in 
the morning to attend assembly but instead can stay home all day. Blepyrus’ response is 
slightly inconsistent with Praxagora’s declaration to abolish lawsuits, but at this point in the 
play, she has not yet told him about her decision—that does not happen until line 656—so it is 
possible that he and Chremes simply assume that jury duty will be handed over to the women. 
Or, as Sommerstein asserts, “not only Blepyrus but even the…neighbour find it impossible to 
imagine an Athens without lawsuits.” Sommerstein 1998: 197.  
 This would link to the joke in Clouds 207-8, when Strepsiades looks at a map of 
Athens and cannot believe that it is Athens because he does not see any law-courts in session 
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 This is why it is attractive to answer the question, whether Praxagora is allowed to do 
what she does, with a yes. As questionable as the foundation of her regime may be, law is a 
social construction and the fact that the other characters do not make use of their right to start 
a graphe paranomon against her, even though they may theoretically be able to, does suggest 
that her rule can be rightly seen as the new law of Athens. Looking at it this way, it becomes 
clear that the Athenians’ fondness for legal action is taken to a whole other level in the 
comedy. In fact, I argue that it has the potential to be read as a more political play than 
Lysistrata because it shows where the power of persuasion, in combination with confusion 
and anxiety, may lead. Ober argues similarly:764  
 
 Ecclesiazusae is emphatically political comedy in that it derives a good deal of its 
 humor from the foibles of democracy—from democracy’s deep-seated institutional 
 and ideological structures and from confusions arising from recent constitutional 
 tinkering with the enactment of law. 
 
Ecclesiazusae therefore is not necessarily as absurd as one may think, for its comic logic is 
the juridical logic of late fifth-century and early fourth-century Athens taken to an extreme. 
More importantly, it expresses something of importance about the characters’ historical, 
social, and legal environment. For it is clear that the changes to the legal system could not be 
made without the willing cooperation of the council and the assembly, which once again 
points at the role of deceptive political jargon and potentially confusing procedures of law in 
the decision-making progress. We are presented with the comic paradox of men who willingly 
sign off a decree that strips them of political power, and the audience in turn is presented with 
an equally comic paradox of a world that is engendered by a procedurally correct decree that 
abolishes the proposition of future decrees.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
on it. A similar joke appears in Birds 110, when the hoopoe, upon hearing why Peisetaerus 
and Euelpides left Athens, expresses his surprise that there are Athenians who oppose law-
courts. 
764 Ober 1998: 152-3. 
	 281	
In this vein, Aristophanes provides a comic narrative of contemporary Athenian 
democracy and its legal system, and he shows us that a conventional procedure may lead to an 
unconventional political order. In this case, the new political order is so unconventional that it 
leads to the collapse of institutionalized law itself.  Ruffell argues that, “comic form, with its 
absurdist, comparative, and self-reflexive moves, anchors itself in the political and cultural 
context, even as it constructs and develops anti-realist worlds, scenarios, and motivations.”765 
I believe the same can be said for Ecclesiazusae: the basic story of the play, i.e. women in 
power, may be absurd to the fourth-century audience, and the juridical logic may be taken to a 
comic extreme; however, the legal language of the play is not absurd, for it is deeply anchored 
in the political and legal world of its time. 
 
 
VI.c. The tragicomic aspect of the play 
 
The comic paradox, and the usage of contemporary Athenian legal language, then 
emerges as a tragicomic narrative of contemporary political-juridical conditions. Aristophanes 
presents to the audience a questionable charade, based in the legal world of early fourth-
century Athens, which works out not only because of confusing legal procedures but also 
because of deeply established assumptions about a speaker’s nature. For as incongruous as 
Praxagora’s costume may be to the audience, the few men present in the assembly do not 
realise that the ‘pale young man’ speaking is, in fact, a woman. (It is, however, hard to 
imagine that any of them would ever suppose that ‘he’ might be a woman—as stated on p. 
270 n. 742, it is unlikely that even the most innovative Athenian at the time would think that 
women might make their way into assembly). 
																																								 																				
765 Ruffell 2011: 429. 
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At the end of the play, the audience is presented with the story of a society that is 
dismantled due to assumptions, confusing legal procedures, and deception by both sight and 
sound. They witness Chremes and the other men accept as authoritative a speech, full of 
political jargon, given by a woman in disguise, which ultimately leads to the breakdown of 
the conventional hierarchical order and institutionalized law. They also see the Athenians 
march into the same trap that Praxagora scolds them for always marching into: they employ a 
scoundrel as their leader.766 It may seem odd (albeit undoubtedly funny) to the audience that 
the men in the assembly do not question the mass of pale people and that they readily accept 
the pale-looking Praxagora as a young man. But again, it is this oddity that reinforces the 
previous statement: when assumptions collide with a persuasive political proposal, which is 
shaped by deception on many levels, the political order can be fundamentally altered.767 
At the same time, despite the fundamental alteration of the Athenian political order, 
this employment of a scoundrel (i.e. Praxagora) shows that not much has changed after all. 
Praxagora may be a revolutionary, and thus not necessarily a scoundrel in the old mould, but 
she does use scoundrelly tricks, presumably because she knows they have worked in the past 
and are thus likely to work again.768 Consequently, even with the revolutionary aspects of the 
story, the ending of Ecclesiazusae seems to provide us once again with a ring composition 
which features Athenians who end up right where they started. Their false optimism, 
engendered by λόγοι and πειθώ, recalls that seen in Birds, Lysistrata, and also Animal Farm, 
as it leads a large group of people to exchange one bad leader for another once again. As is 
																																								 																				
766 Eccl. 176-7. 
767 This links back to the Gorgianic model of perception, for it matters once again, to a certain 
extent anyway, who you are, and who you say you are, and whether others are able to know 
whether you speak the truth. 
768 This feeds into her appropriation of male speech, which she learned by listening to her 
husband and other orators on the Pnyx. This is how she knows that the kind of rhetoric she 
uses will work because she has seen it before. 
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the case in the other texts, it is also this optimism that quickly becomes the weapon of 
criticism when Aristophanes (and Orwell) use it in order to appeal to the audience’s 
intelligence and integrity. In Ecclesiazusae, this appeal is all the more telling because it is 
even more based on Athenian legal and political values than it is in Birds and Lysistrata.  
This is why I think it would be a mistake to dismiss Ecclesiazusae as a ‘lunatic and 
illogical’ play that shows that Aristophanes is ‘aging and overtired,’ ‘elderly, peevish, and 
irritated,’ or indeed “a broken man who could sink to the tiresome dirtiness of Ecclesiazusae” 
and who may have ‘had a stroke.’769 As fantastic, hyperbolic, and absurd some of the play’s 
content may be, its legal allusions, which I adduce to illuminate the play’s admixture of 
fantasy and realism, are of importance, for they point at the historical and social significance 
of the reforms that have been made to the Athenian legal system in the fifth-century. 
Certainly, by playing with the city’s juridical and institutional structures, Aristophanes brings 
the fictive world of comedy into the political and legal realm of Athens, as he does in Birds 
and Lysistrata. By doing so, he may even lead the audience “to entertain ideas which 
renovate, reiterate, develop, or re-create their city and its inhabitants and which can be 
mapped back onto their actual counterparts.”770 
 
	
VII. The future prospects of Praxagora’s regime 
 
At the end of the comedy, the essential question for the establishment of Praxagora’s 
gynaecocracy is this: can we be sure that the new rule will last, and that it will actually break 
the cycles of recurrent political events? Praxagora is overly confident—and stays true to 
Aristophanic fashion by portraying this confidence clearly—but what are the future prospects 
																																								 																				
769 Zeitlin 1999a: 176; Murray 1933: 181; MacDowell 1995: 308; Taylor 1926: 210; Dover 
1972: 195 n. 7. Note that Dover’s remark is in regards to both Ecclesiazusae and Wealth. 
770 Ruffell 2011: 430. 
	 284	
of her regime? Zeitlin and Ober & Strauss assert, “…despite the observance of formal comic 
conventions in the structure of the plot, the ambiguities at the end suggest that ‘the play offers 
no answer as to whether the new regime was a success or a failure.’”771 However, I believe 
the plot of the play actually might offer an answer to that question, albeit only covertly. 
Specifically, when looking at the story of Ecclesiazusae in relation to other stories about 
female dominated societies, both Greek and barbarian, we are in a position to assume that 
Praxagora’s matriarchal government is actually rather ephemeral and bound to fail. 
A first indication for this is the chaotic ending of the comedy, which is triggered not 
only by the collapse of institutionalized law, the abolition of law-courts and assembly 
meetings, the changes made to the conventional hierarchy and sexual roles, but also by the 
obsolescence of monogamous marriage. This outcome, which clearly displays a radical 
departure from the conventional Athenian model of social and political organization at that 
time, brings to mind the myth of matriarchy, which, according to Bamberger, belongs to “a 
prior and chaotic era before the present social order was established.”772 For, “the Rule of 
Women, instead of heralding a promising future, harks back to a past darkened by repeated 
failures.”773 Or, as Merrill puts it, “the ancient matriarchies were not part of a Golden Age but 
rather something which had to be destroyed in order for civilization as patriarchy to exist.”774 
The gynaecocratic rule of Ecclesiazusae recalls this dark past of matriarchy not only 
by taking us back “to the pre-legal world of the Oresteia where force and violence had to 
																																								 																				
771 Zeitlin 1999a: 175. (Zeitlin quotes Ober & Strauss 1990: 269 here). 
772 Bamberger 1974: 276. Cf. Dowden 1995: 44. 
773 Bamberger 1974: 280. This conclusion primarily concerns the message of South American 
myths of matriarchy, but is also applicable to both the ending of Ecclesiazusae and the myth 
of the Amazons. 
774 Merrill 1979: 14. For a counterargument, see Bachofen 1967, who argues that matriarchy 
was the first form of a truly ordered society, which replaced an anarchic time of promiscuity 
and chaos. 
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suffice for the enactment of justice until the establishment of law courts in Athens,”775 but 
also by dismantling the institution of monogamous marriage.776 It also brings to mind other 
female dominated societies, which evoke the myth of matriarchy in a similar manner. 
Specifically, the myth, and the recollection of it in the accounts discussed here, stress social 
tensions, which are present in Greek society. At the same time, however, it also endorses the 
polis through Athenian thinking. This is especially evident in Herodotus’ version of the myth 
of the Amazons, and in the myth of the Lemnian women as told by Apollonius of Rhodes. For 
even though these stories represent the opposite of ideal fifth-century Athenian life, it is 
possible to learn about the Athenian self by examining the ‘Other’ these stories represent. 
This becomes particularly clear when investigating the Amazons’ marriage with the 




775 Fletcher 2012: 137. After all, as mentioned earlier, when asked how she intends to handle 
potential confrontations, Praxagora asserts that she will make use of (comic) violence in order 
to ensure justice. See Eccl. 249-60. 
776 Note that here and in the subsequent sections, I rely on Merrill’s definitions of matriarchy 
and patriarchy, and “define ‘matriarchy’ as a society in which an equal or greater amount of 
authority is vested in women than in men and in which descent is traced through the female 
line. The term ‘patriarchy’ will refer to any society in which primary authority is controlled 
by men, with descent and inheritance traced through the male line.” Merrill 1979: 13. While it 
is not entirely clear whether Praxagora establishes matrilineal descent, she does abolish the 
patrilineal succession of property in lines 587-594, which stems from her proposal that 
everyone should own everything in common. 
 Further note that due to the specific word-limit to which I am obliged to adhere, I will 
not include a discussion of non-monogamous relationships in Plato’s Rep. (except for a brief 
note on p. 291 n. 793) despite their relevance to the following passages. I really wish to lay 
the debate of the revolutionary social organisation of Kallipolis on one side and focus instead 
on the historical, mythical, comic, and modern texts presented below; but it is clear that parts 
of the Rep. could convincingly be added, and that the consequences of the abolition of 
marriage in the Platonic text fit in with the hypotheses presented here. 
777 This is in line with Foley’s rationale for Female Acts in Greek Tragedy, as she “wanted to 
understand how tragic women were used to think about the social order and how they helped 
men confront intractable social and philosophical problems.” See Foley 2001: 13-14. 
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VII.a. Herodotus’ Amazons 
 
Let us begin with Herodotus’ version of the myth of the Amazons, and look at the 
Amazons’ marriage with the Scythians. At Herodotus 4.115, the young Scythian men return 
to the Amazons, after having obtained their share of their property from their parents, in order 
to form a community with them. The women welcome them back with the following words: 
 
ἡµέας ἔχει φόβος τε καὶ δέος ὅκως χρὴ οἰκέειν ἐν τῷδε τῷ χώρῳ, τοῦτο µὲν ὑµέας 
ἀποστερησάσας πατέρων, τοῦτο δὲ γῆν τὴν ὑµετέρην δηλησαµένας πολλά. 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείτε ἀξιοῦτε ἡµέας γυναῖκας ἔχειν, τάδε ποιέετε ἅµα ἡµῖν: φέρετε 
ἐξαναστέωµεν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε καὶ περήσαντες Τάναιν ποταµὸν οἰκέωµεν. 
 
We’re very anxious about having to live here. It’s not just that we’ve separated you 
from your parents, but also that we’ve done a lot of damage to this country of yours. 
Since you want us to be your wives, let’s move together away from here and find 
somewhere to live on the other side of the Tanaïs River. 
 
This proposition to form a community together is important because it links, as will become 
clear, to the concept of patriarchal marriage, the pillar of Athenian stability and order. Before 
the Amazons meet the young Scythian men they are untamed and oiorpata, killers of men, 
who invade Cremni (the country of the Scythians), steal horses, and fight the older Scythians 
in battle.778 After the battle, the older Scythians decide against killing the women; instead, 
they tell their young men to pursue the Amazons and have children with them. The young 
men do as they are told and cautiously follow the Amazons, retreating whenever they turn to 
attack. Eventually, a Scythian happens to come across an Amazon alone and when she does 
																																								 																				
778 In regards to oiorpata, Asheri 2007: 659 writes: “in the first part it is possible to discern 
the Iranic vira- = ‘male, man’, but the second part is reminiscent rather of pati- = ‘lord’. 
Penrose, drawing from How&Wells, argues similarly: “…oior may be cognate to the Persian 
vira [man], whereas pata may be related to the Persian patayo, which means ‘master,’ rather 
than killer. According to this theory, oiorpata meant ‘masters of men,’ not ‘man-killers.’ 
Penrose 2016: 146. See also How&Wells 1928: 340. Elderkin, on the other hand, argues 
otherwise. While he does think that oior is cognate to the Latin vir, he does not believe that 
pata is related to the Persian pati or patayo. Rather, he argues, pata is a noun, which is based 
on the Greek πήω, παίω, ‘to smite.’ This is why, he asserts, “the compound…means what 
Herodotus says it meant ‘man-smiter, i.e. man-killer.” Elderkin 1935: 344. 
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not send him away, they have intercourse. They agree to meet again the next day and to bring 
a friend; in this manner, the Scythians ‘tamed the remaining Amazons’ (καὶ αὐτοὶ 
ἐκτιλώσαντο τὰς λοιπὰς τῶν Ἀµαζόνων).779 
 This ‘taming’ process marks the beginning of the Amazons’ relationship with the 
Scythians, and is the stepping-stone towards a more ordered society. Comparably with 
Tereus, who tames the birds in Birds by teaching them Greek, so they are no longer barbarian, 
the Scythian men teach the Amazons their language and have sex with them in order to guide 
them towards a less barbarian, and more civilized, life.780 Both taming processes can be linked 
to certain Athenian values, specifically to the Athenian idea of a well-ordered society. In 
particular, the birds begin to resemble Athenians when they start learning Greek, and the 
resemblance is emphasized when they begin living in a city (even though they do retain many 
bird-like features). Likewise, the Amazons begin to resemble Athenian women when they 
marry the Scythian men and learn their language (even though they mostly keep to their 
original way of life). 
 The fact that the Scythian men do not learn the language of the Amazons, but the 
Amazons appropriate that of the men, can be compared with Lysistrata’s and Praxagora’s 
appropriation of male speech. Penrose suggests that this points at the Amazons’ intelligence 
(which to the Greeks is a rather masculine trait), and Merrill asserts likewise, that the 
description of language acquisition here “wryly suggests that the Amazons are more skilled at 
cultural adaptation than the admittedly barbarous Scythians they have married.”781 
																																								 																				
779 Herodotus 4.113. 
780 Herodotus 4.114. See Brown and Tyrrell 1985: 299, who write: “Herodotus’ placement 
and use of ἐκτιλώσαντο specifically indicate that by the act of intercourse alone the Scythians 
accomplished the taming of the Amazons.”  
781 See Merrill 2008: 14 and Penrose 2016: 115.  On a different note, this also links back to 
the point made in the sections on The Time Machine and Birds, namely that the possession of 
a common language and community-formation goes hand in hand (cf. pp. 135-6; 158-9). 
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 The Scythians’ reasoning for taming the Amazons recalls that of the Athenians when 
they wish to pursue the Greek model of marriage in order to fix the Amazons’ chaotic way of 
life and establish a community – and not just the model of any Greek, but that of Kekrops, the 
Athenians’ first king and ancestral parent to whom they attribute the establishment of 
marriage.782 This reasoning is first implied in Herodotus 4.114 when the Scythians say to the 
Amazons: “Let’s stop living like this from now on…” (νῦν ὦν µηκέτι πλεῦνα χρόνον ζόην 
τοιήνδε ἔχωµεν), and is later reinforced by the Amazons’ proposal to move to the other side 
of the Tanaïs River to form a society. Like the Athenians, the Scythians seem to believe that 
men and women must join in union together if they want to live in a proper community that is 
not marked by uncivilized and warring conditions.783 Moreover, they seem to believe that the 
Amazons alone may represent chaos, but when united with men, they have the potential to 
form a social order, in this case that of the Sauromatians.784 
 The formation of a community in Herodotus’ account of the Amazons does not only 
recall the Kekropian model of marriage as a civilizing force but also the Homeric household, 
which “was founded on legitimate marriage, and [which] perpetuated itself by fashioning 
legitimate marriages.”785 More specifically, “no household could exist without a lawful wife, 
that is, a wife obtained according to the recognised rules of matrimony.”786 The same is true 
for a plot of land, something that is associated with the idea of a household in Homer. For 
																																								 																				
782 Tyrrell 1984: 28. Cf. Loraux 1986: 25. “King of Athens before Athens comes into 
existence, Kekrops accomplishes the transition from savagery to civilization by collecting 
men together into a city…and by introducing marriage, which puts an end to promiscuity.” 
783 Cf. Hartog 1988: 259. “We find the Scythians reasoning like Greeks (one does not make 
war against women) and it seems that for them, too, the polarity between war and marriage is 
meaningful.” 
784 Cf. Blok 1995: 92. “In the Herodotean story, the Skythians and Amazons were merged to 
become the Sauromatians…” Cf. Dewald 1981: 100. “Together the Amazon women and 
Scythian men remove to a nearby uninhabited area to found a new people that will exhibit a 
blend of Scythian and Amazonian qualities.”  
785 Leduc 1992: 242. 
786 Leduc 1992: 242. 
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example, in Od. XIV, 61-3, Eumaeus says to the swineherd: ἦ γὰρ τοῦ γε θεοὶ κατὰ νόστον 
ἔδησαν, ὅς κεν ἔµ᾽ ἐνδυκέως ἐφίλει καὶ κτῆσιν ὄπασσεν, οἶκόν τε κλῆρόν τε πολυµνήστην τε 
γυναῖκα. “The gods, they must have blocked his journey home. He’d have treated me well, he 
would, with a house, a plot of land and a wife you’d gladly prize.”  
The Amazons and the Scythians seem to associate similar things with the idea of a 
household, as marriage and the obtainment of a plot of land on the other side of the Tanaïs 
River define the foundational structure of their community. Again, both the Amazons and the 
Scythians reason like Athenians; and this time they do not just think like Kekrops but also like 
Homer when they associate wives and a plot of land with the idea of a household, and thus 
also with the idea of a well-ordered community. Leduc writes: “In Homeric societies the 
entire residential group was founded on, and perpetuated itself by enforcing, legitimate 
marriage.”787 More importantly, as Lévi-Strauss puts it, marriage in Homeric societies made 
“an effort to transcend theoretically irreconcilable principles.”788 Presumably, the older 
Scythians have something similar in mind when they send the young men to tame the 
Amazons by the means of marriage: overcome differences and pave the way towards a more 
peaceful future. 
 This kind of reasoning brings to mind the ending of Lysistrata and the myth of the 
Lemnian women, as told by Apollonius of Rhodes. For at the end of Lysistrata, men and 
women reconcile and are moved back into harmony and marriage, which confirms the happy 
and triumphant ending of the comedy. The myth of the Lemnian women provides a similar 
ending: briefly, the Lemnian women develop an unattractive body odour because of 
Aphrodite’s anger towards them. The women’s husbands, repulsed by their wives’ smell, 
decide to take Thracian captives as concubines, which leads the women to kill all the men on 
																																								 																				
787 Leduc 1992: 243. 
788 Lévi-Strauss 1983: 53. 
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Lemnos. Hypsipyle, however, does not want to take part but helps her father to escape 
instead. Shortly after, she greets Jason and the Argonauts, and leads the Lemnian women into 
a mass marriage with them, marking the reunion of men and women and the commencement 
of a more peaceful future that is not shaped by warfare.789 
 In all three stories, the polarity between warfare and monogamous marriage is present 
as well as the (Greek) idea that men and women must (re-) unite in order to live less chaotic, 
and more peaceful, lives.790 The reasoning that Lysistrata, Hypsipyle, and the Scythian men 
seem to share brings to mind a few philosophical dialogues, some of which have already been 
discussed earlier. For example, it recalls the weaving-analogy in Plato’s Statesman where the 
Stranger argues that the universal science of statesmanship knows how to weave everything 
that is in a state into an organized fabric. As stated on p. 92, the statesman accomplishes this 
by providing both a divine and a human bond for the citizens’ souls. The divine bond is 
created by implementing in men’s soul a correct opinion of what is just and good, and the 
human bond is formed by the monogamous marriage of men and women whose offspring will 
have a balanced mixture of the two opposing elements.791 
																																								 																				
789 Ap. Rhod. Argon. 1.9.17. Again, a ring-like sequence is present. 
It is worth noting that Herodotus tells the story the other way around and narrates an account 
of Lemnian men murdering women and children. In his version, told at 6.138, Lemnian men 
abduct Athenian women to be their concubines and have children with them. The women 
raise the children in the Athenian way, and teach them the Attic dialect and Athenian customs. 
The Lemnian men, fearing that these Athenian children will one day dominate over the 
Lemnian children, decide to kill them and their mothers, too. Herodotus also briefly mentions 
the story of the Lemnian women killing their husbands at the end of 6.138, which, along with 
the other one, “is one of the origins of the universal Greek practice of describing savage deeds 
as ‘Lemnian’”, according to him. 
790 In the case of Lysistrata and the Lemnian women, this also brings to mind the “binding 
nature of patriarchal marriage where wife’s subordination and patrilineal succession are 
reaffirmed.” See Zeitlin 1996: 87. 
791 Cf. Lys. 568-570 and Lysistrata’s wool-allegory, which she uses in order to demonstrate 
that Athens must return to the status quo. 
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 A similar stream of thought, albeit more negatively, appears in Aristotle, when he 
expresses concerns about Socrates’ idea that wives should be held in common in Kallipolis, 
specifically about the premise from which the argument proceeds, namely, that it is best for 
the state to be as unified as possible. At 1261a17-23, he asserts:792 
 
καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊοῦσα καὶ γινοµένη µία µᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται: πλῆθος 
γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινοµένη τε µία µᾶλλον οἰκία µὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἄνθρωπος 
δ᾽ ἐξ οἰκίας ἔσται: µᾶλλον γὰρ µίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίηµεν ἄν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα 
τῆς οἰκίας: ὥστ᾽ εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον: ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν 
πόλιν. 
 
Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no 
longer a state? – Since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending a greater 
unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; 
for the family may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the 
family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would 
be the destruction of the state. 
 
Aristotle’s concern about the maximum unification of the state and women being common 
property, which will ultimately lead to the destruction of the state, recalls Lysistrata’s, 
Hypsipyle’s, and the Scythians’ rationale for their actions. Even though their stories are not 
about the unification of the state and the communality of women per se, they do feature an 
absence of partnership, a destructive environment and a lost, or lack of, Aristotelian 
community.793 It also brings to mind the myth of Kekrops mentioned earlier in which Kekrops 
																																								 																				
792 Aristotle, Pol. 1261a17-23. Cf. Plato, Rep. 462. 
793 While for Aristotle the absence of the institution of marriage affects the endurance of the 
state, for Plato the very presence of it (among the Guardian class) jeopardizes the survival of 
the state. For the Guardians, the private household and institution of marriage is to be 
abolished (457c-d) because Plato fears that private interests would clash with public interests, 
which would constitute a threat to the existence of the state. (That being said, there is still a 
form of temporary marriage, which is to be performed at certain festivals, in order to ensure a 
stable birth-rate, “so that the city will, as far as possible, become neither too big nor too small. 
καὶ µήτε µεγάλη ἡµῖν ἡ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν µήτε σµικρὰ γίγνηται, 460a. Low birth-rates 
could potentially become a problem in Ecclesiazusae since all men have to sleep with an old 
woman first before they are allowed to sleep with a young one, 1015-20. If more men sleep 
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introduces the Athenian men and women to marriage in order to end their random and 
promiscuous lifestyle.794 In a similar vein to the myth of the Lemnian women, and Herodotus’ 
account of the Amazons, “matriarchy [i.e. a chaotic era] comes to an end with Kekrops’s 
institution of patriarchal marriage—namely, the yoking of one woman to one man.”795  
 Indeed, the brief stint of gynaecocracy on Lemnos ends when the Lemnian women 
marry the Argonauts, and in Herodotus it ends when the Amazons cross the River Tanaïs and 
settle down with the Scythian men. For even though they keep to their original way of life 
(διαίτῃ ἀπὸ τούτου χρὲωνται τῇ παλαιῇ τῶν Σαυροµατέων αἱ γυναῖκες), they no longer live in 
a female-only society, but in a new community that is made up of both men and women and 
that has its own language and marriage customs.796 Thus, even though it is a different kind of 
social order (men and women are equal, and the women go out hunting and wear the same 
clothes as the men), it is a social order that resembles the Athenian one because it is built on 
the institution of marriage and thus on one of Kekrops’ ancestral norms. In a way then, even 
though the Amazon society contrasts the Athenian one in many ways, it does define the polis 
through the marriage with the Scythians.797  
 This is why I think it is a mistake to dismiss Herodotus’ account of the Amazons as a 
“charming, happily-ever-after tale, [which] seems not only remote from [his] main 
theme…but a perfect example of his alleged gullibility and willingness to detour from the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
with old women than with young ones, this might affect the demographics of the state, which 
might then subsequently lead to its decline). 
794 Tyrrell 1984: 30. 
795 Tyrrell 1984: 31. Cf. Dewald 1981: 92: “…Herodotus’ portrait of women emphasizes their 
full partnership with men in establishing and maintaining social order.” 
796 Herodotus 4.116-7. 
797 This is in contrast with the unbalanced gender relations we see in Herodotus’ description 
of the Persian society, or the rather odd ones in his account of the Egyptians. It is also rather 
different from his account of Periander and his relationship with the Corinthian women. In the 
story, Periander asks all the women in Corinth to strip naked, so he could burn their clothes 
and give them to the ghost of his wife in order to find out where she had put his friend’s 
money. 
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main course of his narrative to tell any amusing story, no matter how irrelevant.”798 On the 
contrary, I think Herodotus’ version of the myth is relevant because it can be used to point at 
something important about the Athenian status quo. For, like Lysistrata and the myth of the 
Lemnian women, it shows that being an Amazon, or living in a gynaecocratic society where 
the sexes are separated, can only ever be an interim status in the Greek world.799 More 
specifically, it can be used “as a model that sets out Herodotus’ idea of how societies begin 
and are enabled to endure over time.”800 For his account of the Amazons suggests that, in 
order for a society to endure, the polis and monogamous marriage must be (re-) created at 
some point, as is the case in Lysistrata and the myth of the Lemnian women (and in Birds as 
well). In this way, the Amazons, for all their social and behavioural differences, recall a Greek 
way of thinking.801  
 
VII.b. Herodotus’ Amazons and Apollonius’ Lemnian women in relation to 
Ecclesiazusae 
 
 This idea, that living in a gynaecocracy without the Kekropian institution of marriage 
is inevitably ephemeral, is significant for our understanding of the plot of Ecclesiazusae. For 
it draws attention to an important point about the (ostensibly) unavoidable outcome of 
Praxagora’s government, and it allows us to construct a view of what the play is doing with 
																																								 																				
798 Flory 1987: 109. 
799 Cf. Dowden 1997: 123 and 128. “The Amazon herself…has no future other than marriage 
or the tomb.” 
800 Dewald 1981: 100. 
801 This is also exemplified by the fact that the Scythian men obtain their share of their 
property from their parents before they marry the Amazons, which points at the relationship 
between property, monogamous marriage, and patriarchy (or, absence of matriarchy) in Greek 
society. At the same time, despite the underlying Greek notion, the fact that men obtain the 
dowries in the account, and not women, also indicates something rather non-Greek. As Asheri 
comments: “The circumstance that men, instead of women, bring dowries and leave their 
paternal home constitutes, in the eye of the Greeks, a subversion of ordinary rules.” See 
Asheri 2007: 660. 
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the idea that it is not possible to escape the Athenian status quo. For at the end of the day, as 
is the case in Lysistrata, the myth of the Lemnian women, and Herodotus’ account of the 
Amazons, everything always seems to come back to it in one way or another. Certainly, the 
basic pattern of these stories is quite similar: at the lowest point of each story, (seemingly) 
unpleasant women are in power, and the men have either disappeared or sunk to the bottom of 
the hierarchy. In the end, the chaos that ensues, because of either the men’s absence, the 
separation of the sexes, or the female rule, is fixed by marriage or the reunion of men and 
women—and this is the important point here, namely the return (or formation, in case of the 
Amazons) to the Athenian status quo on a social level. 
 However, in Ecclesiazusae, this does not exactly happen. The characters do return to 
the status quo on a political level in a way, simply by employing Praxagora as her leader, for 
she uses the same scoundrelly tricks others have used before her to gain power. However, 
they fail to do so on a social level because even at the end of the comedy, monogamous 
marriage is still obsolete and women are still communal; and, more importantly, women are 
still in power.802 Even so, looking at the endings of the other stories discussed here we are in a 
position to suggest that a similar return to Athenian normality will eventually take place in 
Ecclesiazusae as well—even if it does not happen within the temporal frame of the comic 
production. This is why I disagree with Zeitlin, who argues: “[the play] takes the unusual step 
of leaving the women in power to enforce their utopian scheme, which by dissolving the 
																																								 																				
802 This is also why the Athenians would have probably preferred the society featured in 
Herodotus’ version of the Amazon myth to the one depicted in Ecclesiazusae. For in the 
Amazon myth, even though the Scythian men are not at the top of the Sauromatian hierarchy 
but equal to the women, there is some sort of progress (and normality) in the Athenian sense 
because the myth ends with the portrayal of the settled community of Sauromatians. 
Additionally, the men have not really ceased being men, as is the case in Ecclesiazusae, and 
they do not do women’s work, as is the case in Herodotus’ account of the Egyptian society – 
the women may do men’s work here but they have not swapped roles with them; they merely 
do the same kind of work. Herodotus’ version of the myth thus features a kind of progress that 
Ecclesiazusae lacks.   
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institution of marriage and of the individual oikos itself, ensures the permanence of their rule 
in the new social order.”803  
 Instead, I believe that the discussion of the other female dominated societies puts 
forward the idea that Praxagora’s matriarchal rule is not permanent but rather short-lived 
because a society at that time, without the Athenian institution of marriage, can only exist for 
so long. Certainly, the ephemerality of Praxagora’s government is already implied in lines 
657-8 of the play, where Blepyrus tells her that her regime, along with her political agenda, is 
bound to collapse. Blepyrus’ reasoning is based on the abolition of lawsuits rather than on that 
of patriarchal marriage, but it still underlines an important point, which Praxagora fails to see: 
her regime is not sustainable, and one day her downfall will come.  
This, then, sheds new light on her decision to close the law-courts in order to put an 
end to the Athenians’ tendency to change their opinions constantly. Clearly, she is no 
different than they are, for her political agenda joins the seemingly unending string of 
swapping one malfunctioning political system for the other. Specifically, before Kekrops, the 
Athenians live in a state of promiscuity and randomness; “during his reign, Kekrops 
transforms the social organization of the people whom he has organized into a settled 
community, ‘inventing many laws for humans’…”804 and now Praxagora alters the social 
organization of the Athenians once again by unsettling Kekrops’ community and by inventing 
many new laws.805 
																																								 																				
803 Zeitlin 1999a: 177. 
804 Zeitlin 1999a: 182. Zeitlin is referring to the scholiast to Plutus 773 here, who asserts that 
Kekrops “invented many institutions for the human race, raising them from a savage to a 
civilized condition…” 
805 These new laws make clear once again that Praxagora and Lysistrata are actually quite 
different in many ways. They both certainly serve as examples for women who are capable of 
achieving male standards of excellence, and both use a similar kind of rhetoric, but ultimately 
Praxagora is much more of a rebel than Lysistrata is. For not only does she alter existing law, 
but she overturns the laws of Kekropian Athens.  
	 296	
In this way, we can also see a circular movement from matriarchy to patriarchy and 
then back to matriarchy again, which is also pointed out by the neighbour in lines 830-1 when 
he says: τότε µὲν ἡµεῖς ἤρχοµεν, νῦν δ᾽ αἱ γυναῖκες. “We were in power then; now the women 
are.”806 However, Herodotus’ account of the Amazon myth, and the myth of the Lemnian 
women, insinuates that the matriarchal order of the comedy will eventually be replaced by 
patriarchy again. When that happens, the neighbour might change his answer from τότε µὲν 
ἡµεῖς ἤρχοµεν, νῦν δ᾽ αἱ γυναῖκες to ἡµεῖς ἤρχοµεν, τότε αἱ γυναῖκες ἦρχον, νῦν οἱ ἄνδρες 
ἄρχουσιν. Consequently, as innovative as Praxagora is on some levels, her political and social 
agenda is actually rather regressive because, when linking it to other stories that feature 
female dominated societies, it has the potential to show that the Athenians are going in circles 
and that, sooner or later, they will end up right where they started once again.807  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
Although, looking at it another way, while Praxagora’s government is more premature 
and radical than others, it also shows a more successful state of society on many levels. 
Warfare, crime, and poverty do not exist, and everyone is taken care of. In a way, this brings 
to mind More’s ideology discussed in the introduction: while (new) societies may not be able 
to solve all problems (such as violence, which is clearly not on Praxagora’s agenda), they may 
at least be able to reduce the bad. Cf. pp. 35-6, with n. 115. 
806 The movement from patriarchy to matriarchy also brings to mind the oracle in Lysistrata 
767-8, which predicts victory for the women if they work together. The oracle says: ἀλλ᾽ 
ὁπόταν πτήξωσι χελιδόνες εἰς ἕνα χῶρον, τοὺς ἔποπας φεύγουσαι, ἀπόσχωνταί τε φαλήτων, 
παῦλα κακῶν ἔσται, τὰ δ᾽ ὑπέρτερα νέρτερα θήσει Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεµέτης (…when the swallows 
hole up in a single home, fleeing the hoopoes and leaving the phallus alone, then are their 
problems solved, and high-thundering Zeus shall reverse what’s up and what’s down).  
It also recalls the story of the oracle of the Argives in Herodotus 6.77, which predicts 
that the female will overcome the male: ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἡ θήλεια τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα ἐξελάσῃ 
καὶ κῦδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρηται, πολλὰς Ἀργείων ἀµφιδρυφέας τότε θήσει. ὧς ποτέ τις ἐρέει 
καὶ ἐπεσσοµένων ἀνθρώπων δεινὸς ὄφις τριέλικτος ἀπώλετο δουρὶ δαµασθείς. (“But when 
female conquers male and expels him, when glory in Argos redounds to her name, she will set 
Argive women a-plenty tearing their cheeks; and so it will be said by future generations that a 
fearful thrice-coiled snake fell before the spear and perished”). These examples primarily link 
to the topsy-turvy worlds found in Aristophanic comedy and Herodotean societies, but they 
can still be used to underline the idea of the change from patriarchy to matriarchy seen in the 
accounts analysed above. 
807 This brings to mind the question raised in the fragmentary play by Thugenides mentioned 
on p. 278 n. 762 (τί ὦγάθ᾽ἀντιδικοῦµεν ἀλλήλοις ἒτι;) and also line 208 of Ecclesiazusae 
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The persistence of the Greek status quo is thus visible in all the accounts of female 
dominated societies discussed here (even in the one that features barbarians), and it is this 
persistence that helps us reflect on fundamental values of Athenian civilization. For, like the 
stories of Birds and Lysistrata, these accounts demonstrate that ultimately Athenians cannot 
live without their patriarchal political and social standards, no matter how hard some of them 
may try to escape them. The men in Ecclesiazusae may have been stripped of their political 
power, but, taking into consideration the other accounts, it is fair to assume that they will 
rebel at some point and attempt to reinstate the previous status quo by re-institutionalizing the 
subordination of women through monogamous marriage, just as they did during the age of 
Kekrops.808   
 
 
VIII. Modern Perspectives on the Amazon Myth and Women as Political Leaders 
	
At the end of this chapter, one question that is left to be asked is this: in what different 
directions do the conclusions of Ecclesiazusae and Herodotus’ account of the Amazons take 
us? I mention some of the similarities in the previous sections, for example (1) both stories 
play into the historic conflict between matriarchal and patriarchal regimes, (2) both portray 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
where Praxagora scolds the Athenians for tossing to and fro like a ship at sea when it comes 
to public opinions.  
 Furthermore, it recalls the various cycles analysed in the previous chapters, such as the 
ones seen in PV, Birds, the Platonic dialogues, and The Time Machine. These stories show 
that the past is contained in the future. PV makes clear that what Zeus does to Prometheus will 
be done to him as well; Birds is, to a certain extent anyway, about the reclaiming of a 
previously lost leadership; in the Statesman, history perpetually repeats itself by continually 
exchanging (a) for (b); in the Timaeus, Athens is subject to ever-recurring moments of 
foundation and cataclysm, and in The Time Machine, the time traveler is reminded of the 
Phoenicians and the Sphinx when he visits the Eloi in the year AD 802701. Cf. pp. 55-8; 83-
5; 131-2; 141. 
808 If this assumption is true, then the ending of Praxagora’s regime may also have the 
potential to serve as prime example, or warning even, for anyone who dares to challenge 
Athens’ power and greatness, and perhaps even patriarchy in general.  
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women who are capable of achieving male standards of excellence, (3) both feature unbridled 
female sexuality and power relations to do with sex, (4) both present to the audience an 
interrogation and unmasking of female and male law, and legal practices, and (5) both 
examine the question, ‘what law, and what kind of political system, is best for Athens and the 
other societies described in the texts.’ More importantly, both the comedy and the myth 
portray women at moments of foundation and revolution and, comparably with the animal 
societies discussed in chapter 2, they show the power of collectivity. 
But what are the different key elements of the texts? It is clear that both Ecclesiazusae 
and the Amazon myth feature a meeting, and confrontation between men and women—this 
can also be seen in Lysistrata and the myth of the Lemnian women. Eventually, the crises that 
are reached in those confrontations are resolved, but they are resolved rather differently in the 
comedy and the myth. In the comedy, the crisis is resolved by the abolition of monogamous 
marriage, which subsequently results in a form of separation of the sexes. In the myth, 
meanwhile, it is resolved the opposite way, namely by the creation of monogamous marriage 
and the union of men and women. Consequently, what Praxagora advertises as a problem in 
Ecclesiazusae is described as a solution in the Amazon myth. Put differently, while Herodotus 
presents elements of Athens’ view of what an ordered community should look like, 
Aristophanes presents a celebration of a regime that abolishes the very order Herodotus 
creates.  
Furthermore, in Herodotus we witness the ascent from matriarchy to a more 
patriarchal society. This is despite the fact that the Amazons are still barbarian and rebellious 
in the sense that they wear men’s clothing and do men’s work; at the end of the day they are 
also more tame and settled than they are at the beginning of the story. Meanwhile, in 
Ecclesiazusae, we see the opposite happening, namely a comic portrayal of Athens’ descent 
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from patriarchy to matriarchy (even though the unavoidable return of patriarchy seems to be 
looming over the characters’ heads).809 Unlike the Amazons, the women in the comedy 
continue to be rebellious even at the very end of the play, as they celebrate the gynaecocratic 
regime and the end of patriarchal Athens. Consequently, despite their many similarities, 
ultimately the texts take us in two different directions, as they end with different political and 
social notions. 
  However, despite their differences, the interpretations of these different political and 
social notions have the potential to link together, as they are assimilated to a debate not only 
about democracy, different social orders, and the refinement of law, but also about which 
social order is ultimately the better one. In this case, the initial answer to that question seems 
obvious. Ecclesiazusae ends in chaos and features a form of descent (in that the rule of men is 
replaced by the rule of women) and Herodotus’ version of the Amazon myth ends in order 
and portrays a form of ascent (from the Athenian point of view, because men and women are 
united). Thus, at first glance, his appears to be the better (or, at least more successful) social 
order at that time. This idea that the more patriarchal society, the one in which men and 
women have formed a union, appears to be more successful than the other one is significant; 
and it recalls the argument made throughout this chapter and the previous ones, namely that it 
seems to be only a matter of time until the (patriarchal) status quo is (re-) established and 
celebrated once again. 
 Nonetheless, despite one social order arguably being better than the other one, there is 
something to be said about the notion of collectivity, which can be witnessed in both 
accounts. For it not only recalls the different bird stories analysed in chapter 2 where the birds 
																																								 																				
809 This links to the notions of ascent and descent in the Prometheia, analysed in the first 
chapter (cf. pp. 55-8). Both there and here, it is clear that these notions oscilliate, and that the 
theme of change within them dominates the stories. Lysistrata’s and Praxagora’s actions are 
situated within this theme of change, just like Zeus’ and Prometheus’.  
	 300	
attempt to take their fate into their own hands and change it for the better (albeit 
unsuccessfully), but it also brings to mind the comparisons made between Aristophanes and 
Orwell or, more generally, the connection between fifth-century Greek comedy and early to 
mid-twentieth-century political literature. Specifically, it can be compared with utopian 
socialist literature written by women in the early twentieth-century in which female characters 
are often portrayed as a collective unit and the moving force in an attempt to fundamentally 
restructure the society of their time—much like the female characters in Aristophanes’ 
Ecclesiazusae and Lysistrata. 
 It is, however, important to note that there are a number of significant differences 
between the modern gynaecocracies and the ancient ones, which need to be acknowledged 
before continuing. Specifically, the two most important differences for this discussion are the 
following: First of all, modern (utopian) gynaecocracies tend to be more evolutionary than 
ancient ones: rather than promoting radical revolutionary shifts (something that can be seen in 
both Ecclesiazusae and the myth of the Amazons), they avoid large revolutionary movements 
and instead build their societies piece by piece over the course of the centuries. This is so the 
foundations are set “deep to last all the longer” and the walls are raised “so high that they will 
not fear anyone.”810 Secondly, as Johns writes, “the feminist utopian view of history…is not 
the traditional fantasy of suddenly summoning Eden [something which is characteristic for 
Aristophanic comedy]. Instead, it is a theory of history as accumulation, the combined power 
of many small, discrete events issuing in large impacts.”811 Or, as Bammer puts it when 
describing American feminist utopias from the mid-twentieth century, “…a movement toward 
																																								 																				
810 Johns 2010: 186. Pizan 1404-5: 12. 
811 Johns 2010: 188. 
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utopia [is] a journey of many small steps [and] change…is the sum total of changes we 
ourselves create day by day in the process of living.”812   
 Nevertheless, despite these fundamental differences there is a connection to be made 
between the ancient and modern gynaecocracies—just like there is a connection to be made 
between Aristophanes and Orwell. In particular, while Birds and Animal Farm portray, 
amongst others, a confrontation between culture and nature, and civilization and barbarity, the 
ancient gynaecocracies analysed here and their modern counterparts depict a confrontation 
between men and women and, at times, a lack of understanding between the political thoughts 
of the former and the political proposals of the latter. More specifically, many of the texts 
written by women in the early and mid-twentieth century portray scenarios that are especially 
comparable with the beginning of Lysistrata, and the myths of the Amazons and the Lemnian 
women: matriarchy is the (initial) leading force and men are either absent or not in the 
forefront of the stories.  
 Furthermore, in both the ancient and the modern gynaecocracies, the women, or 
female characters, have broken free from the place traditionally assigned to them by the 
society of their time; and they propose a series of modifications within their respective 
societies. These modifications often relate to the core of the women’s societies and may make 
the reader question established social, political, and legal norms—as is the case in Birds and 
Animal Farm. More importantly, while in ancient Athens, it is the stage of the theatre that 
																																								 																				
812 Bammer 1991: 104. Another difference which needs to be mentioned is the fact that the 
stories about the ancient gynaecocracies (especially those seen in Aristophanes) are written 
and played by men for a (presumably) male-dominated audience. The modern gynaecocracies, 
on the other hand, are written by women for a readership composed (largely) of other women. 
However, I do not think that this difference undermines the analysis presented here, just like 
the presentation of comic and tragic women in Greek plays is not undermined by the fact that 
their roles are acted by men. I believe it is possible to compare these texts, regardless of the 
differences in the authors’ sex, as their presentation (and challenge) of the audiences’ 
expectations of social norms is certainly comparable, as are the juxtapositions of the polarities 
between male and female. Cf. Mossman 2001: 375. 
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offers female characters a space to freely express their social and political views without the 
constraints that are placed on women off stage, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-
century that space is provided in (and by) utopian fiction, which serves as a vehicle for 
women’s critique of political and social matters.813 Moreover, it is “one of the few modes 
available for feminist theorizing and the articulation of alternatives” and it allows women “to 
express their desires for a more just and equitable society …”814 
 Additionally, in both the ancient and modern accounts, marriage is often either 
abolished or temporarily interrupted, which has to do with the fact that it may prevent the 
women featured in those stories from achieving both agency and self-determination. As Russ 
writes in the 1975 novel The Female Man in the voice of one of her characters: “Men 
succeed. Women get married. Men fail. Women get married…Men start wars. Women get 
married. Men stop them. Women get married.”815 This is why, in order to achieve the much 
sought-after agency and self-determination, women must either become men (if only 
temporarily, as seen in Ecclesiazusae) or, alternatively, they must remove themselves to a 
remote place, which is separate from their own society and which does not include men. 
 One of the books that features such a separate society, is Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s 
Herland of which I offer a comparative analysis below in order to transport themes from 
Aristophanes and Herodotus to modern literature to show how the anxieties and frustrations 
presented in the ancient texts are able to transcend their historical contexts, and are still of 
significance in Gilman’s time. 
 The book is published in 1915 and tells the story of three male explorers who discover 
an ancient all-female community in a remote Amazonian jungle. The majority of the book 
																																								 																				
813 Johns 2010: 175. 
814 Johns 2010: 175. 
815 Russ 1975: 203-4. 
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focuses on the differences between the society of the men and that of the women; and it 
examines the social and political issues of Gilman’s time by juxtaposing the patriarchal 
society of the men and the two-thousand-year-old matriarchy of the women. While often met 
with a lack of understanding on both sides, most of the characters are also willing to learn 
from one another and look at their respective societies through the lens of the other. It is, 
however, the ending of the story that is particularly noteworthy because, comparably with 
Herodotus’ version of the Amazon myth, Gilman’s account ends with the marriages between 
the male explorers and the Amazonian women, and the (re-) marriage between matriarchy and 
patriarchy.816  
 At first, it seems that the society described in Herland can be readily compared with 
Ecclesiazusae because it features many characteristics which Praxagora proposed for her 
gynaecocracy two thousand years earlier: warfare, crime, and jealousy do not exist, and the 
nation functions as one big household where everyone is cared for. However, these are the 
only (main) similarities of the two gynaecocratic societies, which are potentially even 
outweighed by one big difference, namely by the fact that the women of Herland are 
portrayed as being rather sexless, as the focus is more on motherhood rather than on sexual 
relations even after they marry the men. Still, looking closer it becomes clear that Gilman’s 
modern Amazons can be compared with Herodotus’ ancient Amazons and, through a 
comparative reading and transporting of ancient themes to her writing, I show that they offer 
additional insight into the texts’ implications for both ancient and modern audiences.  
While in ancient Greece the Amazon myth is often associated with the past, 
specifically with the arguably rather chaotic principle of matriarchy discussed earlier, it is also 
																																								 																				
816 Suksang 1995: 147. 
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possible to associate it with the present when looking at it through the lens of the ‘Other’ in 
the early twentieth-century. Blok argues similarly:817  
 
Certainly, the Greeks associated the Amazons with the past, but this remained vague 
in many ways. Not only was there no coherent perception of the past in which the 
Amazons were incorporated in a variety of ways—the historical view of the mythical 
past was too speculative for that—but in other respects too, the Amazons were not 
figures who were confined to the heroic past, for time and again these women turned 
out to intervene in the present as well. 
 
Blok’s argument here is primarily based on the assertion that in Greek etymology, the word 
‘Amazones’ is “approached as a piece of contemporary Greek and not as a residue from 
earlier times,”818 but her argument can nonetheless be placed into the twentieth-century as 
well. Indeed, much like Birds and Animal Farm, the Amazon myth has the potential to 
become assimilated to our time and it can be used to point at contemporary social, political, 
and legal problems. Moreover, comparing it with its modern adaptation in Herland, we can 
continue to examine a) ephemeral female leadership and the temporary absence of men, and 
b) the eventual (re-) union of men and women on a political and social level and the formation 
of, or return to, a more patriarchal community.  
 This becomes especially clear when looking at the initial absence of men and the two-
thousand-year old all-female leadership in Herland. Comparably with elements of the myth of 
the Lemnian women, there used to be a patriarchy, but most of the men are killed in a 
succession of wars. The slaves of the men, seeing an opportunity to gain control, kill the 
remaining men and boys as well as the older women and mothers. This leads the younger 
women to rise in revolt and kill all the slaves, leaving no male behind. This all happens in a 
mountain pathway whose only pass to the outside world had previously been sealed off by a 
																																								 																				
817 Blok 1995: 33-34. 
818 Blok 1995: 34. 
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volcanic outburst. Consequently, there is no way out and no way in, and the younger women 
are the only ones who are left, thus marking the beginning of a matriarchy.819 In regards to the 
foundation of this matriarchy, Johnson-Bogart asserts:820 
 
As in other literary utopias, the strategy for achieving perfection in Charlotte Perkins 
 Gilman’s Herland appears to be based primarily on eliminating one partner in various 
 pairs of terms where the excluded partner is seen to be the locus of the ills of society. 
 
 
Johnson-Bogart continues by arguing that there are deep assumptions about the nature of the 
meaning of certain terms in virtually all literary utopias. These assumptions, she states, are 
“based on the binary structure of language which produces an abundant network of paired 
terms whose meanings are one another’s opposites - masculine/feminine, public/private…and 
so on.”821 It is clear that in the ancient gynaecocracies analysed in this chapter, it is primarily 
the ‘masculine vs feminine’ and the ‘public vs private’ (or, the polis and the oikos), which are 
in opposition to one another (something which can also be seen in the Pythagorean Table of 
Opposites, as stated on p. 256 n. 709). As Johnson-Bogart argues, the same argument can be 
made for many modern gynaecocracies, and utopian fiction in general. 
																																								 																				
819 In regards to the survival of the race: at the very beginning of the history of Herland, the 
founding mothers perfect the asexual reproduction technique of parthenogenesis, thus 
ensuring, and explaining, the continuous birth of baby girls for generations to come without 
the intervention from men.  
 A comic reversal of this scenario is found in Lucian’s moon episode in VH 1.22, 
where “there are no women – they don’t even have a word for ‘woman’ – but men reproduce 
together through an agreed alternation of gender-roles, and in the absence of a uterus gestation 
takes place in the calf of the father’s leg, whence the Moon-baby is delivered in due course by 
surgery – another nod, perhaps, towards the asexual reproduction suggested by Herodorus’ 
egg-laying Moon-women.” Ní Mheallaigh 2014: 220. 
820 Johnson-Bogart 1992: 85. For instance, as Johnson-Bogart writes, “in Looking Backward, 
Edward Bellamy eliminates ‘poor’ from the dichotomy rich vs poor…[and] in Mark Twain’s 
A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, Hank Morgan attempts to eliminate what he 
perceives to be superstition and irrationality…to make his notion of reason ubiquitous.”  
821 Johnson-Bogart 1992: 85. 
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 However, it is also clear that while the meanings of these paired terms are usually in 
opposition to one another in theory, in practice this is not always the case. As argued earlier, 
when looking at Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae, the categories of the ‘masculine vs feminine’ 
appear to be particularly blurred because Lysistrata and Praxagora employ a combination of 
male and female rhetoric (cf. pp. 224-5 and 240-1). In this vein, the traditional opposition of 
the paired terms is deconstructed over the course of the comedies—something that can also be 
observed in the myth of the Amazons and the myth of the Lemnian women. In Herland, these 
terms, and the assumptions about the nature of the meaning of them, are deconstructed in a 
way that is comparable with that seen in the ancient gynaecocracies. More importantly, 
however, is the fact that at the end of the narrative, they are put back together, which is also 
the case in the myths of the Amazons and the Lemnian women, and Lysistrata. In particular, 
it is “the basis of meaning in the relation that binds terms to one another,” which is 
reconstructed [at the end of Herland].822 
 In both the ancient and modern accounts, both terms, whether separated or paired, are 
of importance because it is they that help define the world that is created. As Johnston states, 
“…for Gilman, the patriarchal world makes the fiction of Herland’s matriarchy necessary 
since each requires the concept of that other to define itself.”823 Put differently, in both cases, 
the old world that is abolished at the beginning of the story is still relevant throughout the 
entire narrative, because the new world could not be defined without it. In Herland, this is 
only accentuated by the fact that the world is unfolded through the eyes and consciousness of 
the three male explorers who grow increasingly wary of the flawed patriarchal society they 
come from; and this clearly echoes Hythloday’s sentiments when he tells his friends about 
Utopia which is, according to him, so much better than the society they live in. However, in 
																																								 																				
822 Johnson-Bogart 1992: 86. 
823 Johnston 1991: 59. 
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Herland, it is also emphasized by the fact that the women believe their society can only 
benefit from this male perspective from the outside. More importantly, they learn that their 
society is not fully complete when the ‘masculine’ half does not contribute to it. 
  This brings to mind both the approaches seen in Ecclesiazusae and Utopia, where the 
foundations of the new rules are defined by the flaws of the old (something that is 
characteristic for Aristophanic comedy in general), and the one seen in Lysistrata where 
Athens is, in a way, incomplete during the time the women occupy the Acropolis. In this 
manner, Gilman’s text is as much about women as Ecclesiazusae is about female leadership 
and Lysistrata about a sex-strike. For while it certainly outlines a form of an all-female 
utopia, it also points out the flaws of the male-dominated world, which it has left behind, by 
juxtaposing the matriarchal world of the women, and the patriarchal world of the men. More 
importantly, as is the case in Lysistrata, Herland ends with the re-marriage of men and 
women when the three male explorers marry three of the women in Herland, thus 
accentuating the notion of (the now former) incompleteness and the separation of the sexes. 
One of the marriages in Herland is particularly noteworthy. In the sequel to Herland, 
called With Her in Ourland and published in 1916, one of the women, Ellador, decides to 
leave Herland and move to the United States with her new husband Vandyck. However, 
complications ensue and the couple agrees to return to Herland to settle there for good. By 
now, however, Ellador is pregnant, thus disrupting the 2000-year long stint of 
parthenogenesis immediately upon arrival, and, as it turns out, also the entire matriarchy 
itself. For the last words of the book read: “and in due time a son was born to us.”824 As Mary 
Beard said in a recent lecture on Women in Power, “…Gilman must…have been very well 
aware that there was no need for another sequel. Any reader in tune with the logic of the 
																																								 																				
824 Gilman 1916: 149. 
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Western tradition will have been able to predict exactly who would be in charge of Herland in 
fifty years time: it would be that boy.”825 Even though this is not mentioned in the story, the 
insinuations are clear enough: the return to patriarchy is inevitable even in the matriarchy of 
Herland, and there is no doubt that soon, parthenogenesis will not be needed anymore either. 
Both the sequel, as well as the point made earlier, that Herland juxtaposes the world 
of the women with that of the men by unfolding it through the eyes of the ‘other,’ link to the 
logical structure behind the general idea of matriarchy. This becomes especially clear when 
looking at Pembroke’s and Vidal-Naquet’s definition of matriarchy. Vidal-Naquet, drawing 
from Pembroke, asserts, “whether we are talking about the Amazons or the Lycians, it is the 
Greek polis, that men’s club, that is being defined by historians and its ‘ethonographers’ in 
terms of its opposite.”826 Additionally, the ending of With Her in Ourland brings to mind 
Herodotus’ account of the Amazons, which, as written earlier, can serve as a model that sets 
out his idea of how (patriarchal) societies begin and are enabled to endure throughout time. 
More importantly, however, Pembroke and Vidal-Naquet, as well as Herodotus’ model, recall 
the argument made earlier about Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae (and Utopia, for that matter). 
Namely, that the dismantling of the comic societies, while entertaining, is also unsettling 
because it clearly points at the social and political shortcomings of real societies.  
It appears that Gilman has something similar in mind when writing Herland – and, as 
discussed earlier on pp. 204-5, three decades later, this is also Orwell’s task in Animal Farm 
when he toys with reality only to put it back together at the end of the story in order to 
underline its weaknesses. I mention in the chapter on Birds that one of the connections 
between Aristophanes and Orwell is that both seem to believe that genuine progress “can only 
happen through increasing enlightenment, which means the continuous destruction of 
																																								 																				
825 Beard 2017. Cf. p. 46 n. 141. 
826 Vidal-Naquet 1986: 208. Pembroke 1965, 1967, and 1970. 
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myths.”827 It appears that Gilman, along with other female utopian writers from the early to 
mid-twentieth-century, can join this connection, for she too is interested in sincere progress 
within society, which can only be achieved by increasingly educating people and by 
commenting on social and political matters, using literature as a vehicle.  
This also links her to More’s humanist approach in Utopia, when he attempts to 
educate the public, both amusingly and disturbingly, by commenting on the injustices of his 
time. This, in turn, shows how not only Birds, but also Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae can be 
readily compared with modern political and social discourse (i.e. Herland) when we pin them 
to Utopia. Precisely, I take the issues seen in the Aristophanic comedies (such as the 
separation of the sexes and unjust government styles) and, through a comparative reading, 
transport them into modernity via Gilman who uses the same mixture of realism and fantasy 
that More uses in Utopia. Like Aristophanes (who represents Lysistrata and Praxagora as 
being within both sexes) and More (who places the citizens of Utopia within paradoxical 
interpretations of tyranny), Gilman achieves this by showing an ‘Other’ who is “always and 
necessarily within, and [her project] points to her vision of a better world achieved through 
the integration…of polarities.”828  
In this manner, it is not only the terms ‘masculine vs feminine’ which need to be 
reconstructed at the end of Herland, but also the union of men and women themselves, for 
only then can a more harmonious world be achieved. However, as is the case in Lysistrata, 
Ecclesiazusae, and Utopia, the ending of With Her in Ourland suggests that this union may 
not be as balanced as Gilman had hoped it would be. For it merely offers, in a style that 
reminds of that of Aristophanes and More, a return to the place it had initially tried to escape. 
																																								 																				
827 Kirschner 2004: 766. Cf. pp. 199-200. 
828 Johnson-Bogart 1992: 89. 
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 Finally, it is clear that the plots of Herland and With Her in Ourland are also, like the 
stories discussed in the previous chapters, situated within an ever-recurrent theme of political 
change, and ascent and descent, which in turn is situated within a ring-composition. More 
importantly, like Wells’ The Time Machine and Orwell’s Animal Farm, Gilman’s works are 
clearly comparable with ancient political theory and, like More’s Utopia, they offer a modern 
symbolic interpretation of these themes and show that they are of significance even today. By 
doing so, they help us understand both patterns of legal reforms and political change as well 
























At the end of this thesis, I do not wish to summarise everything that has been said; 
rather I would like to reiterate some of the fundamental points that have been made, and then 
discuss in more detail what they mean, not just for Aristophanes and his contemporaries, but 
also for us. Especially, the discourse presented in this thesis draws attention to the cyclical 
movements and oscillating notions of ascent and descent in law-making and political debate, 
both of which seem to inform western political thought in the last two thousand years. These 
movements demonstrate the conversation between ancient political theory and modern 
political thought when we situate them in a comparative analysis that begins with More’s 
Utopia; and they show that the concerns of the ancient philosophers and playwrights in fifth-
century Greece can also be found in our time when we place them in a trans-chronological 
dialogue across time and space. 
Furthermore, it is clear that these movements and notions are largely characterized by 
rhetoric, and not just by its use and misuse, its merits and its faults, and its strengths and its 
limitations, but also by its portrayal of what it is like to have speech but to lack the capability, 
or inclination, to engage effectively in political debate. Specifically, the discussions about the 
different factions in the Statesman, the demanding task to teach political excellence so it can 
be a social achievement in the Protagoras, and the systematic use of rhetoric in Birds, 
Lysistrata, and Ecclesiazusae, demonstrate the effective and ineffective ways in which 
political speech is used in different settings. 
In the case of Lysistrata and Ecclesiazusae, this certainly also points at female and 
male gender conceptions, and how they can be disrupted and manifested at the same time. 
However, it also points at something else. Earlier this year, NYU hosted a re-staging of the 
2016 presidential debates with reversed gender roles: Donald Trump was played by a woman, 
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and Hillary Clinton was played by a man. The initial assumption was this: Trump’s 
aggression would be much less tolerated in a woman, and Clinton would appear as even more 
competent when acted by a man. However, the opposite was the case: many audience 
members struggled to find in the male Clinton what they had admired in Hillary, and found 
that the female Trump did quite well in moments where the real one had failed. For instance, 
as a few audience members said afterwards:829 
  
The simplicity of Trump’s message became easier for people to hear when it was 
coming from a woman. […] Another…said that [the female] Trump created 
‘hummable lyrics,’ while [the male] Clinton talked a lot, and everything she [said] was 
true and factual, but there was no ‘hook’ to it.” 
 
Like the reaction of the Proboulos who is unable to see Lysistrata’s competence, and 
like the other characters’ support of Praxagora’s violent proposal, this reaction at NYU points 
at something of importance: not only does it show different male and female rhetorical styles, 
but also the presupposed standards by which we judge both of them. In this way, both the 
ancient and the modern examples can be used to think not only about the polarities between 
the masculine and the feminine, but also about their respective language and demeanour on 
the (political) stage, and the assumptions that come with them, even today. This in turn 
highlights the outcome of the task given at the beginning of this thesis, i.e. to understand 
patterns of jurisprudential reforms and dystopian political discourse between the ancient and 
modern world. For these examples make clear that Aristophanes’ concerns (albeit presented in 
a satirical manner) about Athenians being unable to engage intelligently with oratory that is 
																																								 																				
829 Likewise, someone else said: “[The male Hillary Clinton] was ‘really punchable’ because 
of all the smiling. And a lot of people were just very surprised by the way it upended their 
expectations about what they thought they would feel or experience. There was someone who 
described… [the female Donald Trump] as his…aunt who would take care of him, even 
though he might not like his aunt.” See Reynolds 2017 for the link to the debate and the 
quotations from the audience members. 
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beneficial, and dismiss the one that is ultimately damaging, causes just as much distress today 
as it did in late fifth- and early fourth century Athens.  
Similarly, the aim to portray this concern in a way which a wide audience can 
understand, is still as challenging today, as it was during the time of Aristophanes and Plato. 
Three months after the performance at NYU, the New York City’s Public Theatre put on a 
production of William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar for its annual Shakespeare in the Park 
programme. Staying in tune with many of Shakespeare’s other works (and More’s for that 
matter), it is a play which, amongst others, warns about the consequences of political 
violence, especially those who are about to commit it. The key element of the production was 
this: Julius Caesar was portrayed as Donald Trump. The intention, at least in part, was to warn 
the audience about his behaviour and agenda, much like Aristophanes warned about Cleon 
and Eupolis about Alcibiades. However, just like Aristophanes and Eupolis paid for this with 
lawsuits and, in Eupolis’ case, perhaps even with death,830 so the producers of Julius Caesar 
faced repercussions: they lost most of their sponsorships and were accused of ‘sponsoring an 
assassination depiction of Donald Trump.’831  
																																								 																				
830 There are several (fragmented) sources, which accuse Eupolis of attacking Alcibiades and 
paying for it later. For instance, “Probus” ad Juvenal 2.91-92 states: quo titulo Eupolis 
comoediam scripsit, ob quam Alcibiades, quem praecipue perstinxerat, necuit ipsum pergit in 
mare praecipitando, dicens “ut tu me in theatris madefecisti, nunc ego te in mari madefaciam. 
“Eupolis wrote a comedy with this title, because of which Alcibiades, whom he had especially 
attacked, killed him by pitching him headfirst into the sea with these words: ‘You have 
drenched me in the theatre, now I will drench you in the sea.’”  
 Likewise, Platonius On the Distinctions among Comedians (Koster I.19-21), notes: 
ἴσµεν γοῦν τὸν Εὔπολιν ἐπὶ τῷ διδάξαι τοὺς Βάπτας ἀποπνιγέντα εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν ὑπ᾿ 
ἐκείνου εἰς ὃν καθῆκε τοὺς Βάπτας. (“We know at any rate that Eupolis after producing Dyers 
was drowned in the sea by the man against whom he had written Dyers). However, while “it 
is commonly assumed [that Eupolis]…died in the sea battle of Cynossema, fought in the later 
part of 411 (Thucydides 8.104-6),” Eratosthenes refutes this because he says there are plays 
which Eupolis produced after that time (FGrHist 241 F 19). Storey 2011: 26. 
831 See Wilkinson 2017. 
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Like many ancient audience members, several modern spectators missed the point of 
the production: it is not so much about finding entertainment in the depiction of politicians as 
tyrants (although Aristophanes may come close in some passages), but about the political 
warning which informs the performance. Especially, the cautionary advice to the masses who 
are easily swayed and manipulated by opportune rhetoric, and the words of warning about the 
consequences of ochlocracy (which also echoes Orwell’s Animal Farm), are what 
characterizes the portrayal of many characters in these productions. Again, this modern 
example emphasises the distinct pattern of political change and dystopian discourse which the 
ancient and modern texts discussed in this thesis share, because it shows once again how the 
concerns of Aristophanes can also be found in modern paradigms, and what it is like to 
witness political warnings fall on deaf ears.832  
There is one last question I would like to ask: what would Aristophanes make of all of 
this? Particularly, what would he say if he saw More’s Utopia, or the reversed gender debate 
at NYU and the production of Julius Caesar? In regards to Utopia, he might find amusement 
in the idealised Spartan elements of which there are so many on the island, and there is little 
doubt that he would not want to examine the legal system which is so different from that of 
fifth-century Athens. He might look at some of its merits, such as the fact that the constant 
going back and forth at law has stopped once and for all; but he would, presumably, also 
recognise its faults. If there is no room for legal debate, then there is also no room for 
deliberative rhetoric, which could eventually lead to the state of weariness Peisetaerus and 
																																								 																				
832 The timeliness of this is further highlighted when looking at the production of Lysistrata at 
The Cambridge Greek Play in 2016. The Spartan ambassador was purposely depicted as 
Donald Trump (in both speech and demeanour); however, instead of dealing with large 
amounts of criticism, the actors received uncontainable laughter from the audience’s side. The 
point here is not so much about the different receptions of the two plays (which is, in part, 
also due to the fact that they are different genres), but that both the comedy and the tragedy 
can be put on in fifth-century Greece and 16th-century England, and be just as fitting in 2017, 
because they address political issues which are still of relevance, even to us. 
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Euelpides suffer from when they decide to leave Athens to live with the birds. While the 
Utopian legal system does not require any progress according to the text, Aristophanes might 
find the state of weariness to which the lack of debate would lead (symbolically portrayed by 
Wells) troubling, as the absence of debate does not actually solve the problems that come with 
the presence of it. 
Likewise, he might look at New York and find that not too much has changed. It is 
still common practice to impersonate politicians on the theatrical stage, and the task of 
unravelling different styles of speech and their meanings (both on and off stage) still proves 
difficult. In this vein, Plato’s undertakings in the Statesman and the Protagoras, and his 
critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias, are also still as pertinent today as they were in fourth-
century Athens, since so many political discussions are still characterized by πάλιν rather than 
προκοπή. Equally, the dismissal of expertise and the acceptance of ineptitude, is still as much 
of a problem today as it was around 391/2 B.C. when Praxagora scolded the assembly for 
failing to listen to the truly wise and just decrees. 
It is this pertinence which points at the importance of the research presented in this 
thesis. Precisely, I have drawn up a laboratory for political thought which showcases not only 
the history of jurisprudence and the interdisciplinary appeal of studying legal reforms and 
political theories across time and space, but also the value that lies in studying the longue 
durée of literature. It is the vitality of this longue durée of literary merit that makes clear how 
certain rhetorical patterns and political behaviours have the ability to transcend any particular 
historical context and do what Herodotus hoped to accomplish all those years ago. Namely, to 
preserve the remarkable achievements of human beings, their longings and their fears, their 
anxieties and serenities, their frustrations and satisfactions, and the traces of their events, no 
matter how far away they may seem. The dialogue between the ancient and modern world 
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shows how literature both preserves and exposes rhetorical and jurisprudential themes afresh 
for reinterpretation by every new participant throughout the centuries, from the audience 
member watching Aeschylus’ Prometheus Vinctus in fifth-century Greece all the way to the 
guest at the Julius Caesar performance in the New York of our time. 
Finally, as a last flourish, these juxtapositions may, at times, be disheartening, but they 
also serve as an important reminder that we should not stop confronting the limitations of 
rhetoric (as much as of a weary trope this meritorious appeal may have become in recent 
political debate), and the political and juridical problems which are often informed by them, 
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